The position of the whistle-blower in South African law by Isparta, Louise Dorothy
  
THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW 
 
by  
 
Louise Dorothy Isparta 
 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF LAWS 
 
at the 
 
 
University of South Africa 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Magda Slabbert 
  
 
 
October 2014 
  

i 
 
Acknowledgments 
To God all the glory; with Him all things are possible. 
Yet, having acknowledged this, I could not possibly have accomplished this without 
the following exceptional people –  
My husband, Nurullah Isparta; constantly an enigma; supportive, loving and patient, 
who sacrificed as much as I did, if not more – as always; I love you my love. 
My children for enduring me with such composure and unconditional love, Philipa 
Anne, Hakan, Ayla and Gabrial, I love you all to the ends of the earth and back, and 
then beyond. 
My parents, Horst and Rene Cigawe, always loving, exceptional and lending more 
than a few hands with the children, my thanks could never be enough. 
Professor Magda Slabbert, the most remarkable, inspiring and patient of women I 
have ever had the good fortune of meeting, the best supervisor and mentor a student 
could ever wish for. 
Antoinette De Beer and Lara Van Rooyen, two fabulous librarians par excellance. 
Abbigail Van Braack and Monique Basson, without whom the load would have been 
unbearable, thank you ladies for giving so selflessly in my endeavours, and to the 
children. Your investment in our lives is unmeasured. 
Karin Fitzroy, the selfless time given and knowledge imparted. 
Christa Cromhout, for the patient assistance and support, my thanks. 
Each of you were an essential piece in this puzzle; never underestimate the role you 
played. 
Thank you, thank you. 
ii 
 
THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
Key terms: 
Whistle-blower; whistle-blowing; whistle blower; whistle blowing; Protected 
Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; corruption; Protected Disclosures Act 7 of 2000; Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998; Protected Disclosure Act 2012; protected disclosure; 
disclosure. 
 
Abstract: 
The position of the whistle-blower is known to be a precarious one, with the whistle-
blower often either regarded as a hero or a reprehensible traitor. 
Various pieces of legislation have attempted to remedy their precarious position, 
especially within the employment relationship, and in which the whistle-blower more 
often than not has the most to lose. 
The study at hand has the specific objective of comparing the position of the whistle-
blower in terms of South African Law, against 16 specific measurables, and in 
comparison with the position of the whistle-blower in New Zealand, Australia 
(Victoria) and the United Kingdom. 
In the main, the protection offered to the whistle-blower within the South African 
context, is embodied within the Protected Disclosure Act 26 of 2000 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “PDA”).In examining the protection afforded to the whistle-blower 
in South Africa, it is concluded that the framework involved extends much further 
than just the mere provisions in the PDA. However, there are admitted challenges in 
respect of this framework as discussed, both legislative and non-legislative, 
especially in respect of duties of disclosures placed on persons in circumstances in 
which concurrent protection is not afforded to the whistle-blower. 
With reference to the comparison in respect of the measurement parameters set, it 
was found that the PIDA (UK) meets the least amount of the measurements set, with 
the PDA A (Australia, Victoria) meeting the most of the measurements; the PDA NZ 
is equally balanced in meeting and not meeting the measurements and the PDA 
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meeting less of the measurements than not, but still meeting more than the PIDA. It 
was found that had it not been for the catch-all provision contained in section 4 (1) 
(b) of the PDA, the PDA would have ranked last. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AT HAND 
1.1 Introduction 
Whistle-blowing encompasses the act utilising the right to freedom of speech, the 
right to impart information, and which culminates in the reporting of, and the 
exposure of alleged wrongdoing of various kinds. 
Generally, whistle-blowing is regarded as a valuable, if not an invaluable, 
contribution to transparency and accountability within society, as it provides a 
solution, opening non-existent or hidden sources and channels of information. 
However, there are consequences for each action taken, and each action is open to 
a reaction, this is so with blowing the whistle as well. 
Many whistle-blowers 1  have been widely celebrated for blowing the whistle; 
however, retribution taken against whistle-blowers is unfortunately also a common 
occurrence.  
Some of the most famous or infamous whistle-blowers include Daniel Ellsberg2, 
Collin Wallace3, William McNeilly4, Frank Serpico5, Moss Phakoe6 and Imraahn 
Mukaddam7, to mention but a few whose refusal to remain silent has shaped history. 
The heavy price whistle-blowers pay is underscored by the fact that whistle-blowing 
legislation has been necessitated in order to regulate various aspects relating to 
whistle-blowing, such as by way of example, who would qualify as a whistle-blower, 
                                                          
1  Throughout the text of the study at hand, reference will be made to “whistle-blower” spelt in this 
way. Various authors have spelt it differently. The only instances in which a different spelling is 
reflected in this text, is in the circumstances in which an author quoted has used an alternative 
spelling thereof, such as, for example, "whistle blower" and "whistleblower". The same 
consideration has been applied in respect of whistle-blowing. 
2  Daniel Ellsberg leaked Pentagon documentation which related to how the United States of 
America had become involved in the Vietnam War. 
3  Collin Wallace exposed child abuse at the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. 
4  William McNeilly revealed information about serious security breaches at Trident, in respect of 
nuclear submarines. 
5  Frank Serpico attempted to draw attention to the alleged corruption in the New York City Police 
Department. 
6  Moss Phakoe, an African National Congress councillor in Rustenburg, was shot to death two 
days after having handed over documentation relating to corruption within the Bonjanala 
Municipality. 
7  Imraahn Mukaddam raised the complaint regarding price-fixing, which culminated in the 
Competition Commission fining Premier Foods, Tiger Brand and Pioneer Foods. 
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how the whistle is to be blown and ultimately, what types of protection the whistle-
blower is afforded, should the disclosure be met with retribution instead of thanks. 
A whistle-blower is in the normal course of events not distinguishable from others 
that surround him, other than the fact that he happens to know of wrongdoing, and 
decides to act on this knowledge by disclosing this knowledge of the wrongdoing in 
question. 
Evans opines that for some, blowing the whistle is simply an act of disagreement or 
dissent, however, it is emphasised that it is consequential to distinguish whistle-
blowing from other broad negatives, such as complaining, litigating or arguing. Rather 
it is a specific form of dissent, with its own particular characteristic, stemming from 
the practice of the English policemen who blow a whistle when observing a crime, 
thereby also alerting the general public to the wrongdoing.8  
Uys9 highlights the fact that the whistle-blower expects a positive reaction from the 
employer, and expects to be seen as a loyal employee who has the interests of the 
organisation at heart. However, the retaliatory reaction often received changes such 
employee to a "committed activist who wanted above all to have his concerns 
recognised in order to save his professional reputation". 10  She recognises that 
retaliatory action against the whistle-blower paves the way for a power struggle that 
is engaged in between the whistle-blower and his or her employer, which usually 
involves the employer attempting to discredit the whistle-blower, branding him or her 
as a difficult employee, and the employee publishing the wrongdoing even wider, in 
an attempt to defend himself or herself. Uys points out that in order to disempower 
whistle-blowers the organisation in question will ensure the isolation of the whistle-
blower, thus lessening support and the potential or actual impact.11 
Camerer12 expresses the opinion that "putting effective legal protection in place for 
bona fide whistle blowers is but one of a number of measures necessary to fight 
corruption effectively in South Africa."13  
                                                          
8  Evans 2008 Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science Research (21)(3) 267-279. 
9  Uys 2000 Business Ethics: A European Review (9)(4) 259-267. 
10  Uys 2000 Business Ethics: A European Review (9)(4) 263. 
11  Uys 2000 Business Ethics: A European Review (9)(4) 263. 
12  Camerer 2001 Occasional Paper 47. 
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This lies at the heart of the matter, in other words, the rationale behind the 
importance of the protection of whistle-blowers. 
1.2 Background 
A great deal of the impetus behind this thesis is to be found in the spirit of Chapter 
14 of the National Development Plan – 2030.14 
During May 2010, President Zuma appointed the National Planning Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”), as an advisory body which comprised 
of 26 individuals, mostly from outside the sphere of government, to develop the 
National Development Plan (hereinafter referred to as the “NDP”). 
Chapter 14 is entitled Fighting Corruption, stating that the vision thereof includes 
inter alia that by 2030 South Africa will have a zero tolerance in respect of corruption, 
that both public and private officials will be held accountable, that the leadership will 
display integrity and high ethical standards, and that the anti-corruption agencies will 
have the necessary resources and independence with which to achieve their 
mandate.15  
The Commission regards part of the requirements of fighting corruption as support 
from citizens, and inter alia proposes the strengthening of the protection offered to 
whistle-blowers, elaborating on the societal approach to combating corruption.16 In 
respect of the strengthening of the protection offered to whistle-blowers, the 
Commission states that protection for whistle-blowers facilitates a culture of exposing 
wrongdoing, and whilst the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 provides a 
measure of protection, it is insufficient, with the percentage of people indicating that 
they are willing to blow the whistle having dropped by ten percent in the last four 
years, and with the legislation having revealed weaknesses.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13   Camerer 2001 Occasional Paper 47. 
14  National Planning Commission 
http://www.npconline.co.za/medialib/downloads/home/NPC%20National%20Development%20
Plan%20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf (Date of use: 13 February 2013). 
15  National Development Plan 447. 
16  National Development Plan 449. 
17  National Development Plan 450. 
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The Commission proceeds to list some of the perceived weaknesses of the 
Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “PDA”) as 
including the following considerations:  
• The PDA’s scope is too narrow, in that it only provides protection against 
occupational detriment, only finding application within a formal employment 
relationship, and as such excluding external whistle-blowers from the 
protection offered; 
• The number of bodies to whom protected disclosures may be made is 
limited, excluding complaints (disclosures) made to sectoral complaints 
mechanisms available and professional bodies; 
• No immunity is provided for a whistle-blower in respect of criminal and civil 
law implications that may follow, even in circumstances in which the 
disclosure was made in good faith; 
• Adequate security has not been established in respect of whistle-blowers 
should the need arise; 
• Confidentiality in respect of the identity of the whistle-blower is not 
protected; and 
• Physical and economic protection of the whistle-blower is not catered for. 
The Commission points out that further policy research is required to strengthen 
whistle-blower protection 18  adding by way of closure of the topic the following 
recommendations:  
• A review of the PDA. This review should consider expanding the scope of 
the whistle-blower protection outside the limits of “occupational detriment”, 
permit disclosure to bodies other than the Public Protector and the Auditor-
General and strengthen measures to ensure the security of whistle-
blowers. 
• Regulations to the PDA should be developed as soon as possible and 
government departments must develop policies to implement the act. 
However, the Commission’s recommendations regarding the perceived weaknesses 
are by no means the first time that the challenges in respect of the PDA have been 
                                                          
18  National Development Plan 450. 
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highlighted. During 2004 the challenges were highlighted by the South African Law 
Reform Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “SALRC”) in Discussion Paper 
107.19 In reaching its provisional recommendations, the SALRC took cognisance by 
way of a comparative study of whistle-blowing legislation of the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, the United States of America and Australia. 
A summary of the SALRC’s provisional recommendations include the following:20  
• That the scope of the PDA should be extended to include independent 
contractors, consultants, agents and other workers that fall outside the strict 
definition of the employer/employee relationship; including the changing of 
the definition of "employee" to "worker" and the changing of the definition of 
"employer" in order to cater for the wider scope.  
o In this respect consideration was also given to what was termed as 
being "citizen’s whistleblowing", in other word the extension of the 
scope of the PDA beyond the boundaries of the employment 
relationship altogether; 
• The list comprising the forms of victimisation often encountered by whistle-
blowers should be left open-ended to effectively include all forms of reprisal; 
• The list of persons/bodies to whom disclosures may be made should be 
extended; 
• The PDA should provide for indemnity in respect of civil and criminal liability 
of the whistle-blower where appropriate; 
• The identity of the whistle-blower should be protected; 
• Section 4 should be amended to:  
o provide for damages without limit, with the courts and tribunals taking 
into account the actual loss suffered by the whistle-blower when 
awarding damages; and 
o to provide for specific remedies such as interdicts; 
• The provisions of the PDA should not make it an offence to "subject an 
employee or a worker to an occupational detriment ".21  
                                                          
19  http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp107.pdf  (Date of use: 18 October 2013). 
20  SALC Discussion Paper 107, page xi –xii. 
21  SALC Discussion Paper Par 4.95. 
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• Section 5 of the PDA should be amended in order to include good faith as a 
requirement, and include the protection of a disclosure made to a union 
representative.  
It is noted that since these abovementioned recommendations were made in 2004, 
no changes have been effected to the text of the PDA. 
1.3 Problem statement 
The question to be addressed in this thesis is whether whistle-blowers in South 
Africa are appropriately protected in terms of the provisions of the relevant 
legislation, namely the PDA.  
The attempt to answer this question will entail a twofold enquiry, namely, the 
determination of the protection availed to a whistle-blower in South Africa, falling 
within the sphere of the PDA, and further, such whistle-blower’s position when one 
compares his or her legal position with that of whistle-blowers blowing the whistle in 
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  
Should it become clear that the whistle-blower protected by the South African 
legislation is comparatively in a worse position than other countries’ whistle-blowers, 
it needs to be determined whether the law could and or should be changed within 
this context, in order to most effectively reach the actual stated objectives of the 
PDA. 
In order to achieve this, the following needs to be established:  
• Who the persons are that qualify for protection in terms of relevant 
legislation, and under what circumstances they will be able to enjoy the 
protection so availed with reference to –  
o The Republic of South Africa; 
o The United Kingdom; 
o Australia; and 
o New Zealand. 
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• Under what circumstances protection in terms of the relevant legislation is 
not availed to whistle-blowers in the selected countries, and in terms of the 
relevant legislation. 
• Whether the South African legislation meets the objectives set in the 
legislation itself? 
• How the protection availed to the whistle-blower in terms of the South 
African legislation measures up to that availed to whistle-blowers in the 
other selected countries? 
• Should the protection availed to the whistle-blower in terms of the South 
African legislation measures up negatively in the comparison to that availed 
to whistle-blowers in the other selected countries, determine how the 
legislation can be amended to strengthen the position of the whistle-blower 
in South Africa. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
A hypothesis is a proposition or set of propositions which are provisionally accepted 
and which stand to be tested, with the specific aim of proving or disproving the 
proposition or set of propositions. 
It forms the starting point of the study in question.  
Taking into account the above-mentioned, as well as the problem statement and 
research questions to be tested in terms of this research, it is argued that the 
following hypothetical points of departure are relevant: 
• Legislation regulating the responsible disclosure of wrongdoing by either an 
individual, individuals or an organisation, including public interest matters, 
crime and corruption will promote public confidence, ethical citizenship, good 
governance, accountability and transparency; 
• One of the most important tools in fighting wrongdoing, crime and corruption 
is the legislation providing appropriate protection and remedies to the person 
or persons speaking out against wrongdoing, crime and corruption, in the 
public interest. This is due to the fact that whistle-blowing is a detection 
mechanism. 
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• Without legislation providing appropriate protection and remedies to the 
person or persons so speaking out, the said person or persons are much 
less likely to “blow the whistle” on such wrongdoing, crime and corruption; 
• In South Africa such protection and remedies are provided to whistle-
blowers in terms of the provisions of the PDA; 
• In fact, the South African PDA is a world-class piece of legislation, that when 
compared to the protection and remedies availed to whistle-blowers in 
England, Australia, and New Zealand compares favourably in this regard.22 
1.5 Research methodology 
The study encompasses a review of literature, books, journals articles, legislation, 
case law, and as such will not be empirical in nature. It consists primarily of an 
analysis of the protection afforded to whistle-blowers in terms of legislation pertaining 
to the mentioned selected countries, and a comparison pertaining to the different 
remedies availed in this regard. 
1.6 Content  
As a starting point the general concepts that are pertinent to this study will be 
explored, in order to ensure a clear understanding of the relevant concepts such as 
what whistle-blowing is, who a whistle-blower is, why it is important that the whistle 
should be blown, why people choose to blow the whistle or not, and what the actual 
or potential cost is of blowing the whistle.  
Hereafter in terms of each country selected, this study will examine the legislation 
which regulates the whistle being blown, who qualifies as a whistle-blower, what 
remedies are availed to such whistle-blowers, and in what circumstances the 
protection will not be availed. 
                                                          
22  Within this context, the following considerations would be equally pertinent:  
• In the United Kingdom such protection and remedies are provided to whistle-blowers in 
terms of the provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998; 
• In New Zealand such protection and remedies are provided to whistle-blowers in terms of 
the provisions of the Protected Disclosures Act 7 of 2000; 
• In Australia such protection and remedies are provided to whistle-blowers in terms of the 
various pieces of legislation, including Protected Disclosures Act 85 of 2012; 
• The protection and remedies provided are effective enough to ensure that people wishing to 
blow the whistle for public interest’s sake will do so without fear of reprisal; 
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As such, and in main the legislation that has been reviewed includes the following:  
Australia 
Whilst it is so that Australia has many pieces of whistle-blower legislation, its content 
is too comprehensive to be dealt with completely within this study. As such, within 
the Australian context the legislation applicable in Victoria, the Protected Disclosures 
Act 2012 has been selected and dealt with herein. 
South Africa 
Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
United Kingdom 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
New Zealand 
Protected Disclosure Act 2000 
The above countries were chosen as a result of the similarities regarding the legal 
systems when compared with South Africa.  
In this regard it needs to be noted that whistle-blowing and the whistle-blower are 
referred to in both the narrow and broader sense, with the whistle-blower legislation 
usually defining who would qualify as a whistle-blower in the narrow sense. 
However, for example, in respect of the South African position, when discussing the 
remedies availed to whistle-blowers is also discussed in a broader sense, so as to 
include informers and whistle-blowers falling within the sphere of criminal 
proceedings. 
The content of the study includes the following: 
CHAPTER 1:  
This chapter contains a basic introduction to the study at hand with reference to the 
background to the problem being considered, the problem statement expressed, the 
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hypothesis, the research methodology, and the elements considered in respect of 
determining measurable comparative elements in respect of the chosen countries. 
CHAPTER 2: 
This chapter explores the origins of whistle-blowing and the definition of the concepts 
of the whistle-blower and whistle-blowing as they apply in South African law. 
It is acknowledged at the start of the study that the topic of whistle-blowers and 
whistle-blowing does not conjure up positive images and thoughts, even though it is 
more often than not something done with noble intentions, and with the whistle-
blower knowing full well that more likely than not, doing so may end in hardship, for 
him or her and his or her family, real risk to any career related aspirations, and even 
the risk of bodily harm being perpetrated against him or her or them.  
Why anyone would want to blow the proverbial whistle is explored. 
CHAPTER 3: 
This chapter considers noteworthy influences in respect of whistle-blowing within the 
South African context.  
When looking at these noteworthy influences, excluding the relevant legislation, put 
in place by the South African government, one cannot help but to state that there is 
an apparent “political will” to fight corruption in all earnest, including, providing for the 
protection of whistle-blowers within this context.  
In this chapter the influences, both at a national and an international level, where the 
Republic of South Africa has explicitly pronounced agreement and as such 
commitment, is touched on. 
CHAPTER 4: 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the main whistle-blowing legislation in 
South Africa, namely the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, including within this 
context –  
• who would qualify as an employer and employee; 
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• what would qualify as a disclosure and further as a protected disclosure; 
• how disclosures are to be made in order to enjoy the protection offered; and 
• what type of conduct would fall within the ambit of occupational detriment, 
exacted against a whistle-blower. 
The chapter also considers possible pivotal exclusions from the legislation in respect 
of ethical and policy related matters, as well as employees bound by secrecy 
conditions as a matter of employment. 
CHAPTER 5: 
This chapter acknowledges that in actual fact the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 
2000 is but a small part of legislation and legislative provisions within the South 
African context, either placing duties on employees in respect of whistle-blowing or 
providing potential remedies in this respect. It further acknowledges that not only 
whistle-blowers as defined in the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 have 
potential remedies within the employment relationship, but that whistle-blowers in the 
wide sense also have potential recourse.    
CHAPTER 6: 
This chapter looks at the various remedies availed to whistle-blowers in South Africa, 
and within the specific context of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. The text 
stretches further than just the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, due to the 
specific provisions of the Act. The various provisions are identified and discussed, in 
respect of which a whistle-blower would need to qualify in order to have access to 
the specific remedy or remedies sought, including: 
• the role of jurisdiction; 
• appropriate relief availed; 
• automatically unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices; 
• the transfer of a whistle-blower; 
Two further considerations elicited and discussed relate to the vicarious liability of an 
employer within the context of whistle-blowing and delictual considerations. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
This chapter takes a look at South African case law relating to the provisions of the 
Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, in order to establish practically the approach 
taken by the courts. 
It also looks at the actual remedies afforded to whistle-blowers thus far. 
CHAPTER 8: 
This chapter is an overview of the whistle-blower protection discussed, together with 
an analysis of the identified measurables of the relevant legislation. 
CHAPTER 9: 
This chapter explores the content of the Protected Disclosures Act 2000, which is the 
main legislation pertaining to the protection of whistle-blowers in New Zealand. 
CHAPTER 10: 
Chapter 10 measures the position of the whistle-blower in New Zealand, and within 
the context of the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 in accordance with the identified 
measurables. 
CHAPTER 11: 
Within the context of this study, due to the proliferation of the whistle-blower 
legislation in Australia, it was chosen to include and analyse only the Protected 
Disclosure Act 2012, applicable in Victoria, Australia, incorporating amendments as 
at 11 February 2013, and which repealed the Whistleblower Protection Act 2001 in 
its entirety.  
The Protected Disclosure Act 2012 is comprehensive, interrelated with many other 
pieces of legislation, and at its core it envisions a basic three phase process in 
respect of the making of a protected disclosure, namely, the receipt of the disclosure, 
the assessment thereof in order to determine whether the disclosure is in fact a 
protected disclosure, and the investigation of the allegations contained in the 
protected disclosure 
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CHAPTER 12: 
Chapter 12 measures the position of the whistle-blower in New Zealand, and within 
the context of the Protected Disclosures Act 2000, in accordance with the identified 
measurables. 
CHAPTER 13: 
This chapter explores the provisions of the main piece of whistle-blowing legislation 
in the United Kingdom, namely the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which has 
been inserted after part IV of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (hereinafter referred 
to as the “PIDA”), which too regulates in the main the remedies availed to whistle-
blowing employees covered by the provisions of the PIDA. 
The similarities between the PIDA and the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 are 
identified. 
CHAPTER 14: 
Chapter 14 measures the position of the whistle-blower in the United Kingdom, and 
within the context of the PIDA, in accordance with the identified measurables. 
CHAPTER 15: 
Chapter 15 provides the final conclusions in respect of the questions posed in this 
chapter, and the measurement elements identified. 
1.6.1 The elements of analysis - considerations 
When analysing and comparing the various whistle-blower Acts selected for the 
purpose of this study, regard is had to the guidelines set out in a 2009 draft 
resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, penned by Pieter 
Omtzigt of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (hereinafter referred to 
in this section as “the Committee”) regarding the protection of whistle-blowers, in 
addition to the considerations raised by the Commission in the NDP.23  
                                                          
23  Omtzigt P http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=12302&Language=EN 
(Date of use: 29 October 2013). 
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The Committee stressed the importance of whistle-blowing by stating that individuals 
with concerns who sound the alarm in order to stop wrongdoing which puts others at 
risk is an opportunity to strengthen accountability and the fight against corruption and 
mismanagement, in all sectors.24 
The Committee urged states to review their whistle-blowing legislation, especially 
pertaining to the protection of whistle-blowers, and in accordance to basic guidelines 
set out, especially when bearing in mind that potential whistle-blowers are often 
discouraged for fear of reprisal or a lack of interest demonstrated regarding warnings 
sounded, to the detriment of the public interest, effective management and 
accountability. 
Whistle-blowing has always required courage and determination. But “whistle-
blowers” should at least be given a fighting chance to ensure that their warnings 
are heard without risking their livelihoods and those of their families. Relevant 
legislation must first and foremost provide a safe alternative to silence, whilst 
avoiding offering potential “whistle-blowers” a “shield of cardboard” which would 
entrap them by giving them a false sense of security.25 (Own emphasis) 
The guiding principles that are considered in this thesis are the following:  
• Whistle-blowing legislation should be comprehensive: 
o The definition of protected disclosures should include all bona fide 
disclosures against various types of unlawful acts including – 
 Serious human rights violations which may affect life, health or 
freedom; 
 Any other legitimate interests. 
o It should cover both public and private sector whistle-blowers, 
including employees employed by the armed forces; 
o It should provide for various legal issues including labour law, criminal 
law, civil law, media law and specific anti-corruption measures. 
• Whistle-blowing legislation should provide an alternative which is safe as 
opposed to remaining silent such as–  
                                                          
24   http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileD=12302&Language=EN (Date of 
use: 29 October 2013).        
25  Omtzigt  
 http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=12302&Language=EN (Date of 
use: 29 October 2013). 
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o Appropriate incentives offered by government for both the public and 
private sectors to ensure that internal whistle-blowing procedures are 
in place; 
o Ensuring that disclosures are effectively and timeously investigated; 
o Ensuring that where necessary or appropriate identity of the whistle-
blower is protected 
• The legislation should protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-
blowing procedures in good faith from any form of retaliation; 
• Where internal channels do not exist or function effectively, or in 
circumstances in which it could not possibly be expected to function properly 
given the nature of the disclosure, whistle-blowing externally should be 
protected; 
• Any “whistle-blower” acting in good faith when blowing the whistle should be 
protected even in circumstances in which it later comes to light that the 
allegations were unfounded; 
• The relevant legislation should protect the whistle-blower from forms of 
retaliation and such retaliation should be punishable; 
• Appropriate protection should also be provided in respect of accusations 
which are made in bad faith; 
• Regarding the burden of proof to be borne, it should rest with the employer 
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that reprisal alleged to have been 
taken was not due to a protected disclosure made by an alleged whistle-
blower; 
• The implementation and the resultant impact of the relevant legislation 
should be monitored and evaluated at regular intervals. 
Martin26 in taking stock of the status of whistle-blowing in South Africa takes a similar 
approach in identifying the desired characteristics of an effective piece of whistle-
                                                          
26  Martin 2010 http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/ 
ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 18 August 2012). 
 http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/10/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf  (Date of use: 18 August 2012). 
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blowing legislation, and or framework. Additionally to Omtzigt’s 27  recommended 
indicators Martin includes the following:28 
• That the law oblige investigations and corrective measures in response to 
disclosures that are made; 
• Protect the whistle-blowers against both criminal and civil liability or 
sanction; 
• Prohibiting an act or agreement that aims at excluding any protection that is 
availed to a whistle-blower; 
• Ensuring a full range of remedies availed to the whistle-blower including for 
example interim and final interdicts, compensation for pain and suffering, 
loss of earnings and loss of status, mediation and legal costs. 
• The prohibition of any kind of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-
blower; and 
• The facilitation (by the law) of the acceptance, participation in and public 
awareness of whistle-blowing. 
1.7 The template to be utilised in determining measurable comparative 
points/ elements  
In order to constructively and fairly compare all the selected legislation in terms of 
the strengths, weaknesses and shortcomings, it is necessary to establish a set of 
uniform, clearly measurable points identified for analysis and comparison. 
The template reflected below has been designed by the author in order to 
constructively and fairly measure the strengths, shortcomings and weaknesses. 
This template is utilised in this study in Chapters 8, 10, 12, 14 and 15. 
Taking into account best practice pertaining to whistle-blowing, and what one would 
expect such legislation to address, the various Acts selected will be analysed and 
compared on the following uniform basis: 
                                                          
27  Omtzigt P http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=12302&Language=EN 
(Date of use: 29 October 2013). 
28  Martin 2010 http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/ 
ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 18 August 2012).  
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Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful 
acts including serious human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Employment laws     
Criminal law     
Civil law     
Media law     
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Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
    
Interim interdicts     
Final interdicts     
Compensation for pain 
and suffering 
    
Loss of earnings     
Loss of status     
Mediation     
Legal costs     
Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures 
in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
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Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
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Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that 
the allegations were unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal 
due to protected disclosure made 
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Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-
blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
     
TABLE 1: MEASURABLES TEMPLATE 
 
22 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
The South African Government has decidedly indicated in the NDP – 2030 that fighting 
corruption within our country is a national priority, as is the strengthening of the position 
of the whistle-blower in achieving this objective. The recognition of ensuring appropriate 
protection for whistle-blowers is pivotal. At the very centre of this thesis lies the question 
as to whether or not the whistle-blower in South Africa indeed enjoys the necessary 
protection needed and as envisaged by the relevant provisions of the PDA, and further 
to this what the whistle-blower in South Africa’s position is when compared to the 
protection afforded to whistle-blowers in the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
In order to determine the aforementioned, it has been deemed necessary to ensure that 
the manner of determination is undertaken in a uniform manner and to this end 16 
(sixteen) clearly measurable points of comparison have been identified. These 16 
measurable points are contained in the format as represented in table 1, which will be 
utilised in the relevant chapters going forward in accordance with the content as 
summarised. The measurables identified are based on accepted best practice regarding 
whistle-blowing, as well as the expectation of one would regard as central to such 
protection. 
In the main Chapters 8, 10, 12 and 14 deal with the findings in accordance with the 
identified 16 measurables, with Chapter 15 providing the final conclusions in answer of 
the question posed. 
 
 
23 
 
CHAPTER 2: WHISTLE-BLOWING 
2.1 Introduction 
Gabriella1 states that research results, recently released, showed that 40% of South 
Africans thought that parliamentarians and councillors were corrupt; this figure 
showed a significant increase from 2008, when 25% of South Africans believed that 
almost all or most members of parliament were involved in corruption.   
It has to be borne in mind that although the abovementioned refers specifically to 
parliamentarians and councillors, the perceptions regarding whistle-blowers and 
whistle-blowing ripple out much further and are applicable far beyond only politicians. 
This is however indicative of the perceptions and ties in with the government’s 
determination2 to tackle corruption head-on in the coming years. It is also a priority as 
expressed in the NDP – 2030. 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (hereinafter referred to as the “ACFE”) 
recently published the second Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse3 with some of the findings relating to the fact that the average fraud lasts 18 
months before it is reported, and that corruption and billing schemes pose the 
greatest threats to organisations globally, as these two types of schemes comprised 
more than 50 per cent of the frauds reported to the ACFE. Two further significant 
findings were that the banking and financial service industry, government and public 
administration, and manufacturing sectors are most commonly victimised; and in 
cases in which such victim organisations had implemented any one of the 16 
‘common’ anti – fraud controls, experienced significantly lower losses, as well as a 
shortened period in respect of detection. 
One of the conclusions reached in the report was that by providing individuals with a 
manner in which to report suspicious activity is indeed a pivotal part of any anti-fraud 
                                                          
1  Gabriella 2012 June 1 “Perception of corruption on the increase” 
http://opengovpartners.org/za/2012/06/01/perception-of-corruption-on-the-increase/ (Date of 
use: 15 September 2012). 
2  As referred to and discussed under paragraph 1.2 supra. 
3  Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. 2012 Report to the Nations on occupational fraud 
and abuse 2012 Fraud Study  
 http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-t-nations.pdf (Date 
of use: 28 October 2013). 
24 
 
programme; in fact they assert that management should actively encourage 
employees to report suspicious activity, and adopt and enforce an "anti-retaliation 
policy". 
It has to be postulated that the topic of whistle-blowers and whistle-blowing does not 
conjure up positive images and thoughts, even though it is more often than not 
something done with noble intentions, and with the whistle-blower knowing full well 
that more likely than not, doing so may end in hardship, for him or her and his or her 
family, real risk to any career related aspirations, and even the risk of bodily harm 
being perpetrated against him or her or them.  
Uys 4 acknowledges that although whistle-blowers are generally viewed as being 
pivotal in respect of fighting "corporate misconduct", it is the whistle-blowers who pay 
the heaviest price, even when taking into account all the noble values espoused by 
those same organisations who shun and isolate the whistle-blower. According to Uys 
whistle-blowing is typically viewed as betrayal, a deviant act, threatening to the 
organisation against which it is made, and as a result of which the whistle-blower is 
dealt with as one would deal with a traitor.5 
She continues to list the ways in which the whistle-blower is usually punished 
including the ostrich approach, pretending to take the matter disclosed seriously 
whilst in actual fact doing nothing, the cold-shoulder type treatment and isolation, 
identifying the whistle-blower as a "troublemaker", stonewalling, immediate 
dismissal, abrupt decline in performance scoring, suspension, transfer, harassment, 
character assassination, disciplinary action and even "sexual exploitation". She 
states that the fact that the whistle-blower is an "insider is an essential element of the 
perception of betrayal."6  
This argument is strongly underscored by some of the synonyms used with 
reference to whistle-blowers, such as a narc, rat, scab, snake, snitch, squealer, stool 
                                                          
4  Uys 2008 Current Sociology October 15 904-921. 
5  Uys 2008 Current Sociology October 15 905. 
6  Uys 2008 Current Sociology October 15 906. 
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pigeon, stoolie, tattletale, tipster, weasel, informer, betrayer, blabbermouth, canary, 
deep throat, double-crosser, fink, spy, source or a plant, to mention but a few.7  
In Afrikaans a whistle-blower is sometimes referred to as a verkliker, which is 
understood as being a squealer, and which bears the same negative connotation. 
Then there is, of course, the very specifically South African slang for a whistle-
blower, to be seen against the authoritarian historical advent of apartheid, namely 
“impimpi”, which within South Africa’s context, considering the country’s history, has 
the most derogatory meaning and connotations associated with the political history, 
which often involved informers. Statements made to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission quite aptly express the feelings and connotations pertaining to whistle-
blowers or informers, and in this regard reference is made to a newspaper article 
published in 1997 and entitled “ANC Says it assassinated top impimpi and other 
informers”.8 But the negativity connected with impimpis has far outlived the apartheid 
era, as a newspaper article, relating to the fact that the South African Police Services 
used footage obtained by journalists to identify the perpetrators of crime, shows. In 
this regard the rural journalist Oris Mnisi made the statement that in effect the police, 
in using material from journalists would lead to the community regarding journalists 
as impimpis, police spies, and endanger the lives of the journalists. 9 
It is damning indeed to note the reporter himself interprets “impimpi” as meaning a 
“police spy”, and as such a whistle-blower outside the meaning assigned to it in 
terms of the South African whistle-blowing legislation. 
2.2 The origins of whistle-blowing 
Evans10 at page 268 avers that for some whistle-blowing is not much more than an 
act of dissent; it is argued that a more specific definition of whistle-blowing is 
required in order to distinguish it from other broad acts of dissent, including ‘suing or 
arguing’. It is further averred that whistle-blowing is a particular type of dissent with 
                                                          
7  Anonymous 2012 http://theasaurus.com/browse/whistle-blower (Date of use: 15 September 
2012). 
8  SAPA 1997 May 12 http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1997/9705/s970512e.html (Date of use: 
14 September 2012). 
9  ZIWAPHI “Police use journalists’ footage to arrest protestors, says Premier DD Mabuza”  2009 
 http://www.ziwaphi.com/ziwaphi/Police_use_journalists%E2%80%99_footage_to_arrest_protes
tors,_says_Premier_DD_Mabuza.html (Date of use: 15 September 2012). 
10  Evans 2008 Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science, Research (21)(3) 267-279. 
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its own characteristics, and finding its origins from the practice utilised by the English 
“bobbies” or policemen. 
There are many opinions as to where the term “whistle-blowing” originated, including 
the opinion that it is derived from the metaphor of the whistle blown by a British 
policeman (“Bobby”) in olden times when the perpetration of a crime was noticed, or 
a whistle blown by a referee in a soccer or rugby match when a foul (broken rule) is 
noted, all signalling that untoward or illegal conduct is taking or has taken place. 
It is also averred that Ralph Nader coined the term in an effort to remove the 
negative connotations, being drawn back to the first whistle-blowing conference 
hosted by Nader in the United States in 1971 with the topic being “Professional 
Responsibility”. Nader later published a report following the conference regarding 
cases of employees who had blown the whistle at work.11 
However, whistle-blowing and qui tam are often linked, with qui tam’s earliest history 
being traced to 13th century England, in which qui tam writs were used to enforce the 
laws of the Crown. It was commonly used by ordinary citizens to access the King’s 
court in order to redress alleged personal injury caused by lawbreakers. It is averred 
that the British Settlers took the roots of qui tam with them to their colonies.12 
Qui tam is the Latin for “who as well”, and relates to litigation instituted by a private 
person as plaintiff, as well as for the government as a plaintiff. 13  
It seems that the first legislation providing for whistle-blowers was made available in 
the United States of America in terms of the provisions of the False Claims Act in 
approximately 1863, and in respect of qui tam.14  
The False Claims Act provides for private persons to bring qui tam action against 
another who has allegedly defrauded the United States government by knowingly 
presenting a false claim for payment thereof. Further to this, in qui tam actions, in 
terms of which the plaintiff files a suit on his own behalf, and that of the United States 
                                                          
11  Anonymous http://www.uib.no/rg/bbrg/research/whistleblowing (Date of use: 9 May 2013) 
12  Anonymous http://www.whistleblowingprotection.org/?q=node/12 (Date of use: 1 July 2015). 
13  Anonymous http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qui_tam_action (Date of use: 9 May 2013).  
14  Anonymous http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/qui_tam_action (Date of use: 9 May 2013).  
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government, if successful, the plaintiff will be entitled to share in the proceeds of any 
recovery made therein. 15  
The United States’ Continental Congress enacted the False Claims Act during 
Abraham Lincoln’s presidency, in attempt to address the alleged endemic fraud that 
was fraught amongst the private suppliers to the Union’s army. The False Claims Act 
was amended in 1943, significantly reducing the share that the whistle-blower could 
claim, and further included a requirement pertaining to the fact that the whistle-
blower had to have personal knowledge regarding the allegations levelled.16 
During 1986 the False Claims Act was again amended, which amendments are said 
to make it both easier and more profitable for private citizens to blow the whistle in 
terms of its provisions. The 1986 amendments included the protection of whistle-
blowers who were demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or otherwise 
discriminated against in their employment as a result of having blown the whistle. 17  
The protection of what amounts to whistle-blowers is also to be found in the 
Termination of Employment Convention, 1982, no. 15818 of the International Labour 
Office. 19  Article 5(c) provides that submitting a complaint, participating in 
proceedings which involve the employer, which employer is allegedly involved in the 
violation of laws or regulations, and recourse sought to a competent administrative 
authority do not constitute a valid reason for the termination of employment.  
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention provide for the remedies available to a worker 
who is of opinion that his employment has been unjustifiably terminated, as well as 
the powers of the bodies or courts considering the alleged unjustifiable termination. 
2.3 Defining the whistle-blower and whistle-blowing 
Who is defined as a whistle-blower and what is defined as whistle-blowing also does 
not enjoy a commonly accepted definition, as the description of both is influenced by 
the context in which it is used. 
                                                          
15  Anonymous http://www.justia.com/employmnet/qui-ta-whistleblower/ (Date of use: 9 May 2013). 
16  Anonymous http://www.whistleblowingprotection.org/?q=node/12 (Date of use: 1 July 2015). 
17  Anonymous http://www.justia.com/employmnet/qui-tam-whistleblower/ (Date of use: 9 May 
2013). 
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In general terms there is consensus regarding the fact that a whistle-blower is 
someone who brings attention to wrongdoing, and in this regard some of the 
definitions to be found involve the following:   
•   A person who tells someone in a position of authority about something 
illegal that is happening, especially in a government department or a 
company.20  
•   An employee who publicly reports illegal activities going on inside 
his/her company.21 
•   An informant who exposes wrongdoing within an organization in the 
hope of stopping it.22 
•   A person who informs on a person or organization engaged in an illicit 
activity.23 
Thus the commonalities seem to be centred regarding the fact that a person informs 
another of alleged wrongdoing within a sphere relevant to the attendant 
circumstances.  
Dawson 24  defines a whistle-blower as someone who alerts another regarding 
scandal, malpractice or corruption, as well as negligence, a waste of resources, 
misrepresentations and violations regarding safety.25 
He later defines whistle-blowing as the deliberate and voluntary disclosure of either 
individual or organisational wrongdoing by a person who has or has had access  to 
data, information or events relating to the actual, suspected or anticipated 
wrongdoing within or by an organisation, and in respect of which it has the ability to 
control the wrongdoing alleged. He states that this disclosure may be internal or 
external and may or may not become part of public record.26 
                                                          
20  Cambridge Dictionaries online http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/whistle-blower 
(Date of use: 9 May 2013). 
21  InvestorWords http://www.investorwords.com/5304/whistle_blower.html (Date of use: 9 May 
2013). 
22  The Free Dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/whistleblower (Date of use: 15 
September 2012). 
23  Oxford Dictionaries http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/whistle-blower (Date of 
use: 9 May 2013). 
24  Dawson www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Dawson.html (Date of use: 20 August 2012).  
25   Dawson www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Dawson.html (Date of use: 20 August 2012).  
26  Dawson www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Dawson.html (Date of use: 16 September 2012).  
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Bouville 27  defines whistle-blowing as the act by which an employee or former 
employee discloses what he believes to constitute unethical or illegal behaviour to a 
higher level of management, or to an external authority or even to the wider public. 28 
Pierson et al29 refer to whistle-blowing as the term which is applied to the reporting of 
an employee regarding illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices which are perpetrated 
under the control of their employer, to a party who is in a position to take corrective 
action.30 
The Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity guidelines 31  under the auspices of the 
Department of Public Service Administration, defines whistle-blowing32 as the raising 
of a concern regarding malpractice in the organisation, whilst the whistle-blower is 
defined as the person who reports the corruption.  
The disconnection in relation to the type of matter the whistle can or may be blown 
on, to be found in the definitions is noted, as the definition of a whistle-blower seems 
to imply that only a person reporting on corruption can in fact qualify as a whistle-
blower.  
Mansbach 33  surmises whistle-blowing as being the public disclosure made by a 
person working within an organisation, regarding acts, omissions, practices or 
policies perpetrated by that specific organisation that wrongs or harms a third party, 
with the intention of the whistle-blower being to gain the attention of the public or 
authorities, in order to end the wrongdoing alleged.  
Mansbach’s definition is particularly narrow, and in no way clarifies to whom the 
report is made or to be made.34 
                                                          
27  Bouville 2007 Journal of Business Ethics http://mathieu.bouville.name/education-
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28  Bouville 2007 Journal of Business Ethics http://mathieu.bouville.name/education-
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29  Pierson  1993 AJIS (1)(1) 58-62. 
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31  Department of Public Service Administration, 2006. Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements – 
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32   Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Guidelines 51.  
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Whilst in turn, Blonder35 defines whistle-blowing and its various forms as applying to 
unauthorised disclosures made by an employee or a person in some category of 
labour relationship, to an organisation, concerning a concern relating to 
organisational or professional misconduct, and which is often made public by way of 
the media. He goes further in stating that the disclosures are referred to as being 
unauthorised as the employee making the disclosure typically does not have the 
necessary consent from his or her supervisor to report the misconduct. 
2.4 The protection of whistle-blowers 
Domfeh and Bawole36 opine that whistle-blowing is often the most effective weapon 
against wrongdoing of a collective nature, adding that the practice of whistle-blowing 
has the potential of being hazardous with damaging consequences for the whistle-
blower and in certain instances for the organisation involved.37 
They state further38 that whilst South Africa is known for officially acknowledging the 
pivotal role of whistle-blowing through the implementation of the Protected 
Disclosures Act of 2000, it remains so that the image of the whistle-blower remains 
pertinently negative, with the whistle-blower remaining tainted. Thus whilst the 
provisions of the legislation protects the whistle-blower in theory, the whistle-blower 
often remains unprotected from the backlash of reprisal. According to them, the 
Travelgate Affair in South Africa has raised critical questions regarding the moral 
dilemmas facing the whistle-blower, and the public.39  
“Travelgate”, as it is commonly referred to, is known as the biggest post-apartheid 
corruption scandal in South Africa’s history, in terms of which forty past and present 
members of Parliament stood to be charged with the fraudulent usage of 
parliamentary travel vouchers. 
Domfeh and Bawole’s conclusion40 reached, is what lies at the heart of this research. 
They commend the enactment of the whistle-blower legislation as a ‘commendable 
effort’, demonstrating that the countries have shown the will to fight corruption and 
                                                          
35  Blonder 2010 Criminal Justice Ethics (29)(3) 258-277. 
36  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 334-343.  
37  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 340. 
38  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 340. 
39  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 342.  
40  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 342. 
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strengthen governance efforts; however, they point to the case law, asking whether it 
is in fact enough.41 However, they hasten to add that people will not report come 
forward to report alleged wrongdoing just because whistle-blower legislation has 
been enacted. They forward the argument that people will only do so in 
circumstances in which they are truly satisfied that the whistle-blower laws and the 
institutions related thereto are substantive.42  
As should be clear, whistle-blowing is not glamorous in any way, and the 
consequences to the people who do speak up and do speak out about wrongdoing 
sometimes pay the ultimate price. Dawson43 refers to an Independent Commission 
against Corruption (hereinafter referred to as “ICAC”) study which revealed that 71 
per cent of those surveyed expected that people who report corruption would suffer 
as a result of having reported it. He states:  
Those who had been in the public service for more than a year were much 
more likely to hold this view than those who had been employed for less than a 
year (73 per cent v 55 per cent). One third of those surveyed were not confident 
that their organisation would handle reports of corruption appropriately, with 
markedly less confidence in rural areas. While 84 per cent believed that 
something could be done about corruption, only 26 believed that something 
would be done about it.” 
ICAC was established by the New South Wales Government, Australia, in 1989, in 
order to address the growing community concern about the integrity of public 
administration in New South Wales.44 
2.5 Why blow the whistle? 
Uys, 45  highlights three basic characteristics of people who do blow the whistle, 
namely that they are usually highly respected, competent and core employees within 
the organisation; value a dedication to higher moral principles more than the 
organisational norms ‘held dear by management’ and are naïve in their beliefs that 
the organisation actually wants to hear the truth. 
She states that usually the whistle-blower begins his or her employment as a loyal 
employee, who usually realises that the employer generally speaking does not 
                                                          
41  Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 342. 
42   Domfeh and Bawole 2011 Journal of Public Affairs (11)(4) 343. 
43  Dawson www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Dawson.html (Date of use: 20 August 2012).  
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appreciate being told bad news. In fact Uys labels this as one of the ironies of 
blowing the whistle, as the response of management will determine whether or not 
the whistle-blower will evolve into an active political agent. 46  
She also points to the fact that usually the whistle-blower becomes the enemy. 
Why anyone would in fact blow the whistle is a mystery to many, especially when 
one takes into account the potential fate of whistle-blowers in general. Bouville47 
quite aptly explains the two sides of the face of whistle-blowers by stating that 
whistle-blowing’s status is in fact debatable. On the one side there are the whistle-
blowers who are viewed as traitorous violators of the organisation’s norms, whilst on 
the other side there are those who view them as heroic defenders of values which 
are seen as being superior to company loyalty. The whistle-blower is left with the 
choice between betraying his organisation or his humility.48 
Expressed above, one finds a rather dark and cynical view and opinion of the 
whistle-blower, as the intent seems to be to interpret their actions within the context 
of betrayal, thus strengthening the view that whistle-blowers are not welcomed for 
airing their concerns or opinions. Pierson49 hold a slightly more positive view in 
stating that although there are problems and challenges pertaining to whistle-
blowing, and despite the fact that it is a controversial issue, there is seemingly a 
heightened interest from management, even extending to the question of how to deal 
with such incidences. Pierson opines that it would seem that the most employees, 
whether or not they are within a managerial position have seen wrongdoing at their 
place of employment, with most of these wrongdoings never being reported, as 
seemingly ignoring such incidents are the norm.50   
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In exploring the links between morality and self, Bouville 51  states that codes 
employed by the employer merely places more duties upon the shoulders of 
professionals, whilst failing to acknowledge the fact that these professionals are 
individuals as opposed to only being a route for duty. Bouville further states that the 
question of whistle-blowing then boils down to comparing a duty towards the public 
with a duty towards the employer. 52 
He acknowledges however that in holding this view one would be discounting the 
duty that one owes to oneself, and that usually thoughts about the duty toward 
oneself would encompass feelings of guilt and selfishness. However, inevitably, it is 
argued, that a whistle-blower would have to consider the duty not only toward him or 
herself, but also a duty or obligations he or she may have towards the people in his 
or her life, such as a spouse and children. Not to do so would be irresponsible and 
even frivolous. 
Bikinos 53  uses the definitions attributed to Camerer, and Uys, defining whistle-
blowing as the unauthorised disclosure of perceived organisational wrongdoing by a 
member or former member of the organisation to parties who are in a position to take 
corrective action in circumstances in which the disclosure is in the public interest. 54  
He attributes the “unauthorised” nature of the disclosure to two basic factors, namely: 
the fact that the nature of the wrongdoing may be sensitive and protected, and as 
such a disclosure in this regard breaches both the confidentiality and the trust of the 
whistle-blower’s access to the relevant information; and for the above-mentioned 
reason, such disclosure when made may be met with responses of “ambivalence or 
an unwillingness to acknowledge the issue”. 
It is in light of the above that the whistle-blower will blow the whistle outside the realm 
of what is seen as acceptable, in his or her search for an “appropriate response”.  He 
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further avers that whistle-blowing takes place when there is a lack of trust towards 
the organisation, and also refers to the dilemma requiring the whistle-blower to make 
a choice between loyalty to the organisation, and either accepting or rejecting the 
wrongful behaviour perceived by the whistle-blower.  
Bikinos states that as a result of the authority that the organisation is cloaked with, 
the leadership cadre has as much reason to distrust the whistle-blower as the 
whistle-blower has to distrust the organisation. The whistle-blower ceases to 
recognise the organisation’s authority, which makes it more likely that the whistle-
blower will blow the whistle externally becoming the so-called enemy within. 
He used a questionnaire, and was able to successfully establish that organisational 
trust was in fact the influencing variable in the decision taken as to whether or not to 
blow the whistle internally. The conclusion reached included the fact that 
organisational trust did not play a major role in external whistle-blowing, and that 
other considerations may play a role in this regard including for example political 
behaviour or personal gain. 
It seems as though, in deciding whether or not to blow the whistle, whistle-blowers 
are indeed faced with a dilemma pertaining to doing what is right versus what is safe 
for them, in light of the professional gamble it may turn out to be, or even the gamble 
with his or her life itself. 
Luke55 has identified 5 dilemmas that face an employee in deciding whether or not to 
blow the whistle, and as such are considered by the said employee namely:  
• The disapproval of management regarding whistle-blowers; 
• The disapproval of co-workers regarding whistle-blowers; 
• Whether or not the relevant conduct is personally affecting the whistle-
blower (employee); 
• Feelings of loyalty towards the employer; and 
• How much evidence the employee has against the perpetrator. 
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Gehringer56 in discussing the ethical dilemmas of whistle-blowing identifies at least 
three approaches to whistle-blowing ethics, namely:  
• The first view is that a whistle-blower is someone who “rats” on the 
company, and so doing undermines not only the team work but also the 
hierarchical authority that exists within the company; 
• The second view is that whistle-blowing may be seen as a “tragedy to be 
avoided”. In this regard he states that, “In certain cases, it may be a 
necessary evil, but it is almost always bad news all around. It is proof of 
organizational trouble. It threatens the careers of managers, disrupts 
collegiality (because colleagues resent the whistle-blower), and damages 
the informal network of friends at the workplace.” He compares it to being as 
painful as a “disintegrating marriage”. 
• The third view is that it is an obligation when “serious and considerable 
harm to public is involved”. 
Further to this he states that it is better not to marry in haste, but rather choose a 
partner in marriage (in his comparison of whistle-blowing, and with the marriage 
partner being the employer) carefully in order to reduce the need for blowing the 
whistle right from the start. He also opines that blowing the whistle is never a 
decision to be taken lightly, and that the time to prepare for such an eventuality is to 
be found in the now, in order to avoid the need arising in the future. However, should 
it become necessary to blow the whistle, he warns that the whistle-blower should be 
aware of the attendant risks and above all, the obligations to family, the profession 
and the public. 
Clarke57 discusses the whistle-blower’s dilemma from an accountant’s perspective, 
and refers to three potential choices in a situation which involves an ethical dilemma, 
namely: to attempt to change the situation; to attempt to mentally isolate oneself from 
the situation in question; or to resign.  
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In the article he quotes a Chief Financial Officer who was not spared the anguish of 
whistle-blowing as an ethical dilemma, and who stated, “I am a white knight who did 
the right thing and was out of work for 18 months, losing my self-respect in the 
process. Was it worth it? That is a personal question that I don’t have the answer to. 
But please, God, don’t offer me this choice again.” 
Opining as to why it is so difficult to blow the whistle, Clarke states that there may be 
various contributing factors in this regard, such as the conflicting emotions and 
thoughts of wanting to be loyal to someone or an organisation, and wanting to correct 
the wrong perceived; hen the wrongdoer is personally known to the whistle-blower; 
and the thin or grey line between what is right, even when it feels wrong, and the 
ensuing feelings of guilt. 
In closing Clarke refers to the phrase coined by General ‘Stormin’ Norman 
Schwarzkopf, who states, “The truth of the matter is that you always know the right 
thing to do. The hard part is doing it.” 
Dawson states that in many documented whistle-blowing cases, the whistle-blower 
was the sole person in a group who was prepared to take a stand regarding the 
issue in question, whilst other members of the group were often aware of the 
conduct complained of, even viewing the said conduct with disapproval. However, 
due to considerations relating to inter alia career interests and prospects, the other 
members of the group chose to remain silent and disassociate themselves, even on 
a personal level, from the whistle-blower.58 
Van Es and Smit looked at blowing the whistle and the involvement of the media.59 
They referred to research60 pertaining to whistleblowing that had concluded that the 
most productive manner in which to solve ‘moral conflict’ in the workplace is to deal 
with the conflicts internally, as opposed to cases in which the whistle-blower had 
chosen to air the conflicts externally, in which case usually one out of ten cases 
would be resolved. They are of the view that research shows that the majority of 
whistle-blowers experience negative personal consequences, especially in respect of 
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social and financial sanctions imposed. They further opine that in making the 
revelations public, the personal interests of the whistle-blower are effectively 
damaged and the moral conflicts less effectively solved.61  
In making the choices relevant to blowing the whistle, they identify three "moral 
domains and perspectives", namely public ethics, personal ethics and organisational 
ethics.62  
They conclude that within the context of external whistle-blowing there are three 
parties involved, each with their own motivation and background within the given 
circumstances.  They stated further that in overreacting to a potential whistle-blower, 
the problem may increase, pointing out that whistle-blowers long for recognition, 
whether internally or externally. Prevention is lauded as the best option, reached by 
an attempt to solve the conflicting perspectives and interests between the managers 
and professionals in the relevant organisation.63 
2.6  Conclusion 
Although explanations as to the origins of the term “whistle-blower” are varied, what 
is clear is that whistle-blowers are not always viewed in a positive light. Although they 
may have blown the whistle with the noblest of intentions, only in exceptional 
circumstances will it not impact negatively on the whistle-blower’s life, with the 
whistle-blowers sometimes paying the ultimate price.  
The definitions regarding what a whistle-blower is also differ, however, in the main it 
refers to an individual who points out or brings to someone else’s attention actual or 
perceived wrongful (intentionally or negligently so) conduct in the form of either an 
act or an omission, whether in the public or private sector. 
Although the decision as to whether or not to blow the whistle is an intensely 
personal decision, it is usually influenced by beliefs, the strength of the trust 
relationship between the whistle-blower and both the party allegedly in the wrong and 
the party receiving the disclosure from the whistle-blower. Irrespective of what the 
actual reason and or motivation is behind the whistle-blower’s disclosure, he or she 
                                                          
61  Van Es  and Smit  2003 Business Ethics: A European Review (12)(2) 144. 
62  Van Es  and Smit  2003 Business Ethics: A European Review (12)(2) 145. 
63  Van Es  and Smit  2003 Business Ethics: A European Review (12)(2) 150. 
38 
 
will in most instances experience internal conflict and regret as a result of the ethical 
dilemma it places him or her in.64 
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CHAPTER 3: AN INTRODUCTION TO NOTEWORTHY INFLUENCES IN 
RESPECT OF WHISTLE-BLOWING WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction 
The protection afforded to a whistle-blower is a great deal more enticing when the 
relevant provisions are embodied in legislation, such as in the PDA. This chapter 
briefly explores the other noteworthy influences within the South African context, 
including internal measures, specifically within the public service domain, and 
international instruments.  
When looking at the content of this chapter, one cannot help but to say that there is 
an apparent “political will” to fight corruption in all earnest, including, providing for the 
protection of whistle-blowers within this context. 
Within the context of this chapter it is to be understood that with regard to 
conventions and protocols, the signing thereof indicates the intention of a State to 
take steps in order to express its consent to be bound by the convention and/or 
protocol.  
Such signing also creates an obligation, in the period between signing and consent 
to be bound (ratification), to refrain from any acts that would defeat the object and 
purpose of the relevant convention and/or protocol.However, to be binding on a 
signatory state, it is thereafter to be ratified, whereby the signatory state clearly 
establishes its consent to be bound thereby. 
In this section the relevant instruments, guidelines and provisions in this regard, both 
at a national and an international level, where the Republic of South Africa 
(hereinafter referred to as the “RSA”) has explicitly pronounced agreement and as 
such commitment, will be touched on. 
3.2 The Code of Conduct for the Public Service 
Within the context of the South African government and civil servants, the Code of 
Conduct for the Public Service, as contained in Chapter 2 of the Public Service 
Regulations, 2001, states that the Code of Conduct “…should act as a guideline to 
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employees as to what is expected of them from an ethical point of view, both in their 
individual conduct and in their relationship with others.”1 
Paragraph C.4 deals with the performance of duties, and C. 4.10 provides that 
employees, within the course of their official duties, shall report fraud, corruption, 
nepotism, maladministration and others acts constituting an offence or which is 
prejudicial to the public interest to the appropriate authorities.  
Paragraph C.4 (a-c) clearly places a duty on such employee; however, it has to be 
noted that no concurrent provision is made in the regulations, placing a duty on the 
employer or senior management not to cause detriment or more specifically 
occupational detriment to an employee who makes such a report. In terms of ethical 
conduct, all that is expected of senior management is that they: 
• Exhibit the type of conduct which meets the highest standards regarding 
conduct of an ethical nature; 
• Serve as an example to their subordinates; and 
• Ensure that through their conduct they limit potential conflicts of interest, 
prioritising the public interests. 
This aspect will be dealt with more extensively under the auspices of Chapter 4. 
3.3 Minimum anti-corruption capacity requirements 
The Department for Public Service and Administration (hereinafter referred to as the 
“DPSA”) has published a comprehensive document entitled “Guidelines for 
implementing the Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements in Departments 
and Organisational Components in the Public Service (hereinafter referred to as the 
“MACC”) in January 2006.2 The purpose of the MACC is to provide the minimum 
requirements that all departments and organisational components within the South 
African Public Service have to develop and implement in order to fight corruption 
from within. The model is based on four pillars namely, prevention, detection, 
investigation and resolution. 
                                                          
1  Paragraph A2, Chapter 2 of the Public Service Regulations, 2001. 
http//www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts&regulations/regulations1999/PSRegulations_1
3_07_2012.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
2  Department of Public Service Administration. Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity. South Africa. 
www.ccps-africa.org/actoolkit/pdf/guidelines/DPSA_AC.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
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In terms of the MACC model, presented below for ease of reference, whistle-blowing 
forms part of the second pillar, namely the detection of corruption; the other parts of 
detection are made up of the corruption database, internal audit, and management 
action.3 
 
Figure 1 
The document defines whistle-blowing and whistle-blowers 4 as:  
Whistleblowing is the raising of a concern of a malpractice in an organisation. 
People who report corruption are commonly known as “whistleblowers” and a 
reporting mechanism that makes it easy and safe for people to report is often 
referred to as a whistleblowers reporting mechanism. 
It is stated that the most effective manner of detecting corruption is when people, 
either internal or external to that organisation, come across it in their “daily 
business”. It is however recognised that due to mistrust, the fear of retaliation, and a 
                                                          
3  Currently the Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG) reporting to the Anti-Corruption Task 
Team (ACTT) is in the process of developing the new Anti-Corruption Framework (ACF), in 
which whistle-blowing and its importance is carried forward. 
4  Department of Public Service Administration. Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity. South Africa. 
www.ccps-africa.org/actoolkit/pdf/guidelines/DPSA_AC.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
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lack of anonymity in reporting, such experiences are seldom reported. Suggestions 
for dealing with the kind of fears mentioned above include the use of the National 
Public Service Anti-Corruption Hotline (often referred to as “NACH”); the use of 
internal reporting mechanisms; and whistle-blowing or protected disclosure policies. 
3.3.1 The Anti-Corruption Framework5 
During 2011, the Inter-Ministerial Security Committee took the decision to establish 
the Anti-Corruption Task Team (hereinafter referred to as the “ACTT”), within the 
Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (hereinafter referred to as the 
“JCPS”), in order to focus on government’s prioritisation of anti-corruption measures.  
The JCPS Cluster works as a collective in order to ensure that the priorities of, 
amongst others, reducing crime, improving the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system, dealing with corruption, managing the borders of the RSA, improving the 
RSA population registration system and prioritising the combating and prevention of 
cyber-crime, are efficiently and effectively achieved. It includes inter alia the South 
African Police Service, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Correctional 
Services, National Prosecuting Authority, Special Investigations Unit and the South 
African Revenue Service. 
The aim was to develop and implement an updated strategy within the Public 
Service in the fight against corruption, which is proving to present a challenge to the 
Government. A number of Outputs were developed, and each relevant Output has a 
working group to oversee the co-ordination of the work to be performed in respect of 
the Outputs. During July 2012 Outputs 3 and 5 (now referred to as Output 3) were 
combined at ACTT level and approved; it is aimed at reducing corruption nationally. 
Part of the tasks performed by the Anti-corruption Working Group (hereinafter 
referred to as the “ACWG”) was the performance of a MACC effectiveness audit on 
all JCPS cluster departments and components, during 2012/2013.  
An additional task of the ACWG is to develop an updated MACC framework for 
implementation. The ACWG has developed the Anti-corruption Framework 
(hereinafter referred to as the “ACF”), which in principal has been accepted by all the 
                                                          
5  Approval for the inclusion of this portion has been obtained from the Chairperson of the ACWG, 
Mr. C. P. Collings. 
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participating JCPS Cluster department and entities, and which is accompanied inter 
alia by a JCPS Cluster Strategy, “Tackling Corruption Together”.  
The ACF was crafted in a manner to ensure alignment, where relevant, with the 
NDP. The ACF is pictorially presented as follows, with whistle-blowing falling under 
the category of detection. 
The core of the ACF espouses that the four pillars in combatting corruption centres 
on prevention, detection, investigation and resolution. 
Whistle-blowing forms part of the detection of corruption related activities, leading to 
the investigation of the conduct so reported and resolution thereof, but more 
importantly leading to prevention of similar future conduct, based on the lessons 
learnt relating to the matter investigated. 
 
                                                                                                        Figure 2    
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3.4 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereinafter referred to as 
“UNCAC” or the “Convention”) was approved by the ad hoc Committee, and adopted 
by the General Assembly by resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. South Africa is one 
of the 161 signatories to the UNCAC6 and ratified it on 22 November 20047. 
The purpose of the Convention is set out in Article 1 (a – c) as including to:  
• Ensure the promotion and strengthening of measures aimed at the prevention 
and combatting of corruption, in a more effective and efficient manner; 
• Ensure the promotion facilitation and support, at an international level, of co-
operation and technical support in the fight against corruption and the 
recovery of relevant assets; 
• Ensure the proper management of public financial affairs and property, 
promoting both integrity and accountability. 
Article 32 of the UNCAC deals with the protection of witnesses, experts and victims, 
providing that each party to the Convention shall take appropriate measures to 
provide effective protection from potential retaliation and intimidation of witnesses 
and experts who testify about offences established in terms of the Convention, 
including the protection of relatives and other people who are close to them, as may 
be relevant in the given circumstances. 8  This includes physical protection and 
protection whilst testifying, pertaining to the manner in which evidence may be given 
and what personal information may be reflected. 
Article 33 provides for the protection of whistle-blowers (reporting persons); however, 
interestingly enough this article is couched in language that does not place a duty on 
the Party State, but rather provides discretion in this regard. Article 33 provides that 
each party State, and as such South Africa, shall consider incorporating appropriate 
measures into its domestic legal system, to provide protection against any unjustified 
                                                          
6  United Nations “United Nations Convention against Corruption”  
 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf 
(Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
7   Status of Ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session4/V1186007e.pdf (Date of 
use: 30 June 2015) 
8  Article 32(1) of the UNCAC. 
45 
 
treatment for any person who reports to the competent authorities any facts relating 
to offences established in terms of UNCAC, in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds.  
3.5 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (hereinafter 
referred to as the “AUC on PCC”) was adopted on 11 July 2003 by the Second 
Ordinary Session of the Union in Maputo in the Republic of Mozambique, and to 
which South Africa is a signatory;9 in addition South Africa is one of the 34 member 
states that ratified the AUC on PCC.10 
In relation to whistle-blowing and directly related matters Article 5 (5-7) of the AUC 
on PCC requires of the ratifying countries, and as such South Africa, to:  
• Adopt legislative and other measures providing for the protection of informants 
and witnesses in respect of corruption and related offences, including 
measures providing for the protection of their identities;11 
• Adopt measures in terms of which citizens may report corruption without fear 
and reprisals;12 and 
• Adopt domestic legislative provisions which provide for the punishment of 
those who make false and malicious reports regarding corruption and related 
offences against innocent people.13 
3.6 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, (hereinafter referred to as the “OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”) was 
                                                          
9  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption July 16 2003 
www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/b08103a3-a348-11dc-
bf1b335d0754ba85.0:jsessionid=9B32A990EB65F2DEE01FE5A (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
10  African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, “Status of Ratification of the Convention on 
Corruption” http://www.auanticorruption.org/auac/about/category/status-of-the-ratification (Date 
of use: 30 June 2015) 
11  Article 5(5) of the AUC on PCC. 
12  Article 5(6) of the AUC on PCC. 
13  Article 5(7) of the AUC on PCC. 
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adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997, signed on 17 
December 1997, coming into force on 15 February 1999. South Africa is a signatory 
to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention;14 South Africa ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention on 19 June 200715 
Article 12 provides for monitoring and follow-up in respect of the provisions of the 
Convention, which provides for both self-assessment and mutual evaluation. South 
Africa is currently taking part in the mutual evaluation aspect hereof, in terms of 
being assessed by peers. 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention includes inter alia commentaries on the 
Convention, as well as recommendations for further combating foreign bribery. The 
recommendations were adopted by the Council on 26 November 2009. 
Recommendation IX has regard to the reporting of foreign bribery, and recommends 
that member countries should ensure that:  
• Channels of communication which are easily available, are put in place 
through which suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions  can be reported, in accordance with the 
country’s legal principles; 
• Appropriate measures are put in place in order to facilitate the submission of 
reports by public officials, especially those posted abroad; 
• Appropriate measures are adopted to ensure the protection of public and 
private sector employees from discriminatory action or disciplinary action 
taken against them for making a report in good faith, based on reasonable 
grounds, to the appropriate authorities, regarding acts of bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions.  
3.7 SADC Protocol against Corruption 
The South African Development Community (hereinafter referred to as “SADC”) 
Protocol against Corruption was signed on 14 August 2001 and came into force on 6 
                                                          
14  Anonymous OECD Anti-bribery Convention http://en.wkiipedia.org/wiki/OECD_Anti-
Bribery_Convention (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
15   OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf (Date of use: 30 June 2015). 
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August 2003, having been ratified by South Africa as a member State. 16  The 
purpose17 of the Protocol includes:  
• promoting and strengthening the development by the parties, of instruments 
needed to prevent, detect, punish and eliminate corruption on the public and 
private sectors; 
• advocating, facilitating and regulating co-operation between the parties, in 
order to ensure the efficiency of the measures and actions aimed at 
preventing, detecting, punishing and eliminating corruption in the public and 
private sector spheres; and 
• Advance the development and compatibility of policies and legislation 
domestically aimed at preventing, detecting, punishing and eliminating 
corruption in the public and private sector spheres. 
It has to be recognised that whistle blowing plays a crucial role in the detection of 
corrupt activities. However, the authors of the Protocol chose to include provisions 
relating to whistle blowing under the heading of “preventative measures”; bearing in 
mind that when one has something to report, the wrongdoing has in all probability 
taken place already, making it too late for prevention or preventative measures. 
Article 4(e) and (f) of the Protocol provides that each State Party undertakes to adopt 
measures which will create, maintain and strengthen systems for the protection of 
people who have in good faith reported corruption and legislation that punishes 
those people who have made false and malicious reports against innocent persons.  
3.8 Conclusion 
The South African government has arguably expressed a strong commitment to 
protecting whistle-blowers, both at a national and international level, which is most 
certainly encouraging as the tone is set from the top in such matters. 
The commitment expressed at a national and international level includes:  
                                                          
16  Anonymous SADC Protocol Against Corruption http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/795 (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
17  Article 2 of the SADC Protocol against Corruption. 
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• The Code of Conduct for the Public Service, which places a duty on 
employees (civil servants) to report to the appropriate authorities acts of 
fraud, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and the like. What is however 
concerning in this regard is that the Code of Conduct does not place a 
reciprocal duty on the employer’s representatives (senior management and 
management) not to act in reprisal as a result of such a report having been 
made. It merely states that senior management (thus excluding middle 
management) is expected to display the highest possible standard 
pertaining to ethical conduct. It may as such perhaps be argued that it could 
be seen as an implicit requirement then. The further concerns to be noted in 
this respect are dealt with in Chapter 4. 
• The MACC refers to whistle-blowing as one of the most effective ways of 
detecting corruption, setting minimum standards for attempting to appease 
the fears whistle-blowers may experience, including the NACH, internal 
whistle-blower channels and internal procedures and policies. 
• The advent of the ACF has brought about a pivotal change in the way anti-
corruption activities are to be tackled within the JCPS departments and 
entities, in that the focus of the MACC was on the anti-corruption capacity 
available within the relevant department or entity, the ACF makes it clear 
that the fight against corruption is not the “problem” of the anti-corruption 
unit or capacity, or their responsibility, but rather that it is the duty of each 
and every employee to fight corruption by, at the very least reporting 
suspicions in this respect. The basis of this approach may be seen to be 
seated in the considerations pertaining to derivative misconduct, although 
not specifically mentioned within the ACF. 
• The UNCAC, which South Africa has ratified, provides for the protection of 
witnesses, experts and victims, requiring that appropriate measures be 
taken to provide effective protection from potential retaliation. However, 
article 33 which specifically deals with whistle-blowing does not place a duty 
on the Member State to protect whistle-blowers, but rather merely suggests 
it as a recommendation to be considered. 
• The AUC on PP, ratified by South Africa, requires the party States to adopt 
protective measures with regard to whistle-blowers. 
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• The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ratified by South Africa, recommends 
that appropriate measures are put in place to protect whistle-blowers; and 
• The SADC Protocol, ratified by South Africa, states that each State Party 
has by ratification undertaken to adopt whistle-blower protection measures. 
The above-mentioned, as stated, not only sets the tone from the top of the country’s 
hierarchy, but also sets the stage for the PDA.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE PROTECTED DISCLOSURES ACT 26 OF 2000 
4.1 Introduction  
In the RSA, the legislation relating to whistle-blowing, and the remedies that are 
availed to a whistle-blower are mainly seated within the contents of the PDA. The 
PDA was assented to on 1 August 2000, enacted on 7 August 2000 by the 
Presidency, and has since remained the same with not one amendment having been 
incorporated. Within the context of the PDA the term “good faith” is used, without 
being defined by the Act, and as such it is deemed necessary to explore the 
meaning of the usage thereof, especially in light of the fact that it is also used in the 
text of some of the other international legislation within this document. 
In order to ensure that the objectives of this research are effectively met, it is 
deemed expedient to set out briefly the most basic provisions relating to the PDA, in 
order to ensure that the context in which it provides remedies is clearly understood. It 
would however, go amiss, should the author fail to recognise the constitutional 
imperative in relation to the PDA. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Constitution”), which is seen to be the supreme law of the country, does not in its text 
explicitly make provision for the protection of whistle-blowers, however, it is argued 
that it does expound the values pertaining to how all people in the Republic of South 
Africa (hereinafter referred to as the “RSA”), including whistle-blowers, are to be 
treated.1 
Having said this, it is argued that although it does not directly provide for whistle-
blowers or whistle-blowing, it does indirectly provide for whistle-blowing within the 
provisions of section 16, which provides for freedom of expression. More specifically, 
section 16(1)(b), provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression which 
includes the freedom to receive or impart information (own emphasis) or ideas. It 
is argued that blowing the whistle in fact amounts to imparting information and or 
ideas. 
                                                          
1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Human dignity (s 1(a), 7(1) and 10), 
equality (s1 (a), 7(1) and (9) and freedom (s1 (a), 7(1) and 12(1)(c) and (e)). 
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Another standard which is clearly set by the text of the Constitution2 is embodied in 
section 23(1), which provides that everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
This is particularly relevant when it is borne in mind that the provisions of the PDA 
apply in respect of the employment relationship. It is noted that this right granted 
goes wider than applying only to employees, as it grants the right to everyone, and 
as such would include independent contractors and everyone else in an employment 
relationship, including the employer. What constitutes a fair labour practice is not 
defined within the body of the Constitution, nor in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995. In NEHAWU v UCT3  the Constitutional Court considered the fact that the 
meaning of a "fair labour practice" has not been defined, determining that it was in 
fact not desirable to attempt to define the concept, as a precise definition is 
impossible and would depend on the facts of each case, requiring a value judgement 
to be made. Having consideration of the test formulated by the Constitutional Court 
in this respect, it is argued that circumstances involving an alleged unfair labour 
practice as a result of the whistle having been blown, would find application in this 
manner. 
The importance of the provisions and objectives of the PDA are to be seen within the 
context of the Constitution in another respect, was affirmed in Tshishonga v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another:4 in which the court stated 
that the PDA takes its cue from the Constitution of the RSA. The PDA asserts the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom, although it is not 
restricted to a particular section of the Constitution, although each one of the rights 
provided for can be invoked by a whistle-blower. 
Although each of these rights can be invoked by whistle blowers, the analysis in this 
case is from the perspective of the overarching objective of affirming values of 
democracy, of which the particular rights form a part. Democracy embraces 
accountability as one of its core values. Accountability, dignity and equality are the 
main themes flowing through the analysis that follows.5 
                                                          
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
3  National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others 
2003 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
4  Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC);  
5  Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC);  
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This is a clear acknowledgement that whistle-blowing and whistle-blowers are a 
necessary check and balance in ensuring accountability, a core value of democracy, 
within our democratic society. As pointed out in the previous chapters, one of the key 
challenges in respect of whistle-blowing is that more often than not people are too 
afraid to speak out, and it is in this respect that the protection and remedies offered 
by the PDA becomes pivotal.  
The court summarised these considerations eloquently in Tshishonga by stating that 
whistle-blowers are not impimpis, self-serving or socially reprehensible, but rather 
that the negative connotations are recently being replaced by the concepts of 
openness and accountability. The court stated that: 
Employees who seek to correct wrongdoing, to report practices and products that 
may endanger society or resist instructions to perform illegal acts, render a 
valuable service to society and the employer. Still of 230 whistle-blowers in the 
United Kingdom and the USA, a 1999 survey found that 84% lost their jobs after 
informing their employer of fraud, even though they were not party to it.6 
Martin7 also recognises the importance of the Constitution in respect of transparency 
and resultant transparency, and in relation to whistle-blowing, stating that whistle-
blowing is central to the principles underscoring the Constitution, and further that it is 
pivotal to the fight against corruption and mismanagement, especially in respect of 
public funds; that it is pivotal to the strengthening of transparency and accountability, 
not only within organisations, but also within society in general. 8 The preamble of 
the PDA recognises that:  
• In South Africa neither the common – or statutory law provides for 
procedures or mechanisms by way of which employees may or can make 
disclosures pertaining to suspected or alleged criminal or irregular conduct 
by colleagues or their employers in the public or private sectors, without fear 
of reprisal;  and 
                                                          
6  Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC); Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another 2007 (4) 
BLLR (LC)   [168]. 
7  Martin 2010  
 http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
8  Martin 2010  
 http://www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 8 May 2013). 
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• Every employer and employee has the duty to disclose criminal or irregular 
conduct alleged or suspected in the workplace; and that 
• Every employer has a duty to take necessary steps to ensure that 
employees who disclose such information are protected from potential or 
actual reprisals as a result of having made such disclosure. 
It is stated that the provisions of the PDA are necessary to enable the creation of a 
culture which will facilitate employees disclosing information relating to alleged or 
suspected criminal or other irregular conduct in the workplace, in a responsible 
manner, by providing a comprehensive guideline for both disclosing such information 
and the protection against any reprisals for such disclosures made; and promote 
eliminating criminal and other irregular conduct in public and private bodies. 
The PDA was widely welcomed; the Public Service Commission stated that as of 
February 2001South Africa has had the most extensive, state of the art whistle-
blowing legislation in the PDA which will assist in halting and surfacing wrongdoing 
that occurs within the workplace.9 
The National Anti-Corruption Forum, in the Guide to the Whistle-blowing Act, stated 
in 2006 that the purpose of the PDA is to embolden employees to report wrongdoing 
that they know of in their workplace without fearing reprisal, and that the PDA is to 
be viewed as a pivotal part of corporate governance.10  
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as “COSATU” 
also put its support behind the PDA, expressing the belief that the PDA is a pivotal 
interposition in respect of corruption within the South African society.11  
Thus the impetus behind the purpose of the PDA is clear. 
                                                          
9  Public Service Commission “A Guide for Public Sector Managers Promoting Public Sector 
Accountability Implementing the Protected Disclosures Act – Introduction” 
www.psc.gov.za/documents/docs/guidelines/psc_odac_update.pdf (Date of use: 23 May 2013). 
10  National Anti-Corruption Forum  
 http://www.nacf.org.za/guide_to_the_whistle_blowing_act/section_two.html (Date of use: 9 May 
2013). 
11  COSATU “Cosatu submission on the SALC’s Issue Paper on Protected Disclosure submitted to 
the South African Law Commission” http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2222 (Date of use: 
9 May 2013). 
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It is in essence against this background that the relevant provisions of the PDA need 
to be viewed. 
4.2 Good faith and the PDA 
Richard Calland, Executive Chair of the new Open Democracy Advice Centre, states 
in Camerer12 that at the core of the PDA is the ideal that prevention is better than 
cure, encouraging whistle-blowers to first make a disclosure to their employer, in 
order to avail the employer the opportunity to address the alleged wrongdoing. He 
points out that potential whistle-blowers need to do so first, in respect of which the 
test is that of good faith, rather than blowing the whistle externally in the first 
instance. The provisions of the PDA require that disclosures are to be made in good 
faith, in order for the disclosure to be a protected disclosure.13 It is to be noted that 
the only instance in which a disclosure does not need to be made in good faith, is 
when it is made to a legal practitioner, in accordance with the provisions of section 5 
of the PDA.  
What would constitute good faith is not defined within the text of the PDA.14 
In Ramsammy v Wholesale & Retail Sector Education & Training Authority15 the 
court inter alia considered the meaning of good faith, also considering the 
Tshishonga 16  matter. The court referred to a United Kingdom case, Street v 
Unemployed Workers’ Centre 17 , in which the meaning of good faith within the 
context of a disclosure was discussed at paragraphs 203-206.  
In Street v Unemployed Workers’ Centre18, the court stated that at the core meaning 
of good faith is honesty (own emphasis), opining that by setting good faith as a 
legislative requirement it was clear that the legislature required more than just a 
reasonable belief, to form the basis of a disclosure made. 
                                                          
12  Camerer 2001 Occasional Paper 47.   
13  Sections 6 to 9 of the PDA. 
14   Camerer 2001 Occasional Paper 47. 
15  2009 (30) ILJ 1927 (LC). 
16  Tshishonga v Minster of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC) at para 185 – 192. 
17  2004 (4) All ER 839 (CA). 
18  Street v Unemployed Workers’ Centre 2004 (4) All ER 839 (CA). 
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Whether or not good faith was present in the making of a disclosure would centre on 
a finding of fact, with the court considering all the evidence cumulatively. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky19 considered the concept of good 
faith, albeit within the sphere of contractual law, with the court stating at paragraph 
22 that what emerges from recent academic writing and from some leading cases is 
that good faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle, which is 
founded in community standards of decency and fairness. 
Ngcobo J, in the Constitutional Court's judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier 20  at 
paragraph 80, confirmed that good faith includes the concepts of justice, 
reasonableness and fairness. 
 
One has to wonder why the legislature did not rather provide for an honest 
disclosure; as long as the information provided is truthfully made on the basis of 
reasonable belief, the motive of the whistle-blower should be irrelevant, thus 
negating the requirement of good faith. 
4.2.1 The objectives of the PDA: defining the scope thereof 
The objectives of the PDA are stated as follows:  
• To make provision for procedures in terms of which employees in the 
private and public sector may disclose information pertaining to irregular or 
unlawful conduct by their employers or other employees in the employment 
of their employers; 
• To provide for the protection of employees who make a protected disclosure 
as provided for in terms of the PDA; and 
• To provide for matters connected with regard to making protected 
disclosures. 
The objectives of the PDA are further elaborated on in section 2(1) (a-c) of the Act, 
providing that the objectives include: 
                                                          
19  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
20  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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• Protecting employees in the public and private sectors from being 
subjected to reprisal in the form of occupational detriment, for having made 
a protected disclosure; 
• Providing remedies for employees so subjected to occupational detriment; 
and 
• Providing procedures which prescribe the manner in which protected 
disclosures are to be made. 
What should as such be clear from the outset is that the provisions of the PDA are 
only aimed at protecting employees, and further to this, only from occupational 
detriment. The scope of the provisions of the PDA is further defined in terms of the 
provisions of section 2(2), by providing that its provisions apply only to protected 
disclosures made after the date on which section 2 came into operation, irrespective 
of whether the alleged irregular or criminal conduct took place before or after the 
specified date.  
The PDA specifically specifies that any provision in a contract of employment or 
other agreement entered into between an employer and an employee that attempts 
to exclude any provision of the PDA is void,21 including any such provision which 
attempts to preclude an employee from the protection offered by the PDA or 
discourage the employee from making a protected disclosure.22 
The importance of defining the employment relationship, in terms of who would 
qualify as an employer and an employee, is simply stated by McGregor et al23 as 
understanding the protective nature of labour laws, in terms of which labour laws 
may be compared to an umbrella. In McGregor’s analogy used, those persons not 
standing under the umbrella will either get wet or will need to find another umbrella to 
protect them with from the rain. Succinctly put, persons not protected by the scope of 
the labour laws will need to find other laws with which to protect themselves.24  
Thus the establishment of the people falling within the scope of the provisions of the 
PDA is of importance. 
                                                          
21  Section 2(3)(a) of the PDA. 
22  Section 2(3)(b) of the PDA. 
23  McGregor et al Labour Law 15. 
24  McGregor et al Labour Law 15, fn 17. 
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4.2.1.1  Who is the employer? 
As the provisions of the PDA apply specifically to the relationship between the 
employer and an employee, it is necessary to establish who the employer would be 
within the context of the PDA. 
Who the employer is, is defined in section 1of the PDA as including any person who: 
• Employs or provides work for any other person, and who remunerates that 
other person, or who undertakes to remunerate that person; or 
• Permits another to assist in the carrying on or conduct of his, her or its 
business in any way, and includes a person who allows the aforementioned 
on behalf or on the authority of the relevant employer. 
It is to be noted that sections 78 and 231 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”) do not define the employer. 
An interesting development in this regard was the court’s approach in Charlton v 
Parliament of the Republic of SA. 25  In this case the Labour Court (hereinafter 
referred to as the “LC”) was asked to differentiate between an employee and 
employer as defined in terms of the LRA, and an employee and employer for the 
purposes of the PDA. Although this point was found to be appealable by the Labour 
Appeal Court (hereinafter referred to as the “LAC”), the appeal was upheld in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as the “SCA”). 26  It seems to 
indicate that the differentiation in this respect may be entirely acceptable, and that 
                                                          
25  Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of SA 2007 (28) ILJ 2263 (LC); Parliament of the 
Republic of SA v Charlton 2010 (31) ILJ 2353 (LAC) and Charlton v Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 2012 (1) SA 472 (SCA). 
26  In the LC, the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa had excepted to Charlton’s statement 
of claim on six grounds, identified as grounds A to F. However, grounds B to E were not 
pursued at the LC hearing, which left only exceptions A and F to be dealt with. Exception A 
related to the first cause of action, whilst exception F related to the LC’s alleged lack of 
jurisdiction to entertain the fourth and fifth causes of action. The LC had dismissed both 
exceptions in June 2007, however, Parliament was granted leave to appeal to the LAC. In July 
2010, the LAC upheld the exceptions previously dismissed by the LC and made orders staying 
the proceedings under section 158(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and referring 
‘the dispute’ to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration for arbitration. 
Charlton obtained special leave from the SCA in order to appeal the decision handed down by 
the LAC. The order of the LAC was set aside and replaced with the following: ‘The appeal is 
struck from the roll with costs, including the costs of two counsel.’  
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the employment relationship could well be defined in respect of the parameters set by 
the definitions contained in the PDA. 
4.2.1.2 Who is an employee? 
As the provisions of the PDA apply specifically to the relationship between the 
employer and an employee, it is necessary to establish who the employee would be 
within the context of the PDA. 
Who the employee is, is defined in section 1(ii)(a-b) of the PDA including: 
• any person who works for another or the State, and who receives or is entitled 
to receive remuneration, excluding an independent contractor; and 
• any other person who in any manner assists in conducting or carrying on the 
business of the employer. 
It has to be noted that this is the exact definition (own emphasis) of an employee as 
per the provisions of section 213 of the LRA. 
However, section 78 of the LRA in respect of workplace forums defines an employee 
as being any person who is employed, excluding a senior managerial employee, and 
whose employment contract or status allows him or her to represent the employer in 
its dealings with the workplace forum or determine policy in the workplace and take 
decisions on the employer’s behalf that may be in conflict with the representation of 
the employees in the workplace. 
Thus by definition as per the PDA and as mirrored in section 213 of the LRA, both 
private and public sector employees are included, however, excluding independent 
contractors from the protection offered. Further to this, section 78 of the LRA 
excludes from employees senior managerial employees who may represent the 
employer in dealings with the workplace forum or who may determine policy and 
take decisions on behalf of the employer which may be in conflict with the 
representation of employees in the workplace. Note is taken that this definition 
pertains to workplace forums and their functioning, and as such is not to be seen as 
such senior employees being excluded from the protection offered by the provisions 
of the PDA. 
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Who qualifies as an independent contractor is not defined under the auspices of the 
LRA, leaving the distinction to be made on the grounds of the reality test.27 In this 
respect, the presumption created by the provisions of section 200A of the LRA is of 
pivotal importance. Section 200A provides that, until the contrary is proved, a person 
who works for or renders service to another, is presumed to be an employee, 
regardless of the form of the contract or agreement between them, if any one or 
more of the following factors are present, namely:  
• if the manner in which the person works is subject to either the control or the 
direction of another person; 
• if the person’s working hours are determined or subject to the control or 
direction of another; 
• if the person forms part of the organisation in question; 
• if the person has worked for that other person for at least 3 months, for an 
average of 40 hours per month; 
• if the person is economically dependent on the other for whom he works or 
to whom he delivers a service; 
• if the person in question is provided with tools or equipment in order to 
perform the work or service; 
• if the person only renders a service or works for that one other person. 
In terms of section 200A (2), the above-mentioned does not apply to someone who 
earns more than the amount determined by the Minister, in terms of section 6(3) of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“BCEA”). At the present date28 the earnings threshold in this respect has been set at 
205433.40 by the Minister of Labour.29 In terms of section 200A (3), if the proposed 
or existing working arrangement in question involves a person who earns less than 
or an amount equal to the earnings threshold, any of the contracting parties may 
approach the CCMA for an advisory award in respect of whether or not the persons 
involved are employees or not. 
                                                          
27  See Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 2005 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
28  5 November 2013. 
29  Government Gazette July 1 2013 http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/sectoral-
determination/basic-conditions-of-
employment/Determination%20Earnings%20Threshokd%202013.pdf (Date of use: 5 November 
2013).  
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Section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 is a mirror image 
of the provisions of section 200A of the LRA, and as such will not be repeated. In the 
Charlton case supra,30 the court distinguished between employees in respect of the 
LRA and employees for the purpose of the PDA.31  
It also needs to be noted that the LRA specifically differentiates between an 
independent contractor and a temporary employee, as a temporary employee is 
regarded as an employee. See in this respect the provisions of section 198 of the 
LRA. 
4.3 A protected disclosure  
There has been a noticeable trend in respect of the description of what a protected 
disclosure in fact encompasses, for example:  
In general, such disclosures become protected when they are made to certain 
persons and offices under certain conditions…However, irrespective of the person 
or office to whom the disclosure is made, a disclosure will be protected if certain 
conditions are met. The disclosure must be in good faith, the employee must 
reasonably believe that it is substantially true and it must not be made for personal 
gain; and the employee must have reason to believe that if disclosure is made to 
the employer, he or she will suffer an occupational detriment or the same 
information was previously disclosed to the employer with no action within a 
reasonable period or it is exceptionally serious.32  
In 2005 it was added that in general, such disclosures33 become protected when 
they are made to certain persons and offices under certain conditions. 
Not every disclosure made by an employee will be protected and only gradually 
are our Courts beginning to consider the nature of a protected disclosure and 
the protection to be afforded employees.34  
In the 2009 the matter is not directly broached:  
Not every communication or disclosure by an employee will constitute a 
protected disclosure.35  
                                                          
30  Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of SA 2007 (28) ILJ 2263 (LC); Parliament of the 
Republic of SA v Charlton 2010 (31) ILJ 2353 (LAC) and Charlton v Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 2012 (1) SA 472 (SCA).  
31  See Chapter 6. 
32  Basson Essential Labour Law (3rd ed) (1) 301. 
33  With reference to what would constitute a disclosure. 
34  Basson Essential Labour Law (4th ed) 197. 
35  Basson Essential Labour Law (5th ed) 211. 
61 
 
Before attempting to define a protected disclosure, one would need to establish what 
would constitute a disclosure. Section 1 of the PDA defines the concept of a 
disclosure as including any disclosure of information relating to the conduct of an 
employer or an employee of the relevant employer, and which is made by an 
employee who has grounds on a reasonable basis for believing that the information 
so reported has bearing on the following types of conduct that has taken place, is 
taking place, or is likely to take place: 
• A criminal offence; 
• A failure to comply with a legal obligation; 
• A miscarriage of justice; 
• The endangerment of the health or safety of a person; 
• Damage to the environment; 
• Unfair discrimination as provided for in terms of the provisions of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; 
• That any of the abovementioned is or has been deliberately concealed. 
From the above it is clear that the manner of action which would constitute a 
disclosure is not defined within the PDA, but rather the type of information that the 
disclosure relates to. What is also to be noted is how wide the relevant subjects have 
been worded, which it is argued may make it difficult for the potential whistle-blower 
to determine with safety whether his potential disclosure would in fact amount to a 
disclosure as defined above. 
A further point in this regard is that seemingly the ambit of this definition has been 
widened by the provisions of section 1(i)(a) and (b) of the Financial Services Law 
General Amendment Act 45 of 2013, by the insertion of the Pensions Fund Act 24 of 
1956, after the definition of “dependant” of the widened definition of a disclosure. It 
provides that in addition to the meaning of a disclosure as defined in terms of section 
1 of the PDA, a disclosure includes the disclosure of information relating to: 
• Any conduct of a pension fund, the administrator, board member, principal 
offer, deputy principal officer, valuator, officer or employee of a pension fund 
or administrator; and 
• The affairs of the pension fund which may prejudice the fund or its members. 
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4.3.1 A protected disclosure defined 
Not all disclosures made are protected by the provisions of the PDA, but only 
protected disclosures.  
What constitutes a protected disclosure is defined in section 1 of the PDA. According 
to the provisions of section 1, a protected disclosure includes a disclosure made to a 
legal advisor in accordance with the provisions of section 5, or to an employer in 
accordance with the provisions of section 6, or to a member of Cabinet or of the 
Executive Council of a Province in accordance with the provisions of section 7, or a 
person or a body in accordance with the provisions of section 8, or any other person 
or body in accordance with the provisions of section 9. 
However, a protected disclosure does not include a disclosure in terms of which the 
employee involved commits an offence by making the disclosure; 36 or made by a 
legal advisor to whom the relevant information was disclosed in the course of getting 
legal advice in accordance with the provisions of section 5.37 
Although the PDA does include a definition of what would constitute a disclosure, 
which is extremely relevant when determining whether a disclosure is indeed a 
protected disclosure, as one would first have to determine whether a disclosure has 
been made, should it be challenged by the opposition in the given matter, the 
definition relates more to the information disclosed than what would constitute an 
actual or alleged disclosure. 
4.3.2 Pivotal exclusions? 
During 2002, Klaaren pointed out serious challenges in respect of the scope of 
protection, and specifically with regard to what would qualify as a protected 
disclosure.38 He opined that there were at least three categories of information in 
respect of which an employee may wish to make a disclosure or would wish to 
disclose, but would not be able to claim the protection provided in terms of the PDA. 
                                                          
36  Section 1(ix)(e)(i) of the PDA. 
37  Section 1(ix)(e)(ii) of the PDA. 
38  Klaaren  2002 South African Law Journal (119) 721- 732. 
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These would include matters of ethical, professional and public or policy related 
concerns.39  
When measuring whether there is in fact merit in this argument, regard is to be had 
to the definition of a disclosure as provided for in terms of section 1 of the PDA, that 
provides that a disclosure is the disclosure of information regarding the conduct of 
either the employer or an employee in the employ of that employer, made by any 
employee (the potential whistle-blower) who has reason to believe that the 
information he has disclosed shows or tends to show the type of conduct provided 
for in terms of the aforementioned definition. 
Bearing in mind additionally the provisions of section 1(i)(a) and (b) of the Financial 
Services Law General Amendment Act 45 of 2013, it would seem that the collective 
terms in respect of the above-mentioned would be an “impropriety”, as referred to in 
terms of section 1 of the PDA, whether or not the impropriety took place in the RSA 
or in another country, or whether or not the applicable law is that of the RSA or 
another country. 
Section 1 includes the explicitly exclusionary portion, which provides that a 
disclosure will not be a protected disclosure if the employee involved commits an 
offence by making the disclosure or where it is made by a legal adviser to whom the 
information was disclosed whilst the client was seeking legal advice. 
4.3.2.1 A disclosure made in respect of an ethical issue or a policy matter 
Section 1 of the PDA expressly excludes, from the protection afforded by the PDA, 
any disclosure made by an employee in respect of ethical and policy related issues, 
if as an impropriety they do not actually or potentially also amount to an offence. 
Often time policy issues overlap with ethical issues, especially in the public sector, 
such as policies regarding the declaration of private interests, the declaration of gifts, 
(other) conflicts of interest and the declaration of work outside the ‘main’ employment 
relationship (which often in turn, overlaps with declaration of private interests). 
A policy relates to the expression of the relevant organisation of its official stance in 
respect of the relevant issue.  
                                                          
39   Klaaren  2002 South African Law Journal (119) 722. 
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Undoubtedly, ethical issues come into play in respect of whistle-blowing, whether it is 
the manner in which whistle-blowers are to be treated, whether the payment or 
reward of a whistle-blower is ethical, or whether a whistle-blower wishes to blow the 
whistle in respect of an ethical issue, as opposed to purely criminal conduct, such as 
a senior manager who does not disclose his close relationship to an employee 
“headhunted” by him, or the non-declaration of financial interests as required in 
terms of an organisation’s Code of Conduct, especially within the sphere of the 
public sector. 
The South African government too has recognised the importance in this respect, 
when reference is made to the MACC and the ACF. Preston remarks that indeed 
much of what is presented as reforms regarding accountability pertaining to 
parliamentary review committees, may be said to be part of an ethics regime within 
the public sector. Preston opines that the concerns of such an ethics regime are 
three-pronged in that it relates to political morality of elected public sector officials, 
the administrative morality of what he terms “career officials” and the constituted 
morality of existing public sector institutions.40  
Within a changing environment within the public sector of South Africa, with 
government employees being required to follow codes of ethics and conduct, 
declaring their financial interests on a yearly basis, and being required to apply for 
permission to perform additional work to that for which they have been appointed, 
one will not be hard-pressed to realise that a situation may arise, in which a whistle-
blower will want to blow the whistle in respect of such matters; ethical matters. 
Further to this, the most ethical matters within the public sector are regulated by 
policy, as opposed to legislation. Having said this, it is clear that the exclusion of 
ethical and professional concerns from the ambit of protection offered by the PDA 
constitutes a potentially serious dilemma to the professional. Thus the relevant 
considerations would lean more heavily in terms of subjective value judgements in 
respect of what is perceived to be ethical conduct, or not. However, what is certain is 
that a disclosure made in respect of policy provisions, whether or not overlapping 
with value judgements in respect of ethical conduct, and disclosures pertaining to 
                                                          
40   Preston 1995 Australian Journal of Public Administration (54) (4) 462. 
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conduct falling outside policy provisions, will not fall within the protection of the PDA, 
unless it also falls within one of the defined categories of a protected disclosure. 
Great circumspection is required by the whistle-blower in determining whether or not 
the matter he intends blowing the whistle is likely to fall within the realm of protected 
disclosures. All public service employees in South Africa need to take cognisance in 
this respect, especially when seen in light of the Code of Conduct, as implemented 
by the Public Service Commission.41  
4.3.2.2 A disclosure made in respect of which the employee concerned commits 
an offence 
Section 1 of the PDA expressly excludes, from the protection afforded by the PDA, 
any disclosure which is made by an employee, and in terms of which that employee 
commits an offence by making the said disclosure. This specific provision is 
differentiated from that discussed under paragraph 4.3.2.1 above, in that disclosures 
in respect of ethical issues and policy matters do not necessarily involve the 
employee committing a criminal offence by doing so. Snyman42 explains it as an 
offence or a crime when the conduct is in fact legally forbidden, which in principle 
may be prosecuted by the State, and which always culminates in the imposition of 
punishment.43  
Taking the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011, (hereinafter referred to as “TAACT”) 
as an example, the South African Revenue Service introduced TAACT as tax 
administration legislation aimed at providing generic provisions in order to minimise 
duplication contained in the different tax related legislation.44  
Section 236 of the TAACT, provides for criminal offences in respect of the South 
African Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as “SARS”) so-called ‘secrecy 
provisions’, providing that anyone who contravenes the provisions of sections 67(2), 
67(3), 68(2), 69(1), 69(6) or 70(5) is guilty of an offence, and upon conviction may be 
subject to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two (2) years.  
                                                          
41  Public Service Commission. Code of Conduct for Public Servants. South Africa. 
http://www.psc.gov.za/documents/code.asp (Date of use: 29 October 2013). 
42  Snyman Criminal Law (5th ed).  
43   Snyman Criminal Law (5th ed) 4-5. 
44  South African Revenue Service “Tax Administration” 
http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/TaxAdmin/Pages/default.aspx (Date of use: 28 October 2013). 
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In terms of the provisions of section 67(1) of the TAACT, the general prohibition of 
information applies to SARS ‘confidential information’ as referred to in section 
68(1) 45 and taxpayer information, and in respect of which SARS employees are 
required to make an oath or solemn declaration in respect of such secrecy. Section 
67(3) takes this a step further, by also prohibiting any other person to whom such 
information was disclosed from, in any manner, disclosing, publishing or making it 
known to any other person who is not a SARS official. 
Section 68(2) would seem to attempt to soften the restrictions a little, although it 
seems to be aimed it still restricting disclosure, even with the SARS, as it provides 
that someone who is a current or former SARS official, may not disclose SARS 
confidential information to another, who is not a SARS official, and further that 
someone who is a current or former SARS official, may not disclose SARS 
confidential information to a SARS official who is not authorised to have access to 
the information in question. 
                                                          
45  SARS confidential information and disclosure 68. (1) SARS confidential information means 
information relevant to the administration of a tax Act that is— 
(a)  personal information about a current or former SARS official, whether deceased or not; 
(b) information subject to legal professional privilege vested in SARS; 
(c) information that was supplied in confidence by a third party to SARS the disclosure of 
which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of similar information, 
or information from the same source; 
(d)  information related to investigations and prosecutions described in section 39 of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act; 
(e)  information related to the operations of SARS, including an opinion, advice, report, 
recommendation or an account of a consultation, discussion or deliberation that has 
occurred, if— 
(i)  the information was given, obtained or prepared by or for SARS for the purpose of 
assisting to formulate a policy or take a decision in the exercise of a power or 
performance of a duty conferred or imposed by law; and 
(ii)  the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to frustrate the 
deliberative process in SARS or between SARS and other organs of state by— 
 (aa)  inhibiting the candid communication of an opinion, advice, report or 
recommendation or conduct of a consultation, discussion or deliberation; or 
 (bb)  frustrating the success of a policy or contemplated policy by the premature 
disclosure thereof; 
(f) information about research being or to be carried out by or on behalf of SARS, the 
disclosure of which would be likely to prejudice the outcome of the research; 
(g)  information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the 
economic interests or financial welfare of the Republic or the ability of the government to 
manage the economy of the Republic effectively in the best interests of the Republic, 
including a contemplated change or decision to change a tax or a duty, levy, penalty, 
interest and similar moneys imposed under a Tax Act or the Customs and Excise Act; 
(h)  information supplied in confidence by or on behalf of another state or an international 
organisation to SARS; 
(i)  a computer program, as defined in section 1(1) of the Copyright Act, 1978 (Act No. 98 of 
1978), owned by SARS; and 
(j)  information relating to the security of SARS buildings, property, structures or systems. 
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So too, a person who is an existing or former SARS official may disclose SARS 
confidential information if: the information concerned is public information; 46  it is 
authorised by the Commissioner of SARS;47 disclosure thereof is authorised under 
any other Act which provides expressly for the disclosure of information despite the 
provisions of this Chapter of TAACT;48 access to the information and its subsequent 
disclosure has been granted in terms of the provisions of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act;49 or the disclosure of the information in question is required by an 
order of the High Court.50 
Section 69 of the TAACT, provides for the secrecy of taxpayer information and 
general disclosure. Both former and current SARS employees must preserve the 
secrecy of taxpayer information, except when performing their duties under a tax 
act51, including the disclosure of such information to the SAPS and the NPA, as a 
witness to litigation and the like. 
Section 69(2)(b) provides that section 69(1) does not prohibit the disclosure of 
taxpayer information by a former or current SARS official, under any other Act which 
expressly provides for the disclosure of the information, despite the provisions of this 
Chapter. It is argued that this section too does not include the PDA, as the PDA in no 
manner expressly provides for such information to be disclosed. Consideration is 
also to be given to the fact that all employees dealing with classified information, as 
provided for in terms of the Minimum Information Security Standards, and classified 
as confidential, secret and top secret, would potentially be committing an offence in 
attempting to make a protected disclosure involving such information, and as such 
would not enjoy the protection offered by the PDA. It is argued that JCPS Cluster 
employees would potentially fall within this category of employees, depending of 
course on the relevant circumstances, and ascertained on a case-by-case manner. 
It seems worthy to point out in this respect that state or public service employees are 
mostly potentially affected in this regard, and that this provision strongly contends 
with the concept of state privilege. 
                                                          
46  Section 68(3)(a) of the TAACT, 
47  Section 68(3)(b) of the TAACT, 
48  Section 68(3)(c) of the TAACT, 
49  Section 68(3)(d) of the TAACT, 
50  Section 68(3)(e) of the TAACT, 
51  Section 69(2)(a) of the TAACT. 
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Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe52 broach the background to state privilege and the 
impact of constitutional provisions, pointing out that the repeal of section 66 of the 
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 followed on the interim Constitution, a mere 6 
months before the final Constitution came into operation. In terms of the provisions 
of section 66 (1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982, the courts’ jurisdiction was 
unseated in matters affecting state security. They state further that the provisions of 
section 66(1) would not have been able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
especially in light of the provisions of sections 165, 32, 34 and 35(3) (i) of the 
Constitution. 53  
The provisions of section 9(1)(b) of the PDA may (perhaps indirectly) attempt to 
enforce a type of state privilege in respect of disclosures sought to be made, and 
involving for example classified information. This position seems intolerable, 
especially when seen in light of the constitution imperative in terms of section 16 of 
the Constitution, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
Whistle-blowers should not be (potentially) unconstitutionally and unfairly bound as a 
result of classified information; the legislature should rethink this provision, and 
perhaps construct strict guidelines and requirements to be met in this respect in 
order to be in accordance with the requirements of an open and accountable 
democratic society based on fairness and equality. The reasoning of the court in the 
case of Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd & others v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa54 and as reflected in Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe55  
may provide useful considerations in this respect, in that in such matters:  
1. The Court is not bound by the ipse dixit of any cabinet minister or bureaucrat 
irrespective of whether the objection is taken to a class of documents or a 
specific document and irrespective of whether it relates to matters of State 
security, military operations, diplomatic relations, economic affairs, cabinet 
meetings or any other matter affecting the public interest. 
                                                          
52  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed). 
53   Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 163. 
54  Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd & others v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
1999 (2) SA 279 (T) 343-344. 
55   Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 164. 
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2. The Court is entitled to scrutinise the evidence in order to determine the 
strength of the public interests affected and the extent to which the interests 
of justice to a litigant might be harmed by its non-disclosure. 
3. The Court has to balance the extent to which it is necessary to disclose the 
evidence for the purpose of doing justice against the public interest in its 
non-disclosure. 
4. In this regard the onus should be on the State to show why it is necessary 
for the information to remain hidden. 
5. In a proper case the Court should call for oral evidence, in camera where 
necessary, and should permit cross-examination of any witness or probe the 
validity of the objection itself. 
The similarities and conflicts are clear. 
4.3.3 A disclosure made by a legal adviser 
Section 1 of the PDA expressly excludes a legal advisor from claiming the protection 
proffered by the PDA in circumstances in which such legal advisor discloses 
information that was disclosed to him, whilst the initial discloser was disclosing in 
order to obtain legal advice in respect of the matter. One has to wonder whether this 
provision relates to the rules of the law of evidence pertaining to private privilege. In 
both criminal and civil proceedings the communications which are made between a 
lawyer (legal professional) and his client may not be disclosed without the client’s 
consent. In S v Safatsa56 the court expressed clear views regarding the rationale 
behind privilege in this context, stating that in the conflict between the principle that 
all relevant evidence should be disclosed in the hearing of a matter and the principle 
that communications that have transpired between a lawyer and his client, it has 
been determined that the communications between a lawyer and client prevails. The 
rationale behind this determination lies in the public interest, as it is said that 
otherwise the accomplishment of justice would otherwise be handicapped. The court 
further expressed the view that this privilege between a lawyer and his client reaches 
beyond only those communications made for the purpose of litigation, covering all 
communications made for the purpose of seeking and receiving advice, and that 
seen in this light is more than just a rule of evidence. 
                                                          
56  S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 686 (A) 886.  
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It is a doctrine which is based upon the view that confidentiality is 
necessary for the proper functioning of the legal system and not merely 
the proper conduct of particular litigation…(own emphasis).57 
This stance was echoed by the court in the case of Bennett v Minister of Safety and 
Security,58 with the court emphasising that the privilege between a client and an 
attorney is in fact a substantive rule of law which demands compliance. It would 
seem that the legislature has sought to place a double gate of safety in place, in 
respect of communications with a legal practitioner. The first gate placed in respect 
of communications with legal practitioners is set in terms of the principles of the law 
of evidence (substantive law), and in respect of which, such communication is 
privileged should set requirements be met, such as the following: during the 
communication, the legal advisor must be acting in his professional capacity, which 
will of necessity be determined on the basis of the relevant matter’s circumstances; 
the communication must be made in confidence, which will also be determined on 
the facts of each matter; the communication must be made for the specific purpose 
of obtaining legal advice; and the client (person seeking the legal advice) must claim 
the privilege of the communication. 
The rationale behind privilege is clarified by Heydon in Schwikkard and Van der 
Merwe59 as being in essence to level the playing fields between people who may not 
be equal in wealth, power, intelligence and the capacity to handle the challenges 
they may be facing. Privilege seeks to encourage the client to share all the facts of 
the matter with the legal representative should hear, as opposed to only the facts 
that the client believes may favour him or her. 60  
It needs to be noted that in terms of the provisions of the PDA, it would not seem as 
though the client is in a position to waive the privilege, enabling the legal advisor to 
disclose in a protected manner. 
A protected disclosure made in terms of the provisions of section 5 of the PDA, is the 
only disclosure that need not be made in good faith. It is uncertain as to why the 
legislature chose to differentiate in this manner, but it may be motivated by the same 
                                                          
57  S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 686 (A) 886 at 146. 
58  Bennett v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (1) SACR 523 (T) 
59  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed).  
60  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 145-146. 
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reasoning set out in the paragraph above. 61  This section 62  provides that any 
disclosure made to a legal practitioner, or to a person whose job involves giving legal 
advice, and with the aim of and in the course of getting legal advice is a protected 
disclosure. Section 201 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 strengthens this 
principle and provides as follows in this regard:  
No legal practitioner qualified to practise in any court, whether within the 
Republic or elsewhere, shall be competent, without the consent of the person 
concerned, to give evidence at criminal proceedings against any person by 
whom he is professionally employed or consulted as to any fact, matter or thing 
with regard to which such practitioner would not on the thirtieth day of May, 
1961, by reason of such employment or consultation, have been competent to 
give evidence without such consent: Provided that such legal practitioner shall 
be competent and compellable to give evidence as to any fact, matter or thing 
which relates to or is connected with the commission of any offence with which 
the person by whom such legal practitioner is professionally employed or 
consulted, is charged, if such fact, matter or thing came to the knowledge of 
such legal practitioner before he was professionally employed or consulted with 
reference to the defence of the person concerned. 
4.3.4  A protected disclosure made to an employer 
Under certain circumstances a disclosure made to an employer will be a protected 
disclosure; however, it needs to meet the following requirements: the disclosure has 
to be made in good faith; 63 and the disclosure has to be made substantially in 
accordance with any procedure that the employee’s employer has prescribed or 
authorised, for reporting or otherwise addressing the impropriety concerned;64 or a 
disclosure made in good faith to the employer of the employee, where there is no 
prescribed procedure as mentioned in the above-mentioned paragraph.65 
An employee who makes a disclosure to someone who is not his or her employer is 
deemed for the purposes of the PDA to have made a disclosure to his or her 
employer, if the disclosure is made in accordance with a procedure that has been 
authorised by his or her employer.66 It is argued that examples in this regard would 
include a civil servant using the NACH to make a protected disclosure, if the 
department he works for allows or promotes this, or where an employee makes the 
                                                          
61    Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 145-146. 
62  Section 5 of the PDA. 
63  Section 6(1) of the PDA. 
64  Section 6(1)(a) of the PDA. 
65  Section 6(1)(b) of the PDA. 
66  Section 6(2) of the PDA. 
72 
 
disclosure to a hotline (such as one run by KPMG or PWC), and where the hotline 
function has been outsourced to a service provider by the employer. 
4.3.5  A protected disclosure to a member of Cabinet or the Executive Council 
A protected disclosure can also be made to a member of Cabinet or the Executive 
Council of the RSA, in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the PDA. 
Such a disclosure, to be protected, has to meet the following requirements:  
• The disclosure has to be made to such member in good faith;67 and 
• The employee making such disclosure has to be in the employ of an 
employer  who is: 
o An individual appointed in terms of legislation by a member of 
Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a province in the RSA;68 
o A body, the members of which have been appointed in terms of 
legislation by a member of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a 
province of the RSA;69 or 
o An organ of state falling within the sphere of responsibility of the 
member concerned.70 An organ of state is defined in section 1(vii) of 
the PDA as being –  
 Any department of state or administration in both the national 
or provincial sphere of government or any municipality in the 
local sphere of government;71 or 
 Any other functionary or institution when –  
• Exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution;72 or 
• Exercising a public power, or performing a public 
function in terms of any legislation.73 
 
                                                          
67  Section 7 of the PDA. 
68  Section 7(a) of the PDA. 
69  Section 7(b) of the PDA. 
70  Section 7(c) of the PDA. 
71  Section 1(vii)(a) of the PDA. 
72  Section 1(vii)(b)(i) of the PDA. 
73  Section 1(vii)(b)(ii) of the PDA. 
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4.3.6 A protected disclosure made to certain persons or bodies 
Disclosures made in terms of the following requirements will also be regarded as 
being protected disclosures:  
• Any disclosure made in good faith to the Public Protector;74 
The Public Protector’s mandate, as stated on the official website page, includes inter 
alia the strengthening the South African constitutional democracy by investigating 
and addressing improper and prejudicial conduct, maladministration, and the abuse 
of power. 75  It also includes the Public Protector investigating violations of the 
Executive Members Ethics Act of 1994, resolving disputes relating to the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act of 2000, and discharging other responsibilities as 
mandated by the following legislation:  
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996;  
• Public Protector Act 23 of 1994;  
• Executive Members Ethics Act 82 of 1998;  
• Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA);  
• Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996;  
• Special Investigation Units and Special Tribunals Ac t 74 of 1996;  
• Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000;  
• National Archives and Record Service Act 43 of 1996;  
• National Energy Act 40 of 2004;  
• Housing Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998;  
• National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1999;  
• Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000;  
                                                          
74  Section 8(1)(a) of the PDA. 
75  Public Protector of South Africa, Vision and Mission of the Public Protector 
http://www.pprotect.org.about_us/Vision_mission.asp (Date of use: 23 May 2013). 
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• Public Finance Management Act of 1999 and  
• Lotteries Act 57 of 1997.  
• Any disclosure made in good faith to the Auditor General;76 
The mandate and functions of the Auditor General are described in section 188 of 
the Constitution, and also regulated in terms of the provisions of the Public Audit Act 
25 of 2004.77  
Further to this, the employee making the disclosure must reasonably believe that the 
relevant impropriety falls within the description of matters that are ordinarily dealt 
with by the person or body concerned;78 and the information disclosed, including any 
allegation made thereby is or are substantially true.79 
A person or a body referred to in section 8 or prescribed in terms of the provisions of 
section 8(1), who is of opinion that the matter would in fact be more appropriately 
dealt with by another person or body referred to or prescribed in terms of section 8, 
must render such assistance as may be necessary, to enable the employee to 
comply with the provisions of section 8.80 
4.3.7  Making a general protected disclosure 
Besides the manners in which a protected disclosure may be made, and as dealt 
with above, there are additional ways in which a general protected disclosure may be 
made, and as prescribed in terms of the provisions of section 9 of the PDA. This 
includes the following: 
Any disclosure which is made in good faith by an employee who reasonably believes 
that the information disclosed, and any allegation in it are substantially true 81, and 
                                                          
76  Section 8(1)(b) of the PDA. 
77   Auditor General of South Africa, Mandate and Functions of the Auditor General 
http://www.agsa.co.za/AboutUs.aspx (Date of use: 23 May 2013). 
78  Section 8(1)(c)(i) of the PDA. 
79  Section 8(1)(c)(ii) of the PDA. 
80  Section 8(2) of the PDA. 
81  Section 9(1)(a) of the PDA. 
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who does not make the disclosure for personal gain, excluding any reward which is 
payable in terms of any law82, is a protected disclosure if:  
• In all the circumstances of the case it is reasonable to make the disclosure; 
and 
• One or more of the following conditions apply -  
o That at the time of making the disclosure the employee has reason to 
believe that he or she will be subjected to occupational detriment if 
he or she makes the disclosure to his or her employer as provided for 
in terms of section 6 of the PDA; 
o That in the set of circumstances no body or person has been 
prescribed for the purposes of section 883 in relation to the relevant 
impropriety, the employee making the disclosure has reason to 
believe that it is likely that evidence relating to the allegation/s will be 
concealed or destroyed if he or she makes the disclosure to his or 
her employer; 
o That the employee has previously made the same disclosure, with 
substantially the same information, to the employer or a person or 
body referred to in section 8, in respect of which no action was taken 
within a reasonable period after the disclosure was made. In 
determining whether it was reasonable for the employee in these 
circumstances to make the disclosure, what has to be considered is 
any action taken by the employer or the person or body to whom the 
disclosure was made, or might reasonably be expected to have taken 
as a result of the previous disclosure. Further to this, where the 
disclosure was previously made to the employer, whether the 
employee complied with any procedure that was authorised by the 
employer. A subsequent disclosure may be regarded as a 
disclosure of substantially the same information as provided for in 
section 9(2)(c), where such subsequent disclosure extends to 
information concerning an action taken or not taken by any person as 
a result of such previous disclosure. 
                                                          
82  Section 9(1)(b) of the PDA. 
83  Protected disclosure to certain persons or bodies. 
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o Or that the impropriety is of an exceptionally serious nature. 
In establishing whether it was reasonable to make the disclosure, as provided for 
above, and in terms of section 9(1)(ii) of the PDA, the following factors according to 
section 9(3)(a-g) have to be taken into account: the identity of the person to whom 
the disclosure was made; the seriousness of the impropriety; whether or not the 
impropriety is or is likely to continue in the future; whether or not the disclosure has 
been made in breach of a duty of confidentiality of the employer towards any other 
person; and the public interest. 
4.3.7.1 Reconciling the section 1 definition of a ‘disclosure’ and section 9(1)(b) of 
the PDA 
The section 1 definition of the PDA of a ‘disclosure’ makes it clear that any number 
of the categories might relate to alleged actual or potential criminal conduct, which 
the potential whistle-blower might wish to disclose in a manner that renders it a 
protected disclosure. Within this context, and in relation to general disclosures, note 
must be taken of the provisions of section 9(1)(b) of the PDA, which provide that 
should the prescribed circumstances and conditions provided for be met, the good 
faith disclosure by the employee may not be made for the purposes of personal gain, 
excluding any reward payable in terms of any law (own emphasis). 
Once again the legislature thought it good to cast the net exceptionally wide in 
respect of the payable rewards, and the potential whistle-blower would be well 
advised and warned to ensure that should he be granted or offered a financial or 
other reward for relinquishing his information held, within the context of an 
employment relationship, the said reward is legislatively sanctioned. It can only be 
assumed in this respect the legislature perhaps meant to distinguish between an 
informer, an information merchant and an extorter. 
4.4 Occupational detriment 
The PDA provides that an employee making a protected disclosure may not be 
subjected to occupational detriment by the employer as a result of the employee 
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having made a protected disclosure.84 What constitutes occupational detriment in the 
working environment of the employee is defined in section 1of the Act as:  
• being subjected to any disciplinary action; 
• dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated; 
• transferred against his or her will; 
• refused either a transfer or a promotion; 
• subjected to a term or condition of employment or retirement which is 
altered or kept altered to his or her disadvantage; 
• refused a reference, or being provided with an adverse reference by his or 
her employer; 
• denied appointment to any employment, profession or office; 
• being threatened with any of the actions referred to in the paragraphs 
above; 
• being adversely affected in another manner in respect of his or her 
employment, profession or office, including both employment opportunities 
and work security 
In this regard it is noted that the legislature did not attempt to define the categories of 
occupational detriment in the PDA. 
McGregor85 identifies three requirements to be met in order to establish an unfair 
labour practice founded on occupation detriment86, namely that:  
• the employee must have made a protected disclosure in terms of the 
provisions of the PDA; 
• the employee’s employer must have taken action against the employee, which 
action amounts to occupational detriment; and 
• there must be a causal link between the disclosure made and the 
occupational detriment alleged. 
She has further opined87 in an in-depth discussion of the Engineering Council of SA 
& another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality88 case that the reason for 
                                                          
84  Section 3 of the PDA. 
85  McGregor  2007 Juta’s Business Law 15(4) 160-163. 
86  McGregor  2007 Juta’s Business Law 15(4) 160. 
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prohibiting the infliction of occupational detriment 89  upon an employee who has 
made a protected disclosure, within the meaning of the PDA is to be found in the fact 
that the PDA promotes accountability and openness in the workplace, without fear of 
reprisal aimed at the whistle-blower. 
The court in a relatively recent case, Ngobeni v Minister of Communications and 
another90 very clearly summarises the potentially precarious position of the whistle-
blower in respect of occupational detriment to be suffered as follows91: 
The irony however is that our whistle-blowing framework does not always and 
immediately provide the protection whistle-blowers expect and deserve. Given 
the various powerful political forces and interests at stake in the scramble to lay 
hands on the public purse, that valiant act of exposing malfeasant within the 
public service might be a career limiting move if not the beginning of a long 
nightmare. 
It also highlights how pivotal the nexus is that needs to be demonstrated between the 
disclosure made and the alleged occupational detriment, 
In this case, the whistle-blower had approached the court in a bid to have a pending 
disciplinary enquiry, with him as the accused employees, halted, claiming that the 
disciplinary enquiry was in actual fact retribution being exacted against him as a 
result of a protected disclosure made. 
The court specifically sought a causal connection between the disclosure and the 
disciplinary action sought. 
In light of the fact that there were allegations which had been levelled against the 
whistle-blower, which at that stage remained untested the court held that he would 
have to answer the allegations so levelled against him, no matter how spurious and 
unsustainable.92 The court couldn’t find that there was the necessary nexus, holding 
that the employer was entitled to invoke the disciplinary actions, and that in this 
regard, the whistle-blower’s remedies were to be found in the provisions of section 4 
of the PDA. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
87  McGregor 2014 GST Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) 4(1) 87-94. 
88  Engineering Council of SA & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2008) 29 ILJ 
899 (T). 
89  McGregor 2014 GST Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) 4(1) 88. 
90  Ngobeni v Minister of Communications and another (2014) 35 ILJ 2506 (LC). 
91  At paragraph 2. 
92  At paragraph 71. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The central South African whistle-blowing legislation, defining the relevant concepts 
and offering both the defined avenues of reporting and protection to whistle-blowers 
is the PDA. Since its inception no amendments have been made to its text. With 
reference to who it aims to protect it is clear that the protection is aimed only at the 
relationship between the employer (both a natural and juristic person) and employee 
(excluding independent contractors), in both the private and public sectors. Within 
this relationship, the PDA provides clearly that no provision in a contract of 
employment or other agreement entered into between the employer and employee 
may attempt to exclude the provisions in the Act. However, what needs to be noted 
in this regard at the very outset is that the PDA does not offer protection to the 
whistle-blower who as a result of his or her position has had to agree to or sign an 
“oath of secrecy” or secrecy clause, in respect of which disclosure would then 
become illegal.  
The PDA provides the following reporting avenues:  
• to a legal advisor in terms of section 5 (interestingly enough the only one 
that does not require the whistle-blower to report in good faith); 
• to the employer or an external party if authorised by the employer’s internal 
procedures (section 5); 
• to a member of Cabinet or the Executive Council (section 7); 
• the Public Protector, the Auditor General or another body prescribed for this 
purpose (section 8); 
• general disclosures (section 9) 
Two very basic determinations that need to be made relate to whether a disclosure 
was made, and if such disclosure is found to have been made, whether the said 
disclosure is a protected disclosure. The definition of a disclosure excludes the 
manner of the disclosure, and only relates to the widely defined type of information 
disclosed. 
The ambit of a disclosure as per the provisions of sections 1(a) – (g) of the PDA has 
ostensibly been widened by the provisions of sections 1(i) (a) and (b) of the Financial 
Services Law General Amendment Act 45 of 2013 and in respect of the Pension 
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Fund Act 24 of 1965, by providing for defined disclosures relating to the affairs of 
pension funds and their administration which may prejudice the fund or its members. 
A potentially pivotal exclusion from the ambit of a protected disclosure is that 
disclosures pertaining to ethical, professional and policy related matters are 
excluded from protection in as far as they do not relate to a legal obligation. 
A challenge of a concerning nature has been identified in terms of section 1(ix)(ii) of 
the PDA, which excludes from protection afforded by the PDA any disclosure which 
is made by an employee, and in terms of which the employee commits an offence by 
the making of such disclosure. This would seem to pose the greatest threat to state 
employees and public servants, especially in light of classified information, which 
often is part of their employment world and duties. It is opined that the legislature will 
need to rethink this specific provision and the approach to it as it may be 
unconstitutional when weighed up against the requirements of our open and 
democratic society based on fairness and equality, firmly cemented within our 
Constitution. 
Section 1 of the PDA expressly excludes a legal advisor (professional) from claiming 
the protection proffered by the PDA in circumstances in which he discloses 
information disclosed to him, whilst the initial discloser was disclosing in order to 
obtain legal advice in respect of the matter. This limitation is opined to have its 
foundation acceptable and firmly set in substantive law which demands that 
confidentiality in this context is maintained for the proper functioning of our legal 
system. 
In keeping with this view and in terms of section 5 of the PDA a disclosure need not 
be made in good faith to a legal professional in order to be a protected disclosure. It 
is assumed that this is so to ensure the required frankness by the client in consulting 
with the legal professional. 
In respect of a general disclosure, and more specifically in respect of the provisions 
of section 9(1)(b) of the PDA, the potential whistle-blower would be well advised to 
ensure that if a reward is offered for the information concerned, and in respect of the 
employment relationship, that that reward is legislatively sanctioned, and that he is 
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acting in good faith as an informer as opposed to an actual or perceived information 
merchant or extorter, which would nullify the protection sought. 
The protection that is provided is aimed against acts causing occupational detriment 
to the whistle-blower, and as widely defined in terms of section 1 of the PDA. 
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CHAPTER 5: FURTHER PROVISIONS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
AFFECTING WHISTLE-BLOWERS 
5.1 Introduction 
Martin1 in her stock-taking of the state of whistle-blowing in South Africa refers to four 
key elements that make up the whistle-blowing framework in South Africa,2 including 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, Protected Disclosures Act 26 
of 2000, Companies Act 71 of 2008, and the Open Democracy Bill 71 of 2008 (which 
was never enacted). 
There is however, a fifth main piece of the framework which relates to the guidelines 
for employees that came into operation at the end of August 2011. Simultaneously, it 
should be noted that there are various pieces of legislation that further contribute to 
bolstering or pertain to the provisions of the PDA and the predicament faced by 
informers who may not fall within the ambit of the PDA, even taking into account that 
some of these were enacted before the PDA. 
There are also provisions in South African legislation which requires the whistle to be 
blown under threat of criminal charges being instituted in the face of non-compliance, 
such as the provisions of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 
of 2004 and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, involving even the 
gagging of the whistle-blower. In turn this leads to considerations pertaining to the 
protection of whistle-blowers and informants in respect of testifying, especially in 
criminal procedures.  
5.2 Practical guidelines for employees in terms of section 10(4)(a) of the PDA 
Section 10(4)(a) of the PDA provides that guidelines which explain the provisions of 
the PDA and all the procedures which may be available to employees in terms of 
legislation, to employees who are desirous of reporting or otherwise remedying an 
impropriety. On 31 of August 2011 the Practical Guidelines for Employees in terms of 
                                                          
1  Martin 2010 
 www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 24 May 2013). 
2  Martin 2010 
 www.opendemocracy.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ODAC_Whistleblowing_Report_web.pdf (Date of use: 24 May 2013).  
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section 10(4)(a) of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as 
“the guidelines”) were issued. The introduction to the guidelines3 states that both 
employees and employers have a responsibility in respect of disclosing criminal and 
other irregular conduct in the workplace, and further that every employer is 
responsible for taking all the necessary steps to facilitate disclosures without fear of 
reprisal.  The guidelines go on to describe the purpose of the PDA, how it works, how 
to make a disclosure in order for it to be protected, against what a whistle-blower is 
protected, and what to do should he or she be victimised as a result of the fact that a 
protected disclosure has been made. Part II of the guidelines deal with “other” 
procedures available to a whistle-blower, outside the provisions of the PDA, and in 
this regard, the following are referred to: 
•   The Public Service Act 103 of 1994; 
•   The Defence Act 42 of 2000; 
•   The South African Police Act 68 of 1995; 
•   The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; and finally  
•   The Western Cape Public Protector Act 6 of 1994. 
Each of these will now be dealt with in the context of whistle-blowing. 
5.3 The Public Service Act 103 of 1994 
The Public Service Act aims at providing for matters pertaining to the public service 
in South Africa, including inter alia the regulation of employment conditions, discipline 
and discharge of public service employees.  
The guidelines point to the fact that in terms of the Public Service Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the “PSA”) a complaint or grievance regarding an official act or 
omission may be investigated by the Public Service Commission, in terms of the 
provisions of section 35(1). It terms of the provisions of section 35(1) an officer or 
employee is permitted to lodge a complaint or grievance with the relevant executing 
authority in prescribed circumstances, on prescribed conditions and in the prescribed 
manner. Should the complaint or grievance so submitted not be resolved, the 
                                                          
3  Practical Guidelines for Employees in terms of Section 10(4) (a) of the PDA, 2000. Government 
Gazette No. 34572, Government Notice No. 702 
www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2011/20110831_gg34572_n702-disclosure-
guidelines.pdf (Date of use: 25 May 2013). 
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executing authority in question shall then submit the dispute to the Public Service 
Commission in the prescribed manner, and within the prescribed time.  
What needs to be noted from section 35(1) is that it differentiates between an 
“employee” and an “officer”. 
Section 8(1)(a) excludes the following from the definition of an employee as set out in 
section 8(1)(c):  
(a) hold posts on the fixed establishment 4— 
(i) classified in the A division and the B division;5 
(ii) in the services;6 
(iii) in the Agency7 or the Service; and 
(iv) in state educational institutions;8 
 
“officer” means a person who has been appointed permanently, 
notwithstanding that such appointment may be on probation, to a post 
contemplated in section 8(1)(a), and includes a person contemplated in section 
8(1)(b) or 8(3)(c); 
Section 8(1)(b) provides that:  
(1) The public service shall consist of persons who— 
(a) hold posts on the fixed establishment— 
(i) classified in the A division and the B division; 
(ii) in the services; 
(iii) in the Agency or the Service; and 
(iv) in state educational institutions; 
(b) (i) having ceased to hold posts on the fixed establishment contemplated 
in paragraph (a), and not having retired or having been discharged, are 
employed additional to the fixed establishment or who are deemed to 
continue to hold posts under the circumstances contemplated in 
subsection 3(c); 
(ii) are appointed permanently additional to the fixed establishment; 
Section 8(3)(c) provides that:  
Any officer whose post has been excluded from both the divisions 
aforementioned shall, for the purposes of this Act and the applicable pension 
                                                          
4  Section 1 of the PSA defines a fixed establishment as follows - “fixed establishment” means 
the posts which have been created for the normal and regular requirements of a department. 
5  The PSA in no manner clarifies the terms A Division and B Division. 
6  Section 1 of the PSA defines services as follows - “Service” means the Service as defined in 
section 1 of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994. 
7  Section 1 of the PSA defines agency as follows - “Agency” means the Agency as defined in 
section 1 of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994. 
8  Section 1 of the PSA defines state educational institution as follows - “state educational 
institution” means an institution (including an office controlling such institution), other than a 
university or technikon, which is wholly or partially funded by the State and in regard to which 
the remuneration and service conditions of educators are determined by law; 
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law, be deemed to continue to hold a post in the division in which his or her post 
was included immediately before the determination whereby such exclusion was 
effected came into force. 
Note needs to be taken of the fact that employees within the employ of the South 
African Secret Service, as defined in terms of the Intelligence Services Act 65 of 
2002 are specifically excluded from the right created in terms of section 35(1) of the 
PSA, as are employees working within education institutions, other than universities 
partially or wholly funded by the State. The Intelligence Services Act does not define 
an employee at all. 
An “executing authority” is defined in section 1 of the Act as including the Office of 
the President, the Office of the Deputy President, a department or organisational 
component which falls in a Cabinet portfolio, the Office of the Commission, Office of 
the Premier of a province, and a provincial department within the Executive Council 
portfolio. 
In this regard the guidelines also refer to the Public Service’s Code of Conduct which 
obliges a public service employee to report certain matters, and as dealt with in 
Chapter 3. It has to be highlighted that the guidelines in no manner clarifies the 
position in respect of when an employee’s disclosure would qualify as a protected 
disclosure if made in terms of section 35(1) of the PSA. It is assumed that the 
potential whistle-blower would need to weigh up his obligation within his 
circumstances, and decide in terms of which section to make the disclosure. 
The guidelines in no manner clarify which employees within the public service are 
accorded the right in accordance with the provisions of section 35(1), and certainly 
do not forewarn those excluded. Further to this section 35(1) of the PSA makes 
mention of the submission of the complaint in terms of the prescribed conditions and 
in the prescribed manner. A thorough search of the internet site of the PSC (Public 
Service Commission) reveals only one option in respect of whistle-blowing, and that 
is submitting a complaint electronically to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline 
(NACH).9 
                                                          
9  Public Service Commission “Feedback information” 
http://www.psc.gov.za/feedback/feedback_form.asp (Date of use: 24 May 2013). 
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The second portion in this regard deals with the Code of Conduct for public servants 
which place a duty on a public servant to report in respect of an employee who is 
enjoined to report to the appropriate authorities fraud, corruption, nepotism, 
maladministration and any other act or omission for that matter which constitutes an 
offence or which is prejudicial to the public interest, during the course of his or her 
official duties.  
What is noteworthy in this respect is that the Code places a duty on such an 
employee, whilst section 35(1) of the PSA imposes an optional right, couching it as 
“may”, as opposed to “shall” or “must”. The guidelines reveal another anomaly in 
respect of the application of the “above-mentioned” 10 in stating that “it” applies to the 
following persons who are employed in the public service:  
(a)  employees of all national departments, provincial administrations and 
provincial departments and organisational components listed in Schedules 1 
to 3 of the Public Service Act, 1994; and 
(b)  employees in the South African Police Service, the South African National  
Defence Force, Department of Correctional Services, state educational 
institutions, as defined in the Public Service Act, 1994, the National 
Intelligence Agency, and South African Secret Service, but only insofar as 
they are not contrary to the laws governing their employment.11 
Contrary to the provisions of section 35(1) of the PSA, the Code places a perilous 
duty upon employees in the National Intelligence Agency and the South African 
Secret Service, adding though that they may not meet this duty so imposed if it would 
mean that the disclosure would be contrary to any legislation governing their 
employment. Further to this, it would seemingly also mean that a double duty is 
placed upon employees of the SAPS. 
5.4 The Defence Act 42 of 2000 
The guidelines mention the Defence Act, as well as the fact that the South African 
Defence Force (hereinafter referred to as the “SANDF”) is comprised of two types of 
                                                          
10  It is not clear whether the “above-mentioned” includes only the Code of Conduct or section 
35(1) of the PSA as well. 
11  This classification is not referred to in any legislation or document by the guidelines. 
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members, namely those appointed in terms of the PSA (or so-called “civilians”) and 
those appointed in terms of the Defence Act 42 of 2002.12  
In terms of whistle-blowing the civilian members of the SANDF are entitled to utilise 
the provisions of the PDA. The members appointed in terms of the Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the “DA 2002”), are however subject to the provisions of the DA 2002, 
as well as the provisions of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 
“DA 1957”), as the Military Discipline Code is still embodied within the First Schedule 
of this Act. In respect of the DA 2002, there are noteworthy legislated limitations 
relevant within the context of whistle-blowing that cognisance must be taken of, 
provided for in terms of section 50 and in respect of the communication of 
information and the right to join and participate in the activities of trade unions.  
In terms of the provisions of section 50, subject to the Constitution, the rights of 
employees and members may be restricted in the following manners: 
• Members of the Defence Force and employees may be subjected to 
restrictions of any kind of information to the extent that may be necessary for 
security and the protection of information; 
• As may be necessary  for national security and the maintenance of structure 
and discipline in the Defence Force, the rights of members of the regular 
force, serving members of the reserve force and members of any auxiliary 
force to join in and participate in the activities of any organisations and trade 
unions may be restricted. 
No mention of the above-mentioned restrictions, and within context of the duties 
provided for in terms of the Military Discipline Code, is made in the guidelines, nor is 
it mentioned that both the civilian employees and members fall under the blanket 
coverage of the section 50 provisions. Nor is any mention made of the potentially 
harsh penalties that have been provided for in terms of section 104 of the DA 2002 
for offences which may very well be committed in attempting to blow the whistle. 
On conviction the person may be liable to either a fine or imprisonment for up to 25 
years. 
                                                          
12  Note has to be taken that the SANDF encompasses the South African Army, Air Force, Navy 
and Military Health Service. 
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It would seem that the only safeguard in such circumstances would be to obtain the 
necessary authority required in terms of the provisions. However, having said that, 
within the context of the SANDF environment, two provisions were found that could 
potentially be aimed at protecting a whistle-blower, 13 who is a member, namely, 
sections 104(16) and (17).  
In terms of the provisions of section 104(16) any person who discloses the identity of 
a covert source of the SANDF, without the necessary authority, is guilty of an offence 
and liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period of not more than 25 
years. 
Section 104(17) provides that any person who undermines or stifles any procedure 
for the redress of grievances, or attempts to do is guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period of not more than 5 years. 
As pointed out by the guidelines, the Military Discipline Code as found in the First 
Schedule of the DA 1957, sections 7, 21 and 134 have bearing on potential whistle-
blowers. However, the Military Discipline Code is not available on the internet for 
analysis purposes within this context. The SANDF’s homepage was also searched in 
this regard, to no avail.  
5.5 The South African Police Act 68 of 1995 
As discussed above, and in accordance with the provisions of the guidelines, South 
African Police Service members fall within the ambit of the duty created by the Public 
Service Code of Conduct, and in respect of reporting certain irregularities as defined. 
The guidelines further refer to the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, 
(hereinafter referred to as the “SAPS Act”) which is aimed at providing for the 
establishment, organisation, regulation and control of the South African Police 
Service (hereinafter referred to as the “SAPS”), and matters related thereto; and 
more specifically Regulation 18(10) of the SAPS Discipline Regulations, issued in 
terms of section 24(1)(g) of the SAPS Act. 
                                                          
13  For obvious reasons not necessarily meaning the whistle-blower as provided for in the strict 
sense within the PDA context. 
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Government Gazette 28985, Government Notice 643, dated 3 of July 2006 states 
that it pertains to the disciplinary regulations for the SAPS, and has been provided for 
by the Minister for Safety and Security under section 24(1) of the SAPS Act. No 
updated relevant regulation could be found.14 It has to be noted that the guidelines 
refer to the fact that an employee commits misconduct if he or she “withholds or 
unreasonably delays any complaint or an adverse communication in connection with 
another employee or person employed by the Service. In this regard reference is 
then made to Regulation 18(10) of the South African Police Service Discipline 
Regulations, issued under section 24(1)(g) of the SAPS Act, 1995. Reference is also 
made of Regulation 18(9), although no Government Gazette cross reference is 
supplied. Within the current discipline regulations, it has to be noted that there is no 
Regulation 18(9) or (10), as regulation 18 ends at regulation 18(5). 
It seems probable that the guidelines may have been referring to the repealed 
Discipline Regulations 2005. Then there are the regulations applicable to the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (hereinafter referred to as “DPCI”), as 
provided for in terms of Government Gazette No. 33524, Government Notice No.783, 
dated 7 September 2010. Reference to these regulations is not made at all in the 
guidelines. The establishment of the DPCI was provided for in terms of the South 
African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008. The said regulations were 
promulgated in terms of section 24(1)(eeA) of the SAPS Act. 
Regulation 4 deals with “measures to protect confidentiality of information”, and any 
breach of this regulation will be treated as serious misconduct. 
The regulations refer to how complaints are to be made to a retired judge in terms of 
regulation 5, the origin of which is to be found in section 17L of the South African 
Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008. Section 17L is entitled “Complaints 
mechanism” and provides as follows:  
• The appointment of a retired judge to investigate complaints;15 it is noted in 
this regard that the performance of such functions by a retired judge does not 
detract at all from the powers of the Independent Complaints Directorate 
                                                          
14  16 August 2012. 
15  Section 17L (1)(a) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
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which is empowered to investigate complaints against SAPS members and 
DPCI members.16 
• Such retired judge is precluded from investigating complaints pertaining to 
intelligence matters;17 
• In the investigation of such matter, the retired judge may –  
o Request information from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(hereinafter referred to as the “NDPP”), who may however, on 
reasonable grounds refuse to provide such information requested;18 
o Obtain any information or documents under the control of SAPS;19 
o Enter any SAPS building or premises to obtain SAPS information and 
documents;20 
o Shall be entitled to reasonable assistance;21 
•     The retired judge shall report on the investigation undertaken;22 
In no manner does the Amendment Act make provision for the protection of such a 
member of the public, nor are any additional remedies availed to such a DPCI 
employee. 
5.6 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
The National Environmental Management Act (hereinafter referred to as “NEMA”) is 
aimed at providing for co-operative, environmental governance by establishing 
principles for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, institutions that 
will promote co-operative governance and procedures for co-ordinating 
environmental functions exercised by organs of State; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith. NEMA was legislated before the PDA came into effect. 
Section 31 of the NEMA is entitled “Access to environmental information and 
protection of whistle-blowers”. Section 31(4) of NEMA provides that notwithstanding 
the provisions of any other law, no person is civilly or criminally liable or may be 
dismissed, disciplined, prejudiced or harassed as a result of having disclosed any 
                                                          
16  Section 17L (1)(b) and (2) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
17  Section 17L (3) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
18  Section 17L (7) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
19  Section 17L (8)(a) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
20  Section 17L (8)(b) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
21  Section 17L (8)(c) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
22  Section 17L (6) of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; 
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information, if in making that disclosure the person involved in good faith believed 
reasonably, at the time of making the disclosure, that he or she was in fact disclosing 
evidence of an environmental risk, and that the disclosure in question was made in 
accordance with the provisions of subsection 5.   
As such, any person who makes such a disclosure is offered the said protection, 
irrespective of whether he or she is an employee or not. Section 31(6) of NEMA 
provides that section 31(4) applies whether or not the whistle-blowers has used or 
exhausted “any other applicable external or internal procedure to report or otherwise 
remedy the matter concerned.” Further to this, sections 31(7) – (8) provide that:  
• No one may advantage or undertake to advantage any person for not blowing 
the whistle as provided for in terms of section 31(4); and 
• No one  may threaten retribution against a person because that person has or 
intends to blow the whistle in accordance with the provisions of section 31(4); 
Besides making the disclosure in good faith, reasonably believing at the time of the 
disclosure that he or she was disclosing evidence of an environmental risk, the 
whistle-blower also needs to meet the requirements set out in section 31(5), namely 
that:  
• The whistle-blower must disclose the information to:23   
o a committee of Parliament or of a provincial legislature;  
o an organ of state responsible for protecting any aspect of the 
environment or emergency services;  
o the Public Protector;  
o the Human Rights Commission;  
o any attorney-general or his or her successor; or 
o more than one of the bodies or persons referred to above. 
The alternative to this is provided in terms of section 31(5)(b) of the NEMA, in that 
the whistle-blower disclosed the information concerned to one or more news media 
and on clear and convincing grounds believed at the time of the disclosure that: the 
disclosure in question was necessary in order to avert an imminent and serious 
                                                          
23  Section 31(5)(a) of the NEMA. 
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threat to the environment, in order to ensure that the threat to the environment was 
both timeously and properly investigated, or alternatively, to protect himself or herself 
from serious or irreparable harm from reprisal; or in giving due weight and or 
consideration to the importance of administration that is open, accountable and 
participatory in nature, and that the public interest regarding the disclosure of the 
information outweighs not disclosing the relevant information. 
The last alternatives are provided in terms of section 31(5)(c) and (d) of the NEMA, 
which provides that: disclosed information, so disclosed substantially in accordance 
with any applicable procedures, whether internal or external,, other than procedures 
provided for in section 31 (5) (a) or (b), for reporting or remedying the matter at hand 
or disclosed information which had become available to the people in the RSA, or 
elsewhere, before the disclosure was made. 
5.7 The Western Cape Public Protector Act 6 of 1994 
The Western Cape Public Protector Act (hereinafter referred to as the “WCPPA”), 
states in section 1(a-f) that its purpose is to determine the inter alia procedures 
regarding complaints laid with the Public Protector, procedures regarding the 
resolution of disputes, service standards that are applicable in respect of 
investigations conducted by the Public Protector, and applicable timelines. 
The WCPPA was legislated before the PDA came into effect. 
As to who may lodge a complaint, section 3(3)(a-j) provides that any person may 
report a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Public Protector, and includes any 
person, group of persons or organisation that approaches the Public Protector in 
terms of various pieces of legislation.24 
                                                          
24  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Public Protector Act 23 of 1994, Executive 
Members Ethics, 1998, Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000, 
Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998, Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, Lotteries Act 57 of 1997; and National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998. 
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In this regard the guidelines read that “…any person (own emphasis) and which 
includes employees of the Western Cape Province may report …”25 
The Public Protector of South Africa 26  is appointed by the President, on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly, in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution 
and is required to be a South African citizen who is suitably qualified and 
experienced and has exhibited a reputation for honesty and integrity. The 
Constitution also prescribes the powers and duties of the Public Protector. Further 
powers, duties and the execution thereof are regulated by the Public Protector Act.27 
Section 181 of the Constitution determines that the Public Protector shall be subject 
only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial; exercising his/her powers 
and performing his/her functions without "fear; favour or prejudice". No person or 
organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the Public Protector’s office. 
The Public Protector has the power to investigate any conduct in matters pertaining 
to the State, or the public administration in any sphere of government, that is either 
alleged or suspected of being improper, or which is alleged or suspected to result in 
any impropriety or prejudice. Once such an investigation has been completed, the 
Public Protector has to report thereon, and where appropriate take the necessary 
remedial action. Additional functions and powers have been granted in this respect in 
the provisions of the Public Protector Act, 1994. However, the Public Protector is 
excluded from investigating court decisions. 
Further to this, the Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and 
communities; is neither an advocate for the complainant or for the public authority 
concerned, but rather ascertains the facts of the case and reaches an impartial and 
independent conclusion on the merits of the complaint. Other organs of state must 
assist and protect the institution to ensure its independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness. 
Section 4 of the WCPPA sets out the information that is required from all reporting a 
matter to the Public Protector, and inter alia includes the full names, physical and 
                                                          
25  Par 6.5. 
26  Public Protector of South Africa: History and Background to the Office of the Public Protector 
http://www.publicprotector.org_us/history/accessinfo_act.pdf (Date of use: 24 May 2013). 
27  Public Protector Act 23 of 1994.  
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postal addresses of the complainant, telephone, facsimile, email addresses of the 
complainant, as well as “any other information that identifies the complainant”. 
Section 5 of the WCPPA sets out what the Public Protector may investigate, as also 
referred to in the guidelines. Section 6 of the WCPPA deals with confidentiality, and  
should a complainant wish to remain anonymous, the Public Protector may decline to 
investigate the complaint, and in terms of section 8 the manner of lodging the 
complaint is stipulated, which in all instances includes the fact that the complaint has 
to be in written format.  
It has to be stressed that the WCPPA makes no provision for the protection of 
complainants whatsoever. This has to be seen in light of the fact that “any person” 
may make such complaint, and then bearing in mind that should that person not be 
an “employee” within the meaning allocated in terms of the PDA, such as just a 
member of the public acting in public interest, he or she has no recourse whatsoever 
to any additional protection not already available in law (own emphasis). An 
employee making a disclosure will only enjoy the protection offered by the PDA if he 
or she meets the relevant requirements as set out in terms of section 8(1) of the 
PDA. 
5.8 A few more considerations not covered in the guidelines 
The guidelines as discussed above deal with disclosures made only by employees, 
and when taking into consideration that the PDA only provides protection for 
employees making a protected disclosure, it is interesting to note that there are a few 
pieces of South African legislation that place an obligation on members of the public 
(non-employees) to make disclosures, whilst offering no protection in return. Two of 
these pieces of legislation are the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
12 of 2000 and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
5.8.1  Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004  
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as 
the “PRECCA”, is aimed at:  
95 
 
• Providing for strengthening measures to prevent and combat corruption 
and corrupt activities; 
• To provide for the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt 
activities; 
• To provide for investigative measures in respect of corruption and related 
corrupt activities; 
• To provide for the establishment and endorsement of a Register in order 
to place certain restrictions on persons and enterprises convicted of 
corrupt activities relating to tenders and contracts; 
• To place a duty on certain persons holding a position of authority to report 
certain corrupt activities/ transactions; (Own emphasis) 
• To provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the offence of 
corruption; and 
• To provide for matters related thereto. 
Section 34 of the PRECCA places a duty on certain persons to report corrupt 
activities:  
34. (1) Any person who holds a position of authority and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that any other person has 
committed- 
(a)  an offence under Part 1, 2, 3 or 4, or section 20 or 21 (in so far as it 
relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2; or 
(b)  the offence of theft, fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering a forged 
document, involving an amount of R100000 or more, must report such 
knowledge or suspicion or cause such knowledge or suspicion to be 
reported to any police official.  
 (2) Subject to the provisions of section 37(2), any person who fails to 
comply with subsection (l), is guilty of an offence. 
Section 34(4) of PRECCA defines a person of authority as including people who hold 
a position of authority, including: 
• The Director-General, head or equivalent officer, of a national or provincial 
department; 
• The municipal manager of a municipality; 
• Any public officer who form part of the senior management cadre of a public 
body; 
• The head, rector or principal of a tertiary institution; 
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• A manager, secretary or director of a company as defined in terms of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and a member as defined in 
terms of the provisions of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1981; 
• Executive Manager of a bank or financial institution; 
• A partner of a partnership; 
• A Chief Executive Officer; 
• Any person responsible for the overall management and control of a business; 
• Any of the aforementioned who have been appointed in a temporary or acting 
capacity. 
In such circumstances it is quite imaginable that the person so required to report a 
matter is not an employee who would thus otherwise qualify for protection should the 
disclosure have been made in a manner qualifying for protection. PRECCA does not 
make provision in any manner for the protection of such a whistle-blower, even when 
seen in light of the fact that it has placed a legal obligation on such person. 
5.8.2    Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (hereinafter referred to as the “FICA”) is aimed 
at:  
• Establishing a Financial Intelligence Centre and Money Laundering Advisory 
Council in order to combat money laundering activities; 
• To impose certain duties on institutions and other persons who might be 
used for money laundering purposes; (own emphasis) and 
• Provide for related matters. 
 
Sections 28 of the FICA places a duty on an accountable institution and a reporting 
institution to report prescribed particulars to the FIC, within the prescribed time, 
regarding cash transactions above the prescribed limit (as determined). 
Section 29 of the FICA places a duty on people who carry on a business, manage a 
business or who are employed by a business, and who know or suspect certain 
things, to report such knowledge or suspicions. In terms of the provisions of section 
29(1)(a-c) of the FICA, a person who carries on a business or is in charge of or 
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manages a business, or who is employed by a business and who knows or suspects  
that the business has received or is about to receive the proceeds of unlawful 
activities, or a transaction or a series of transactions to which the business is a party: 
• Is  facilitated or is likely to facilitate the transfer of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities; 
• Apparently has no lawful business  or purpose; 
• Is being conducted in order to avoid having to report something as required 
in terms of the FICA; or 
• May be relevant to the investigation of tax evasion; or that 
• The business is or will be used for money laundering purposes; 
Such knowledge and or suspicions as aforementioned must within the period 
specified be reported to the FIC, as well as the facts on which the knowledge or 
suspicion is based. 
Further to this, the FICA also specifies that such a person may not disclose such 
information, knowledge or suspicion to any other person, including the person about 
whom such a report must be made or has been made.28 Sections 29(3)(a) – (d) set 
out the exceptions in this regard. 
Section 37(1) provides that no duty of secrecy or confidentiality, or any other 
restriction on the disclosure of information that has to be disclosed in terms of the 
provisions of the FICA, whether it arises from legislative provisions or common law 
agreement, affects the compliance with the duty to make such required report. The 
exception in this regard relates to client attorney privilege as provided for in terms of 
section 37(2) of the FICA. 
Section 38 of the FICA provides for the protection of people making the required 
reports. Section 38(1) provides that no criminal or civil action lies against such 
whistle-blower, complying in good faith. Further to this in terms of the provisions of 
section 38(2) nobody who has made, initiated or contributed to a disclosure made in 
terms of sections 28, 29 or 31 of the FICA, or who has provided additional 
information to such a report made may be compelled to give evidence in criminal 
                                                          
28  Section 29(3)(b) of the FICA Act. 
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proceedings regarding his or her part of the report. In other words even though such 
a person is a competent witness, he or she is not a compellable witness. Section 
38(3) provides that no evidence regarding the identity of the whistle-blower is 
admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings pertaining to the relevant report, 
unless the whistle-blower testifies. 
However, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe29 point out that the protection of identity in 
terms of the provisions of section 38(3) is confined to criminal proceedings, and 
ceases to exist should the person concern testify at the proceedings. Further it is 
pointed out that section 38(2) does not provide for the compellability of such a 
witness, but only the competency of such a witness to testify in criminal proceedings 
arising from such a report made.30  
Even further to this section 39 of the FICA provides for the admissibility of reports 
made to the FIC, providing that a certificate issued by an official of the FIC, that 
information specified in the certificate was sent or reported to the FIC in terms of 
sections 28, 29, 30(2) or 31 will subject to the provisions of section 38(3) 31 be 
admissible as evidence on its production in court, provided that it would be 
admissible as direct oral evidence. 
Section 40 of the FICA places certain restrictions on access to information held by 
the FIC, together with the required procedures to be followed. Section 41 also 
protects confidential information held by the FIC, in that no person may disclose 
confidential information held by or obtained by the FIC except within certain 
circumstances. 
5.9 The protection of witnesses in terms of South African legislation 
Although witness protection is not specifically mentioned in terms of the PDA, it does 
provide in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the PDA, that a whistle-blower (as an 
employee) who has been subjected to, is subjected to or may be subjected to an 
occupational breach may pursue any other process allowed or prescribed by law. 
 
                                                          
29  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed). 
30  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 170. 
31  Pertaining to the admissibility of evidence about the identity of the whistle-blower. 
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5.9.1   The Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 
One could well imagine circumstances in which the National Prosecuting Authority, 
the SAPS or even the whistle-blower would consider witness protection within the 
South African context, within relevant circumstances, and as provided for in terms of 
the Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998.  
The natural question following on such a consideration would then be what kind of 
protection such a witness would be entitled to, and under which circumstances. The 
body mandated with implementing this legislation is the Office of Witness Protection 
(OWP), which “deals with the safekeeping of identified and intimidated witnessed 
[sic] and related persons requiring prosecution 32  whilst testifying in cases being 
prosecuted.”33  The OWP aims to provide a support service to the criminal justice 
system by protecting threatened or intimidated witnesses and related persons, and 
by placing them under protection to ensure that they will indeed testify in criminal 
matters and other defined proceedings. The only report publicly available was for the 
financial year 2008/9, and the following reported facts are noteworthy:  
• No witnesses or related person on the programme were threatened, 
harmed or assassinated in the past 7 years; 
• The unit had 431 witnesses, including family members, on the programme 
at the end of March 2009; 
• The unit had 218 witnesses on the programme at the end of March 2009; 
• 44 witnesses walked off the programme during the year; 
• A witness stabbed his wife to death before committing suicide; 
• Another witness drowned at sea whilst swimming; 
• A witness and her baby were injured during transport; 
However, due to the fact that the programme intends to protect the 
relevant witnesses from external attacks and threats the 3 above-
mentioned incidents are not reported in the figures give. One has to 
wonder where the protection was though when this was taking place; 
perhaps the answer is to be found in the notation below. 
                                                          
32  It is assumed “protection” was meant at this point. 
33  Office of Witness Protection. Sub-programme 2, Witness Protection 
 www.npa.gov.za/UploadedFiles/SUB-PROGRAMME%202%20-
%204%20(OWP,%20DSO,%20AFU).pdf (Date of use: 25 May 2013). 
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• The ratio of protectors available to protect the witnesses is significantly 
lower than international best practice. 
The Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 provides for witness protection officers34 and 
security officers.35 The procedures pertaining to the application for witness protection 
is provided for in terms of section 7 of the Act. Temporary protection may be granted 
in relevant circumstances, whilst the application is being made, processed or 
considered, and which may not exceed 14 days.36 Section 15 of the Act provides for 
the circumstances in which a party or witness in civil proceedings may be protected. 
Employees in the WPO are required to take an oath pertaining to the confidentiality 
and disclosure of information within this context,37 further to which in terms of section 
17(4) of the Act, no person may disclose information that he or she has acquired in 
the line of duty (within the context of this Act), except for the purpose of giving effect 
to the provisions of the Witness Protection Act, when required to do so by a 
competent court, when authorised to do so by the Minister of Justice or in terms of 
the provisions of section 17(5) of the Act.  
Section 18 provides that the presiding officer in a matter, despite any other legislation 
that may be applicable, must make an order prohibiting the publication of any 
information that could possibly disclose the place of safety where the witness is 
being kept or where the witness has been relocated to, the circumstances relating to 
his or her protection, and or the identity or place of safety at which another protected 
person is located. 
Relocation specifics or change of identity specifics of a protected person; unless the 
Director of the WPO satisfies the presiding officer that exceptional circumstances 
exist, that would mean it would be in the interests of justice for such an order not to 
be made. 
Section 22 provides for the various offences relating to the Act, including matters 
such as the disclosure of related information, interference with or hindrance of the 
duties of the WPO, its officials in their capacity and the like. 
                                                          
34  Section 5 of the WPA. 
35  Section 6 of the WPA. 
36  Section 8(1) of the WPA. 
37  Section 17 of the WPA. 
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5.9.2   The informer as a witness in criminal proceedings 
The situation may arise in which a matter initiated by or contributed to by a whistle-
blower, whether the term (whistle-blower) is understood within the context of the 
PDA, or a wider sense, such as that envisioned by the FICA, PRECCA or the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, may evolve and culminate in criminal proceedings in 
terms of the Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as the “CPA”). In such 
circumstances, potential whistle-blowers need to be aware of the potential 
implications in terms of substantive law and the CPA, in their role as witnesses in 
criminal proceedings. Within the sphere of criminal procedure, a whistle-blower in the 
wider sense is referred to as an informant or informer, and it is well worth noting in 
this regard that the PDA in no manner provides for the protection of the identity of the 
whistle-blower. 
A particularly useful definition of an informer was given by the court in R v Van 
Schalkwyk38 as: 
• the person who first discloses information which may be prejudicial to other 
parties, and who retaliation he may then provoke ; 
• that the information disclosed must be the kind of information that may 
cause or may potentially cause the institution of a criminal prosecution; and 
• the disclosure is to be made to officers of justice. 
The court points out that it is desirable to ensure that a definition of who would 
comprise an informer, remains flexible, including any person who provides useful 
information relating to a crime, and who needs protection from retaliation as a result 
of having made the relevant disclosure.  
This definition was also applied in Suliman v Hansa.39 
It seems clear that the rationale behind the protection of informants would include the 
protection of the informant and those close to him against the wrath that may be 
exacted by those against whom he informed, and the encouraging of others 
regarding the provision of information pertaining to crimes to the police. 
                                                          
38  R v Van Schalkwyk 1938 AD 543 at 548. 
39  Suliman v Hansa (1) 1971 (2) SA 437 (N) at 438G. 
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Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe40  deal with the implications to the witness in his role 
as informer within criminal procedure; it is accepted that in order to ensure and 
facilitate efficient crime detection measures privilege has emerged which protects 
communications which would otherwise reveal the identity of an informer or the 
communications channels used during the investigation of crime. This privilege is 
provided for in section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.41  
They contend that the rationale behind this with reference to judgement in the 
Abelson case,42 in which the learned judge stated that as crime is orchestrated in 
secret and underhanded ways against the state’s interests, defeating criminal 
conduct must similarly be conducted in a similar manner.43 
In cases, for example Abelson supra and Peake, 44  the manner in which 
communications were obtained or the methods by which investigations were 
conducted are sometimes held by our courts to be privileged. 
In Swanepoel v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 45  the court held that an 
informant has a substantive right to the non-disclosure of his identity, especially in 
circumstances in which he had requested to remain anonymous. A cause of action, 
in all probability falling under the auspices of civil law, lies therein, should the 
informer’s identity be disclosed maliciously, intentionally and unlawfully. 
However, Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe46 sound a warning in this regard stating 
that in the constitutionalised system, care would have to be taken to ensure that any 
claim to privilege, concerning methods of investigation, is not a mere attempt at 
covering up the fact that the evidence in question was unconstitutionally obtained. 
5.9.2.1 Section 202 of the CPA 
Section 202 of the CPA provides for privilege from disclosure on the ground of public 
interest or public policy, and reads as follows:  
                                                          
40  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 165-170. 
41  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 165. 
42  R v Abelson 1933 TPD 227. 
43  R v Abelson 1933 TPD 227 at 231. 
44  S v Peake 1962 2 SA 288 (C). 
45  Swanepoel v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 2 SACR 284 (T). 
46  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed). 
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Except as is in this Act provided and subject to the provisions of any other law, 
no witness in criminal proceedings shall be compellable or permitted to give 
evidence as to any fact, matter or thing or as to any communication made to or 
by such witness, if such witness would on the thirtieth day of May, 1961, not 
have been compellable or permitted to give evidence with regard to such fact, 
matter or thing or communication by reason that it should not, on the grounds of 
public policy or from regard to public interest, be disclosed, and that it is 
privileged from disclosure: 
Provided that any person may in criminal proceedings adduce evidence of any 
communication alleging the commission of an offence, if the making of that 
communication prima facie constitutes an offence, and the judge or judicial 
officer presiding at such proceedings may determine whether the making of 
such communication prima facie does or does not constitute an offence, and 
such determination shall, for the purpose of such proceedings, be final. 
This section clearly states that the privilege is based upon considerations of public 
policy or public interest, within the circumstances of the specific case. There are 
however exceptions in respect of the invocation of the provisions of section 202, and 
which were thoroughly dealt with by the court in Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v 
Pillay 47  in which three such exceptional circumstances were mentioned, namely:  
circumstances in which it is material to disclose the identity of the informer, in respect 
of the ends of justice; circumstances in which it is either necessary or right to 
disclose the identity of the informer in order to show the accused’s innocence; and  
circumstances in which the reason for the non-disclosure no longer exist. 
Hiemstra48 refers to the four fundamental conditions seen to be prerequisites for this 
kind of privilege, namely:  
• The communication must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed; 
• This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties; 
• The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered; and 
• The injury that would be inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.49 
                                                          
47  Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Pillay 1945 AD 653 at paragraphs 665-666. 
48  Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 23-44. 
49  Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 23-44. 
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He points out further exceptions to the provisions of section 202 as being as that 
peace officers can never be regarded as informers for the purposes of section 202 of 
the CPA,50 if the disclosure of the identity of the informer would favour the innocent 
the court may in its discretion allow it,51 and when the informer admits himself having 
been involved and his identity has already been disclosed in another manner.52      
Finally, he points out that although the attitude of the informer is relevant when 
deciding whether or not it is to be disclosed, it is not the deciding factor, with the 
court having the final say in this respect. 
5.9.2.2 Section 203 and 204 of the CPA 
Should an informer (whistle-blower in the wider sense) himself have been complicit in 
the alleged criminal conduct which he has informed on, he may in certain 
circumstances be able to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination as provided 
for in section 203 of the CPA, and should the provisions of section 202 (informant 
privilege) not be applicable to him. Section 203 of the CPA provides that:  
No witness in criminal proceedings shall, except as provided by this Act or any 
other law, be compelled to answer any question which he would not on the 
thirtieth day of May, 1961, have been compelled to answer by reason that the 
answer may expose him to a criminal charge. 
The provisions of section 203 go hand-in-hand with the provisions of section 204 of 
the CPA. 
Section 204 relates to the potential “protection” of an accomplice testifying in criminal 
proceedings against himself being prosecuted in regard to the alleged crime that he 
is to testify about. When an informant as accomplice in these circumstances decides 
or agrees to testify against accomplices, the prosecutor will inform the court before 
he starts testifying that the witness will be required to answer questions during his 
testimony which may incriminate him. 
The court will inform the witness that he is obliged to give evidence in the matter, that 
questions will be put to him by the prosecutor, the answers to which may incriminate 
                                                          
50  R v Makaula 1949 (1) SA 40 EC. 
51  Tranter v Attorney-General 1907 TS 415 at 423; S v Rossouw 1973 (4) SA 608 (SWA) at 609H.  
52  Suliman v Hansa (1) 1971 (2) SA 437 (N) at 72 D-E; R v Van Schalkwyk 1938 AD 548 at 549; S 
v Rossouw 1973 (4) SA 608 (SWA) at 609H; S v Solani 1987 (4) SA 203 (NC) at 23-44. 
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him, that he is obliged to answer such potentially incriminating questions, and that 
should he answer frankly and honestly all such questions put to him, he will be 
discharged from prosecution with regard to the specified offence. 
Section 106(1)(g) pertaining to the kinds of pleas an accused may plea, confirms 
this, in that an accused may plea that he has been discharged under the provisions 
of section 204 from prosecution for the offence he has been charged with. Within the 
context of witnesses being required to testify, note should also be taken of the 
comprehensive provisions in this respect, such as sections 183,53 184 and 185,54 
and 188,55 18956 of the CPA. 
5.10 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the “CA”) has a section, 
section 159, completely devoted to provisions pertaining to the protection of whistle-
blowers within the context of a company. The main provisions in this regard are as 
follows:  
• Any provision contained in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, 
rules or agreement which is inconsistent with, purports to limit or set aside 
the provisions of section 159 (in respect of the protection of whistle-blowers) 
is void to the extent that it is so inconsistent, purports to limit or set aside the 
protection of whistle-blowers.57 This provision is comparable with section 
2(3)(a) of the PDA. 
                                                          
53  This section requires a witness to keep the SAPS informed of his whereabouts until the disposal 
of the matter or until such time as he is officially informed that he will no longer be required as a 
witness. 
54  Section 184 provides for dealing with witnesses who are about to abscond, and in relation to 
whom a warrant of arrest may be issued.  
 Section 185 provides for the detention of witnesses whose safety is in danger, who may 
abscond or who may be tampered with, or if it is deemed to be in the interests of the witness or 
the administration of justice that such witness be detained in custody.  
55  This section provides that a witness subpoenaed to attend criminal proceedings or warned to 
attend such proceedings by the court, and who fails to attend or remain in attendance shall be 
guilty of a criminal offence. 
56  This section provides for the powers of a court in respect of a recalcitrant witness. Should a 
witness refuse to answer a question put to him or fail to produce a book, paper or document 
which he is required to produce, the court may in a summary manner inquire into his refusal or 
failure in this regard. Unless the witness has a just excuse for his refusal or failure, and 
sentence him to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 2 years, or in circumstances in which 
the criminal proceedings relate to an offence in Part III of Schedule 2 of the CPA, to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years. 
57  Section 159(2) of the CA. 
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• A shareholder, director, company secretary, prescribed officer or employee 
of a company, a registered trade union that represents employees of a 
company or another representative of that employee, a supplier of goods 
and services to a company or an employee of such a supplier, who makes a 
disclosure as contemplated in the provisions of section 159, have –  
 
o Qualified privilege in respect of the relevant disclosure; and 
o Is immune from any civil, criminal and administrative liability for that 
disclosure.58 
The provisions of this provision go much wider than the provisions of the PDA in that 
the protection offered to a whistle-blower goes wider than the ambit of the 
employment relationship; by include suppliers and employees of suppliers to the 
relevant company. It further goes wider by providing both privilege and immunity, as 
set out above. 
Beside the remedies offered in terms of section 159, the whistle-blower is also 
offered remedies in terms of section 159(5) of the CA. 
All those mentioned in section 159(4) are entitled to compensation from another 
person in respect of any damages suffered  if the person is entitled to make or has 
made a disclosure as contemplated in the provisions of section 159, and because of 
that actual or possible (own emphasis) disclosure the second person engages in 
conduct with the intent to cause detriment to the first person (the whistle-blower, 
actual or potential), and the conduct causes detriment, 59  or directly or indirectly 
makes a threat, whether express or implied, conditional or unconditional, to cause 
any detriment to the first person or another person,60 and intends the whistle-blower 
to fear that the threat will be carried out61 or is reckless as to causing the first person 
to fear that the threat will be carried out, irrespective of whether the first person 
actually feared that the threat would be carried out.62 
                                                          
58  Section 159(4) of the CA. 
59  Section 159(5)(a) of the CA. 
60  Section 159(5)(b) of the CA. 
61  Section 159 (5)(b)(i) of the CA. 
62  Section 159(5)(b)(ii) of the CA. 
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This provision in effect means that an actual or potential whistle-blower is protected 
whether the conduct of the threatening party is intended or takes place, and whether 
or not the actual or whistle-blower actually believes him or not. 
The provisions of section 159(6) of the CA create a rebuttable presumption, in that it 
is presumed that the threat or conduct described in section 159(5) has occurred as a 
result of a possible or actual disclosure that a person is entitled to make or has 
made.  
In substantive law (law of evidence) a distinction is made between an irrebuttable 
presumption and a rebuttable presumption. Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe63 state 
that an assumption which is demanded in law must be accepted in circumstances in 
which there is an absence of either evidence or proof to the contrary.64  
The presumption can be rebutted if the person who engaged in the conduct or threat 
can show satisfactory evidence in support of another reason for engaging in the 
conduct or the making of the threat. It is opined that this rebuttable presumption 
potentially removes a hurdle relating to the evidentiary burden in respect of this 
aspect out of the way of the actual or potential whistle-blowers. Remember to 
distinguish between burden of proof and evidentiary burden. A burden of proof is that 
burden which a party bears, in that he or she will lose if he fails to persuade the court 
that he is entitled to the either the relief he or she seeks or the defence he or she has 
raised. Whereas an evidentiary burden refers to the burden on a party to a dispute to 
produce sufficient evidence entitling the presiding official to call upon the other party 
to answer the allegations levelled.65  
Section159(7) of the CA places a duty on companies as well as state owned 
companies to implement  that system to the persons mentioned in section 159(4).66 
Section 159(3)(b) of the CA is comparative to the provisions of section 1(a - g) of the 
PDA in respect of the definition of disclosures, but is wider in respect of being 
tailored for a company environment, providing as that it would include the disclosure 
of any information by a person provided for in terms of section 159(4), if: 
                                                          
63  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed). 
64  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 23. 
65    Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (3rd ed) 559. 
66  Section 159(7)(b) of the CA. 
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• The disclosure has been made in good faith to the Commission, Companies 
Tribunal, Panel, a regulatory authority, legal advisor, director, prescribed 
officer, company person, auditor, board or committee of the company 
concerned; 
• The person disclosing the information reasonably believed at the time at which 
he disclosed the information, that the relevant information showed or tended 
to show that the company or another company, or a director or a prescribed 
officer or a company that acted in that capacity had contravened the 
provisions of: 
o The Companies Act or an Act listed in schedule 467; 
o Failed to comply with a statutory duty to which the company was 
subject; 
o Engaged in any act or omission that endangered or was likely to 
endanger the health or safety of someone or harm the environment; 
o Unfairly discriminated or condoned unfairly discriminatory conduct as 
provided for in section 9 of the Constitution and the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act4 of 2000; or  
o Contravened the provisions of any other Act in a way which could 
expose the company to the risk of liability, or is inherently prejudicial 
to the company’s interests. 
5.10.1 Powers pertaining to investigations and inspections in terms of the CA 
Section 159(3)(a) of the CA provides that disclosures may be made in good faith to 
the Commission,68 the Companies Tribunal,69 the Panel,70 a regulatory authority,71 an 
                                                          
67  In this regard it has to be noted that Schedule 4 merely refers to “legislation to be enforced by 
Commission”. Clarification may be required in this respect. 
68  Section 1 of the CA: “Commission” means the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission established by section 185. 
69  Section 1 of the CA: “Companies Tribunal” means the Companies Tribunal established in 
terms of section 193. 
70  Section 1 of the CA: “Panel” means the Takeover Regulation Panel, established by section 
196. 
71  Section 1 of the CA: “regulatory authority” means an entity established in terms of national or 
provincial legislation responsible for regulating an industry, or sector of an industry. 
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exchange, 72  a legal adviser, director, 73  prescribed officer, company secretary, 74 
auditor,75 or a board76 or committee of the company concerned.  
Sections 168 to 175 of the CA provide for complaints to be lodged with the 
Commission or panel. 
Section 169 provides for matter relating to investigation by the Commission or Panel, 
including the designation of one or more persons to assist the inspector or 
investigator in conduction the investigation, or the appointment of an independent 
investigator at the expense of the company. In conducting such an investigation the 
inspector or investigator may investigate any person named in the complaint, 
including a person related to the person so named in the complaint, or whom the 
inspector reasonably considers may have information which is relevant to the 
investigation being undertaken. 
Section 170 provides for matters regarding the outcome of the investigation and the 
related decisions and actions which may be taken, including for example 
commencing court proceedings in the name of the complainant if the complainant has 
a right to do so in terms of the CA and has consented to this. The matter may also be 
referred to the National Prosecuting Authority or other regulatory authority concerned, 
if the Commission or Panel alleges that a person has committed an offence in terms 
of the CA or any other legislation. 
Part E of the CA (sections 176 to 179) provide for the powers needed in order to 
support investigations and inspections. In terms of section 176, the Commission or 
Panel may at any time during an investigation being conducted by it issue a 
summons to any person who is believed to be in a position to furnish any information 
pertaining to the subject of the investigation, or to have possession or control of any 
book, document or other object which has bearing on the matter to appear  before the 
Commission, Panel, inspector or independent investigator in order to be 
                                                          
72  Section 1 of the CA: “exchange” when used as a noun, has the meaning set out in section 1 of 
the Securities Services Act, 2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004). 
73  Section 1 of the CA: “director” means a member of the board of a company, as contemplated 
in section 66, or an alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying the 
position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name designated. 
74  In terms of section 86 (1) of the CA a public company or state-owned company must appoint a 
company secretary. 
75  Section 1 of the CA: “auditor” has the meaning set out in the Auditing Act. 
76  Section 1 of the CA: “board” means the board of directors of a company. 
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questioned,77 or to deliver or produce any book, document or object referred to above 
at a time and place specified in the summons to the Commission or Panel.78 
Section 176(5) provides for the exclusion of self-incriminating answers or statements 
given when so summoned, and if criminal proceedings are thereafter instituted. 
Section 177 of the CA provides for the authority to enter and search premises and in 
relation to such inspection or investigation, issued by a judge of the High Court or a 
magistrate, from information on oath or affirmation. 
Section 178 of the CA provides for the powers in respect of a search and seizure 
warrant so issued. An inspector authorised to conduct such a search and seizure 
may be accompanied and assisted by a police officer. Whilst section 179 of the CA 
provides for the required conduct to be displayed and undertaken during an entry and 
search, including the strict regard for decency and order, and with regard for each 
person’s rights to dignity, freedom, security and privacy. 
Sections 180 to 184 of the CA relate to the adjudication of hearings before a 
companies’ tribunal, the right to participate in such hearings, procedures to be 
followed and dealing with witnesses. 
5.11 Conclusion 
In respect of the guideline issued in 2011, it is argued that it was badly thought 
through and written, and if anything would rather serve to confuse someone 
attempting to utilise it, rather than actually clarify and guide any relevant 
considerations. 
In respect of section 35(1) of the PSA, the guideline highlights the right which certain 
employees have in respect of blowing the whistle, but it fails in total to try and clarify 
who as employees are included and who are in fact excluded, such as for example 
people within the employment of the South African Secret Service and employees 
within education institutions wholly or partly funded by the State, excluding 
universities and technikons, which are explicitly excluded. Section 35(1) is in fact 
technical by nature, and most certainly should have suitably dealt with. 
                                                          
77  Section 176(1)(a) of the CA. 
78  Section 176(1)(b) of the CA. 
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Simultaneously the bare duty imposed by the Public Servant’s Code of Conduct is 
left without clarification in the whole. 
With reference to the two categories of employees falling within the SANDF (civilians 
and members) are both covered in terms of the provisions of section 50 of the DA 
2002, which would in effect mean that a civilian employee, thinking that he is covered 
by the remedies provided for in the PDA is not, due to the fact that his disclosure in 
fact amounted to an unlawful disclosure. This pivotal topic is in no manner broached 
in the guideline, nor are the offences, penalties and protections that are available to 
the members of the SANDF. 
The guidelines point out a double duty that has been laid of the door of SAPS 
members and in no manner attempts to guide such a member through the various 
directives and their applicable sections. 
The NEMA is also addressed within the guide, however, the guide in no way attempt 
to assist an employee who may utilise the NEMA provisions, especially in light of the 
fact that NEMA is applicable to employees and non-employees. The same is true of 
the portion in respect of WCPPA. 
The relevant provisions of the PRECCA and FICA both place certain duties in 
respect of reporting irregularities as specified therein, with the wording clearly 
indicating that the employment relationship may come into play in this respect. Yet 
the guideline in no way deals with or even mentions these provisions. 
Hucker79 refers to the FICA and PRECCA, in respect of the duty to report, and 
opines that the wide scope of the aforementioned legislation and the application of it 
to almost all persons in both the public and private sectors may have serious 
implications within South African society.80  
It is argued that the framework outside the PDA is wide and complex, further 
complicating the decisions and the potential peril an actual or potential whistle-blower 
may find him in. It took almost 10 years for the issuing of the guidelines, as provided 
for in terms of the PDA, and in this respect it is argued that it is of almost no use. 
                                                          
79  Hucker The Bottom Line (1) 1-4. 
80  Hucker The Bottom Line (1) 3. 
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In respect of the CA, it is opined that the provisions pertaining to whistle-blowers is 
quite comprehensive, widening the scope and application of the PDA and whistle-
blower protection in the RSA. The supporting powers in respect of whistle-blowers in 
respect of companies are also quite comprehensive. 
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CHAPTER 6: REMEDIES AVAILED TO WHISTLE-BLOWERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PDA 
6.1 Introduction 
The preamble to the PDA clearly states that part of the purpose of the PDA is to 
ensure that employees disclose information regarding wrongdoing or suspected 
wrongdoing by their employer without fear of reprisals. It is argued that this is indeed 
the most imperative part of the PDA, as a prospective whistle-blower’s 
considerations pertaining to self-preservation are inevitable, especially when seen in 
the context of the employment relationship, which by its very nature is unequal.  
The protection afforded to such whistle-blowers is to be found in section 4 of the 
PDA, seen within the context created by section 3 of the PDA. It would be fair to 
state that protection availed, albeit indirectly, is that no contract of employment or 
agreement between the employer and employee that attempts to exclude or 
discourage the employee from blowing the whistle would have any effect.1 
Section 3 of the PDA creates the context within which the whistle-blower falling 
within the ambit of the PDA would be entitled to avail himself or herself of the 
remedies provided for, namely within the context of his employment and occupation, 
and with reference specifically to occupational detriment. 
Section 1 of the PDA defines occupational detriment within its context includes 
being:  
• Subjected to disciplinary action of any nature; 
• Dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated; 
• Transferred against his will; 
• Refused a transfer or promotion; 
• Subjected to terms or conditions of employment or retirement which has been 
changed to his disadvantage; 
• Refused a reference by his employer, or being given a negative reference 
from the employer; 
• Denied appointment to employment, a profession or an office; 
                                                          
1  Section 2(3) of the PDA. 
114 
 
• Being threatened with any of the aforementioned; 
• Otherwise negatively affected in respect of his employment, profession, office, 
employment opportunities and work security. 
Raising the remedies available to the whistle-blower within the South African context, 
and more specifically within the PDA’s context is by no means a new concern raised. 
During June 2004, the South African Law Reform Commission published Discussion 
Paper 107, Project 123 in respect of Protected Disclosures, with the project leader 
appointed being Professor C. E. Hoexter.2 The project entailed a comparative study 
in respect of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States of America and 
Australia. The discussion paper highlighted the need for the urgent revision of the 
PDA, both with reference to the scope of the PDA and the remedies availed to the 
whistle-blower. Regrettably, apparently, the findings, recommendations and 
submissions made by the Commission were merely filed away, with not a backward 
glance being given thereto. And yet, currently, 3 we are confronted with a media 
headline announcing that the South African Police Service has been hacked, and the 
details of 16 000 whistle-blowers lain bare.4 
Who the whistle-blower is or would be is not defined within the text of the PDA. What 
is defined is the employer, the employee and a disclosure, where after the PDA then 
section by section states what the requirements would be in order for a disclosure to 
be a protected disclosure in sections 5 to 9. It would as such seem, in an attempt to 
define a whistle-blower within the context of the PDA would amount to an employee 
who makes a disclosure that meets all the requirements as provided for in the PDA, 
meriting the qualification of that particular disclosure as a protected disclosure, in 
respect of his employer’s conduct, actual or potential, as provided for in section1 of 
the PDA, and who as a result of the protected disclosure made shall be entitled to 
the remedies provided for in respect of occupational detriment. 
 
 
                                                          
2  Protected Disclosures, Discussion Paper 107, Project 123 
 http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/dpapers/dp107.pdf (Date of use: 23 May 2013). 
3  Date of use 18 June 2013. 
4  Roane Independent Online News (IOL) http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/saps-website-
hacked-1.1520042 (Date of use: 23 May 2013). 
115 
 
6.2 The first remedy 
The first remedy offered to a whistle-blower facing actual or potential occupational 
detriment is to be found in section 4(1) of the PDA, which provides:  
Any employee who has been subjected, is subjected or may be subjected, to an 
occupational detriment in breach of section 3, may –  
(a) approach any court having jurisdiction, including the Labour Court 
established by section 151 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 
1995), for appropriate relief; or 
 
(b) pursue any other process allowed or prescribed by law. 
Within the context of the definition of occupational detriment, as set out above, it 
seems clear that for the most part thereof, occupational detriment relates to 
employment related circumstances, which would therefore bring the jurisdictional 
considerations relating to the LC and the LAC into play in the main. 
However, the provisions including harassment and intimidation in the definition of 
occupational detriment into consideration, as well as the provisions of section 4(1)(b) 
of the PDA, serve as a catch-all provision. As has been seen in many matters, 
whistle-blowers sometimes face much more serious consequences than just labour 
related consequences, which can be multifarious in nature, such as for example 
defamation and even attempts made on their lives. As such, this remedy provides for 
all eventualities, even those remedies which fall outside the labour ambit, including 
those eventualities of both a civil and a criminal nature. 
In determining which court would have jurisdiction in such circumstances, the normal 
considerations pertaining to the establishment of jurisdiction will be applicable, and 
as provided for. 
Jurisdiction was defined in Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveldt’s Pass 
Irrigation Board5 as being:  
The power or competence which a particular court has to hear and determine 
an issue between parties brought before it. 
Jurisdiction does not depend upon the substantive merits of the case. There are in 
fact various grounds determining jurisdiction, including, the geographical area, the 
persons, the causes of action and the relief sought, the monetary size of the claim, 
                                                          
5  Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld's Pass Irrigation Board 1950 (2) SA 420 (A) at 424. 
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restrictions on the power of the parties to engage the jurisdiction of the court by 
consent, and restrictions on the competence to pronounce on the validity of a 
statutory enactment.6 
Pete7 suggest that in establishing within which jurisdiction a matter falls, depends on 
a two stage enquiry, with the first question being ‘which general type?’ and 
thereafter, ‘which particular one?’. It has to be borne in mind that if the whistle-blower 
in his litigation, for example in civil matters, issues process out of the wrong court, in 
other words a court which lacks the necessary jurisdiction, his or her opponent will 
be able to special plea in abatement, which destroy the plaintiff or applicant’s cause 
of action.  
In criminal matters regard may be had to the provisions of section 110 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which provides how matters may be dealt with when 
brought before the wrong criminal court.8 Regard is also to be had to the provisions 
of sections 26 to 50 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, which provides for the 
jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ courts, and section 21 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 
2013 which provides for the jurisdiction of the High Courts. It should also be borne in 
mind that it is possible for more than one court to have jurisdiction over a matter, in 
which case the plaintiff as dominus litis has the right to choose. In litigating in a court 
other than the LC and the LAC, jurisdictional determinations may also be provided for 
by a specific piece of legislation, where applicable. 
By way of example, reference may be had to the provisions of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 17 of 2011, which may very well be applicable within the context of 
the provisions of section 4(1) of the PDA. 
                                                          
6  Chapter VI of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944. 
7  Pete Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide (2nd ed) 36. 
8  As this in itself is a detailed topic for discussion this will not be dealt with within the context of 
this thesis. Examples to be found in this regard relates to the extradition of an accused to stand 
trial in a South African Court, which is regulated in the Extradition Act 67 of 1962. Other 
examples include: 
The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act 33 of 
2004; 
Section 90 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944; 
Section 18 of the Aviation Act 74 of 1962; 
Section 11 of the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982; and 
Sections 105 and 106 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
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6.2.1 An example made with reference to the Protection from Harassment Act 
17 of 2011 
The provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “PFHA”), provides a poignant example of other relief that a whistle-
blower or prospective whistle-blower may avail him or herself to in circumstances in 
which he or she is actually  harassed or threatened with harassment as a 
consequence of having made a protected disclosure. The aim of the PFHA is to 
afford victims of harassment an effective remedy against harassment and to 
introduce measures which are aimed at enabling the relevant organs of state to give 
full effect to the provisions of the PFHA. 
The provisions of the PFHA are based on the constitutional right of all people in 
South Africa to the right to equality, privacy, dignity, the right to freedom and security, 
which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence, be it from public or 
private sources.  
6.2.1.1 What constitutes harassment? 
In terms of the provisions of section 1 of the PFHA, harassment is defined as the 
respondent in the matter9 directly or indirectly engages in conduct which he or she 
knows or reasonably ought to know: 
• causes harm or even inspires the reasonable belief that harm may be caused 
to either the person complaining of the harassment (the complainant) or a 
person related to him or her by unreasonably: 
  
i. following, watching, pursuing or accosting of the complainant or a related 
person, or loitering outside of or near the building or place where the 
complainant or a related person resides, works, carries on business, 
studies or happens to be; 
ii. engaging in verbal, electronic or any other communication aimed at the 
complainant or a related person, by any means, whether or not 
conversation ensues; or  
iii. sending, delivering or causing the delivery of letters, telegrams, packages, 
facsimiles, electronic mail or other objects to the complainant or a related 
person or leaving them where they will be found by, given to or brought to 
the attention of, the complainant or a related person; or 
 
 
                                                          
9  The PFHA is based upon application principles, as a result of which there is as such an 
applicant and a respondent, reflecting a civil nature, as opposed to a criminal nature. 
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• if the conduct amounts to sexual harassment of either the complainant or a 
person related to him or her. 
 
Harm is defined in section 1 of the PFHA as including any mental, psychological, 
physical or economic harm. Sexual harassment is also defined in terms of the 
provisions of section 1 of the PFHA.10 
 
6.2.1.2 Determined jurisdiction in respect of the PFHA 
 
As already stated, the provisions of the PFHA fall neatly within the meaning of the 
provisions of section 4(1) of the PDA, and in circumstances in which such an 
application is brought by a whistle-blower, the jurisdiction is prescribed in terms of 
section 14 of the PFHA. In terms of section 14(1)(a) of the PFHA, any court within 
the area in which the complainant permanently or temporarily resides, carries on 
business or is employed, has jurisdiction to issue a protection order as provided for 
in this Act. 
In terms of section 14(1)(b) of the PFHA, any court within the area in which the 
respondent permanently or temporarily resides, carries on business or is employed, 
has jurisdiction to issue a protection order as provided for in this Act. 
There is no specific minimum period that is required in terms of the provisions of 
sections 14(1)(a) and (b) of the PFHA.11 So too, any court within the area in which 
the cause of action arose has the necessary jurisdiction to issue a protection order 
as provided for in the PFHA. However, it needs to be noted that such applications 
can only be brought in the Magistrates’ Courts, as section 1 of the PFHA defines a 
                                                          
10  "sexual harassment" means any- 
a) unwelcome sexual attention from a person who knows or ought reasonably to know that 
such attention is unwelcome: 
b) unwelcome explicit or implicit behaviour, suggestions, messages or remarks of a sexual 
nature that have the effect of offending, intimidating or humiliating the complainant or a 
related person in circumstances, which a reasonable person having regard to all the 
circumstances would have anticipated that the complainant or related person would be 
offended, humiliated or intimidated; 
c) implied or expressed promise of reward for complying with a sexually oriented request; 
or  
d) implied or expressed threat of reprisal or actual reprisal for refusal to comply with a 
sexually oriented request; 
11  Section 14 (2) of the PFHA. 
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court as any magistrate’s court for a district referred to in the Magistrate’s Court Act 
32 of 1994. 
 
The provisions in respect of appeal and review as provided for in terms of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and the Superior Courts Act 10 of 201312 apply to 
the proceedings in terms of the PFHA.13 
6.2.1.3 The court’s powers in terms of such a protection order 
Section 10 of the PFHA provides for the protection that a court may afford to an 
applicant for such a protection order, whether an interim or final order. Thus, this is 
potentially also the protection which may be afforded to a whistle-blower as provided 
for by section 4(1) of the PDA. 
This protection includes:  
• Prohibiting the respondent from engaging in or attempting to harass the 
complainant;14 
• Prohibiting the respondent from enlisting the assistance from another person 
to harass the complainant;15 
• Prohibiting the respondent from committing any other act as may be specified 
in the protection order;16 
• The court may impose any additional order which it deems necessary to 
protect and provide for the safety or well-being of either the complainant or a 
person related to the complainant, on the respondent in the matter;17 
• The court may order a member of the SAPS to seize any weapon18 in the 
possession or under the control of the respondent, as provided for in terms of 
section 1219 of the PFHA;20 
                                                          
12  It is noted that’s section 17 of the PFHA still refers to the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
13  Section 17 of the PFHA. 
14  Section 10(1)(a) of the PFHA. 
15  Section 10(1)(b) of the PFHA. 
16  Section 10(1)(c) of the PFHA. 
17  Section 10(2) of the PFHA. 
18  Section 1 of the PFHA defines a weapon as follows: 
"weapon" means- 
a) any firearm or any handgun or airgun or ammunition as defined in section 1(1) of the 
Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act No. 60 of 2000); and 
b) any object, other than that which is referred to in paragraph (a), which is likely to cause 
serious bodily injury if it were used to commit an assault. 
19  Section12 
120 
 
• The court may order a member of the SAPS to accompany the complainant or 
related person to a specified location to assist with any arrangements 
regarding the collection of his or her personal property identified by the 
complainant in the application for a protection order;21 
• The court may order the station commander of the relevant police station to 
investigate the complaint in order to establish the potential institution of 
criminal proceedings against the respondent;22 
• The residential and work addresses of a complainant or a person related to 
the complainant must be omitted from the protection order which will be 
served on the respondent, unless the nature of the terms of the protection 
order make it necessary to include such an address.23 For example, if the 
respondent is prohibited from coming within 100 metres of the complainant’s 
residential address, such address would need to be included. 
• The court may issue any necessary directions in order to ensure that the 
complainant or a related person’s physical address is not disclosed in a way 
which could endanger the well-being or the safety of either the complainant or 
a person related to the complainant;24 
• The court may not refuse to issue a protection order or to impose any 
condition or make any order which it is competent to make in terms of the 
provisions of section10 of the PFHA, merely on the grounds that there are 
other legal remedies available to the complainant;25 
If the court is of the opinion that any of the provisions of the protection order it is 
requested to make, should in the interests of justice be dealt with in terms of any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 The court may order a member of the South African Police Service to seize any weapon in the 
possession of or under the control of a respondent and direct the clerk of the court to refer a 
copy of the record of the evidence concerned to the National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service for consideration in terms of the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act No. 60 
of 2000). 
20  Section 10 (3)(a)(i) of the PFHA. 
21  Section 10 (3)(a)(ii) of the PFHA. 
22  Section 10 (3)(b) of the PFHA. 
23  Section 10 (4)(a) of the PFHA. 
24  Section 10 (4)(b) of the PFHA. 
25  Section 10 (5)(a) of the PFHA. 
 It has to be noted that the exception in this regard is in the circumstances in which the 
complainant is in possession of or in the process of applying for a protection order against 
harassment or stalking as provided for in the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. However, it is 
not envisioned that this is likely to be the position of a whistle-blower being harassed, although 
it cannot be discounted entirely. 
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other law, that court must order that the provision in question remain in force for a 
limited period of time, in order to afford the complainant to seek an opportunity to 
seek appropriate relief in terms of the law in question.26  
6.2.1.4 Offences in terms of the PFHA 
Section 18 of the PFHA provides for offences that can be committed within the 
context of the PFHA in that if: 
• A person contravenes a provision of an interim of final protection order 
granted27 that person is guilty of an offence, and liable on conviction of said 
offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years;28 
• Any person who in an affidavit stating that the respondent has contravened a 
provision contained in a protection order (final or interim), makes a false 
statement in a material respect is guilty of an offence, and liable on conviction 
of said offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five 
years;29 
• Any person who reveals the identity or residential or other physical address of 
the complainant or a related person in contravention of section 8(1)(b)30 or 
publishes information in contravention of section 8(1)(c)31 of the PFHA is guilty 
of an offence and may be liable on conviction of said offence to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years;32 
• Any person who either contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of 
section 7(3) of the PFHA is guilty of an offence and may be liable on 
conviction of such offence to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three 
                                                          
26  Section 10(5)(b) of the PFHA. 
27  This could by way of example include the respondent or any other person assisting the 
respondent. 
28  Section 18(1)(a) of the PFHA. 
29  Section 18(1)(b) of the PFHA. 
30  Section 8(1) The court may, of its own accord or at the request of the complainant or related 
person, if it is of the opinion that it would be in the interests of the administration of justice that 
the proceedings in question be held behind closed doors, direct that- 
(a) … 
(b) the identity or address of any person may not be revealed;  
31  Section 8(1) The court may, of its own accord or at the request of the complainant or related 
person, if it is of the opinion that it would be in the interests of the administration of justice that 
the proceedings in question be held behind closed doors, direct that- 
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) no information relating to the proceedings be published in any manner whatsoever. 
32  Section 18(2) of the PFHA. 
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months.33 Section 7(3) of the PFHA provides that any person subpoenaed or 
warned to attend the proceedings, and who fails to attend the proceedings or 
remain in attendance at the proceedings in question, or fails to appear on the 
date and at the time and place that the proceedings were adjourned to or 
remain in attendance at the proceedings so adjourned, or who fails to produce 
a book, document or object specified in the subpoena, is guilty of an offence.  
• So too, any electronic communications service provider34 or an employee of 
such a service provider who fails to provide information within five ordinary 
court days from the time that a direction is served on it, to a court in terms of 
section 4(3)(a) of the PFHA or an extended period allowed by the court in 
terms of section 4(3)(h) is guilty of an offence;35 
• Any electronic communications service provider or employee of such service 
provider who makes a false statement in an affidavit referred to in sections 4 
(1)(b)36, 4(3)(b)37 or 4(4)(b)38 in a material respect is guilty of an offence;39 
                                                          
33  Section 18(3) of the PFHA. 
34  In terms of section 1 of the PFHA an electronic communications service provider is defined as 
follows: 
 "electronic communications service provider" means an entity or a person who is licensed or 
exempted from being licensed in terms of Chapter 3 of the Electronic Communications Act, 
2005 (Act No. 36 of 2005). to provide an electronic communications service. 
35  Section 18(4)(a)(i) of the PFHA. 
36  Section 4(1)(b) provides as follows:  
  If an application for a protection order is made in terms of section 2 and the court is satisfied in 
terms of section 3(2) that a protection order must be issued as a result of the harassment of the 
complainant or a related person by means of electronic communications or electronic mail over 
an electronic communications system of an electronic communications service provider and the 
identity or address of the respondent is not known, the court may-  
(a)  … 
(b)  issue a direction in the prescribed form directing an electronic communications service 
provider to furnish the court in the prescribed manner by means of an affidavit in the 
prescribed form with-  
(i) the electronic communications identity number from where the harassing 
electronic communications or electronic mail originated; 
 (ii)  the name, surname, identity number and address of the respondent to whom the 
electronic communications identity number has been assigned; 
 (iii)  any information which indicates that electronic communications or electronic mail 
were or were not sent from the electronic communications identity number of the 
respondent to the electronic communications identity number of the complainant; 
and 
 (iv)  any other information that is available to an electronic communications service 
provider which may be of assistance to the court to identify the respondent or the 
electronic communications service provider which provides a service to the 
respondent. 
37  Section 4(3)(b) provides as follows:  
(b) An electronic communications service provider on which a direction is served, may in the 
prescribed manner by means of an affidavit in the prescribed form apply to the court for- 
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• Any electronic communications service provider or employee of such service 
provider who fails to comply with the provisions of section 4(6)40 of the PFHA 
is guilty of an offence; 
• Any electronic communications service provider or employee of such a service 
provider who is convicted of such an offence41 is liable in the case of such 
service provider to a fine not exceeding R 10 000.00 (ten thousand Rand)42 or 
in the case of an employee of such service provider to a fine or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding six months43; 
• Any person, who in terms of the provisions of section 6(2)44 of the PFHA, who 
is requested to provide his or her name and address or any other information 
to a member of the SAPS, and who fails to do so or who furnishes false or 
incorrect name, address or information, is guilty of an offence, and upon 
conviction may be liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months.45 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i) an extension of the period of five ordinary court days referred to in paragraph (a) for a further 
period of five ordinary court days on the grounds that the information cannot be provided 
timeously; or  
(ii) the cancellation of the direction on the grounds that- 
(aa) it does not provide an electronic communications service to either the respondent or 
complainant or related person: or 
(bb)  the requested information is not available in the records of the electronic communications 
service provider. 
38  Section 4 (4)(b) provides as follows: 
(4) After receipt of an application in terms of subsection (3)(b), the court- 
(a) … 
(b) may, in the prescribed manner, request such additional evidence by way of affidavit from 
the electronic communications service provider as it deems fit; 
39  Section 18 (4)(a)(ii) of the PFHA. 
40  Section 4(6) provides as follows:  
(6) An electronic communications service provider must, at least 48 hours before providing the 
information referred to in subsection (1)(b) to the court, by means of an electronic 
communication, inform the respondent of the- 
(a) information that is to be provided to the court; 
(b) reference number of the direction; and 
(c) name and address of the court. 
41  As referred to in section 18(4)(a) of the PFHA. 
42  Section 18(4)(b)(i) of the PFHA. 
43  Section 18(4)(b)(ii) of the PFHA. 
44  Section 6(2) provides as follows: 
6(2) A member of the South African Police Service may, in the manner set out in the national 
instructions issued in terms of section 20(2), request the respondent to furnish such member 
with his or her full name and address and any other information which the member may 
require in order to identify or trace the respondent. 
45  Section 18(5) of the PFHA. 
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6.2.2 The determination of jurisdiction in labour relations disputes arising 
from the provisions of the PDA 
In terms of the provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the PDA, it is clear that the LC as 
established in terms of section 151 of the LRA also has jurisdiction in defined 
circumstances, and the whistle-blower may as such also approach the LC  in order to 
seek appropriate relief. However, in this respect section 4(1) and  the second remedy 
provided for in terms of section 4(2) of the PDA go hand in hand, as the pivotal 
distinction, determining the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in terms of the 
LRA will be applicable is determined by the distinction between an automatically 
unfair dismissal and an unfair labour practice. In order to attempt to clarify this 
aspect, the jurisdictional aspects that are relevant will be discussed in tandem with 
the second remedy availed to the whistle-blower in terms of the PDA hereunder. 
6.3 The second remedy 
The second remedy which is availed to the whistle-blower in terms of the PDA, 
relates to two discernible situations, as follows: 
• Any dismissal which is in breach of section 3 of the PDA will be deemed to be 
an automatically unfair dismissal as contemplated in section 187 of the 
LRA, and any dispute about such a dismissal must follow the procedure set 
out in Chapter VIII of the LRA;46 and 
 
• Any other occupational detriment which is perpetrated in breach of section 3 of 
the PDA, it is deemed to be an unfair labour practice as contemplated in 
Part B of Schedule 7 of the LRA, and such a dispute must follow the 
procedure set out in that part of the LRA. An additional proviso in this respect 
is that if the matter fails to be resolved by way of conciliation, it may be 
referred to the LC for adjudication.47 
 
 
 
                                                          
46  Section 4(2)(a) of the PDA. 
47  Section 4(2)(b) of the PDA. 
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6.3.1 The automatically unfair dismissal of a whistle-blower 
In terms of section 4(2)(a) of the PDA, if a whistle-blower is dismissed, and as such is 
subjected to occupational detriment in this manner by the employer, on account of or 
partly on account of having made a protected disclosure, such a dismissal is deemed 
to be an automatically unfair dismissal, and as provided for in terms of section 
187(1)(h) of the LRA. 
If the whistle-blower is so dismissed, the procedure provided for in Chapter VIII of the 
LRA is followed. It also needs to be borne in mind that in these circumstances the 
employee (whistle-blower) must not only show that he or she was dismissed, but also 
that he was dismissed on account of or partly on account of having made a protected 
disclosure. It is then for the employer to show that the employee was not dismissed 
on account of or partly on account of having made a protected disclosure. If the 
employer is unable to do so, it will be an automatically unfair dismissal.48 If there is a 
dispute about the fairness of the dismissal, the dismissed employee may refer the 
dispute in writing 30 days from the dismissal to a council, if the parties’ dispute falls 
within the registered ambit of that council 49  or to the CCMA, if no council has 
jurisdiction50. 
 
The council or the CCMA (as the case may be) may on good cause shown permit the 
employee to refer the dispute after the aforementioned time limit has expired.51 The 
council or CCMA (as the case may be) must attempt to resolve the dispute through 
conciliation.52 If the council or CCMA (as the case may be) certifies that the dispute 
remains unresolved, or if 30 days have expired since the council or CCMA received 
the referral of the dispute and the dispute remains unresolved, the dispute must be 
arbitrated at the request of the employee if: 
• The employee alleges that the reason for his dismissal relates to his conduct 
or capacity, unless paragraph (b)(iii) applies; 
                                                          
48  Section 192 of the LRA. 
49  Section 191(1)(a)(i) of the LRA. 
50  Section 191(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA. 
51  Section 191(2) of the LRA. 
52  Section 191(4) of the LRA. 
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• The employee alleges that the reason for his dismissal relates to the fact that 
the employer made the employee’s continued employment unbearable, or that 
the employer provided the employee with materially less favourable conditions 
or circumstances within the employment, following a transfer effected in terms 
of section 197 or 197A, unless the employee alleges that his contract of 
employment was terminated for a reason provided in section 187; or 
• The employee doesn’t know what the reason for the dismissal was.53  
Alternatively the employee may refer the dispute regarding the automatically unfair 
dismissal alleged to the LC for adjudication if the employee has alleged that the 
reason for dismissal is automatically unfair.54 Such a referral of a dispute to the LC 
for adjudication must be made within 90 days after the council or the CCMA (as the 
case may be) has certified that the dispute remains unresolved.55 However, despite 
any other provision in the LRA, the council or CCMA (as the case may be) must 
commence with arbitration immediately after certifying that the dispute remains 
unresolved, and in respect of which none of the parties have objected to the matter 
so being dealt with.56 
In terms of the provisions of section 191(6) of the LRA, despite the provisions of 
sections 191(5)(a) or 191(5A) of the LRA the director of the CCMA must refer the 
dispute to the LC if the director decides on application made by any party to the 
dispute that it is appropriate to do so after considering the following factors: 
• the reason for dismissal;  
• whether there are questions of law raised by the dispute;  
• the complexity of the dispute;  
• whether there are conflicting arbitration awards that need to be resolved;  
• considerations relating to the public interest.  
When so considering the referral of the dispute to the LC, the director must give the 
parties, as well as the commissioner who attempted to conciliate the dispute an 
                                                          
53  Section 191(5)(a)(i) – (iii) of the LRA. 
54  Section 191(5)(b)(i) of the LRA. 
55  Section 191(11)(a) of the LRA. 
56  Section 191(5A) of the LRA. 
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opportunity to make representations in this respect.57 The director’s decision in this 
regard is final and binding58 and no person may apply to any court to review the 
director’s decision until the dispute regarding the alleged automatically unfair 
dismissal has been arbitrated or adjudicated.59 
6.3.2 An unfair labour practice in respect of a whistle-blower 
As provided for in terms of section 4(2)(b) of the PDA, any other occupational 
detriment (beside dismissal) which is perpetrated by the employer on account, or 
partly on account of the whistle-blower having made a protected disclosure, is 
deemed to be an unfair labour practice as contemplated in Part B of Schedule 7 of 
the LRA. 
Section 186(2) of the LRA defines an unfair labour practice as including: 
• unfair conduct by the employer regarding the promotion, demotion, probation 
or training or benefits of an employee; 
• unfair suspension of the employee; 
• any other disciplinary action, short of dismissal of the employee; 
• failure or refusal of the employer to reinstate a former employee in terms of an 
agreement; and 
• an occupational detriment, besides dismissal, in contravention of the 
provisions of the PDA as a result of the employee in question having made a 
protected disclosure. 
If there is a dispute about the an unfair labour practice, the employee alleging the 
unfair labour practice may refer the dispute in writing to a council, if the parties’ 
dispute falls within the registered ambit of that council60 or to the CCMA, if no council 
has jurisdiction.61 The referral must be made within 90 days of the date of the alleged 
act or omission which allegedly constitutes the unfair labour practice, or if it is a later 
                                                          
57  Section 191(7) of the LRA. 
58  Section 191(9) of the LRA. 
59  Section 191(10) of the LRA. 
60  Section 191(1)(a)(i) of the LRA. 
61  Section 191(1)(a)(ii) of the LRA. 
128 
 
date than the aforementioned, then within 90 days of the date on which the employee 
became aware of the act or occurrence.62 
The council or the CCMA (as the case may be) may on good cause shown permit the 
employee to refer the dispute after the aforementioned time limit has expired.63 The 
council or CCMA (as the case may be) must also attempt to resolve the dispute 
through conciliation.64 If the council of CCMA (as the case may be) certifies that the 
dispute remains unresolved, or if 30 days have expired since the council or CCMA 
received the referral of the dispute and the dispute remains unresolved, the dispute 
must be arbitrated at the request of the employee if the dispute relates to an unfair 
labour practice.65  
Alternatively the employee may refer the dispute regarding the automatically unfair 
dismissal alleged to the LC for adjudication if the employee has alleged that the 
reason for dismissal is automatically unfair.66 Such a referral of a dispute to the LC 
for adjudication must be made within 90 days after the council or the CCMA (as the 
case may be) has certified that the dispute remains unresolved.67 Despite any other 
provision in the LRA, the council or CCMA (as the case may be) must commence 
with arbitration immediately after certifying that the dispute remains unresolved, and 
in respect of which none of the parties have objected to the matter so being dealt 
with.68 
In terms of the provisions of section 191(6) of the LRA, despite the provisions of 
sections 191(5)(a) or 191 (5A) of the LRA the director of the CCMA must refer the 
dispute to the LC if the director decides on application made by any party to the 
dispute that it is appropriate to do so after considering the following factors: 
• whether there are questions of law raised by the dispute;  
• the complexity of the dispute;  
• whether there are conflicting arbitration awards that need to be resolved;  
                                                          
62  Section 191(1)(b)(ii) of the LRA. 
63  Section 191(2) of the LRA. 
64  Section 191(4) of the LRA. 
65  Section 191(5)(a)(iv) of the LRA. 
66  Section 191(5)(b)(i) of the LRA. 
67  Section 191(11)(a) of the LRA. 
68  Section 191(5A) of the LRA. 
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• considerations relating to the public interest.  
When so considering the referral of the dispute to the LC, the director must give the 
parties, as well as the commissioner who attempted to conciliate the dispute an 
opportunity to make representations in this respect.69 The director’s decision in this 
regard is final and binding70 and no person may apply to any court to review the 
director’s decision until the dispute regarding the alleged automatically unfair 
dismissal has been arbitrated or adjudicated.71 
6.3.3 Remedies available for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices 
In terms of the provisions of section 193 of the LRA, read together with the remedies 
provided for by the PDA, certain remedies are made available to whistle-blowers 
regarding unfair labour practices perpetrated against them. 
If it is found that a dismissal was unfair, the court or arbitrator may: order that the 
employer reinstate the employee as from a date not before the date of dismissal;72 
order that the employee be re-employed in the position that the employee occupied 
before the dismissal or in another position deemed to be reasonably suitable.73 The 
LC or arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate the employee unless the 
employee does not wish to be reinstated or re-employed, the circumstances are of 
such a nature that it would be intolerable, it is not reasonably practicable, or the 
dismissal was found to be unfair based only on procedural unfairness.74 Lastly, order 
the employer to pay compensation to the employee.75 
Limits are placed on the compensation which may be ordered by the provisions of 
section 194 of the LRA. Where dismissal was found to be unfair either because the 
employer did not prove substantive or procedural fairness, the compensation must 
be just and equitable taking all circumstances into account, and may not exceed the 
equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration, calculated at the employee’s rate of 
                                                          
69  Section 191(7) of the LRA. 
70  Section 191(9) of the LRA. 
71  Section 191(10) of the LRA. 
72  Section 193(a) of the LRA. 
73  Section 193(1)(b) of the LRA. 
74  Section 193(2)(a)-(d) of the LRA. 
75  Section 193(1)(c) of the LRA. 
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remuneration as at the date of dismissal.76 Should the dismissal be found to be 
automatically unfair, the compensation must be just and equitable taking all the 
circumstances into account, and may not exceed the equivalent of 24 months’ 
remuneration, calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration as at the date of 
dismissal.77 In respect of an unfair labour practice, the compensation awarded must 
be just and equitable considering all the circumstances, and may not exceed 12 
months’ remuneration.78 It also needs to be noted that such compensation ordered, 
is so ordered in addition to any other amount which the employee is entitled to in 
terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employment.79 
6.3.4 An inquiry by an arbitrator 
Section 188A of the LRA also needs to be considered within the context of the 
whistle-blower. An employer may with the consent of the relevant employee or in 
accordance with the provisions of a collective agreement request a council, an 
accredited agency or the CCMA to appoint an arbitrator in order for the arbitrator so 
appointed to conduct an inquiry into allegations about the conduct or capacity of an 
employee.80 
Such an employee may only consent to such an inquiry after the employee has been 
advised of the allegations against him or her.81 However, an employee earning more 
than the amount determined by the Minister from time to time in accordance with 
section 6(3) of the BCEA, may consent in a contract of employment to the holding of 
such an inquiry.82 
 
The ruling by an arbitrator in such an inquiry has the same status as an arbitration 
award 83 , and the arbitrator conducting the inquiry must in light of the evidence 
presented and with reference to the criteria of fairness provided for in the LRA rule as 
to what action should be taken against the relevant employee, if any84. 
                                                          
76  Section 194(1) of the LRA. 
77  Section 194(3) of the LRA. 
78  Section 194(4) of the LRA 
79  Section 195 of the LRA. 
80  Section 188A(1) of the LRA. 
81  Section 188A(4)(a) of the LRA. 
82  Section 188A(4)(b) of the LRA. 
83  Section 188A(8) of the LRA. 
84  Section 188A(9) of the LRA. 
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Despite the provisions of section 188A(1), if an employee alleges in good faith that 
the holding of such an inquiry contravenes the PDA, that employee or the employer 
may require that an inquiry be conducted in terms of this section into allegations by 
the employer into the conduct or capacity of the employee involved.85 Such an inquiry 
by an arbitrator and the suspension of the employee involved on full pay pending the 
outcome of the inquiry does not constitute an occupational detriment as 
contemplated and defined in the provisions of the PDA.86 
6.4 The third remedy 
The third remedy provided to a whistle-blower is to be found in terms of the 
provisions of section 4(3) of the PDA. 
Such an employee who has made a protected disclosure and who reasonably belies 
that he or she may be adversely affected as a result of having made that protected 
disclosure, must at his or her request, and if in the circumstances it is reasonably 
practicable be transferred from the position he or she occupies at the time of making 
the disclosure to another position whether or not it is in the same division of the 
employer. Where the employer of the employee who made such a protected 
disclosure is an organ of state, it may also include him or her so being transferred to 
another organ of state. It is clear that the availability of this remedy will need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 
The PDA makes no provision for the way forward should such a transfer not be 
reasonably practicable, or alternatively if the employer should simply refuse. It has to 
be noted too that disputes pertaining to transfers are not specifically dealt with within 
the ambit of the LRA either. 
There is further at the date hereof87 no case law available in South Africa in this 
respect. Perhaps an additional consideration in dealing with this type of application is 
to be found in the thinking displayed in the Media 2488 matter in which the SCA found 
that an employer has a common law duty to take reasonable care of employees’ 
                                                          
85  Section 188A(11) of the LRA. 
86  Section 188A(12) of the LRA. 
87  May 2015. 
88  Media 24 Ltd & Another v Grobler 2005 (26) ILJ 1007 (SCA). 
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safety, and that this obligation was not confined to the employer taking steps to 
protect employees merely from physical harm, but also psychological harm. 
 
6.5 The fourth remedy 
The fourth remedy which is provided to a whistle-blower is to be found in terms of the 
provisions of section 4(4) of the PDA. This provision provides that an employee who 
has made a protected disclosure has been transferred as provided for may not 
without his or her consent be subjected to terms and conditions of employment that 
are less favourable than the terms and conditions of employment that were 
applicable to him or her immediately before the transfer. It is clear that whether the 
terms and conditions are less favourable, will need to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. It however needs to be pointed out that the fourth remedy is not so much 
a remedy as a prohibition, as relief is not provided for within the context of the 
provisions of section 4(4) of the PDA. 
The terms and conditions of employment may be regulated by the BCEA, collective 
agreements, sectoral determinations, other legislation and the provisions contained 
within the contract of employment. 
6.6 The duties of the employer and vicarious liability within this context – a 
fifth remedy? 
The judgement of the SCA in Media 24 89  has no bearing on whistle-blowing, 
however, it does raise a question in respect of the liability of an employer, when seen 
both within the context of the duties of the employer, as well as vicarious liability, in 
respect of a whistle-blower and occupational detriment and more exacted upon such 
a whistle-blower as employee. The background to the matter is that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, in 2005 dismissed appeals brought by Media 24 Limited and 
Gasant Samuels against orders made by Justice Nel in the Cape High Court on 19 
March 2004 ordering them jointly and severally to pay R776 814 to Mrs. Grobler, 
who was a former secretary employed by Nasionale Ltd in Cape Town.  
                                                          
89  Media 24 Ltd & Another v Grobler 2005 (26) ILJ 1007 (SCA). 
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The court found that Samuels had sexually harassed Mrs. Grobler over a period of 
six months at the premises of Nasionale Tydskrifte and on one occasion near her 
flat, as a result of which she suffered chronic emotional problems which prevented 
her from working. The judge also found that Media 24 Limited, which had employed 
Gasant Samuels was vicariously liable for his conduct in sexually harassing Mrs. 
Grobler. On appeal the SCA upheld the finding by the trial court that Samuels had 
sexually harassed Mrs. Grobler. It left open the question as to whether Media 24 
Limited was vicariously liable for the harassment because it found that Nasionale 
Tydskrifte Limited, for whose obligations it had assured liability, had negligently 
breached the legal duty it owed Mrs. Grobler to take reasonable steps to prevent her 
from being sexually harassed in her working environment. The question thus raised 
is whether an employer has a duty to ensure that occupational detriment, and even 
further detriment is not caused to a whistle-blower within its employ? 
6.6.1 The basic duties of the employer 
The various basic duties of the employer in relation to its employee arise out of the 
contract concluded between the parties, as well as out of the nature of the 
relationship between them within the employment relationship. 
6.6.1a Vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability relates to the employer being held liable for the wrongful acts of its 
employees,90 and in the main relates to the law of damages in terms of which the 
pecuniary terms of the liability is then determined.91 
This is a specialised, voluminous field of law, and as such in this thesis no attempt 
will be made to canvass it, even partially. However, having said that, it is argued that 
a fair statement would be to say that within an employment relationship, it is so that 
society expects someone with a certain title within the employment relationship to act 
in accordance with not only the title, but also the status and expectations connoted 
with such position. 
                                                          
90  Basson Essential Labour Law (5th ed) 52. 
91  Potgieter Law of Damages (3rd ed) page v (Preface). 
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Millard92 explores vicarious liability in detail, commenting on an apparent alarming 
trend in South Africa in holding especially government employees liable for wrongful 
and culpable acts. The start of such an inquiry is to be found in asking whether there 
has in fact been a wrongful and culpable act committed by the employee as alleged. 
In the event that it is found that the employee indeed commit such a delict, the 
relationship between the employee and employer becomes relevant.93  
It would seem that upon consideration of the above, it would be possible for a 
whistle-blower to institute proceedings in respect of the vicarious liability of his 
employer should he have suffered detriment that goes wider than just occupation 
detriment as provided for in the PDA, and perhaps as considered within the 
provisions of section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA. 
The body of case law pertaining to vicarious liability is considerable, and in 
attempting to determine the precedents set in this respect by our courts, 
consideration could be had to cases such as Viljoen v Smith,94 Grobler v Naspers 
Bpk & Another, 95  Ntsabo v Real Security CC, 96  Mkhize v Martens 97  (by way of 
example). 
6.6.1b Further delictual considerations – common law 
In respect of the provisions of section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA, it is argued that it is 
within this realm that further considerations regard delictual liability in respect of the 
whistle-blower would come into play. For example, should the employer cause 
detriment to a whistle-blower as a result of his or her (the employer’s) failure to carry 
out his obligations as provided for in the contract of employment, the employer would 
be in breach of the contract. This would give rise to the enforcement of contractual 
remedies. 
Two examples which could potentially relate within the context of the whistle-blower 
are: 
                                                          
92  Millard 2012 De Jure 225-253. 
93  Millard 2012 De Jure 226. 
94  Viljoen v Smith 1997 (18) ILJ 61 (A). 
95  Grobler v Naspers Bpk & Another 2004 (5) BLLR 455 (C). 
96  Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2004 (1) BLLR 58 (LC). 
97  Mkhize v Martens 1914 AD 382 390. 
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• the employer’s duty to provide safe working conditions, as demonstrated in 
the Media 24 matter;98 
• the employer’s duty of fair dealings with employees as introduced by the SCA 
in Murray.99 This would be especially relevant in respect of certain employees 
within the military and intelligence environments not covered by the LRA. 
 
…the Supreme Court of Appeal introduced a new general and 
contractual obligation on employers, namely the duty of fair dealings 
with employees. The employee, a military policeman, claimed that he 
had been constructively dismissed by his employer (he resigned 
because his employer made continued employment impossible). If 
the employee had been covered by the LRA he would have had 
specific remedies in terms of the Act. But the LRA does not apply to 
members of the SA National Defence Force and he relied on purely 
contractual grounds to approach the High Courts. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the employee was entitled to rely directly 
on his right to fair labour practices and the associated right to 
personal dignity, and of course, he could also rely on his contractual 
rights. The constitutionally extended common law relating to the 
contract of employment, said the Court, now imposes a duty on all 
employers (not only the military) to deal fairly with their employees 
(own emphasis).100 
Considerations that apply within the same delictual context, which would in all 
probability therefore also apply within the realm of whistle-blowing, would certainly 
include the infringement of fama through defamation and malicious proceedings. 
In certain circumstances the defamation of a natural person may result in monetary 
loss, such as cases concerning a right to goodwill, earning capacity or the 
creditworthiness of the person concerned. In such cases the loss of income or the 
loss of profit, by way of example, will be utilised in ascertaining the damages 
suffered. In this respect the courts have a wide discretion, with fairness being the 
central consideration.101  
In fact, it is suggested that the remedies within this common law context in respect of 
a whistle-blower, may very well be said to extend to parties other than the whistle-
blower. Take, for example, the instance in which a whistle-blower (and in the wider 
context of an informer outside the scope of the employment relationship) is killed, or 
dies or is injured as a result of the fact that blew the whistle. In such circumstances 
the law of damages provides for damages that may be claimed for loss of support 
                                                          
98  Media 24 Ltd & Another v Grobler 2005 (26) ILJ 1007 (SCA). 
99  Murray v Minister of Defence 2008 (6) BLLR 513 (SCA). 
100  Basson Essential Labour Law  47 and 48. 
101  Potgieter Law of Damages 513. 
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caused by death or injury. The damages that may be claimed include medical costs, 
funeral costs and claims by the dependants of such persons.102 
6.7 The insertion of section 200B in the LRA 
Recently the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 inserted section 200B, 
which relates to the liability for an employer’s obligations. 
Section 200B(1) of the LRA provides that for the purposes of the LRA and any other 
employment laws, which would obviously include both the provisions of the BCEA 
and the PDA an ‘employer’ includes any one or more persons, who carry on 
associated or related activity or business ‘by or through an employer if the intent or 
effect of their doing so is or has been to directly or indirectly defeat the purposes of 
this Act or any other employment law’. 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 200B(2) of the LRA provides that if more than 
one person is so held to be the employer of an employee, those people are jointly 
and severally liable for any failure to comply with the obligation of an employer of the 
LRA or any other employment laws, including the PDA and the BCEA. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
When considering the remedies that may be available, the PDA itself in section 4(1) 
itself directs the whistle-blower to look wider than the ambit of that provided for in the 
PDA. The wording of the mentioned section makes it clear in that seeking a remedy 
the whistle-blowers reach expands beyond the boundaries of that available merely 
within the context of the employment relationship. His or her cause of action in 
seeking an appropriate remedy may fall within the labour context, criminal law or the 
civil law, with the remedies not ending to those availed to the whistle-blower; the 
family and dependant of the whistle-blower too may have a cause for action in 
search of an appropriate remedy depending on the circumstances of the case. 
                                                          
102  Potgieter Law of Damages 477 – 490. 
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CHAPTER 7: AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW CONCERNING 
WHISTLE-BLOWERS 
7.1 Introduction 
As has been established, on occasion, the whistle-blower is viewed with absolute 
dissent, as disloyal at heart. 
Hucker opines that it is as a result of upbringing, the values of which include loyalty 
and team spirit, which people are taught from an early age that one is never to inform 
on others members of a group, no matter what they have done, as this would amount 
to betrayal and an indication of low moral fibre.1  
However, the LC’s recent view expressed in respect of whistle-blowers, in Ngobeni v 
Minister of Communications and another2 seems to underpin an attitude seemingly 
directly opposite to the above-mentioned sentiments, which no doubt, still linger.  
 
Having established the remedies that have been provided for whistle-blowers in 
terms of section 4 of the PDA, and which indicates the breadth and width thereof, it 
is deemed expedient to consider South African case law in respect of whistle-
blowing for two basic purposes. First of all it is necessary to determine what kinds of 
remedies have been afforded to whistle-blowers in practice, and secondly, to 
examine the tests determined by our courts in so-doing, in establishing whether 
those laying claim to the remedies provided actually qualify to do so based on their 
claims. 
Further cases displaying jurisdictional issues are also mentioned under paragraph 
7.4 hereunder. 
  
                                                          
1  Adv. Dion Hucker (for Grant Thornton). "Whistleblowing – is it the right thing or the only thing to 
do?" 2005 The Bottom Line (1) 1. 
2  (2014) 35 ILJ 2506 (LC) 
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7.2 The body of case law 
7.2.1 Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd3 
In the Grieve case the applicant in the matter was employed at Swartklip as its safety 
and security manager. Denel is a private company with the state as its sole 
shareholder and managed by a board of directors appointed by the Minister for 
Public Enterprises. This matter concerned the division of Denel (Pty) Ltd which was 
styled as “Swartklip Products” (hereinafter referred to as “Swartklip”). The applicant 
averred that the general manager (Bedford) at Swartklip, had as a result of his 
management style, alienated a number of the employees, and that the employees 
had started organising themselves into what was termed ‘concerned groups’, 
although seemingly the specifics in respect of these groups could not be clarified or 
defined. It seemed as though the applicant and the members of the group had over a 
period of time accumulated information and ‘evidence’ in respect of Bedford, and 
alleged wrongdoing and poor management, with the intention of revealing the 
information and having Bedford removed from Swartklip. 
On 23 October 2002, the applicant disclosed information to his immediate supervisor 
(Schultz) in an informal manner in respect of four matters purportedly relating to 
alleged unauthorised expenditure, nepotism and financial wrongdoing by Bedford 
and some associated with him. Following this, further meetings were held between 
the applicant and Schultz and on 24 October 2002 Van Der Merwe, who was the 
financial executive at Swartklip also attended. On 29 October 2002 Schultz called 
the applicant, stating that investigating the allegations that had been made would 
place him in a difficult position, and as such, should the applicant wish to pursue the 
allegations the applicant should take the matter directly to the board. The applicant 
was in the process of finalising a report he was compiling for this very purpose when 
he was called to a meeting with Schultz and Bedford in respect of another 
investigation pertaining to an explosion.  
The applicant’s report was submitted to the board on 19 November 2002, with the 
applicant being suspended the following day with full pay. He was charged with 
misconduct during early December 2002, with the disciplinary hearing being 
                                                          
3  Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 551 (LC). 
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postponed to 13 January 2003. During preparation for the hearing, both the applicant 
and his attorney discovered4 the provisions of the PDA. An urgent application for 
interim relief was launched on 10 January 2003, in respect of which the relief sought 
was that the employer be interdicted from continuing with the pending disciplinary 
action against the applicant; the matter was set down by agreement on 16 January 
2003 in the LC, where it was fully argued.  
In respect of the jurisdiction, the court noted that would only have the necessary 
jurisdiction in the dispute once the conciliation process had run its course. However, 
the court was mindful of the fact that despite this, that the matter at hand was the 
type of case in which the court had the necessary power to order that the status quo 
be maintained or restored, pending the main dispute’s determination. The court 
pointed out that in a matter such as the one at hand the test was not whether the 
court had the necessary jurisdiction to determine the main dispute, but whether it 
had jurisdiction in an application for an interim interdict, with reference to 
Airoadexpress (Pty) Ltd v The Chairman, Local Transportation Board, Durban & 
others 1986 (2) SA 663 (A), National Gambling Board v Premier KwaZulu-Natal & 
others 2002 (2) SA 175 (CC) at 713B. 
In such a situation the court had to determine whether or not the applicant had a 
prima facie right to the relief sought, within the court’s jurisdiction.5 
When applying the test in respect of an interim interdict, the court, taking into account 
the facts of the matter before it, was satisfied that at a prima facie6 level the applicant 
had established a causal link between the charges that had been brought against 
him and the fact that he had made disclosures. The court further noted that the 
applicant had no other remedy available, and in the court’s view the balance of 
convenience favoured the granting of the interim interdict.  
The interim interdict was granted to the applicant. 
 
                                                          
4  It has to be borne in mind that at this stage, the PDA was relatively new. 
5  Venter v Automobile Association of SA (2002) 21 ILJ 675 (LC) at 677E-678B. 
6  In other words, on the face of the facts placed before the court. 
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7.2.2 Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) 
Ltd7 
In this matter an interim interdict had been granted on 16 April 2003, with a return 
day (rule nisi).  
In terms of the interim order that had been granted the Mobile Telephone Networks 
(hereinafter referred to as “MTN”), had been interdicted from proceeding with 
disciplinary action against the second applicant, until the finalisation of the application 
before the court. The relief sought by the applicants was that MTN be interdicted 
from proceeding with the disciplinary action, pending the adjudication of the unfair 
labour practice dispute that had been referred by the applicants to the CCMA on 16 
April 2003. They also sought an order from the court in terms of which the 
suspension of the second applicant would be lifted, pending the final determination of 
the matter. 
The second applicant at the time was employed by MTN as a supervisor in the 
business improvement unit. Until the beginning of 2003 a number of temporary staff 
members had been provided to the unit in the Gauteng Office by various employment 
agencies. The second applicant averred that in March 2003 it became apparent to 
him that there were departures from previous practice, in that supervisors were given 
lists of candidates to interview, with the most of the candidates on the lists being 
supplied by an agency known as Thlalefang. On 1 April 2003 at a meeting the 
second applicant raised the allegation he had regarding the alleged preferential 
treatment that was being afforded to Thlalefang. He was advised to refer the matter 
to the business risk unit. However, on 4 April 2003 the second applicant wrote and 
circulated an email to a group of people, blind copying a number of people including 
the chief executive officer and the commercial director; some of the recipients had 
been in attendance at the meeting on 1 April 2003. It was this email that the 
applicants averred constituted the protected disclosure. 
In consequence on 11 April 2003 the second applicant was suspended and advised 
that he would have to attend a disciplinary hearing on 17 April 2003. The issue 
                                                          
7  Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 1670 
(LC). 
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before the court was whether the disclosure qualified as a protected disclosure as 
provided for in the PDA. The requirements for a final interdict require the applicant in 
a matter to establish a clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably 
apprehended, as well as the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary 
remedy. The court stated that if a disclosure was made to an employer in terms of the 
provisions of section 6 of the PDA, there were a number of conditions to be satisfied 
before the disclosure would be held to be a protected disclosure. The conditions to 
be met would include inter alia that the disclosure was to be made by an employee, 
that the employee had reason to believe that the information disclosed shows or 
tends to show the type of conduct defined as a disclosure in the PDA, that the 
disclosure had been made in good faith, in accordance with the prescribed procedure 
and the like. 
The court held that there had to be a demonstrable nexus between the disclosure 
made and the alleged occupational detriment.8 
The court agreed with the observation of the court in the Grieve matter9  that the PDA 
seeks to encourage a culture of whistle-blowing, however, the court also observed 
that the protection is not unconditional. In this regard the court stated that in 
circumstances in which an employee set out deliberately to embarrass or harass the 
employer, the requirement of good faith has not been met, and that the PDA did not 
provide protection for a whistle-blower whose disclosure was based on rumour or 
conjecture.10  
In the matter at hand the court held that the disclosure did not qualify as a protected 
disclosure as the applicant was in fact expressing what amounted to a subjectively 
held opinion or accusation.  As such in this matter the rule nisi was discharged.  
7.2.3 H & M Ltd11  
In this matter the applicant at the time of her dismissal had held the position of 
Human Resource Manager. On 20 September 2004 the applicant had been 
                                                          
8  Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 1670 (LC) 
para 19. 
9  Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 551 (LC). 
10  Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 1670 (LC) 
para 21. 
11  H & M Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 1737 (CCMA). 
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suspended and called to a disciplinary hearing on 12 October 2004. The charges she 
faced were included malicious intent to cause harm to the employer by abusing and 
divulging confidential information, fraudulent activities whilst holding a position of 
trust, the breach of her duty of good faith whilst in a position of trust and gross 
negligence. 
The applicant’s case was that the suspension and charges had originated as a result 
of a letter the applicant had sent to Mr. J, a 5% shareholder in the respondent, 
resident in Spain, on 8 September 2004, and the applicant averring that the letter had 
amounted to a protected disclosure in terms of the PDA. In other words, she was 
alleging occupational detriment as a result of a protected disclosure made. 
On 9 October 2004 the applicant addressed a letter to the respondent in which she 
raised various concerns, offering to attend a hearing in terms of section 188A12 of the 
LRA, contending as well that the charges were vague and embarrassing and seeking 
clarity in respect thereof, and further contending that her conduct was protected in 
terms of the provisions of the PDA. In respect of her suspension, the applicant had 
already submitted an alleged unfair labour practice dispute with the CCMA. The 
Commissioner in this matter referred to both Grieve v Denel13 and Communication 
Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd14 noting inter alia that there 
were certain conditions to be met with before a disclosure could be said to be 
protected, and as provided for in terms of the provisions of section 6 of the PDA. 
In respect of the nexus the Commissioner noted that the court “did not deem it 
necessary that the detriment be directly linked to the disclosure in the sense that an 
employee would be entitled to a remedy if and only if the detriment threatened or 
applied by the employer is so threatened or applied expressly for the making of a 
disclosure.” 15  The Commissioner stated that this would permit unscrupulous 
                                                          
12  In terms of the provisions of section 188A, at the time an employer may, with the consent of the 
employee involved, request a council, an accredited agency or the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration, to conduct an arbitration pertaining to allegations about the conduct 
or capacity of that employee. This provision has subsequently been amended in terms of the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014, and now relates to an inquiry by an arbitrator. 
13  Grieve v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 551 (LC). 
14  Communication Workers Union v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 (24) ILJ 1670 
(LC). 
15  H & M Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 1737 (CCMA) 1776. 
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employers to create pretexts upon which to affect occupational detriments and 
undermine the purpose of the PDA. However, the nexus needs to be demonstrable. 
The Commissioner also referred to the parameters set out by the provisions of the 
PDA, within which the whistle-blower would need to stay to enjoy the protection 
offered, including the requirement that the disclosure had to be made in good faith, 
and may not be based on mere rumours or conjecture, but that the whistle-blower 
also needed to base his beliefs in respect of the disclosure on reasonable grounds 
regarding the substantial truth of the allegations. Taking cognisance of the 
requirements as provided for in the PDA, the Commissioner found that only 
allegations 2, 3 and 27 made by the applicant qualified as protected disclosures. The 
award granted equalled four months’ remuneration. 
7.2.4 Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd (formerly SCMB Securities 
(Pty) Ltd)16 
The applicant in this matter had been dismissed on 24 April 2004, with the employer, 
the respondent in the case, citing operational requirements as being the reason for 
her dismissal. However, the applicant alleged that the retrenchment proceedings 
were a sham that the respondent had used to disguise the true reason for her 
dismissal. The applicant alleged that her dismissal was automatically unfair inter alia 
as a result of her having made a protected disclosure.  
The applicant had been employed by the respondent, who was part of the Standard 
Bank Group, as a Compliance Manager. In this position she inter alia responsible for 
investigating insider trading and other irregularities regarding share trading.  
The applicant had prepared a report regarding trading irregularities that was sent to 
her superior and to the Group’s Compliance Department. One of the employees 
implicated was the applicant’s superior’s senior manager. The applicant’s superior 
viewed the fact that he had not been consulted in respect of the report, as an act of 
insubordination on the part of the applicant.  A few weeks later, the respondent 
decided that it needed to increase the staff component of the Compliance 
Department, however, even in the face of this the applicant was given a section 189 
                                                          
16  Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd (formerly SCMB Securities (Pty) Ltd) 2006 (27) ILJ 362 
(LC). 
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letter, in which it was proposed that she work full-time, be allocated a suitable 
alternative position or be retrenched. At this stage the applicant was working half 
days as a result of a back condition she had developed. A counter-proposal that she 
submitted was rejected by the respondent and the applicant was dismissed.  
The court was of the view that the disclosure made by the applicant fell squarely 
within the ambit of section 6 of the PDA. As such the applicant’s dismissal was 
automatically unfair, and as a result of which the respondent was ordered to pay the 
applicant compensation equal to twenty four months’ remuneration, as well as the 
applicant’s costs. 
7.2.5 Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & 
Another17 
In this matter, following what the applicant averred was a protected disclosure as 
defined in the PDA, the applicant was suspended pending a disciplinary enquiry. 
Tshishonga had been employed in 1978 in the department of justice (the 
department) in Venda as a Director-General; in 1994 he was appointed as a Deputy 
Director-General when various departments of justice were consolidated, and where 
after he was appointed as the Managing Director of the Masters’ office business unit 
(hereinafter referred to as “the unit”). One of his duties were to address the rife 
instances of corruption regarding the administration of insolvent estates, and 
especially in the appointment of liquidators.  A panel was to be establishes which 
would appoint such liquidators. 
During 2002 Tshishonga was contacted by the former Minister of Justice, Dr Penwell 
Maduna, who informed Tshishonga that a friend of his, a certain Mr Enver Motala, 
would make contact with Tshishonga, as Motala was knowledgeable about 
liquidations. During approximately February 2002 Tshishonga and Motala met, 
however, to Tshishonga it seemed clear that Motala’s aim was to influence him for 
his own benefit. 
                                                          
17  Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC). 
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Also during February 2002 it appeared that two bodies of insolvency practitioners 
wanted to merge, and in respect of which they met under the chairmanship of 
Tshishonga. Before the meeting Motala had contacted Tshishonga, informing 
Tshishonga that the Minister wanted Motala to attend the meeting. Tshishonga was 
not pleased and told the erstwhile chairman of one of the merging associations, Dr 
Seriti, of his unhappiness. This report concerned Dr Seriti, and at the meeting he 
informed that it was not proper for Motala to attend; however, undeterred, Motala 
remained in attendance at the meeting. 
On approximately 15 February 2002, the Minister contacted Tshishonga, informing 
him that he was unhappy with the manner in which liquidators were being appointed, 
instructing Tshishonga to arrange a staff meeting so that the Minister could address 
the staff members. 
The meeting was duly arranged, and was also attended by Motala, as the only 
liquidator present. During the course of the meeting the Minister expressed his 
unhappiness with the manner in which Motala was being side-lined. Irene 
Mokgalabone, the chairperson for the panel responsible for appointing liquidators 
distributed a report she had prepared, explaining why Motala was not appointed. 
During the course of the meeting, the Minister was informed of the procedure to be 
employed by a party who was unhappy, before that party would contact the Minister; 
according to Tshishonga, he believed that the issue relating to Motala had been 
resolved. 
Whilst on leave in June 2002, Tshishonga was contacted by Koos Van Der Merwe, 
who was acting in Tshishonga’s position during his leave, informing him that the 
Master of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg, had been instructed by the Minister to 
appoint Motala as the liquidator in the liquidation of the Retail Apparel Group 
(hereinafter referred to as “RAG”). Van Der Merwe wanted direction as to how he 
was to assist the Master of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg. Tshishonga told Van 
Der Merwe to engage with the department’s legal advisors, who in turn would need 
to contact the Minister in order to advise him of the extent of his powers. He further 
told Van Der Merwe to contact the Master of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg, and 
advise him to obtain the Minister’s instructions in writing, if it became apparent that 
the Minister’s instructions went beyond his actual powers. 
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Upon his return the Master of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg had prepared a report 
regarding the Minister’s instruction pertaining to RAG. RAG was liquidated during 
May 2002; and the four liquidators who had originally been appointed to liquidate 
RAG successfully challenged Motala’s appointment in the High Court, KwaZulu-
Natal, with the court confirming the legal opinion of the department’s legal advisors in 
that the Minister did indeed not have the power to instruct the Master to appoint 
liquidators. 
The Minster appealed to the SCA, which appeal was dismissed. 18 However, on 
approximately 12 September 2002, whilst the SCA’s decision was still pending, the 
Minister instructed Tshishonga to convene a meeting including inter alia a certain Mr. 
Lategan, the Master of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg and Tshishonga. 
During the meeting held, the Minister informed those in attendance that he was 
appointing Lategan as the acting Assistant Master in Pietermaritzburg, specifically to 
manage the appointment of liquidators in the RAG liquidation. The stated actions of 
the Minister surprised Tshishonga, and were in his mind unheard of. It has to be 
borne in mind that the liquidation of RAG was one of South Africa’s biggest 
liquidations to date, involving claims of more than R1 billion. 
Lategan appointed Motala as the fifth liquidator as soon as he became the Assistant 
Master in Pietermaritzburg, and it was later found that Lategan’s relationship was 
untoward. 
Rumblings were to be heard at the highest levels regarding the Minister and Motala’s 
relationship. 
On 28 January 2003 at approximately 21h00 the Minister telephonically contacted 
Tshishonga, stating that he was with a union who was angry as it averred that their 
interests were not being taken into account when liquidators were appointed; the 
Minister blamed Tshishonga, stating that Tshishonga had not assisted in the RAG 
liquidation, and spreading negative comments about the Minister, threatening that 
Tshishonga would be the first casualty. The Minister informed that with immediate 
effect he was removing Tshishonga as the unit’s head, refusing to hear Tshishonga’s 
side in respect of the allegations. After the ending of the call Tshishonga contacted 
                                                          
18  Minister of Justice v Firstrand Bank Ltd and Others 2003 (6) SA 636. 
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the Director-General, who expressed shocked, and who agreed that they should 
meet the next day. 
At the meeting with the Director-General the next day, it was clear to Tshishonga 
that the Minister had already contacted the Director-General. Tshishonga insisted on 
the Minister providing reasons for removing him as the head of the unit, with the 
Director-General replying that no such reasons would be forthcoming. The Chief 
State Law Advisor, Enver Daniels was appointed on 4 February 2003 to take over 
Tshishonga’s duties. 
In the media it was reported that Tshishonga was making accusations as a result of 
having been reprimanded for poor work performance, with Tshishonga denying the 
allegations regarding his work performance. 
After removing Tshishonga, the Minister stated that he still needed his expertise; 
however, Tshishonga was not given work within his new position. 
Whilst Tshishonga had still been the head of the unit, the Director-General, upon his 
advice, had requested a forensic investigation regarding alleged corruption. During 
the first week of February 2003 Tshishonga was provided with the resultant report, 
which report had also been supplied to the Director-General, and following any 
action on the report by the Director-General, Tshishonga approached the office of 
the Public Protector during February 2003, leaving copies of the report with them.  
When no action was taken by the Public Protector, Tshishonga approached the 
Auditor-General’s offices, also receiving no response whatsoever. 
Due to a lack of progress, on 6 October 2003 Tshishonga met with an investigative 
journalist, holding a press conference two days later, and after the Director-General 
had attempted to discourage him from engaging with the media. The consequences 
were grave. 
On national television the Minister allegedly defamed Tshishonga, where after 
Tshishonga lodged a complaint of criminal defamation against the Minister, however, 
the Director pf Public Prosecutions refused to prosecute the matter, advising 
Tshishonga to institute a civil claim. 
On 13 October Tshishonga was suspended for allegedly revealing sensitive issues 
about the Ministry, without following departmental protocol. 
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On 27 October 2003 Tshishonga was subpoenaed to testify at the RAG enquiry, and 
although he was not a relevant witness, and suspected other underhanded tactics at 
play, he attended the enquiry, at which he was examined in respect of the 
allegations he had made in the media. However, the questions he was being asked 
would be relevant to the disciplinary hearing pending against him. 
He later received a message in accordance with which the Director-General had 
requested that Tshishonga return documents, and in respect of which Tshishonga 
sought a meeting with the Director-General in order to determine which documents 
he sought. The Director-General refused to meet with him, and on 14 November 
2003 the Director-General obtained an interim interdict with a return date against 
Tshishonga, which interdicted him from disclosing privileged information or 
documents, calling for the return of all documentation which belonged to the 
department; the rule nisi was discharged on 16 November 2004. 
On 5 December 2003, Tshishonga was charged with misconduct, where after he 
successfully challenged his suspension in the LC, which matter was unopposed. 
On 28 January 2004 he was reinstated in his former position, pending arbitration of 
the dispute, however, the department refused to comply with the LC’s order because 
of the alleged misconduct. 
As a result he was on suspension until 20 July 2004, on which date an independent 
chairperson who conducted the disciplinary enquiry found him not guilty. 
Tshishonga contacted the Director-General to re-enter his job, however, despite it all 
the Director-General refused to reinstate him; he insisted that the trust relationship 
had been destroyed, and that they should seek to reach a settlement, where after 
negotiations between them started, with Tshishonga’s employment being terminated 
by agreement. 
Hereafter, a claim for compensation arose from the provisions of the PDA. The court 
considered inter alia that Tshishonga was forced to terminate his employment, and 
that although he had been paid during his suspension and received a satisfactory 
settlement, he had been denied the dignity of employment. The court ruled that 
Tshishonga be paid the maximum of twelve months’ remuneration, calculated at the 
rate payable to deputy directors-general as at the date of judgement. The 
respondents were also ordered to pay the Tshishonga’s costs. 
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7.2.6 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Another v 
Tshishonga19 
As described above, the LC made an award to Tshishonga. On appeal in this matter 
it transpired that the only ground of appeal was that the LC had erred in fact and law 
in ordering the compensation, with the appellants contending that it was excessive. 
The LAC considered that the compensation was provided for in the PDA. As the 
respondent had been subjected to occupational detriment, which was found to be an 
unfair labour practice in terms of the PDA,20 the award was to be made in terms of 
the provisions of section 194(4) of the LRA. 
In considering the compensation awarded, the LAC considered the factors as listed 
by the SCA in the Mogale21 matter namely, the seriousness of the defamation, the 
nature and extent of the publication, the reputation of the employee, and the motives 
and conduct of the appellants. Taking this into consideration within the context of the 
matter, the LAC found that the respondent should be granted a significant award. 
The LAC accordingly awarded Tshishonga R 277 000 in compensation (a reduced 
amount) and costs. 
7.2.7 Sekgobela v State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd22 
Sekgobela had been a programme manager at the State Information Technology 
Agency (hereinafter referred to as “SITA”), alleging that he had raised certain 
irregularities that the Chief Executive Officer had failed to deal with, pertaining to the 
failure to comply with tender procedures, where after he had disclosed the 
improprieties to the Public Protector. Following his disclosure he was suspended and 
faced disciplinary procedure, including a charge pertaining to the fact that he had 
referred the matter to the Public Protector that was still being dealt with internally. He 
was subsequently dismissed.  
The court concluded that Sekgobela had made a disclosure that fell within the ambit 
of a protected disclosure, as the SITA had failed to comply with a legal obligation.  
                                                          
19  Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another v Tshishonga 2009 (30) ILJ 1799 
(LAC). 
20  Section 4(2) (b) of the PDA. 
21  Mogale & others v Seima 2008 (5) SA 637 (SCA). 
22  Sekgobela v State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd 2008 (29) ILJ 1995 (LC). 
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In this matter the employee’s dismissal was found to be automatically unfair, and that 
he had been a victim of occupational detriment because he had to dared to question 
the procedures followed by the SITA and his colleagues.23 The court awarded the 
applicant compensation equal to twenty four months’ salary with costs. 
7.2.8 Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another24 
In this application the applicant sought a rule nisi, an interim interdict and further 
relief on 4 December 2007.  
The applicant had been responsible for providing medical care to prisoners at 
Pollsmoor prison for approximately 22 years, with the parties to the matter arguing 
that the applicant was an employee of both the Department of Correctional Services 
(hereinafter referred to as the “DCS”) and the Department of Health (hereinafter 
referred to as the “DOH”) for the purposes of the PDA. 
For years there had been serious challenges in respect of the standard of health care 
available, as well as the circumstances under which the health care available was to 
be provided to the prisoners, and on various occasions throughout the years the 
applicant had raised these concerns with various officials in both the DCS and the 
DOH. During January 2007 the applicant has raised the concerns with the office of 
the Inspecting Judge of Prisons, and during April 2007 the applicant had raised the 
concerns with the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of Parliament. Both 
the office of the Inspecting Judge and the Portfolio Committee later issued reports 
that were highly critical of the health care available. 
On 19 July 2007 the applicant was charged by the DOH with misconduct for having 
contacted the office of the Inspecting Judge, Justice N. C. Erasmus, and visiting the 
chairperson of the Portfolio Committee without informing the Area Commissioner. 
The applicant launched an urgent application in order to interdict the DOH from 
continuing with the disciplinary action. However, the DOH agreed to an order 
interdicting the holding of the disciplinary proceedings; the charges against the 
applicant were later withdrawn, and a settlement reached pertaining to the unfair 
labour practice dispute that the applicant had referred to the Public Health and 
                                                          
23  At par 33. 
24  Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another 2008 (29) ILJ 1275 (LC). 
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Welfare Sector Bargaining Council. When the applicant tried returning to work during 
September, he was advised that his services were no longer required at Pollsmoor, 
and which had later been confirmed in a letter. The applicant later managed to obtain 
a copy of the letter. As a consequence the applicant was placed by the DCS at Lotus 
River Day Community Health Care Centre, where the working conditions were 
considerably better than at Pollsmoor. However, the applicant regarded this as 
occupational detriment. 
The court found that the applicant had established a right which was open to slight 
doubt, that the right so established was especially worthy of protection, that he had 
not suffered irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured him 
slightly. The court exercised its in favour of granting the interim relief sought as the 
applicant’s right had been infringed as a result of him having made a protected 
disclosure.25  
7.2.9 Bargarette & others v Performing Arts Centre of the Free State & 
others26 
In this matter the applicants were employed by the first respondent, the Provincial 
Arts Council of the Free State (hereinafter referred to as “PACOFS”) as senior 
managers, with the three applicants being the CEO, Chief Financial Officer 
(hereinafter referred to as “CFO”) and the Human Resources Manager. They 
approached the LC seeking an interdict.  
At the time of bringing the application, the three applicants were on suspension with 
full pay, pending the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry that the PACOFS had 
instituted. Before bringing the current application, the applicants had previously 
brought two urgent applications. The first had been an urgent application in which 
they sought to interdict the PACOFS from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing 
which had been scheduled for 1 to 9 November 2007. The second urgent application 
had sought an order to have the disciplinary hearing scheduled for 5 November 2007 
postponed. The rule nisi interdicting the proceedings on that day had been granted 
by the Orange Free State High Court. 
                                                          
25  Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another 2008 (29) ILJ 1275 (LC) 1290. 
26  Bargarette & Others v Performing Arts Centre of the Free State & others 2008 (29) ILJ 2907 
(LC). 
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The applicants had also, before filing the application now under consideration, 
referred three separate disputes to the CCMA. These three disputes concerned their 
alleged unfair suspension, unfair discrimination or victimisation, and occupational 
detriment exacted on them after they had made a protected disclosure which they 
had made regarding alleged irregularities pertaining to the appointment and payment 
of a service provider identified as JGL. After the CCMA had issued certificates that 
the dispute between the parties remained unresolved, in respect of the three matters 
referred to above, the applicants approached the court in this instance. 
This matter centred on the pending disciplinary matters regarding the applicants. It is 
trite that it is the primary prerogative of the employer to determine the disciplinary 
process in the workplace, provided that the attendant procedure is fair. 
In this respect the court held that the courts have held that they can and have 
intervened in a pending disciplinary hearing, however, that they would do so only in 
the most extraordinary of cases, for example where the constitutional rights of an 
employee were being disregarded, and by way of example with reference to Police & 
Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services & others27  
The court pointed out that in cases which did not display the exceptional 
circumstances required for intervention, the employee had other remedies at his 
disposal, using Mantzaris v University of Durban Westville & other as example.28 
 The applicants’ application was dismissed with costs. 
7.2.10 Ramsammy v Wholesale & Retail Sector Education & Training 
Authority29 
In this matter the applicant, who had been employed as an executive skills 
development manager at the respondent in the matter, had been dismissed after 
making what he alleged to have been a protected disclosure.  
                                                          
27  Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services & others 1999 (20) ILJ 
2416 (LC) at 2432-3 at paras 53 – 56). 
28  Mantzaris v University of Durban Westville & other 2000 (21) ILJ 1818 (LC) at para 5.8 
29  Ramsammy v Wholesale & Retail Sector Education & Training Authority 2009 (30) ILJ 1927 
(LC). 
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An article had been published in the Enterprise magazine in March 2005 which was 
entitled “Women power”, inter alia featuring that Ms Ntombi Dludla held a BA degree 
in Industrial Psychology and Communication from the University of South Africa 
(hereinafter referred to as “UNISA”), that she was a member of the respondent’s 
management team and further that she had previously been employed by FABCOS 
Development Services. The article had incorrectly stated that she had the above-
named BA degree, as she had two outstanding modules, which two modules she had 
completed during 2006, and with the BA degree having been conferred on her in 
2006. The article had been published in March 2005, and she had only been 
appointed as an executive manager from 1 April 2005. 
The respondent’s annual report for the period ending 31 March 2005 had held Ms 
Dludla to be the Executive Manager: Human Resources, even though her appointed 
had only been effective from the day after, on 1 April 2005. From April 2006 both the 
applicant in the matters and other employees had started raising concerns about 
human resource issues that they were unhappy with. One of these issues related to 
“preferential treatment” and concerns regarding Dludla’s advancement. 
During July 2006 the applicant in the matter obtained a copy of Dludla’s academic 
record from UNISA, which showed that in April 2004 she still had four modules 
outstanding in respect of her BA degree. He also got a copy of the magazine article 
from Polly Modikoe, who was the executive manager: marketing and 
communications. Further to this, Modikoe provided the applicant with a copy of the 
respondent’s CEO’s profile, which showed that he had previously worked at 
FABCOS. 
On 17 July 2006 the applicant sent an email to the CEO. 
The CFO and the Chief Operating Officer (hereinafter referred to as “COO”) were 
appointed to investigate the allegations made, which investigation commenced on 2 
August 2006. On 15 September 2006, after the commencement of the investigation, 
the applicant sent the email as set out above to all the directors and executive 
managers of the respondent. Further to this, and on the same day, he made three 
further disclosures to external parties, namely the Special Investigations Unit 
(hereinafter referred to as the “SIU”), the Public Protector and the Department of 
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Labour. The disclosures so made externally to the three above-named parties, very 
broadly stated that the respondent’s CEO had engaged in fraud, mismanagement 
and maladministration. After this the respondent appointed Executive Committee 
(hereinafter referred to as “EXCO”) members to investigate (hereinafter referred to as 
the “EXCO investigation”). 
The applicant was charged with insolence and allegations of fraud made against the 
CEO, and dismissed in 2007 as a result. What is pivotal to note in respect of the 
applicant’s evidence rendered in the matter, is the following:  
• The main part of his disclosure was in respect of the respondent’s CEO’s 
complicity in respect of the fraudulent curriculum vitae (hereinafter referred to 
as “CV”), in order to ensure that Dludla was promoted to an executive 
management position, which he referred to as “recruitment fraud”; 
• That he had not intended the email that he sent to be a protected disclosure 
as he had made in the ordinary course of his employment in respect of the 
human resources policy. He had raised the issues in confidence with the CEO, 
and he had understood that the complaint was aimed at the CEO more than it 
was at Dludla; 
• The reason he had referred to “alleged” fraud in respect of the CV was 
because he had not been totally convinced that it in fact was fraudulent; 
• The applicant’s reason for not having co-operated with the EXCO investigation 
was that the members of EXCO who were undertaking the investigation had 
been implicated in allegations regarding financial mismanagement, which was 
concerning to him in respect of their actual impartiality and independence; 
• When asked about the reason for making the external disclosures, he stated 
that it was because he wasn’t “winning” in respect of the original investigation 
instituted.30 
The court had regard to the applicant’s counsel’s submissions which included the 
following:  
                                                          
30  Ramsammy v Wholesale & Retail Sector Education & Training Authority 2009 (30) ILJ 1927 
(LC) par 66. 
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• That the applicant had acted in good faith when he had sent the email to the 
CEO in confidence, especially as he was concerned about the reputational risk 
which could befall the respondent, as it had in respect of the previous CEO’s 
fraudulent CV. He had made his disclosure in terms of the applicable protocol 
and procedure, and his refusal to participate in and cooperate with the 
investigations was justified; 
• That in respect of the external disclosures made, he had intended to raise the 
same concerns as those raised in his email, and that in doing so he had relied 
on wording he had found on the Public Protector’s website, and in doing so 
had indicated to these other bodies to share the information he had available. 
• His complaint had not been against the respondent, but against the CEO and 
Dludla; he had never had the intention to embarrass the respondent. 
• He believed that what he was reporting on was substantially true. All the bits of 
information that he had collected led to his belief that the CEO was complicit in 
concealing Dludla’s qualifications, and that this was done in order to ensure 
her promotion. 
• That the applicant met all the requirements of a protected disclosure. 
As could be expected, the respondent’s submissions differed from those of the 
applicant, and counsel for the respondent, submitted inter alia the following:  
• That the process for determining whether a protected disclosure had been 
made was a four stage process, including  the following –  
• An analysis of the information in order to determine whether it is a 
disclosure; 
• If it is, then the next question is whether the said disclosure is a 
protected disclosure; 
• To determine whether the employee was subjected to occupational 
detriment; and finally 
• What remedy should be awarded for such treatment. 
• Counsel stated that it is not an enquiry about wrongdoing, but rather about 
whether the employee in question deserves protection. 
• As a result of the pre-trial agreement, the court should only be encumbered 
with the first two stages of the four mentioned above. 
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• The applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proving that his disclosure is 
protected by the PDA.31  
• In respect of the meaning of a disclosure, counsel provided the court with a full 
explanation with reference to jurisprudence, concluding that a disclosure 
should be interpreted as excluding “normal duty reports”. 
  
Counsel submitted that ‘disclosure’ in the PDA must bear its ordinary meaning, i.e. a 
‘revelation’ or ‘exposure’ synonymous with whistle-blowing. 
 
Mr. Myburgh implored the court to find that the meaning of ‘disclosure’ is at the very 
least ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted to mean conduct synonymous 
with whistleblowing. 
In respect of what “information” would mean, the court referred to the Tshishonga32 
case in detail, stating as follows at paragraphs 51 – 52 that what would constitute 
information would include facts, which by its very nature starts with a suspicion, 
including inferences and opinion based on facts, which indicate that the suspicion is 
reasonable and sufficient enough to require investigation. However, ‘smelling a rat’ 
and unsubstantiated rumours do not constitute information. 
The court also explored the meaning in respect of ‘reason to believe’, as contained in 
the definition of a disclosure, and quoted the Tshishonga33 matter. Further to this, the 
argument considered the meaning of ‘good faith’. In this regard the court referred to 
the Tshishonga case, in which the argument had referred to the Street v Unemployed 
Workers’ Centre 2004 (4) All ER 839 (CA) case in which the meaning of good faith 
within the context of a disclosure was discussed at paragraphs 203-206.  
Further to this argument, the court identified a hierarchy of protection, at paragraph 
54, provided for by the PDA identifying that the lowest level of protection is afforded 
                                                          
31   In this regard he referred to Kroukamp v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd 2005 (26) ILJ 2153 (LAC), 
Tshishonga v Minster of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 (LC) 
and Engineering Council of SA v City of Tshwane  Metropolitan Municipality & another 2008 
(29) ILJ 899 (T). 
32  Tshishonga v Minster of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC). 
33  Tshishonga v Minster of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC) at para 185 – 192. 
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to a legal advisor, and the most stringent being afforded to public disclosures and 
those made to bodies not prescribed, such as disclosures made to the media. 
It was highlighted in argument that the PDA encourages a culture in terms of which 
internal procedures and remedies are resorted to and exhausted before a disclosure 
is made public, the reason being that the employer should first be granted an 
opportunity by the employee to investigate the matter. Should an employee refuse to 
so engage on the issues with the employer it would be challenging to the employee 
to justify the requirement aligned with reasonable belief.  
The importance of this highlighted approach is of such importance that the PDA sets 
a more substantive test in respect of external disclosures, as the reasonableness of 
the belief held must be linked to the information being substantially true. In this 
regard it was argued at paragraph 54 that the test is both subjective and objective; 
the test is subjective in nature as the employee who makes the disclosure holds the 
belief, but also objective in that the belief has to be reasonable, and that the 
determination of the reasonableness thereof is based on facts. 
In the matter, the court eventually found that the applicant had not made a protected 
disclosure based inter alia on his refusal to cooperate in the investigations and his 
fabrication of evidence. 
7.2.11 Young v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd34 
The background facts to the matter include the common cause fact that Young had 
made a number of disclosures, pertaining to alleged impropriety in the Coega 
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “CDC”), which by their 
nature implicated the CEO. The applicant in the matter was an employee of the CDC, 
seated in the position of the CFO. The alleged improprieties included inter alia 
unbudgeted expenditure, in the amount of approximately R 150 million, which 
required board approval. Young had engaged with the CEO, forwarding to him a 
letter intended for the chairman of the board, giving the CEO an opportunity to 
comment of the content of the letter; the CEO did not comment thereon. 
                                                          
34  Young v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd [2009] 6 BLLR 597 (ECP). 
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In the letter Young had stated that in terms of the Treasury Regulations he had a 
duty to make the report. It transpired that Young’s attorney had advised him that the 
transaction in question contravened the provisions of the Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999, and as the CFO, he was duty bound to report the 
transaction. 
Young had also discussed the contents of the letter with the chairperson of the Audit 
and Finance Committee and had provided the chairperson with a copy of the letter. 
This was later argued as constituting an even further disclosure. 
The second disclosure which was common cause between the parties related to 
Value Added Tax (hereinafter referred to as “VAT”) irregularities, pertaining to an 
irregular claim by the CEO’s trust, which was not registered for VAT, for VAT 
regarding services which were rendered by the trust to the CDC. During October 
2008 Young had addressed a communication to the CEO, raising the matter, and 
requesting the repayment of R 178 627.80, which was the amount involved; however, 
here too he received no response from the CEO. Young contended that the claim by 
the CEO’s trust constituted an offence in terms of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 
1991, administered by SARS. The aforementioned amount was not repaid as 
requested, and as a result of which Young reported the matter telephonically to the 
chairman of the CDC’s Human Resources Sub-Committee, a Mr. de Bruyn. 
The third disclosure was in respect of the failure of the CEO’s trust to make an 
income tax payment required relating to the services that the trust had rendered to 
CDC, and as a result of which CDC was subsequently required to pay approximately 
R1.2 million to SARS, which amount should have been deducted from the payments 
made by CDC to the CEO’s trust. Young had reminded the CEO to make the 
payment, with CDC later claiming payment of the amount from the CEO; however, 
the CEO had repaid only a portion of the amount. During May 2008 the CEO had 
agreed to repay his indebtedness in nine equal instalments by way of post-dated 
cheques, and in respect of which he had only provided three post-dated cheques, of 
which only one cheque was honoured. The original indebtedness of the CEO had not 
been authorised by the board, nor were the terms of the repayment undertaken. 
Young informed De Bruyn of these circumstances by way of a letter during 
December 2008. 
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The CDC had instituted disciplinary action against the applicant in respect of the 
aforementioned disclosures, despite the applicant’s objection through his attorneys 
who had indicated that the applicant would seek relief in terms of section 4(1) (a) of 
the PDA, in the form of an order barring the disciplinary action.  
Young averred that the disciplinary action amounted to occupational detriment for the 
protected disclosures that he had made. 
On 10 March 2009 the applicant instituted action in the High Court and the summons 
therein was served on the CDC. At the disciplinary hearing held on 16 March 2009 
the applicant requested a postponement pending the outcome of the application to 
the High Court; however, the chairperson refused the request. It is noted that the 
chairperson did grant a postponement to launch the application on an urgent basis. 
CDC was interdicted and restrained from proceeding with the disciplinary enquiry 
instituted against the applicant, pending the determination of the action instituted by 
the applicant in the High Court under case number 597/09. 
7.2.12  Radebe & Another v Premier, Free State Province & Others35 
The crux of the matter to be decided on was, whether the two applicants had made a 
protected disclosure on 9 December 2005, as contemplated in the PDA. On 9 
December 2005 the two applicants had signed a document, requesting an 
investigation into various allegations pertaining to corruption, nepotism, fraud and 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The document was thereafter forwarded to the 
President of the Republic of South Africa, the National Minister of Education, the 
Premier of the Free State, the Member of Executive Council (hereinafter referred to 
as “MEC”) for Education of the Free State, the Superintendent General for Education 
Free State, the Deputy Director General for Education Free State and the District 
Director. In the documents the applicants contended that the disclosure being made 
was a disclosure in terms of the PDA. 
Upon receipt of the document, the National Minister for Education instructed that an 
investigation into the allegations be launched, and it was stated that the applicants 
                                                          
35  Radebe & Another v Premier, Free State Province and Others (JA61/09) [2012] ZALAC 15 (1 
June 2012). 
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had refused to cooperate with the investigating team, as before their arrival, the State 
Attorney had issued a letter indicating that the allegations were malicious, baseless 
and defamatory, and according to the instructions by the State Attorney, the two 
applicants were to stop making such allegations. Their second reason in respect of 
their refusal to cooperate was based on the fact that the investigators were internal 
investigators, and they had requested independent investigators. 
On 24 May 2006 the applicants were charged. Upon being served with the charges 
the applicants brought an application in the High Court, Orange Free State Provincial 
Division, wherein they sought an interdict against the disciplinary enquiry to be held. 
The basis of the application was that they were whistle-blowers in terms of the PDA, 
and that the said enquiry amounted to occupational detriment. However, the matter 
was dismissed with costs. 
During the disciplinary enquiry the applicants also objected on the basis that they 
were whistle-blowers. The chairperson of the enquiry ruled that the matter had 
already been decided by the High Court, and he decided to proceed in the absence 
of the two applicants. Both applicants were found guilty of the second alternative 
charge to charge 1, which alleged that they had unjustifiably prejudiced the 
administration, discipline or efficiency of the district when they published and or 
communicated the defamatory statements. The sanction in respect of both applicants 
was demotion to the next lower rank, immediately effective. The applicants appealed 
in respect of the sanction, however, the outcome in respect of the first applicant was 
confirmed, and the sanction in respect of the second applicant was altered. 
In respect of the employment relationship, the court held that the first applicant’s 
employer was the Head of the Provincial Department of Education, which appeared 
to be the Superintendent General, whilst in respect of the second applicant the 
employer was deemed to be Thabong Primary School. The court stated that the MEC 
and the Minister did not qualify as employers within the context of the PDA when 
taking into account especially the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the PDA, and that 
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the responsibility implicit in a position does not change a responsible party to an 
employer. 36  
The court also considered the requirement pertaining to the fact that the employees 
making the disclosure must have reason to believe that the information concerned 
shows or tends to show one or more of the irregularities provided for. Having regard 
to the Vumba 37  matter in which the Full Bench dealt with the phrase reason to 
believe, and taking cognisance of the fact that the decision in Vumba was quoted 
with apparent approval by the SCA in the MTN38 matter.   
The court held that should any of the elements required for a disclosure to be a 
protected disclosure be wanting, then the disclosure is not a disclosure in terms of 
the PDA, and all the protection offered therein is lost. The court in this regard also 
referred to the four stage approach highlighted in the Tshishonga39 matter, namely 
an analysis of the information in order to determine whether it amounts to a 
disclosure, the determination of whether or not the disclosure is protected, whether  
the employee has been subjected to occupational detriment; and the appropriate 
remedy. 
The court also referred to Roos v Commissioner Stone No & others 2007 (10) BLLR 
972 (LC) in which the court, although dealing with reviews held that the PDA does not 
give employee any grounds for making unsubstantiated and belittling comments 
about its employer, and later to hide behind the PDA.40 
In summary the court held that the alleged disclosure was in fact not a disclosure, 
that the complaints made included parties who did not fall within the ambit of an 
employer, that the conduct complained about did not show or tend to show anything 
untoward, and that the bona fides of the applicants were questionable. 
The applicants’ claims were dismissed. 
                                                          
36  Radebe & Another v Mashoff, Premier of the Free State Province & Others (JS140/08) [2009] 
ZALC 20 (17 February 2009) at para 43. 
37  Vumba Intertrade CC v Geometric Intertrade CC 2001 SA 1068 (W). 
38  MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v Afro Call (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 620 (SCA). 
39  Tshishonga v Minster of Justice & Constitutional Development & Another 2007 (28) ILJ 195 
(LC). 
40  Radebe & Another v Mashoff, Premier of the Free State Province & Others (JS140/08) [2009] 
ZALC 20 at para 67. 
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7.2.13 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Engineering Council of 
South Africa and Another41 
Mr. Weyers, the second respondent in the matter an electrical engineer, had been 
employed by the appellant since 1996, and had held the position of Managing 
Engineer: Power System Control (hereinafter referred to as “PSC”) since 2003. In the 
last-mentioned position he was responsible for Tshwane’s PSC centre, the primary 
function of which was to ensure that correct systems of configuration and safety 
measures were applied to the networks, in order to ensure the continuity, quality and 
safety of electrical supply within his sphere of responsibility. 
On 31 August 2005 Weyers had addressed a letter to the Strategic Executive Officer 
(hereinafter referred to as “SEO”) of the Electricity Department, copying the General 
Manager: Electricity Development and Energy Business, as well as the Municipal 
Manager, expressing concerns about the employment of the new system operators in 
the PSC. He also sent the letter to the Department of Labour and the Engineering 
Council. On 9 November 2005, Weyers was suspended, and the employer 
proceeded with disciplinary steps against him, and the remaining charge brought 
against him related to the copies of the letter sent to the SEO, the Department of 
Labour and the Engineering Council without authorisation or prior approval and 
knowledge of the Head of the Electricity Department. 
Upon being found guilty on the charge he approached the Pretoria High Court, with 
the support of the Engineering Council, in order to obtain an order interdicting the 
appellant from imposing any disciplinary sanction upon him. The said order was 
indeed granted, and the appeal in this matter lay against that order, with the leave of 
the High Court.  
When considering the circumstances that led to Weyers penning the letter, the court 
had regard to the fact that during 2005 there was a substantial staff shortage as a 
result of which employees were required to perform excessive and dangerous levels 
of overtime work. As a result Weyers was permitted to recruit some staff members. 
                                                          
41  City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Engineering Council of South Africa and Another 
[2010] 3 BLLR 229 SCA. 
 See also Engineering Council of South Africa and Another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Council and Another [2008] 6 BLLR 571 (T). 
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The shortlists were compiled after testing of the candidates had been undertaken, 
however, the response from a Mr. Ratsiane was that the shortlists were unacceptable 
and a meeting was to be arranged. The problem was that all the candidates on the 
shortlist were white, and the existing foreman and operators were also white. In this 
respect Weyers had sent an email pointing out that the employment equity 
candidates lacked sufficient technical knowledge of the network, even after 10% had 
been added to their test scores. 
Human Resources refused to allow Weyers to appoint white candidates, and to 
compound his challenges an internal communication was circulated stipulating that 
staff were not allowed to work more than 40 hours overtime per month, whilst some 
of Weyers’ employees were working between 60 to 100 hours overtime as a result of 
the capacity constraints. The situation eventually led to Weyers seeking guidance 
from the Engineering Council on more than one occasion.  On one occasion he was 
given advice by the Manager of Legal Services of the Council, advising him to report 
the situation to the Mayor of Tshwane, and that he was also obliged to report to the 
Engineering Council and the Department of Labour. 
On 29 August Mr. Mahlangu simply shortlisted all the employment equity candidates 
who had scored between 32.2% and 2.22% in the test; Mahlangu was the General 
Manager: Electricity Management and Energy Business.  Weyers stated that he 
could not sign the shortlist as it was in his mind contrary to his professional 
obligations to do so. In the circumstances, Weyers approached the Engineering 
Council for guidance, as he sought advice on what his professional duties were in his 
given circumstances. The Engineering Council advised him that it would be 
unprofessional besides amounting to misconduct on his side, if he were a party to 
the appointment of people who in his opinion were incompetent, and which could 
give rise to safety risks. 
Following this advice, Weyers informed Mahlangu that if he continued with the 
process he would be obliged to write a letter to the Department of Labour in order to 
report the matter to them.  The response from Mahlangu (un-rebutted) was “You can 
write the letter.  I don’t care.” It was against these circumstances that Weyers had 
written the letter, which letter was also sent to the Department of Labour and the 
Engineering Council. 
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On 9 November 2005 Weyers was suspended and his employer instituted 
disciplinary proceedings against him; initially he faced various charges, all of which 
were abandoned by the employer, save the charge in respect of the letter sent, 
without the necessary authorisation or approval of the head of the Electricity 
Department. 
Weyers was found guilty of the charge, where after he approached the High Court, 
Gauteng Division, with the support of the Engineering Council, for an order in terms 
of which his employer would be interdicted from imposing any disciplinary sanction 
upon him. 
The High Court granted the order sought on the grounds that the letter sent to the 
parties amounted to a protected disclosure. 
The employer then appealed against this order of the High Court to the SCA. 
The SCA found that it was common cause between the parties that the systems 
operators perform work more dangerous to that performed by electricians, and as a 
result need to be more skilled than ordinary electricians. 
The SCA stated that the PDA recognises that disclosures made by employees are 
often not welcomed by the employer, and in such circumstances seeks to protect the 
employee from reprisal exacted by the employer. The court pointed to the provisions 
of section 3 of the PDA which prohibits this type of reprisal in the form of 
occupational detriment, including taking disciplinary action against the employee who 
has made a protected disclosure. 
The court was satisfied that both the letter and the circumstances culminating in the 
penning and sending of the letter related to serious concerns raised in respect of the 
actual or potential health and safety of not only employees of the municipality in 
question, but quite possibly that of external parties as well, as well as compliance 
with statutory obligations concerning safety. The SCA was satisfied that the letter in 
question indeed contained a disclosure of information regarding the conduct of those 
employees of the appellant who had taken responsibility for the selection of system 
operators, and accordingly the letter constituted a disclosure in terms of the PDA. 
The court accepted that Weyers had made the disclosure to his employer and that 
165 
 
no action had been taken thereon, other than ‘to disregard his bona fide concerns.’  
In light of this the court came to the conclusion that in fact the disclosure was also a 
protected disclosure. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed, with costs. 
7.2.14 Randles v Chemical Specialities Ltd42 
The applicant in this matter approached the LC for an urgent order interdicting the 
employer from proceeding with disciplinary action against him, pending the outcome 
of a dispute referred to the CCMA, and if conciliation failed, pending the outcome in 
the LC.  
The application was essentially based on the assertion that Randles had made a 
protected disclosure in terms of the PDA and as a result was being subjected to 
occupational detriment on account or partly on account having made the protected 
disclosure in question. 
Randles had started his employment with the respondent in April 2006, in the 
position of Group Legal Counsel, where after he accepted appointment as a Director 
of the Respondent. 
During November 2007 the respondent was listed with the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. Towards the end of 2008 the Finance Director tendered his resignation, 
and whilst his resignation was pending the Finance Director issued a letter entitled 
“Matters for the attention of the Board”. The letter highlighted concerns regarding 
inter alia the company’s debtor book, bank facilities and securities, transactions 
questioned by employees, and a director’s loan made to Mr. Wood. 
During the first part of 2009 the relationship between Randles and Wood soured, 
with the raging dispute between them relating to the entitlement of Randles to a 
share entitlement in the company. In May 2009 Randles sent an email to Randles 
informing him of his intention to resign as a director. Randles resigned as a director, 
remaining as an employee. In his letter of resignation as a director Randles stated 
that it would be inappropriate to so resign without giving the board reasons for the 
resignation. One of his reasons given by Randles related to the share entitlement 
dispute that he and Wood had been entangled in, and with the other issues 
                                                          
42  Randles v Chemical Specialities Ltd 2010 (3) ILJ 2150 (LC). 
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highlighted including those pointed out by the erstwhile Finance Director. 
On 2 July 2009 Randles instituted a civil claim in the High Court against Wood 
pertaining to the share entitlement dispute, and on 4 August 2009 Randles issued a 
10 page document headed “to whom it may concern”, and which he sent to the 
company’s board. This document included various issues including those pointed out 
by the erstwhile Finance Director, and dealt with wide ranging concerns about the 
lack of corporate governance exercised within the company. Wood on the other hand 
had mandated an investigation of Randles.  
On 4 January 2010 Randles was given a copy of a charge sheet reflecting two 
charges, and was suspended pending the disciplinary hearing instituted. Upon being 
suspended Randles was required to provide his computer password, which he did, 
where after the employer appointed a company to investigate the contents of 
Randles’ computer’s hard drive. On 20 January 2010 Randles was served with an 
amended charge sheet which included an additional charge of fraud and the abuse 
of the company’s computer. The disciplinary hearing was scheduled to commence 
on 22 January 2010, before which Randles had unsuccessfully applied for a 
postponement, where after on 21 January 2010, Randles’ attorneys launched this 
application. 
In considering the good faith with which Randles had made the contentious 
disclosures the court held that his bona fides were to be seen in various factors 
including his various attempts to bring the discrepancies to the employer’s attention 
and the opportunity given to the employer to deal with the alleged discrepancies as 
required in terms of the provisions of section 9 of the PDA. 
The court further held that being subjected to a disciplinary hearing, as Randles was, 
fulfilled the definition of occupational detriment, as provided for in section 1 of the 
PDA. 
Considering all the facts of the matter the court was satisfied that the applicant had 
shown the existence of a prima facie right to the relief he sought, as well as meeting 
all the additional requirements for the interim relief sought.  The company was 
interdicted from proceeding with any disciplinary action regarding the protected 
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disclosure made, pending the outcome of the dispute which had been referred to the 
CCMA. 
7.2.15 Potgieter v Tubatse Ferrochrome and Others43 
Tubatse Ferrochrome operates a mine and had employed Potgieter, who is a 
qualified engineer, on 16 January 1989. One of Potgieter’s duties within his 
employment was to ensure that at the workplace, health and safety standards were 
maintained as required. During August 2006 Potgieter had sustained a fractured 
collarbone, whilst off duty, and in respect of which he had to undergo surgery, where 
after he was booked off work by a medical practitioner until 28 August 2006. Whilst 
on sick leave Potgieter’s manager had contacted him, requesting that he work from 
home in light of the fact that another project superintendent had resigned; Potgieter 
agreed to work from home, where after the employer had a report, referred to as the 
Golder Report, which was prepared by an independent consulting company was 
delivered to him at his home. Potgieter’s sick leave was extended a few times, where 
after his employer invited him to the workplace in order to discuss his sick leave; this 
discussion however, never took place.  
On 3 October 2006 Potgieter received a letter from his employer, which informed him 
that his medical condition had been re-evaluated by a medical practitioner in his 
employer’s employ, and that he was to return to work on what was termed “restricted 
duty” as from 4 October 2006. Potgieter did not return to work, and a similar letter 
was sent to him instructing him to return to duty the next day, which once again was 
not adhered to. Potgieter sent an email to the employer stating that the instruction 
regarding his return had not been adhered to in light of the fact that he had a valid 
medical certificate booking him off until 15 October 2006. 
On 6 October 2006 the employer sent an email to Potgieter informing him that he 
had failed to obey a valid instruction, where after he was served with a notice of a 
disciplinary hearing, and charged with failing to obey a reasonable instruction, being 
absent without permission and insubordination. 
Potgieter was found guilty on all charges and dismissed. After his dismissal but 
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before the hearing of his appeal Potgieter released a report to the media, and in 
respect of which an article was published in the Highland Panorama. In the 
publication Potgieter alleged that his employer did not have the necessary measures 
in place in respect of the water pollution that its mining activities caused. After his 
dismissal Potgieter referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Metal and Engineering 
Industries Bargaining Council, with the commissioner arbitrating the matter finding 
that Potgieter’s dismissal had been procedurally and substantively unfair, and that 
Potgieter’s reinstatement would be impracticable; in light of this the commissioner 
awarded him the maximum compensation. The reason for the commissioner finding 
that reinstatement would be impractical as the employment relationship had been 
irretrievably damaged as a result of the disclosure of the Gerber report to the media 
after his dismissal. Potgieter’s contention was that the disclosure was a protected 
disclosure in terms of the PDA; the commissioner disagreed, stating that it was 
highly improbable that Potgieter had made the disclosure in good faith as required by 
the PDA, and that the disclosure had been vindictive aimed at embarrassing and 
humiliating the employer. 
Potgieter applied to the LC for a review of the commissioner’s award, praying that 
the commissioner’s award be set aside and replaced by an order reinstating him to 
his previous position. 
The LC dismissed Potgieter’s review application, finding that the commissioner’s 
decision was reasonable, especially in light of the fact that Potgieter had not led any 
evidence to show that he had made a protected disclosure, or that the disclosure 
had been made in good faith. 
 
7.2.16 Potgieter v Tubatse Ferrochrome & others44 
 
The approach and decision of the LAC in this matter is significant, as it is the first 
South African case in which the court considered whistle-blower related legislation 
beside the PDA. 
 
Potgieter took LC’s decision on appeal to the LAC; there was no cross-appeal, with 
the two main issues relating to the granting of the remedy of compensation and the 
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costs order granted by the LC in favour of the employer. 
The LAC acknowledged45 that the encouraging of a culture of whistle-blowing is a 
constitutional imperative which lies at the core of the fundamental principles directed 
at the achievement of a just society based on democratic values, and that this 
constitutional imperative is in fact in compliance with South Africa’s international 
obligations in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the UNCAC.46 
The LAC further referred to the case of Guja v Moldova47 which was decided in the 
European Court of Human Rights, and which held that whistle-blowing constitutes 
the exercise of a person’s internationally protected right of freedom of expression ,as 
provided for in terms of Article 10 of the UNCAC as well.48 
The LAC referred to Potgieter’s assertion that his disclosure made was also 
protected in terms of the provisions in NEMA, and with specific reference to sections 
28(1) and, before its amendment 31 in 2009.49 In terms of the provisions of section 
31(1) of NEMA (before its amendment), it provided that no person was civilly or 
criminally liable or could be dismissed, disciplined, prejudiced or harassed  as a 
result of having made a disclosure of any information if the person in good faith and 
on reasonable grounds believed at the time of making the disclosure that he or she 
was disclosing evidence of an environmental risk, and if the disclosure was made in 
accordance with the provisions of section 31(5) of NEMA.  
The court pointed out that NEMA’s protection reached further than the protection of 
only whistle-blowing employees, and those whistle-blowers who had blown the 
whistle in the media were also protected in terms of the provisions of section 31 
thereof.50 
It was stated that Potgieter in his evidence during the arbitration of his dismissal had 
stated that it was his duty to disclose some of his employer’s acts and omissions 
relating to compliance with the provisions of NEMA, and that this evidence had not 
                                                          
45  At par 14. 
46  See paragraph 3.4 of Chapter 3. 
47  Guja v Moldova, application no 14277/04 (at para 70) February 2008. 
48  At par 15. 
49  At par 19. 
50  At par 21. 
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been challenged.51  
The LAC stated that this evidence showed good faith on the part of Potgieter, and 
that it was clear from the evidence given at the arbitration that he had made the 
disclosure as he feared criminal sanctions, he had previously made reports to his 
employer and he regarded the release of the report as being in the public interest.52 
Whilst it was acknowledged that due regard has to be had to reputational damage 
which could ensue to the employer if sensitive information was made public, the 
mere finding that such disclosure would render the employment relationship 
untenable, would seriously damage the very protection that the legal framework 
aimed at protecting whistle-blowers, endeavoured to uphold. The court stated that it 
is an accepted principle that in certain circumstances the public interest may 
outweigh the interests of protecting an organisation’s reputation.53 
The court found that when the evidence was viewed in its totality it has been 
demonstrated that Potgieter made a disclosure in good faith, and fell within the 
category of a protected disclosure.54 
The appeal was upheld, and Potgieter’s retrospective reinstatement was ordered. 
7.2.17 Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of South Africa55 
In this matter Charlton had been the Chief Financial Officer to Parliament from 1 May 
2002, initially on a 3 year fixed term contract, and thereafter permanently appointed 
as from 1 March 2004, holding his position until his purported dismissal on 13 
January 2006. During approximately 2002, December, Charlton had informed the 
then Secretary of Parliament, Mr. Mfenyana of an alleged improper travel claim that 
had been submitted by a member of Parliament.  With Mr. Mfenyana’s approval, 
Charlton had investigated the matter further, where after in April 2003, Charlton had 
submitted a written report to Parliament pertaining to prima facie evidence of fraud 
that had been perpetrated together with certain travel agents, and in relation to travel 
claims. 
                                                          
51  At par 23. 
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Charlton remained involved in respect of the investigations, making various oral and 
written reports to Parliament and the senior presiding officers, informing them of the 
processes followed and the emerging details of the alleged fraud.  The South African 
Police Service, the Scorpions and the National Prosecuting Authority were also 
involved in the investigation, of what was later referred to as “Travel Gate” scandal. 
According to Charlton he enjoyed Parliament’s support in respect of the 
investigation, which had identified fraud in the amount of R13 million, perpetrated 
over a period of approximately 15 months. 
However, after the April 2004 elections the previous senior presiding officers left and 
Mr. Dingani replaced Mr. Mfenyaya as the Secretary. According to Charlton, as of 
the time of the appointment of Dingani, Parliamentary support in respect of the 
investigation declined substantially, even when Charlton reported to Dingani that 
further investigation had uncovered further fraud on Parliament, increasing the 
amount involved to approximately R35.7 million, and implicating prominent (then) 
current and former members and office bearers of Parliament.  According to 
Charlton, Dingani frustrated the proper investigation of the allegations, by not making 
available appropriate resources in this regard. In fact, it is alleged by Charlton that 
during the period August 2004 until the date of his dismissal in 2006, Parliament 
failed to take appropriate action in respect of the alleged fraud. 
On 18 November 2005, Charlton was suspended by Parliament, where after a 
disciplinary hearing in respect of the various allegations pertaining to misconduct 
was conducted against him during the period 12 to 21 December 2005.  Following 
the disciplinary enquiry, Charlton’s dismissal was recommended, and on 13 January 
2006 Dingani accepted the recommendation and dismissed Charlton. Charlton 
challenged his dismissal in the LC, inter alia on the basis that his dismissal was 
automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(h) of the LRA as he had been 
dismissed for having made protected disclosures as envisaged in terms of the PDA 
(first cause of action). 
The respondent averred that the members of Parliament hold constitutional positions 
as a result of which no contract of employment arises, and that they are free agents 
owing no allegiance to Parliament. Whilst the applicant’s case was that the members 
of Parliament are employees for the purposes of the PDA, and not necessarily as 
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defined in the LRA.  
The court noted in this regard that parliamentary staff perform the work of 
parliament, and if there were no members of parliament the staff would not have any 
work to do, as a result of which it follows that the members of parliament proved 
work to parliamentary staff to perform. In other words members of parliament permit 
the staff to assist in the carrying on of parliamentary business.56 
The court found that Parliament was indeed an employer for the purposes of the 
PDA. Further to this submissions were made by the respondents relating to 
Parliamentary privilege.  The court stated that it did not regard this argument as 
relevant, as the applicant was not suing the members in their individual capacity. The 
court stated that the crux of the respondents’ case depended on the assertions that 
members of Parliament do not follow within the scope of the PDA, whilst the 
members of Parliament could act as whistle-blowers without enjoying the protection 
availed in the PDA.57 
In considering whether the PDA applies to members of Parliament, the court held 
that these assertions made a mockery of the PDA as it would make no sense for the 
very people who enacted the PDA to claim that its provisions did not apply to them. 
The court further held that in finding that the provisions of the PDA apply to the 
members of Parliament such an interpretation would not violate the purposes of the 
PDA or the relevant constitutional principles,58 and would accord with the purpose of 
the PDA in eliminating corruption.59 
The court held that Charlton was indeed protected by the PDA, as to hold otherwise 
“... would deal a blow to government intentions and would be a national 
embarrassment”.  
Following this the respondent took the matter on appeal to the LAC.60 The LAC 
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found that: 
• The LC had made a final determination on the first exception in respect of the 
fact that parliamentarians are both employers and employees for the 
purposes of the PDA.  As this decision was final in effect, the decision in this 
regard was indeed appealable. 
• With regard to the second exception relating to jurisdiction, the LAC held that 
in dismissing the exception the LC had made a finding that it was therefore 
also appealable. 
• That members of parliament are not employees for the purposes of the PDA, 
as to subject them to the provisions of the PDA may frustrate the democratic 
process and that they ought to be totally independent. 
• The court found further that Parliament is not an employer. 
• In respect of jurisdiction, the court held that once apparent to the LC that the 
matter should have been referred to arbitration, the matter in the LC should 
have been stayed and so referred for arbitration. 
The LAC upheld the appeal.  The proceedings were stayed in terms of section 158 
(2)(a) of the LRA and the dispute referred to arbitration under the auspices of the 
CCMA. In turn, Charlton turned to the SCA for relief. 61 The SCA held that it is 
established law that the dismissal of an exception raised is generally not appealable, 
with exceptions in respect of exceptions to jurisdiction.  The SCA stated that the 
reason for this being that the order (in respect of the exception) is not final, as there 
is nothing that prevents the aggrieved party in the matter from raising and arguing 
the same issue during the trial. 
7.2.18 Arbuthnot v SA Municipal Workers' Union Provident Fund62 
Arbuthnot had been employed by the respondent during June 2007 as a paralegal 
officer.  The respondent had requested an opinion from counsel pertaining to the 
potential liability of the trustees. 
The applicant in the matter had earlier raised concerns regarding the discharge of 
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the duties by the trustees in respect of the fund with the fund’s principal officer. 
When the opinion requested from counsel was received, the applicant’s worst fears 
were realised, and in her mind the opinion was so damning that she was concerned 
that the trustees of the fund would attempt to suppress it in order to ensure that the 
potential liability totalling approximately R150 million did not become public.  As a 
result the employee emailed a copy of the opinion to the national benefit officer of 
SAMWU. 
She was later confronted about leaking the opinion, which she at first denied, but 
was later forced to admit when presented with a copy of her email. The applicant 
was subjected to a disciplinary hearing and was found guilty of insubordination, 
dishonesty and disloyalty, and subsequently dismissed. In the LC the employee 
contended that her dismissal had been unfair, as the reason for her dismissal had 
been that she had made a protected disclosure in terms of the PDA. 
The court was satisfied that at the time at which the applicant had emailed the 
opinion, she reasonably believed the opinion to be substantially true in respect of the 
breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the fund’s trustees. 
The court also found that her protected disclosure made had indeed constituted the 
main reason for her dismissal, with the result that her dismissal was automatically 
unfair for the purposes of section 187 of the LRA. The applicant was awarded the 
equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration and costs. 
7.2.19  South African Municipal Workers Union National Fund v Arbuthnot63 
This was an appeal against the judgment of the LC as discussed above.  
 
The court first turned to the question as to whether Arbuthnot had believed the 
information disclosed was substantially true. The appellant had argued that what was 
required was that the information disclosed must be objectively true, and that the 
discloser must subjectively believe that the information is true; thus attempting to 
divide the concept of reasonable belief into two elements that required fulfilment.  
 
                                                          
63  South African Municipal Workers Union National Fund v Arbuthnot (JA73/11) [2014] ZALAC 23 
(5 June 2014). 
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The court stated that this argument was “misconceived” as what was required was 
the reasonableness of the belief pertaining to the truth of the information, as 
opposed to the reasonableness of the information.64 The requirement regarding the 
reasonableness of the belief did not require the demonstration of the correctness of 
the information in question. In this regard the court referred to the explanation in this 
regard rendered in the Radebe matter (supra). The court held that the LC had 
correctly concluded that the respondent had reasonably believed that the information 
disclosed was substantially true.65 Hereafter the court turned to the question as to 
whether the discloser made the disclosure in good faith. 
 
In this respect the appellant averred that Arbuthnot had acted in bad faith. 
  
It was important to note that at the time, Arbuthnot was on a final written warning, 
dated 16 September 2008, for having divulged information and having disregarded 
the rules and instructions from her superior. 66  The relevant letter had clearly 
demonstrated the respondent’s attitude in respect of undermining her superior, and 
yet only two weeks thereafter she sent the disclosure in question to the National 
Benefits Officer of SAMWU, a Mr. Odendaal.67 
 
The appellant argued that after she had been dismissed the respondent had grabbed 
at the provisions of the PDA. In the court’s view68 good faith entailed the absence of 
ulterior motive, revenge and malice in making a disclosure within the context of the 
PDA. Hereafter, the court turned to the question as to whether it had been 
reasonable for Arbuthnot to have made the disclosure. The court was of the view 
that Arbuthnot had acted prematurely and could not just adopt the attitude that 
nothing would be done by the employer had it been disclosed to the employer.69  
 
It could be inferred that it had been unreasonable for her to make the disclosure as 
she had, and as such that the disclosure was indeed not a protected disclosure, and 
in the premises her dismissal had not been automatically unfair. 
                                                          
64  At par 15. 
65  At par 17. 
66  At par 20. 
67  At par 21. 
68  At par 23. 
69  At par 27. 
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7.2.20 Malan v Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra70 
This was an appeal against a judgement in the LC, in terms of which the LC had 
dismissed the appellant’s application to have his dismissal declared automatically 
unfair, with costs. The appellant claimed that he had been subjected to occupational 
detriment as a result of having made a protected disclosure, pleading in the 
alternative that his dismissal had been substantively and procedurally unfair. 
The appellant had been employed on a fixed term contract basis by the employer, 
the Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra, which is a non-profit (section 21) 
company.  
The circumstances that led to concerns escalating in respect of the financial 
activities of the respondent started during 2007 when employees’ salaries were 
fractured and paid late, intensifying when the appellant had attended the Annual 
General Meeting (hereinafter referred to as the “AGM”) on 5 December 2008. The 
appellant had formed the opinion that he needed access to the respondent’s 
financial statements in order to establish how the funds were being utilised.  In this 
regard the appellant arranged a meeting with the respondent’s auditor. After the 
appellant’s meeting with the auditor regarding the financial statements, he sent an 
anonymous letter from a friend’s email address to the auditor in the matter. The 
auditor assumed correctly that it had been sent by the appellant. 
After having sent this correspondence the appellant was charged and brought before 
a disciplinary hearing, in respect of attempting to acquire company information in a 
fraudulent way and bringing the company into disrepute.  
On 20 March 2009 the appellant addressed correspondence to his colleagues, in 
which he related the background information to them. In this correspondence he 
sought their assistance. To this end he distributed the correspondence by placing the 
letters on the music stands in the orchestra pit before a performance. According to 
the appellant, in this manner he had distributed his letter to between 40 and 45 
musicians, some of whom where employees of the respondent and others who were 
not.  
                                                          
70  Malan v Johannesburg Philharmonic Orchestra (JA61/11) [2013] ZALAC 24 (12 September 
2013). 
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On 24 March 2009, at the start of the disciplinary hearing, he was faced with two 
additional charges, namely:  
1. Bringing the employer into disrepute with other employees and third parties; 
2. Breach of duty of good faith. 
Subsequently, at the disciplinary hearing the appellant was found guilty and 
dismissed in consequence. Both his internal appeal and conciliation in this regard 
failed, where after he referred the matter to the LC, citing an automatically unfair 
dismissal. With regard to the LC, the court found that within the context of the PDA, 
that in respect of the appellant’s letters distributed, that he had made a disclosure in 
respect of information tending to show actual or likely impropriety in respect of 
contractual obligations owed to the employees by the respondent. 
The LC then went on to consider whether the disclosures made also qualified as 
protected disclosures. The LC held that on the evidence, and in respect of the first 
disclosure, it seemed clear that the appellant was genuinely concerned about the 
financial health of the respondent, and had tried to raise his concerns in this regard 
with the various parties, and that in doing so he had done so in good faith and in the 
belief that the information was substantively true. However, in respect of the second 
disclosure the court held that he had acted in self-interest, and in respect of the 
disciplinary hearing that he wished to have postponed. 
The LC subsequently found that the disclosures were not protected, and as such 
went on to try and establish whether his dismissal had been for an unfair reason as 
provided for in terms of section 188(1)(a) of the LRA. In respect of the substantive 
fairness of the LC found that the appellant was indeed guilty of having brought the 
employer into disrepute with employees and external parties 
The LAC states in this regard at paragraph 25 that the LC that a number of the 
allegations made were untrue and defamatory.  
In respect of the procedural fairness, the conduct of the disciplinary hearing was held 
to have been procedurally fair, especially in light of the fact that the appellant had not 
sought further postponement, but relied solely on his first request for postponement. 
The LAC deemed it unnecessary to deal with the questions as to whether the 
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appellant had made the disclosures in good faith or for personal gain, or whether he 
believed that the allegations were substantively true. For the LAC the first issue to be 
determined was whether the disclosures made by the appellant were protected by 
the provisions of section 9(2)(c)71, and in respect of which the appellant argued that 
he had discharged this duty, when he had made the disclosures to Jurisch and 
Roberts. 
The court found that during the discussions with Jurisch and Roberts, the appellant 
imparted or disclosed no information that was new to anyone. In fact, the appellant 
had asked about the financial health of the company, he was conducting an 
investigation. Further to this, the appellant had not led any evidence showing that 
either Jurisch or Roberts were unwilling to remedy the situation, or that they meant to 
victimise the appellant in light of the conversations. As such, the court held, as the 
LC had, that no disclosures were made during these conversations. As there was no 
disclosure, they could not be protected. The same was said in respect of the two 
letters authored by the appellant. 
As such, the appeal was dismissed with costs. 
7.2.21  Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union obo Ngxila-Radebe v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Another72 
The matter at hand was brought as an urgent application for relief in terms of section 
158 (1)(a) of the LRA, brought by IMATU on behalf of Gloria Ngxila-Radebe (the 
applicant), seeking an order declaring that the disciplinary hearing against the 
applicant be declared as occupational detriment as defined in terms of the PDA. It 
further sought an order in terms of which the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
(first respondent) be interdicted from subjecting the applicant to further occupational 
detriment. The Notice of Motion reflected that final relief was sought by the applicant, 
however, it emanated during argument that in the alternative the applicant sought an 
interim interdict pending the finalisation of the proceedings instituted in terms of the 
                                                          
71  Which provides that a disclosure is protected when an employee making the disclosure had 
previously made a disclosure of substantially the same information to his employer, and in 
respect of which no action had been taken by the employer after a reasonable period of time. 
72  Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union Obo Ngxila-Radebe v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality and Another (J1029/2010) [2010] ZALC 289 (1 July 2010). 
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LRA. The application was opposed by the first respondent on the basis that the 
applicant had not satisfied the legal requirements regarding the PDA, and in 
particular that she had not demonstrated a clear right in respect of the relief sought. 
Essentially the most of the facts before the court were common cause, and in 
particular that the applicant had made disclosures regarding irregularities pertaining 
to a contract entered into with Microsoft. It transpired that because of the applicant’s 
disclosures there had been delays which affected the necessary payment and the 
fluctuation of the Rand Dollar rate, and as a result of which, a further R6 000 000.00 
had become payable in respect of interest; this formed the essence of the charges 
brought against the applicant. 
In this matter the first respondent argued that the applicant had fundamentally 
misconstrued the protection afforded to employees by the PDA, and that she was not 
being disciplined as a result of having made a disclosure. It was averred that she 
saw the PDA as a free pass to misconduct. The court expressed its consensus with 
the approach in Grieve v Denel stated by that court73 in which it stated that should an 
employee so be subjected to occupational detriment, the employee is entitled to 
approach the LC for appropriate relief. However it pointed out that the employee was 
entitled to interim relief since conciliation is a prerequisite before the LC is 
empowered to grant final relief. The court also set out the usual approach to a 
dispute of facts that may arise based on the documentation74 in an application. 
The court noted that the respondent had wisely decided not to dispute the fact that 
protected disclosures had been made by the applicant in the matter.75 
The court remarked that it could not be argued that the disclosures had been made 
in good faith by the applicant76; in fact, the disclosures made by the applicant had 
ultimately led to the payments being properly authorised.77 The court found that 
there was a link between the disclosures made and the disciplinary action instituted 
                                                          
73  At paragraph 9. 
74  Which will be dealt with under a separate heading in this regard. 
75  At paragraph 34. 
76  At paragraph 37. 
77  At paragraph 38. 
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against the applicant78 and that the first respondent blamed the applicant for the 
additional costs incurred, which delay was caused by her disclosures. 
The court was persuaded that the applicant would suffer occupational detriment 
should she be subjected to the disciplinary hearing, and ordered that the first 
respondent be interdicted from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing pending the 
outcome of the dispute being referred to the South African Local Government 
Bargaining Council within 10 days of the granting of the order, and if the conciliation 
could not resolve the dispute, then pending the dispute being adjudicated on by the 
LC. The first respondent was also ordered to pay the costs of the application.79 
 
7.2.22  Xakaza v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others80 
In this matter the applicant sought a final order declaring that he had suffered 
occupational detriment as a result of having made protected disclosures as defined 
by the PDA. Previously the applicant had sought to interdict the first respondent, the 
Municipality, from continuing with disciplinary proceedings against him, however, that 
application had been struck from the roll on 17 August 2011 due to a lack of urgency. 
The applicant had been employed by the first respondent as an area development 
planner since 2006. During 2008 the first respondent had mandated an independent 
audit to be undertaken by an independent company, PASCO Risk Management (Pty) 
Ltd (PASCO), in order to investigate irregularities regarding the alienation of land 
that had previously belonged to the first respondent. PASCO had prepared various 
reports finding evidence of potential involvement in irregularities perpetrated by 
councillors of the first respondent. The applicant in the matter alleged that in the 
performance of his duties as the area development planner he had become aware of 
certain irregularities regarding the establishment of the township called Meyersdal 
Nature Estate (MNE) extensions 7 to 12. Further to this the applicant asserted that 
the PASCO had revealed prima facie corruption, fraud and other irregularities 
committed by officials of the first respondent, also in respect of MNE. 
                                                          
78  At paragraph 41. 
79  At paragraph 45. 
80  Xakaza v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others (JS281/11) [2013] ZALCJHB 22 (21 
February 2013). 
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The applicant stated that he had made disclosures in this respect during an 
interview, and by way of affidavit, which had been attached to the PASCO 
investigation report. According to the assertions of the applicant the section 101 
certificate 81 had been issued after the Registrar had been misled regarding the 
compliance of the applications, and further that a section 82 certificate82 had also 
been issued in contravention of the applicable Ordinance’s provisions.83 
The applicant averred that he had raised the same concerns at a meeting during 
October 2009, and that as a result of his disclosures made to PASCO he had 
suffered various actions constituting occupational detriment. The first respondent 
averred that the applicant in the current matter had been responsible for the 
issuance of the section 82 certificates, but that he had done everything in his power 
to prevent the issuance of the section 82 certificate, and as a result of which the 
developer instituted legal action against the first respondent for R67 million. 
However, the applicant still refused to comply, where after the first respondent had 
attempted to transfer him, and when this failed, suspended him and instituted legal 
action against him. It was during the applicant’s absence from the office, during his 
suspension, that the first respondent claims that new information was uncovered in 
respect of the applicant, including the following:  
• That he was moonlighting as a town planner without the employer’s 
permission; 
• That the applicant had failed to disclose a relationship with a potential 
contractor; 
• That he had purported to act as an Area Manager whilst he was not; and 
• Manipulating certain town-planning documents which had been submitted by 
developers and which resulted in unnecessary delays. 
 
                                                          
81  A section 101 of the Town Planning and Townships Ordinance Act 15 of 1986 entitles the 
Registrar of Deeds to endorse or register plans and diagrams with the relative title deeds 
lodged by an applicant provided that he shall not accept such documents for endorsement or 
registration until such time as he is advised by the authorised local authority that an applicant 
has complied with such conditions as the local authority may require to be fulfilled.  
82  Section 82 of the Town Planning and Townships Ordinance Act 15 of 1986. 
83  Section 82 prohibits registration of certain deeds of transfer by the Registrar and in particular 
section 82 (1) (ii) (cc) requires a local authority to certify that it will within 3 months of the date 
of the certificate be able to provide the erf with such services as it may deem necessary. 
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The first respondent went on to deny that the Registrar had been misled and there 
had not been compliance with section 82 as required, and further that it had taken 
cognisance of the applicant’s opinions at the various stages, which views were found 
to be incorrect. The first respondent further averred that the applicant had not 
established the requirements of the PDA in respect of protected disclosures, that his 
disclosures had rather amounted to the mere expression of an opinion held, as well 
as an indication that he had refused to comply with instructions that he regarded as 
being contrary to his view and that the information contained in his disclosures were 
substantially true. The first respondent also contended that the applicant’s actions 
had been motivated by malice. 
 
Another point raised by the first respondent relates to the contention that the papers 
upon which the application was founded contained a wide range of disputes between 
the parties, which should all have been foreseen by the applicant, and that action 
proceedings should have been instituted as opposed to application proceedings. In 
this respect the court noted that there were clear disputes of fact in the case, as a 
result of which action proceedings should have been utilised as opposed to motion 
proceedings. However, in light of the applicant having preferred motion proceedings, 
the court would make a finding based on the motion proceedings84. 
  
In a decision of the National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma85, Harms 
DP said the following: 
‘Motion proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the 
resolution of legal issues based on common cause facts. Unless the 
circumstances are special they cannot be used to resolve factual issues 
because they are not designed to determine probabilities. It is well established 
under the Plascon-Evans rule that where in motion proceedings disputes of fact 
arise in the affidavits, a final order can be granted only if the facts averred in the 
applicant’s (Mr Zuma’s) affidavits, which have been admitted by the respondent 
(NDPP), together with the facts alleged by the latter, justifies such order. It may 
be different if the respondent’s version consists of bald or uncreditworthy 
denials, raises fictitious disputes of fact, is palpably implausible, far-fetched or 
so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the 
papers…’(own emphasis) 
 
Mr Hulley argued that the Plascon- Evan86 rule applies regardless who bears 
the onus. I agree with this proposition... 
Whilst there are disputes of fact it is clear that the crisp issue in this case 
revolves around the applicant’s interpretation of sections 82 and 101 of the 
Ordinance, which ultimately is a legal issue. These are the provisions of the 
Ordinance which the applicant alleges were infringed. 
                                                          
84  At par 48 to 51. 
85  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at paragraph 26 
86  Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd v Van Riebeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 at 634H-635C 
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Hereafter the court turned to the provisions of the PDA, and what the applicant 
needed to demonstrate in order to satisfy the court that he deserved the protection 
afforded by the PDA. In this regard the court held that: 
 
• It was not disputed that the applicant was an employee of the first respondent; 
• It was not clear what disclosure had been made to PASCO by the applicant. 
In this regard the court noted that it was not sufficient to merely annex an 
affidavit to the application that lacked sufficient particularity in respect of the 
requirements of the PDA, and that specific reference had to be made to the 
relevant portions. The court noted that the applicant had been unable to show 
that the PASCO reports had contained any information supplied by him. The 
court stated that the first respondent had been able to show that the 
information contained in the reports were known, and as such could not 
constitute a disclosure. Further to this various persons in the first respondent 
were interviewed, gave information which was indicative of irregularities, and 
were not disciplined.87 
• The court noted that it had failed to find any disclosed information as alleged 
by the applicant that disclosed or tended to disclose any form of criminal 
conduct or misconduct as envisioned by the PDA.88 
• There was also no link to be found between the alleged disclosure and the 
occupational detriment referred to, and that the first respondent had been able 
to demonstrate that the charges against the applicant were ‘genuine’.89 
• The applicant had also failed to show that he had reason to believe that the 
information contained in his disclosure alleged was substantially true; rather 
his beliefs in this regard had been proven to be both factually and legally 
incorrect on various occasions, and he was made aware of this.90 
 
In light of these considerations, the application was dismissed with costs. 
 
                                                          
87  At par 56. 
88  At par 64. 
89  At par 65. 
90  At par 69. 
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7.2.23  Lowies v University of Johannesburg91 
Dr Adolf Lowies (the applicant) approached the LC for relief based on the allegation 
that he had been subjected to occupational detriment after having made a protected 
disclosure in terms of the PDA, and thus that his dismissal was automatically unfair. 
The applicant had disclosed information relating to the performance of private work 
on the University of Johannesburg’s (the respondent) premises on Saturdays by 
other psychologists in the employment of the respondent.  
During his employ in November 2008, the applicant had had discussions with Ms 
Trudie Le Roux (hereinafter referred to as “Le Roux”) also within the employment of 
the respondent, regarding the appointment of supervisors to intern psychologists, 
with the applicant indicating that he would be interested in such appointment. Le 
Roux required such an applicant’s registration number with the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as “HPCSA”). 
On 26 November 2008 the applicant had sent his application in this regard via email 
to Le Roux, indicating his registration number held with the HPCSA as an 
educational and counselling psychologist. Hereafter the applicant was allocated as 
supervisor to a counselling intern psychologist. However, the applicant was not 
registered as a counselling psychologist with the HPCSA, and as such was not 
permitted to act as such a supervisor. One Professor Pretorius became aware of this 
and confronted the applicant in this regard, where after the applicant sent an 
explanation and apology to both Pretorius and Le Roux in respect of the earlier email 
sent. However, this explanation and apology was not accepted by either recipients, 
and the respondent instituted an investigation into the applicant’s registration with 
the HPCSA. The investigation revealed that the applicant had been registered as an 
educational psychologist on 10 February 1995, that he was not registered as a 
counselling psychologist, that his name had been removed from the register of 
psychologists on 3 September 2002 due to his failure to pay his annual fees, and 
where after his name was restored on 15 April 2005. 
On 19 January 2009 the applicant was charged in a disciplinary hearing with charges 
relating to misconduct. The applicant was found guilty of misrepresentation and 
                                                          
91  Lowies v University of Johannesburg (JS1062/2009) [2013] ZALCJHB 284 (30 April 2013). 
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gross dishonesty, with dismissal being recommended as the appropriate sanction. 
During the disciplinary hearing and even in the appeal thereof afterwards, no 
mention was made that the applicant was being subjected to occupational detriment 
on account of having made a protected disclosure. The appeal was refused, and in 
the petition to the Vice-Chancellor, for the first time, it was submitted on behalf of the 
applicant that he had been charged with misconduct after he had started questioning 
private work done by colleagues during official working hours, and that the applicant 
was in fact a whistle-blower. However, the petition was refused and the applicant 
was dismissed on 8 June 2009, where after the applicant referred a dispute to the 
CCMA. 
The court noted92 that on the applicant’s own version of events the Saturday work 
practices complained of had already been stopped by 9 September 2008, when he 
lodged the complaint that was said to constitute the protected disclosure, and further, 
that he had relied on rumour and hearsay in this respect. The court referred to the 4 
stage approach 93 set out in Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and another94.   
Further to this the court noted that the applicant had claimed that he had disclosed 
corrupt and fraudulent activities perpetrated at the respondent’s place of work, 
however, that the applicant had not adduced any evidence in this respect.95 In fact, 
the court noted that he had conceded that he had no idea of what happened to the 
money generated by the Saturday work, which in no way contributed to his 
allegations levelled. The court was not convinced that the applicant had made out a 
case as a whistle-blower, but for completeness sake referred to the conditions to be 
satisfied by the whistle-blower in accordance with the PDA. The court found that the 
disclosure that did not amount to a protected disclosure was not made in order to 
remedy any alleged wrongs, nor was it made in good faith, and further that there was 
no causal between the disclosure and the subsequent disciplinary action. The 
applicant’s dismissal was held to have been fair.  
 
                                                          
92  At par 33. 
93  At par 39. 
94  Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and another [2007] (4) SA 
135 (LC); [2007] 28 ILJ 195 (LC) at paragraph 176. 
95  At par 40. 
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7.2.24  Palace Group Investments (Pty) Limited and Another v Mackie96  
 
This related to an appeal against the judgment and order granted by the LC, and in 
terms of which on an urgent basis an interdict was granted, ordering that the 
disciplinary action against Alexander Michael Mackie (hereinafter referred to as 
“Mackie”) be stayed, pending the outcome of a dispute regarding an unfair labour 
practice. Mackie was employed by Palace Group Investments (Pty) Limited (first 
appellant) as the Group Risk and Internal Manager.  
The second appellant had received a facsimile on 10 February 2012 which was a 
copy of a Notice of Motion which appeared to have been issued by the North 
Gauteng High Court97  on 9 February 2012. Mackie appeared to be the applicant in 
that application in the High Court, and the relief sought was the provisional 
liquidation of the second appellant, alternatively that the second appellant be placed 
under business rescue. The Notice of Motion had not been served in accordance 
with the provisions of High Court Rule 4, just faxed to the second appellant, and was 
not accompanied by a founding affidavit as required in terms of the High Court 
Rules.  
It was common cause that on 9 February 2012 Mackie had provided the appellants’ 
landlord with a copy of the Notice of Motion in question, where after the appellants’ 
landlord indicated that they intended on refusing them further access to the 
premises. On 21 February 2012 an unsigned affidavit to the liquidation application 
was sent to the appellants’ attorney of record, however, no annexures were annexed 
as they were said to be too voluminous. Further to this Mackie never set the 
application down for hearing. On 19 July 2012 the appellants issued a notice of the 
contemplated suspension of Mackie, and in terms of which he would later be 
afforded an opportunity of making representations pertaining to his contemplated 
suspension. Mackie was suspended with full payment and issued with a notice to 
attend a disciplinary hearing in terms of which he was charged with 6 charges of 
misconduct. On 10 August 2012 Mackie lodged an unfair labour dispute to the 
CCMA, alleging that the disciplinary proceedings against him constituted 
occupational detriment as provided for in terms of the PDA. 
                                                          
96  Palace Group Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mackie (JA52/12) [2013] ZALAC 27 (28 May 
2013) 
97  Now the Gauteng Division. 
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At the start of the disciplinary hearing on 15 August 2012 Mackie launched an urgent 
application against the two appellants, in which he sought to interdict the disciplinary 
hearing, pending the outcome of the dispute referred to the CCMA. On 28 August 
2012 the court a quo handed down judgment, granting an interim interdict ordering 
that the disciplinary hearing be stayed pending the outcome of the dispute referred to 
the CCMA, further ordering the appellants to pay the costs of the urgent application. 
It was against this decision that the appellants approached the current court. 
Mackie’s case in the urgent application had been that he had made a protected 
disclosure in the liquidation application, and as a result of which disciplinary 
proceedings had been instituted against him. The court noted that a copy of the 
liquidation application had been attached to the urgent application, but here too 
without any annexures.98 The court stated that the question to be considered was 
whether the court a quo was justified in granting the interim interdict. 
Hereafter the court went on consider that in application proceedings are based on 
the facts set out in the affidavits supporting the application, and that such an 
applicant’s case must be made out in the affidavits with sufficient particularity to 
enable the opposing party to respond thereto. In this regard the court noted that the 
respondent’s case was that he was entitled to the protection under the PDA as a 
result of the protected disclosure he made in the liquidation application.99 The court 
analysed the provisions of the PDA stating that the starting point was to establish 
whether Mackie had prima facie established a right which was capable of the 
protection afforded by the PDA; thus whether the information disclosed by him in the 
liquidation application qualified as a protected disclosure. This called for an analysis 
of the information provided in the affidavit supporting the liquidation application. The 
court opined that such an analysis of the founding documentation did not amount to 
a protected disclosure, and further that the allegations had not been made in good 
faith. The application was dismissed with costs. 
 
 
                                                          
98  At par 8. 
99  At par 14. 
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7.2.25  Magagane v MTN SA (Pty) Ltd & Another100 
The applicant, Magagane, was employed by the first respondent (hereinafter referred 
to as “MTN”) as a senior legal advisor until her dismissal on 31 July 2011. In this 
matter, Magagane claimed that she had automatically unfairly dismissed on account 
of having made a protected disclosure, and alternatively that her retrenchment was 
substantively and procedurally unfair.  
Magagane sought reinstatement or alternatively maximum compensation together 
with an order that she be allowed to exercise certain share rights. During March 
2010 Magagane became aware of certain invoices that had been issued by Nozuko 
Nxusani Attorneys (hereinafter referred to as “NNA”) to MTN, and which had been 
authorised by a certain Madzonga for payment. Magagane viewed the invoices as 
being irregular. In November 2010 one Sehoole was appointed as a Vice President 
within MTN, reportedly a very senior position; Sehoole and Magagane were distant 
relatives. During November 2010 at Magagane’s request Sehoole met her at her 
home, at which time she handed to Sehoole a string of invoices from NNA, airing her 
concerns in this regard; she confided in Sehoole as she trusted him. A week 
thereafter Sehoole asked Magagane to meet him at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, who 
are MTN’s external auditors, and for whom Sehoole had worked before. Sehoole had 
asked a PriceWaterhouseCoopers employee to look into the invoices, where after he 
was advised that the invoices seemed on the face thereof to be irregular. 
In the meantime, due to internal restructuring within MTN Magagane underwent the 
interviews in respect of the optimal restructuring of her division, and by own 
admission did not fare well. On 10 June 2011 she was handed a letter of 
retrenchment; she was invited to make representations by 13 June 2011 in this 
regard to the employer. On 14 June 2011, without having made any representations 
Magagane referred a dispute to the CCMA for conciliation, stating therein too that 
she believed her retrenchment to have been a reprisal for having made a protected 
disclosure; MTN did nothing to address her concerns in this regard. Magagane was 
asked to leave MTN on 21 June 2011, and paid until 31 June 2011 (which was also 
in dispute). On 22 August PriceWaterhouseCoopers submitted a draft forensic report 
                                                          
100  Magagane v MTN SA (Pty) Ltd and another (JS834/11) [2013] ZALCJHB 77 (17 May 2013). 
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regarding the NNA invoices, and as a result of which Madzonga received a written 
warning. 
Various positions opened at MTN in the meantime, and the applicant was not invited 
to apply for any as a result of the alleged trouble she had caused, and which had led 
to her being asked to leave earlier. On 1 October 2011 she commenced with new 
employment obtained. 
In determining the question as to whether Magagane had made a protected 
disclosure the court noted that an employee was required to make a disclosure in 
good faith, and substantially in accordance with the procedures provided by the 
employer as prescribed or authorised.101 The respondents had contended that the 
disclosure had not been made to the hotline and as such did not enjoy protection, 
especially since she then reported the matter to Sehoole, who further failed to follow 
the proper procedures. In this regard the court that in circumstances in which an 
employer has a hotline and the employee nevertheless decides to make a 
confidential report to a director of her employer, and is then requested to cooperate 
with auditors in the resultant investigation, and does so on a confidential basis it can 
certainly not be argued that the disclosure is not protected as it did not comply with 
prescribed procedures. It was found that the applicant had as such made a protected 
disclosure.102  
The next question considered by the court was whether Magagane had been 
dismissed as a result of having made the protected disclosure. The court, in 
considering all the evidence and contentions was of the view that MTN had acquitted 
itself of the onus of proving that Magagane had not been dismissed as a result of the 
protected disclosure made, and rather that her dismissal would have occurred 
whether or not she had made the protected disclosure; as such the required causal 
link was not formed, and as such her dismissal was not automatically unfair.  
 
 
                                                          
101  At par 70. 
102  At par 71 and 72. 
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7.2.26  Van Alphen v Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd103 
The applicant in the matter sought to interdict a disciplinary hearing that was 
instituted against her, on the basis that it constituted occupational detriment as a 
result of her having made a protected disclosure. The applicant had raised 
complaints regarding the alleged failure of her employer, the respondent in the 
application, to deal with customer complaints, and further that certain employees and 
senior managers were not doing their jobs and that the Quality Assurance 
Department (hereinafter referred to as “QAD”) was in chaos in the extreme. The 
court discussed the requirements pertaining to obtaining a final interdict, and stating 
that the case at hand concerned two pivotal considerations, namely whether the 
applicant had made a protected disclosure; and if the court found that she in fact did, 
there could be no doubt that a disciplinary hearing would be occupational 
detriment.104 The court went on to consider the PDA before considering whether the 
applicant had shown that she had a clear right. 
The court considered that the applicant had to show that she had made a disclosure 
regarding an impropriety, as envisioned in the PDA. 105  The court stated that 
performance and extreme chaos in a department did not in its mind meet this test, 
stating that it agreed that the PDA should be given a wider interpretation, as 
opposed to a narrow interpretation, in order to encourage a culture of whistle-
blowing. However, having said this, the legislature could surely not have intended 
complaints concerning alleged poor work performance, the quality of systems and a 
lack of concern regarding customer complaints to fall within the PDA’s ambit of 
protection. The court differentiated this case from City of Tshwane, Radebe and 
Tshishonga.106 
 
Hereafter, the court turned to the question of irreparable harm that may be suffered 
by the applicant. It held that she would have an opportunity to state her side of the 
story at the disciplinary hearing, and that it was unlikely that she would at worst be 
issued with a final written warning should she be found guilty of the misconduct. The 
                                                          
103  Van Alphen v Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd (C418/2013) [2013] ZALCCT 21 (21 June 
2013). 
104  At par 7. 
105  At par 38. 
106  At par 39 and 40. 
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court further pointed out that both the LC and the LAC had made it clear that they 
would only interfere in exceptional circumstances to intervene in pending disciplinary 
proceedings, and a genuine protected disclosure would merit such interference.107 
The court held that the applicant had failed to show such exceptional circumstances. 
Further to this the applicant had not referred the dispute to the CCMA for 
conciliation, which was prescribed by the PDA read with the LRA as a first step, and 
further yet that the applicant could have applied for interim relief pending the 
conciliation of the matter. The application was dismissed. 
 
7.2.27  Mattheus v Octagon Marketing (Pty) Ltd108  
Mattheus had launched an urgent application in the LC, Johannesburg for an interim 
order to interdict the respondent from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against 
him, pending the outcome of a dispute relating to the PDA. The background to the 
matter revealed that Mattheus had been employed by the respondent as the Group 
Finance Director since April 2007. On 2 October 2013 Mattheus was given notice to 
attend a disciplinary hearing, and Mattheus contended that this constituted 
occupational detriment for the purposes of the PDA. The court set out the material 
facts in this regard tracing the foundation of the applicant’s claim to a report which he 
had prepared during March 2013, and which was to be presented to the employer’s 
board. The report included allegations regarding financial mismanagement, 
unauthorised expenditure, travel, bribery and fraud.109  
During the period between May and early October 2013 there had been a number of 
communications and meetings between the afore-mentioned, with Ngwenya having 
expressed his unhappiness in June 2013 regarding the fact that Mattheus had gone 
over his head directly to the chairman. During July 2013 Ngwenya informed 
Mattheus that as far as he was concerned the relationship of trust and confidence 
between them had broken down, which led to Mattheus meeting with the 
respondent’s attorney. Mattheus regarded the outcome of this meeting as a 
suspension and he referred an unfair labour dispute to the CCMA. On 2 October 
2013 Mattheus was issued with a notice of a disciplinary hearing, setting forth four 
                                                          
107  At par 42. 
108  Mattheus v Octagon Marketing (Pty) Ltd (J2264/13) [2013] ZALCJHB 317 (17 September 
2013). 
109  At par 3. 
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charges of misconduct relating to financial misconduct, serious misconduct and the 
like. 
It was noted that the respondent opposed the application on various grounds 
including the allegation that Mattheus did not make a bona fide protected disclosure, 
especially based on the consideration that the report that had been prepared, that 
the report had not exposed any criminal activities and that the report had been 
unsigned. The court remarked that these submissions held no merit; in that inter alia 
the PDA does not prescribe a format for disclosures to be made, nor do they need 
they be signed. 110 Further to this the court remarked that at least some of the 
matters contained in the report in question fell into one or more of the categories of 
conduct pertaining to disclosures that merit protection, and that the truth of these 
assertions had not been contested. 
So too it was not contested that the charges brought against Mattheus were only 
levelled after Ngwenya had asserted that there had been a breakdown of trust 
between him and Mattheus. The approach was that the matter had to be objectively 
determined on the facts. The court held that it was satisfied that the respondent’s 
version did not cast significant doubt on the version of Mattheus, and that the 
charges had in fact been contrived as a result of the disclosures made by him, and 
as such the respondent was interdicted from pursuing the disciplinary charges until 
the outcome of the dispute had been resolved.111 The respondent was ordered to 
pay Mattheus’ costs.  
 
7.2.28  Solidarity obo Roos v South African Police Service and Others112 
The applicant in this matter, Colonel J. J. H. Roos (hereinafter referred to as “Roos”), 
had claimed that he had been removed from his position as the head of Internal 
Audit of the Crime Intelligence Division (hereinafter referred to as “CID”) of the South 
African Police Service (hereinafter referred to as “SAPS”), and thereafter appointed 
as the head of a unit which was still to be established, and to be known as Inspection 
and Evaluation. He averred that this had been in consequence of him having made a 
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112  Solidarity obo Roos v South African Police Service and others (JS1043/12) [2014] ZALCJHB 
131 (22 April 2014). 
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number of disclosures regarding fraud and corruption that had been committed in 
respect of the Secret Service Account of Crime Intelligence. Roos stated that he had 
made these disclosures during the period of 2004 to 2009, and that he had made the 
disclosures to both his superiors and to the Directorate of Special Operations (the 
Scorpions), and that his transfer amounted to occupational detriment as provided for 
in terms of the PDA. As such he claimed that these actions by the employer 
amounted to unfair labour practices in terms of the LRA. 
The court noted that two of the respondent’s key witnesses, namely Mdluli and 
Mphego had not made themselves available to the respondent to testify despite 
various different approaches and various postponements of the matter in order to 
obtain their cooperation. As a result of this, the court stated that the respondents 
were unable to dispute the merits of Roos’ claim that he had been subjected to 
occupational detriment as a result of having made protected disclosures.113 As a 
consequence, the only issue to be decided by the court was to determine the 
remedies. In the evaluation of the suitable remedy, the court took into account the 
following factors:  
 
• That the disclosures made by Roos were central to his official functions and 
duties; 
• The disclosures concerned serious corruption and fraud implicating very 
senior officers; 
• That the applicant had conducted himself with scrupulous discretion in the 
manner in which he dealt with the disclosures; 
• That the disclosures made by the applicant lay at the core of his functions and 
duties, and that the disclosures were in regard to serious allegations of 
corruption and fraud which implicated very senior officers in the Crime 
Intelligence Divisions. In doing so, the applicant had conducted himself with 
discretion which could not be faulted, remaining obedient to his superiors. 
 
 
• The inertia with which the superiors reacted was disturbing, and that they 
simply allowed the prejudicial measures taken against Roos to continue. 
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The order made by the court in this matter was the most comprehensive thus far in 
respect of a whistle-blower, and reads114: 
 
In light of the above, noting that the respondents have conceded the merits of 
the applicant’s claim and the points of agreement reached between the parties 
on the form that an order should take in relation to the applicant’s return to 
useful employment, the following order is made: 
66.1 For the avoidance of doubt it is recorded that: 
66.1.1 Colonel JJH Roos (‘Roos’) is currently on the staff of the South African 
Police Services (Crime Intelligence) in the position of Colonel and is drawing 
benefits as such. 
66.1.2 Nothing in this order shall affect – 
66.1.2.1 his status as such; 
66.1.2.2 his rank as Colonel; 
66.1.2.3 his remuneration (that is, his basic salary and fringe benefits), which 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
66.2 Nothing in this order shall entail the displacement of any person from his or 
her position in Crime Intelligence specifically, or in the South African Police 
Service generally. 
66.3 The respondents are obliged – 
66.3.1 to redeploy Roos preferably in the Internal Audit section of Crime 
Intelligence or failing that in an internal audit unit of the South African Police 
Service and to provide him with work of a comparable nature to that which he 
performed prior to his transfer to Inspection and Evaluation; 
66.3.2 to give preference to Roos in any application for appointment or 
promotion in a post reasonably acceptable to him within the said Department or 
in any other Department in which his skills can properly be deployed, as soon 
as such a post becomes available. 
66.4 The respondents must pay Roos compensation under s 194 (4) of the LRA 
in the amount of R 156,250-00 (one hundred and fifty six thousand, two 
hundred and fifty rands) within 14 days of the date of this judgment. 
66.5 The respondent must pay the applicant’s costs of suit, including the costs 
occasioned by the employment of two counsel. 
 
7.2.29  Motingoe v The Head of The Department of The Northern Cape 
Department of Roads And Public Works And Others115 
The applicant (Motingoe) held the position of Director and Head of Legal Services of 
the Northern Cape Department of Roads and Public Works (the Department), and 
sought relief in that the disciplinary hearing that had been scheduled for 20 and 24 
January 2014 be suspended pending the final determination of an unfair labour 
practice dispute which had been submitted. 
Motingoe had referred three disputes to the General Public Service Sectoral 
Bargaining Council, and in the alternative to the LC. Two of the disputes alleged that 
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his suspension by the first respondent, the department, and the holding of the 
scheduled disciplinary hearing amounted to occupational detriment as provided for in 
the PDA. At the date of the hearing of the application at hand there had already been 
an attempt at conciliation, with the parties awaiting the certificate of non-resolution 
regarding the disputes. The applicant asserted that part of his functions related to the 
department’s supply chain management, including legal vetting within the supply 
chain management context. The tender process which had given rise to the 
application at hand pertained to the procurement of professional engineering 
services for the repair at Theekloof Pass, a key mountain pass in the Western Cape 
Province. Motingoe alleged that the tender evaluation report, as well as the minutes 
of the bid and bid adjudication committees contained irregularities, which he reported 
to the department’s CFO in a memorandum dated 29 May 2013. Motingoe averred 
that the content of the said memorandum amounted to a protected disclosure in 
terms of the PDA. Motingoe submitted that no legitimate award could have been 
made, based on the serious irregularities that he had reported on.  
 
During July 2013 the first respondent appointed a legal advisor to his office without 
notifying Motingoe, and during October 2013 a certain Mr. Osman (hereinafter 
referred to as “Osman”) was appointed in order to investigate alleged management 
issues within Legal Services, which Motingoe saw as a continuation of a pattern of 
harassment. Motingoe informed Osman that he construed the investigation as a 
thinly disguised ploy to divert attention from the corruption in which the first 
respondent was involved and that he was using his subordinates to undermine the 
authority in his unit. On 1 November 2013 Motingoe sent an email to the second 
applicant, attempting once again to secure a meeting. On 21 November 2013 a 
heated meeting took place, but in terms of which it seemed to be common cause that 
the first respondent told Motingoe that Motingoe was trying to blackmail him in 
respect of the irregularities. Motingoe was suspended on 22 November 2013; with 
the reason given being that he was suspected of serious misconduct by disclosing 
departmental information to a third party, which letter of suspension was signed by 
the second respondent. The court viewed it as noteworthy that in respect of the 
application at hand no affidavit had been filed by the second respondent. 
On 26 November 2013 Motingoe was served with a notice summoning him to appear 
at a disciplinary hearing, however, the charges did not relate to the disclosure of 
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information at all. It was clear from the answering papers that the first respondent 
disagreed with Motingoe regarding the vetting function.116 
The court went further in defining the steps relevant as determining117: 
• Whether the respondent had put enough information before the court of 
first instance to enable it to determine whether a prima facie right to the 
protection availed in the PDA had been established, which includes 
determining whether a disclosure had been made; and 
• If the information indeed constitutes a disclosure, whether the 
disclosure also falls within the realm of a protected disclosure; and 
• Whether the person having made the protected disclosure was being 
subjected to occupational detriment as a result. 
Amongst the factors to be considered was whether failure to intervene would lead to 
a grave injustice and whether such justice might be ascertained by another manner, 
and public interest considerations. Based on the circumstances of the case the court 
held that it was in the interests of justice that the interim relief applied for by 
Motingoe be granted.118 
 
7.2.30  IMATU & Another v City Of Matlosana Local Municipalilty119 
The first applicant (hereinafter referred to as “IMATU”120) and the second applicant, 
Mr. Abraham Gerhardus Strydom (hereinafter referred to as “Strydom”) brought the 
application in order to obtain an interdict against a decision that had been taken by 
the first respondent, the City of Matlosana Local Municipality (hereinafter referred to 
as “the Municipality”), to institute disciplinary action against Strydom.  
The application brought centred on two issues, namely that: 
                                                          
116  At par 15. 
117  At par 21. 
118  At par 26. 
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1. The decision to institute disciplinary action against Strydom was invalid as the 
Council that had deliberated on the matter had not had a sufficient quorum; 
and 
2. That the decision to take the disciplinary action against Strydom constituted 
“occupational detriment” as defined by the PDA. 
For the purposes of this thesis only point 2 above will be focused on. 
Strydom contended that during the first part of 2013 he had assisted Warrant Officer 
Jaco Van Den Berg (hereinafter referred to as “Van Den Berg”) who is part of the 
Hawks in the SAPS, in the investigation of allegations relating to tender fraud at the 
Municipality. In this respect various communications were made with Van Den Berg 
regarding the Director of Infrastructure of the Municipality, Mr. Motsemme. Thirteen 
charges were brought against Strydom, of which none related to his communication 
with Van Den Berg. Based on this consideration the court found that the information 
conveyed by Strydom to Van Den Berg constituted a protected disclosure as 
required in terms of the PDA. Central to the decision before the court was the 
consideration that Strydom was not being charged with communicating with Van Den 
Berg. The court saw the question to be answered as being whether the disciplinary 
action undertaken against Strydom was so undertaken in whole or part as a result of 
him having made the protected disclosure referred to supra, and which required an 
examination of the degree of nexus between the protected disclosures and the 
decision taken to charge Strydom in respect of the disciplinary hearing. The court 
considered a practical approach to include consideration of factors such as121: 
• The timing of the disciplinary enquiry; 
• The reasons forwarded by the employer relating to the decisions taken to 
institute such disciplinary action; 
• The nature of the disclosure that had been made; 
• The person/s responsible employed by the employer for making such 
decisions regarding the disciplinary hearing. 
The court considered the matter based on the available facts in light of the above-
mentioned factors, surmising that there was not a sufficient nexus, and as such the 
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disciplinary action instituted did not amount to “occupational detriment” against 
Strydom. 
 
7.2.31  Beaurain v Martin N. O. and Others122 
The applicant in the matter, Mr. Johan Beaurain (hereinafter referred to as 
“Beaurain”) worked at the Groote Schuur Hospital as an electrician and had been 
employed in that position since 2006; Beaurain had published both photographs and 
complaints on Facebook regarding the state of the toilets at the hospital, including 
allegations that health of both the patients and the staff members was being 
compromised as the dirty air in question was being circulated through the hospital 
via the air conditioning system. Beaurain was instructed to stop, which he did not 
adhere to, where after he was dismissed. Beaurain averred that his disclosures were 
protected in terms of the provisions of the PDA, as a result of which his dismissal 
was automatically unfair in terms of section 187 (1)(f) of the LRA. 
The court concluded that whistle-blowing should be encouraged123, but on the facts 
before the court, the applicant did not qualify for the protection offered by the PDA, 
and as a result of which the application was dismissed. 
7.3 A checklist devised 
From the case law, the following checklist can be derived in respect of the whistle-
blower. The aforementioned checklist has been attached hereto as annexure A for 
convenience sake. 
7.4 Case law dealing with jurisdictional considerations 
To date there has been a marked confusion regarding which court in actual fact has 
jurisdiction in various matters. The intention of the legislature in passing the LRA was 
to create a specialist court which was to give effect to the general intention of the 
LRA, namely, the resolution of labour disputes. The LC is a superior court with the 
same status as the High Court in respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction,124 
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and has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters to be determined in terms of 
the LRA or any other law.  
The High Court has concurrent jurisdiction in certain specified instances which 
seems to highlight the intention to exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction otherwise. In 
Langeveldt v Vryburg Transitional Local Council & others 125  the majority of the 
Labour Appeal Court expressed concern about the confusion which existed in 
employment and labour matters, and the jurisdiction of the various courts to 
adjudicate such matters. It seems that this already confusing situation, and as 
indicated by case law,126 has been compacted even further by the wide berth of 
section 4(1)(a) of the PDA. 
Various cases have dealt with jurisdictional considerations regarding whistle-blowing 
cases. 
Reference in this regard can be had to the contents of Chapter 6 above, which deals 
with jurisdiction within the context of the PDA. 
What follows hereunder relates to the cases dealing with the jurisdictional 
considerations. 
7.4.1 Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality127 
In the Tsika case the Constitutional Court concluded with a summary of the law as it 
stood in 2009, regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in labour and employment 
matters. All matters in which the cause of action is covered by the LRA and for which 
the LRA provides a remedy fall within the jurisdiction of the LC and outside the 
jurisdiction of the High Court:  
                                                          
125  Langeveldt v Vryburg Transitional Local Council & others 2001 (22) ILJ 1116 (LAC).  
126  See for example, Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v SA National Union for Security Officers and 
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Security & Others 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC), and Kriel v Legal Aid Board & Others 2010 (2) SA 282 
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127  Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 2009 (30) ILJ 173 (CC). 
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• Employees of statutory institutions are not allowed to bring actions in the High 
Court under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 or by way of 
application for common law review in respect of matters covered by the LRA. 
• Employees may not bypass the LRA dispute-resolution procedures and 
approach the High Court with claims based on their constitutional rights to fair 
labour practices. 
• The High Court and civil courts retain their common law jurisdiction to entertain 
claims for damages arising from alleged breaches of contracts of employment 
and the acts or omissions of either party after the termination of employment, 
and in such matters the LC has concurrent jurisdiction. 
7.4.2 Young v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd128 
In the Young case the respondent contended that the High Court did not have 
jurisdiction to issue the declaratory order, and averred that this fell exclusively within 
the jurisdiction of the LC. The court held that the respondent had lost sight of the 
words "any court having jurisdiction, including the Labour Court".129 The court held 
further that the respondent’s averment was not supported by case law. It referred to 
the case of Jordan v MEC for Finance, Eastern Cape & Another130 in which it was 
held that "a matter pertaining to occupational detriment or an allegation of 
occupational detriment is not limited to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour 
Court".131 The application for substantive relief was granted as sought. 
7.4.3 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Engineering Council of 
South Africa & Another132 
In this matter the question arose as to whether the matter fell exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the LC. The SCA held that there was nothing in section 4 of the PDA or 
the LRA to indicate an intention to deprive the High Court of its inherent jurisdiction. 
The SCA held further in relation to the argument of the employer that the LC had 
primary jurisdiction in PDA cases that this was indeed contrary to the language and 
structure of section 4, which provides that employees may resort to any court having 
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129  Section 4(1)(a) of the PDA. 
130  Jordan v MEC for Finance, Eastern Cape & Another 2007 JOL 19802 (CK). 
131  Jordan v MEC for Finance, Eastern Cape & Another 2007 JOL 19802 (CK) [13] and [14]. 
132  City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Engineering Council of South Africa & Another 
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jurisdiction, including the LC. The court held that the fact that the LC was mentioned 
in section 4 of the PDA did not mean that employees had to resort to it. Accordingly, 
the appeal was dismissed. 
7.5 Additional general considerations by legal practitioners in whistle-
blower cases 
Reading the case law to date, there are three general considerations that seem to 
appear from time to time in the judgments rendered, and which apply to civil litigation 
in general in South Africa, namely: 
1. Cases brought before the courts as urgent matters; 
2. Whether interim or final relief is to be sought; 
3. A foreseeable material dispute of facts. 
The legal practitioner dealing with a matter regarding an alleged whistle-blower 
needs to give thorough consideration to these three aspects in order to sure that the 
relief sought is not defeated on one of the three technical aspects referred to supra. 
 
7.5.1 Urgent matters 
It is imperative that an urgent application actually be urgent, as a lack of urgency will 
result in the matter being struck off the roll, where after the applicant will need to set 
it down on the normal motion roll; an adverse costs order must also follow. See for 
example Govender v Minister of Defence. 133  High Court Rule 6 (12) (b) clearly 
requires that the reasons upon which an applicant bases his urgency to be set forth 
explicitly in the founding affidavit supporting the notice of motion.  
It has also been held that the applicant in an urgent matter cannot create his own 
urgency; such a matter will also be struck off the urgent roll.134 
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7.5.2  Interim or final relief 
In approaching a court for relief, practitioners should assess whether final or interim 
relief ought to be sought. This consideration plays a pivotal role as the requirements 
for the two types of relief differ, and applying for the incorrect relief too could defeat 
the application brought; see for example the court’s remarks in this regard in Van 
Alphen v Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd135at paragraphs 29 and 30. This finds 
applicability in a great number of whistle-blower cases, as the whistle-blower will 
often turn to the courts to interdict the employer from continuing with a disciplinary 
hearing which is then averred to constitute the source of occupational detriment.  
The requirements to be met in respect of final relief in the form of an interdict are:  
• That the applicant is able to demonstrate a clear right, in other words 
confirming that the right exists in law and thereafter proving that the right 
exists in fact; 
• That there has been an injury actually committed or an injury reasonably 
apprehended. In this respect the applicant will need to demonstrate that a 
reasonable person 136  (man) confronted with the same set of facts would 
expect that injury would result therefrom;137 
• That there is no other satisfactory remedy available to the applicant in the 
given circumstances. 
The requirements to be met in respect of interim relief in the form of an interim 
interdict are: 
• That the applicant is able to demonstrate a prima facie right; in other words 
the applicant is able to show that the asserted right exists, even though it may 
be open to a measure of doubt as a result of the respondent’s denials.138 
• That the applicant is able to demonstrate that he harbours a well-grounded 
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted and the 
final relief is granted; irreparable harm within this context does not mean harm 
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that is absolutely irreparable, but also includes harm that would be difficult to 
repair. 
• That the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interim relief 
sought; here the court will weigh the convenience in respect of the relevant 
parties to the matter. 
• That the applicant is able to demonstrate that there is no other satisfactory 
remedy available to him within those particular circumstances. 
As should be clear from the above, the requirements in seeking interim relief are less 
stringent than that relevant in seeking final relief. 
7.5.3  A material dispute of facts 
In Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union obo Ngxila-Radebe v Ekhuruleni 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another 139  and Xakaza v Ekhuruleni Metropolitan 
Municipality and Others140 the courts referred to disputes as to material facts, which 
plays a pivotal role in deciding whether to proceed by way of action or application 
proceedings, and when in application proceedings a legal practitioner should raise a 
request to have a matter referred to either trial or oral evidence. 
In this regard, sight should not be lost of the provisions of High Court Rule 6 (5)(g). 
 
The most basic difference between action and application proceedings is that action 
proceedings are instituted by way of summons, whilst application proceedings are 
instituted by way of notice of motion supported by a founding and supporting 
affidavits. In effect this means that action proceedings are conducted as a trial in 
which witnesses testify and are cross-examined and or re-examined, whilst in 
application proceedings, usually, no oral evidence is led as all the evidence is 
contained in the relevant affidavits with the necessary annexures and the 
practitioners argue the matter on the papers. 
 
Matters in which a material dispute of facts is foreseen which will not be capable of 
resolution on the papers should be brought by way of action proceedings. However, 
as indicated supra, High Court Rule 6 (5)(g) provides a court with various alternatives 
                                                          
139  (J1029/2010) [2010] ZALC 289. 
140  (JS281/11) [2013] ZALCJHB 22. 
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should the wrong form of proceedings have been brought, of which notably one such 
option is to strike the matter from the role. 
 
Legal practitioners would be well advised to heed the test espoused in the Room Hire 
case141 according to which guidance was given in determining whether a dispute of 
fact constitutes a material dispute which would merit oral evidence in its resolution. 
7.6 The remedies provided 
Those applicants who had been successful in the above-named matters were 
awarded the following kinds of relief by the courts in question: 
Remedy Case 
Four months’ remuneration H & M Ltd 
Interim interdict Grieve v Denel 
Interim interdict Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & 
Another 
Interim interdict Young v Coega Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
Interim interdict Randles v Chemical Specialities 
Interim interdict Ngxila-Radebe v Ekhuruleni Metropolitan 
Municipality & another 
Interim interdict Motingoe v The Head of the Department of the 
Northern Cape Department of Roads and Public 
Works and another 
Interim interdict and costs Mattheus v Octagon Marketing (Pty) Ltd 
R 277 000.00 (a reduced 
amount) and costs 
Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development 
v Tshishonga 
Redeployment 
Preferential treatment in respect 
of promotion opportunities 
Provision of comparable work 
Compensation to the value of R 
156 250.00 
Costs 
Roos v SAPS and others 
Twenty four months’ 
remuneration and costs 
Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd 
Twenty four months’ 
remuneration and costs 
Sekgobela v SITA 
Retrospective reinstatement Potgieter v Tubatse Ferrochrome 
 
It is worth noting that in most of the matters in which the applicants that sought the 
protection offered by the PDA were unsuccessful, their applications or actions were 
                                                          
141  Room Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd 1949 (3) SA 1155 (T). 
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dismissed with costs. 
‘Costs’ within this context has reference to legal costs related to the fees of any legal 
practitioner that has acted on behalf of the party. According to Theophilopoulus et al 
at page 402142 the opposing parties in a matter are responsible for the payment of 
their attorney’s fees, including the payment of money disbursed by the attorney, 
including the briefing of counsel. In the usual course, in civil matters, the parties will 
claim an order for costs from the opposing party in order to cover the costs paid in 
this manner to their own attorney.143  
Theophilopoulus et al at page 402-403 refers to the fact that the court has a wide 
discretion in respect of costs, and that it is expected of the court to consider costs 
and exercise its discretion in this regard in accordance with the well-established 
principles. 
• It would serve both employees and employers well, to take note of 
these principles in respect of costs: A successful party may be deprived 
of costs if there is good reason for this; 
• Matters that are separate and distinct usually carry their own costs; 
• Judgement on the merits is usually a prerequisite for a costs order, but 
orders made in respect of interlocutory procedures may include an 
appropriate costs order; 
• Small or partial success may carry an appropriate award of costs. 
• A successful application for the granting of an indulgence does not 
carry a costs order; 
• A party who unnecessarily causes costs must bear those costs; thus a 
successful party may be ordered to pay the losing party’s costs in 
respect of proceedings that the successful party himself or herself 
caused; 
• In exceptional circumstances a party may be ordered to pay costs on a 
more punitive scale than would normally have applied, for example on 
an attorney-and-client scale instead of party-and-party scale. 
                                                          
142  Theophilopoulos C, Van Heerden C M, Boraine A Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 
(LexisNexis Durban 2012) 
143  As opposed to criminal matters. 
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7.7 Suspension of the whistle-blower 
It would have been noted that a great deal of the case law deals with the suspension 
of employees claiming to have been subjected to the suspension as a result of a 
protected disclosure made. 
In terms of section 186 (2)(b) of the LRA provides that the unfair suspension of an 
employee, or any other unfair action by the employer short of dismissal amounts to 
an unfair labour practice, and simultaneously falls within the definition of  
occupational detriment as defined in terms of the PDA. This in turn brings such 
action by the employer against an employee on account of or partly on account of 
having made a protected disclosure, under the provisions of section 4 (2)(b) of the 
PDA, as discussed under paragraph 6.3.2 in Chapter 6 supra. 
Such suspensions would include so-called precautionary and punitive suspensions.. 
In Mogothle v Premier of North West Province & another144 the court held that the 
suspension of an employee pending a disciplinary hearing regarding alleged 
misconduct can be equated to arrest, and as such it should only be used in 
circumstances in which there is a reasonable apprehension that the employee 
concerned will interfere with the on-going investigation or pose some other kind of 
threat. In Country Fair v CCMA & others145 and South African Breweries Ltd (Beer 
Division) v Woolfrey & others146 the LC has held that in appropriate circumstances 
suspension of an employee without pay can be a fair sanction as an alternative to 
dismissal of the employee. However, clearly each case has to be considered on its 
own merits in determining whether or not it is justified, with suspension never being 
used as a tactic against a whistle-blower. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Bearing the above in mind it should be absolutely clear that the pivotal 
considerations upon which the approach of our courts is based, is the manner in 
which the whistle-blower approaches the subject and circumstances pertaining to his 
concern. The whistle-blower is expected to come to court with clean hands, and to 
                                                          
144  [2009] 4 BLLR 331 (LC). 
145  [1998] 6 BLLR 577 (LC). 
146  [1999] 5 BLLR 525 (LC). 
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act in the utmost good faith, having followed the letter of the PDA, without which the 
relief sought, will not be granted. The courts have constantly measured the whistle-
blower’s right to attain the desired relief provided for in terms of the provisions of the 
PDA according to the following central factors: 
1. That the applicant must be an employee; 
2. The applicant must have reason to believe that the information he/she 
discloses fall within the definition of section 1 of the PDA, in other words that 
the information discloses or tends to disclose some form of criminal conduct 
or misconduct; 
3. That the disclosure must be made in good faith;  
4. Where there is a prescribed procedure or an authorised procedure for making 
such disclosure the employee must so make the disclosure; where there is no 
such procedure the disclosure must be made to the employer; and 
5. There must be some link or nexus between the disclosure and the 
occupational detriment alleged. 
 
In preparation for such a matter practitioners in turn should evaluate the urgency of 
the matter (where applicable), whether a likely material dispute of fact will arise and 
whether final or interim relief should be sought on behalf of the litigant. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN SOUTH AFRICA’S POSITION 
MEASURED 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 of this research, under paragraph 1.4, certain hypothetical points of 
departure were made in respect of whistle-blowing. The relevant points of departure 
in this regard are as follows:  
• Legislation regulating the responsible disclosure of wrongdoing by either an 
individual, individuals or an organisation, including public interest matters, 
crime and corruption will promote public confidence, ethical citizenship, good 
governance, accountability and transparency. 
 
The premise of this stance is demonstrated within the context of Chapters 3 
and 4 of this study. It is argued that the government of the RSA has 
recognised this stance by including the right to whistle-blowing, albeit 
indirectly, as a constitutional imperative, and more directly by inclusion and the 
emphasis placed on whistle-blowing in the long term strategic direction of the 
country, as reflected in the NDP. This is further underscored by the clear 
positioning in this respect, as reflected by the MACC, ACF and the agreement 
reflected in the respective conventions enjoined in. 
 
• One of the most important tools in fighting wrongdoing, crime and corruption is 
the legislation providing appropriate protection and remedies to the person or 
persons speaking out against wrongdoing, crime and corruption, in the public 
interest. This is due to the fact that whistle-blowing is a detection mechanism. 
In this respect note is taken of the fact that there are various pieces of 
legislation that has been enacted by the government of the RSA, that aim at 
implementing this position. A concern that will be engaged on a little later 
though is the seemingly haphazard manner in which this has been 
approached. The most applicable chapters in this regard are Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. 
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• Without legislation providing appropriate protection and remedies to the 
person or persons so speaking out, the said person or persons are much less 
likely to “blow the whistle” on such wrongdoing, crime and corruption; 
 
Chapter 2 of the study addresses this proposition. 
 
• In South Africa such protection and remedies are provided to whistle-blowers 
in terms of the provisions of the PDA. 
This proposition is partly correct, in that it is one of the various legislative 
mechanisms available to a whistle-blower in the RSA, applying only within the 
narrow sense of the understanding of the terms whistle-blower and whistle-
blowing, in that it applies to a formal employment relationship, to the exclusion 
of independent contractors. The remedies provided also only reflect within the 
narrow formal employment relationship, having no specific regard to wider 
protection in terms of the whistle-blower. This statement is enforced and 
underlined by the fact that only occupational detriment is recognised in the 
PDA. It is however noteworthy that this is an oversimplification, especially in 
circumstances in which an employer could be held vicariously liable in respect 
of negative actions perpetrated against a whistle-blower, and falling outside 
the sphere of mere occupational detriment. 
• The protection and remedies provided are effective enough to ensure that 
people wishing to blow the whistle for public interest’s sake will do so without 
fear of reprisal; 
This will be clearly explored and concluded on at the end of the study, as this 
is argued to be the most pivotal of considerations. 
• The South African PDA is a world-class piece of legislation, that when 
compared to the protection and remedies availed to whistle-blowers in 
England, Australia, and New Zealand compares favourably in this regard. 
This will be clearly explored and concluded on within the text of this chapter, 
as this is argued to be the most pivotal of considerations. 
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 Having said this, the South African position will now be measured in respect of the 
sixteen established comparative elements, in order to be compared in the chapters 
to follow with the other chosen countries. 
8.2 The whistle-blower in South Africa's position measured  
Taking into account best practice pertaining to whistle-blowing, the template utilised 
below, designed by the author and as discussed under paragraph 1.7 in Chapter 1 
supra, is utilised in measuring the whistle-blower in South Africa’s position. 
In this respect it has to be noted that the measurement cannot take place in respect 
of the PDA only, as this is only part of the legislative framework pertaining to whistle-
blowers as has been demonstrated. 
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Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful acts 
including serious human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA: 
Reference to the definition of a 
protected disclosure makes it 
clear that the measureable is 
aimed at the PDA within this 
context. 
X x1 Section 1 of the PDA 
 
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is 
being committed or is likely to be committed; 
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail 
to comply with any legal obligation to which that 
person is subject; 
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is 
occurring or is likely to occur; 
(d) that the health or safety of an individual has been, 
is being or is likely to be damaged; 
(e) unfair discrimination as contemplated in the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; or 
(f) that any matter referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) 
has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately 
One also needs to take cognisance that the 
ambit of section 1 defining a protected 
disclosure has seemingly been widened in the 
following ways: 
 
Section 1(i)(a) and (b) of the Financial Services 
Law General Amendment Act 45 of 2013, in that 
a disclosure also relates to the disclosure of 
information: 
(a) regarding any conduct of a pension 
fund, an administrator or a board 
member, principal officer, deputy 
principal officer, valuator, officer or 
employee of a pension fund or 
administrator; and 
                                                          
1  The ‘no’ in this regard recognises that more than mere good faith is required before the disclosure will potentially enjoy protection. 
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concealed. (b) relating to the affairs of the pension fund 
which may prejudice the fund or its 
members. 
 
What is important to note in respect of the afore-
mentioned, is that it obviously, by its very 
content widens the issues beyond occupational 
detriment and the employment relationship, thus 
casting the net wider than just the PDA. 
 
Further to this, it would seem that section 31(4) 
of the NEMA also in effected widens the ambit in 
respect of the type of conduct that may form the 
subject of a protected disclosure, in relation to 
an environmental risk. However, it may in certain 
circumstances also fall within the ambit of 
section 1(b), regarding the failure to meet a legal 
obligation, should the environmental risk 
concerned pertain simultaneously to a legal 
obligation. 
 
It is argued that the provisions of section 159 (3) 
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of the CA do not widen the definition, in that 
although it is tailored for the company 
environment, it can still be aligned with the 
definition of a protected disclosure as provided 
for in terms of the PDA. 
A matter of concern is pointed out in respect of 
concerns relating to ethical and policy related 
matters, which do not fall within the ambit of 
section 1 of the PDA, and as such, which remain 
unprotected in toto. 
See paragraph 4.5.2 in Chapter 4 
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA:  
The reference to public and 
private sector whistle-blowers, 
as well as the reference to the 
armed forces and special 
forces is indicative that the 
measurable applies within the 
x x Section 2(1)(a) of the PDA 
The objects of the PDA are: 
(a) to protect an employee, whether in the private or 
public sector, from being subjected to an 
occupational detriment on account of having 
made a protected disclosure. 
Although it is true that the PDA covers both 
private and public sector whistle-blowers, the 
following is recognised: 
• independent contractors are excluded 
from the protection offered by the 
provisions of the PDA; 
• it is at this point unsure what the 
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employment relationship. practical position of those excluded in 
terms of section 8(1)(a) from the 
definition of an employee in the Public 
Service Act would be, as discussed 
under paragraph 5.3.  
- This includes the exclusion of the 
employees or the South African 
National Academy of Intelligence 
(established in terms of the 
Intelligence Services Act 38 of 
1994); 
- This includes the exclusion of the 
employees of the South African 
Secret Service, and the National 
Intelligence Agency (now known as 
the State Security Agency); 
- This also includes the exclusion of 
the employees of a private company 
incorporated in terms of the CA, 
namely Electronic Communications 
Security (Pty) Ltd, known as 
Comsec. Section 5 of the Electronic 
Communications Security (Pty) Ltd 
Act 68 of 2002 provides that a 
provision of the CA does not apply 
to Comsec where the Minister of 
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Trade and Industry has issued a 
declaration under section 6 thereof. 
Whether such a declaration has 
been issued is unknown. 
 
• The guideline issued regarding the PDA 
also clearly states that employees in the 
SAPS, SANDF, DCS, State Educational 
Institutions, the National Intelligence 
Agency (now the State Security Agency) 
and the South African Secret Service 
are covered in so far as it is not contrary 
to the laws governing their employment. 
This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, it is argued that there is a 
double bar in this respect, as the most 
of these employees sign an oath of 
secrecy upon employment, which would 
in respect of whistle-blowing, in all 
probability, fall within the parameters of 
section (e)(i) in respect of the definition 
of a ‘protected disclosure’. 
• It has to be borne in mind that section 
159 of the CA gives much wider 
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protection (including both employees 
and suppliers) within the public sector, 
including state owned companies. 
Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Employment laws x  PDA and the LRA The entire PDA is focussed on the protection of 
a whistle-blower employee. 
However, note is taken of the fact that as it 
currently stands, it is applicable in respect of the 
narrow employment relationship excluding 
independent contractors from the ambit of its 
protection offered. 
 
The LRA compliments the provisions of the 
PDA, such as for example the provisions of 
section 191, section 158, section 188A and 
section 192 of the LRA. 
Criminal law X  PDA2 
For example, section (a) of the definition of a disclosure 
 
 
                                                          
2  All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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clearly envisages the potential of criminal law coming into 
play in appropriate circumstances 
 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Procedure in general 
 
 
 
 
This section envisages that a whistle-blower, 
within the employment relationship, who has, is 
or may be subjected to occupational detriment 
by his employer on account of having made or 
wishing to make a protected disclosure, may 
approach any court having jurisdiction and 
pursue any process allowed or prescribed by 
law. 
This would as such include criminal law. 
 
However, it is argued that the protection of a 
whistle-blower goes further than that prescribed 
as such. 
Any person in South Africa, including a whistle-
blower in the wider sense, may invoke the 
criminal procedure/ process in appropriate 
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circumstances, and provided he has locus 
standi3, jurisdiction and a recognised cause of 
action as defined in terms of criminal law and 
the required elements, in relation to the matter. 
Civil law X  PDA4 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section envisages that a whistle-blower, 
within the employment relationship, who has, is 
or may be subjected to occupational detriment 
by his employer on account of having made or 
wishing to make a protected disclosure, may 
approach any court having jurisdiction and 
pursue any process allowed or prescribed by 
law. 
This would as such include civil law. 
However, it is argued that the protection of a 
whistle-blower goes further than that prescribed 
as such. 
Any person in South Africa, including a whistle-
blower in the wider sense, may invoke the civil 
                                                          
3  Locus standi refers to a person’s right to sue or be sued, the right to institute action or to have action instituted against him, i.e. to have legal standing. 
Two factors need to be considered in determining whether a person has locus standi or not, namely, does he have a direct and substantial interest in 
the matter, and does he have legal capacity to act. For a more comprehensive discussion in this regard see for example Pete et al Civil Procedure, A 
Practical Guide 13 – 34, and Theophilipoulos et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure 101 – 112.  
4  All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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Civil law in general 
 
procedure/ process in appropriate 
circumstances, and provided he has locus 
standi, jurisdiction and a recognised cause of 
action in relation to the matter. 
Media law X  PDA5 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
 
This section envisages that a whistle-blower, 
within the employment relationship, who has, is 
or may be subjected to occupational detriment 
by his employer on account of having made or 
wishing to make a protected disclosure, may 
approach any court having jurisdiction and 
pursue any process allowed or prescribed by 
law. 
This would as such include media law, which is 
a subject in its own right, including 
considerations such as film, multimedia, music, 
publishing, and including practical implications 
falling within the spheres of labour law, 
international law, intellectual property rights, 
copyright and the like. 
It is however argued that within the context of 
the whistle-blower, it could come into play in 
                                                          
5  All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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respect of the publication of aspects of a matter, 
involving the breach of the whistle-blower’s right 
to privacy, defamation and crimen iniuria, thus 
placing it within the spheres of civil and criminal 
law. 
Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
X  PRECCA 
Section 34 
Section 34 places a duty on specified persons, 
including employees to report specified offences 
including theft, extortion fraud and the like. 
Failure to comply with this duty is guilty of a 
criminal offence. 
Section 34 refers to ‘any person’. 
Interim interdicts X  PDA6 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
Grieve v Denel – interim interdict granted against the 
employer 
Theron v Minister of Correctional Services & Another – 
interim interdict was granted against the employer 
 
In Bargrarette & others v PACOFS an interim interdict was 
 
In such a situation the court will grant an interim 
interdict if the applicant has a prima facie right to 
the relief sought in a court which has the 
jurisdiction to deal with it. 
 
 
In this matter the court found that the applicants 
had failed to meet the requirements of an 
                                                          
6  All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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denied. 
 
 
 
Young v CDC – the employer was interdicted and 
restrained in proceeding with the disciplinary enquiry 
instituted against the employee, pending the 
determination of the action instituted against the employer 
in the HC. 
 
Randles v Chemical Specialities Ltd – the employer was 
interdicted from proceeding with a disciplinary enquiry 
regarding the protected disclosure made by the employee, 
pending the outcome of the dispute which had been 
referred to the CCMA. 
interdict. 
See Chapter 7 
 
 
See Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 
See Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
Also see the content of Chapter 6 in this regard 
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(for example paragraph 6.2.2.2b) 
 
Final interdicts X  PDA7 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
 
A final interdict has not yet been reported in 
case law, however, section 4(1)(a) and (b) does 
allow for this. 
Cognisance in this regard should also be taken 
of the content of Chapter 6 in this regard. 
 
The basic difference in respect of whether an 
interim or a final interdict is granted lies within 
the allegations proved.8 
According to Pete et al at page 404, ‘An interdict 
                                                          
7   All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
8  Pete et al Civil Procedure, A Practical Guide succinctly establish the difference between obtaining an interim interdict as opposed to a final interdict at 
page 404: ‘If, when you approach the court to enforce your right, you are able to establish clearly your right (i.e. the court is prepared to hold that you 
have a clear right), then the court may be prepared to grant you a final interdict (i.e. a final order enforcing your right). If however, when you approach 
the court you are only able to advance prima facie proof of your right (i.e. you are able only to satisfy the court that you have a right on the face of it), 
then the court will only be prepared to grant you an interim interdict. An interim interdict (also called a temporary interdict or an interlocutory interdict, 
will serve to enforce your right for a limited period until it can be established whether or not your prima facie right, is in fact, a clear right (i.e. you have 
clearly established your right).’ 
 It is pointed out by Pete et al at page 405 (fn 160) that the term ‘interlocutory interdict’ should only be used when referring to interdicts which are sought 
as part of pending procedures. 
 Pete et al discuss the requirements in more detail at pages 405 -415. 
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is a court order which either orders a person to 
refrain from performing some act, or orders a 
person to perform a particular act.’ 
Compensation for pain and 
suffering9 
X  PDA10 
 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
For a whistle-blower who is not an employee, the 
principles of the law of damages. 
 
 
Such action will fall within the ambit of civil law, 
and more specifically within the private law 
sphere of damages.11 
Loss of earnings12 X  PDA13 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
Such action will fall within the ambit of civil law, 
                                                          
9  Potgieter et al Law of Damages 109: ‘By this is meant all pain, physical and mental suffering and discomfort caused by bodily injury, emotional shock, 
or the medical treatment necessitated by the injuries. Of importance here is the pain actually experienced by the plaintiff irrespective of whether he or 
she is more or less sensitive than the average person.’ 
 In this regard it may in passing also be noted that damages may be claimed for psychiatric injury (shock), disfigurement, loss of the amenities of life 
and a shortened life expectation. 
10   All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
11  Potgieter et al Law of Damages 1, state that: ‘The law of damages is that part of the law which indicates how the existence and extent of damage as 
well as the proper amount of damages or satisfaction are to be determined in the case of delict, breach of contract and other legal principles providing 
for the payment of damages.’ 
 At page 6 Potgieter et al Law of Damages elaborate on the principles in respect of delictual remedies. Due to the scope and specialisation involved 
within this field of law, this study will in no manner attempt to elaborate hereon.   
12  This has relation to the loss of earnings and even earning capacity as a result of the injury. See Chapter 14, for example, of Potgieter et al Law of 
Damages in this regard for a comprehensive discussion. 
13   All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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For a whistle-blower who is not an employee, the 
principles of the law of damages. 
and more specifically within the private law 
sphere of damages. 
Loss of status X  PDA14 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
For a whistle-blower who is not an employee, the 
principles of the law of damages. 
 
Such action will fall within the ambit of civil law, 
and more specifically within the private law 
sphere of damages. Examples in this regard 
within the sphere of private law would be injury 
to the personality in iniuria affecting the body15, 
defamation16 and insult17. 
 
However, such action may also fall to the realm 
of criminal law, in respect of crimen inuiria. 
They aspects may go hand-in-hand with media 
law. 
                                                          
14   All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
15  Potgieter et al Law of Damages at 119: ‘Psychological or mental harm is usually brought about by an assault through the causing of fear and emotional 
shock (causing psychological lesion or psychiatric injury).’ 
16  Potgieter et al Law of Damages 120: ‘Injury to personality caused by defamation has some special characteristics. In reality, the element of loss should 
be the fact that the plaintiff’s good name or reputation in the community has in fact been impaired. 
17  Potgieter et al Law of Damages 122: ‘A person’s dignity includes his or her (subjective) feelings of dignity or self-respect. These feelings may be 
violated by any conduct that actually insults a person.’ 
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Mediation18 X  PDA19 and the LRA 
 
Section 4(1)(a) and (b) of the PDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section envisages that a whistle-blower, 
within the employment relationship, who has, is 
or may be subjected to occupational detriment 
by his employer on account of having made or 
wishing to make a protected disclosure, may 
approach any court having jurisdiction and 
pursue any process allowed or prescribed by 
law. 
This would as such include mediation and 
arbitration, whether in terms of the LRA or 
pursued privately. 
In terms of section 112 of the LRA, the CCMA 
was established inter alia to provide simple 
procedure for the resolution of labour disputes 
through statutory conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration, such as that envisaged in terms of 
                                                          
18  Pete et al Civil Procedure, A Practical Guide 585 define mediation as: ‘An ADR (alternative dispute resolution) process which requires the intervention 
of a neutral third party (the mediator) to assist the parties to reach a mutually acceptable resolution to their dispute’. And further that Med-Arb is: ‘A 
hybrid ADR procedure where mediation culminates in arbitration.’ 
 Pete et al Civil Procedure, A Practical Guide 578 define arbitration as: ‘Non-formal dispute-resolution mechanism where the arbitrator fulfils a role 
similar to that of a judge in that he hears oral evidence and argument, or considers written evidence, and finally makes a decision (called an ’award’)’. 
19   All persons within the RSA have this right, subject to locus standi, jurisdiction and cause of action in any event. 
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Section 112 of the LRA – establishment of the CCMA and 
the related purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 188A of the LRA – Agreement with reference to 
pre-dismissal arbitration 
section 191 of the LRA. (Chapter 6) 
 
In terms of section 188A(1) of the LRA an 
employer may with the consent of the employee 
request a council, an accredited agency or the 
CCMA to conduct an arbitration into allegations 
relating to the conduct or capacity of the relevant 
employee. 
In terms of section 188A(9) of the LRA such 
arbitrator must then, having considered 
evidence presented and the criteria of fairness 
as provided for in the LRA, direct what action (if 
any) should be taken against the employee in 
question. 
Legal costs20 X  General principles of law The PDA does not specifically provides for 
costs, but the principles relating to costs are well 
entrenched in our law. 
 
See Chapter 7 
                                                          
20  All persons within the RSA have this right in respect of litigation in any event. 
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Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA  x  There is no evidence in this respect. 
Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA  x  There is no evidence in this respect. 
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA  x  There is no evidence in this respect. 
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA  x PDA There is no provision providing for the protection 
of the identity of a whistle-blower. 
Falling outside the PDA  x Section 4 and 6 of the WCPPA Section 4 sets out the information that is 
required from a party reporting a matter to the 
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Public Protector, including full names, physical 
address, telephone number, email address etc. 
Section 6 deals with confidentiality. Should a 
complainant wish to remain anonymous, the 
Public Protector may decline to investigate the 
matter. 
 X  In criminal proceedings, privilege in respect of the 
informer/ informant. 
Principles of the law of evidence. 
Section 202 of the CPA. 
See the discussion in Chapter 5 under 
paragraph 5.9.2 
     
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA  x  The PDA only offers protection to employees, 
and subject to the other measurables as 
discussed above relating to the reporting 
channels, the matter that the whistle is blown on 
and the like. 
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Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA  x  No evidence to be presented in this regard. 
Falling outside the PDA X  Section 184 and 185 of the CPA See paragraph 5.9.2.2 (bottom) in this regard. 
Section 184 provides for dealing with witnesses 
who are about to abscond, and in this regard a 
warrant of arrest may be issued in respect of the 
witness. 
Section 185 provides for the detention of 
witnesses whose safety is in danger, who may 
abscond or who may be tampered with, or if it is 
deemed in the interests of the witness or the 
administration of justice that such witness be 
detained in custody. 
Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
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In relation to the PDA  x Section 1 of the PDA Only an employee is protected in relation to his 
employment relationship with the employer in 
respect of occupational detriment. 
Falling outside the PDA x  Sections 31(4), (5), (7) and (8) of NEMA in respect of 
environmental risk. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, no 
person is civilly or criminally liable or may be 
dismissed, disciplined, prejudiced or  harassed 
on account of having disclosed information in 
good faith, and as provided for in terms of 
section 31(5) of the NEMA, regarding 
environmental risk. 
  x Section 34 of PRECCA Section 34 places a duty on specified persons, 
including employees to report specified offences 
including theft, extortion fraud and the like. 
Failure to comply with this duty is guilty of a 
criminal offence. 
Section 34 refers to ‘any person’. 
Yet there are no provisions relating to the 
protection of such persons. 
 X  Section 38(1) of FICA This section provides that no criminal or civil 
action lies against a person who has made a 
report as required in terms of section 29 of FICA 
in good faith. 
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 X  The establishment of the OWP and the WPA.  
  x WCPPA The WCPPA makes no provision for the 
protection of complainants. 
 x   
Section 159(3) (a) of the CA 
 
 
 
 
Section 159(4) of the CA 
 
Note should be taken that the persons to whom 
a protected disclosure can be made are wider 
than that provided for in terms of section 5-9 of 
the PDA. 
 
Both employees and specified external parties 
such as a trade union and a supplier have 
qualified privilege in respect of a disclosure 
made, and are immune from civil, criminal and 
administrative liability in respect of that 
disclosure. 
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that the 
allegations were unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA    The case law as discussed in Chapter 7 is very 
clear in this regard. 
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In relation to the PDA  x Section 1: ‘disclosure’ defined. This section starts off with 
–  
…made by an employee who has reason to believe that 
the information concerned shows or tends to show that 
the conduct contained in the disclosure conforms to that 
within the definition of a disclosure. 
  
Section 2(1)(c) of the PDA 
(c) to provide for procedures in terms of which an 
employee can, in a responsible manner, disclose 
information regarding improprieties by his or her 
employer. 
 
 
See the case law discussed in Chapter 7 in this 
regard, and in which it becomes apparent that 
conjecture, speculation and rumour (by way of 
example) is not acceptable to invoke protection. 
Falling outside the PDA  x Section 31(4) of NEMA NEMA reflects no provision in this regard, but 
does provide that the disclosure made in good 
faith must be reasonably believed by the whistle-
blower. 
 X  Section 38(1) of FICA This section provides that no criminal or civil 
action lies against a person having made the 
report as required in terms of section 29 of 
FICA, who has complied in good faith. 
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Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA  x  There is no evidence in this respect. 
Falling outside the PDA  x  There is no evidence in this respect. 
Having said this, it is noted that 176 – 179 of the 
CA provides for the powers needed in order to 
support investigations and inspections in relation 
to disclosures. However, there are no provisions 
in respect of the enforcement of such 
investigations.  
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In relation to the PDA  x The case law as discussed in Chapter 7 
Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the PDA require that the 
disclosure (accusations) must be made in good faith in 
order for the whistle-blower to be protected. 
The only disclosure that need not be made in 
good faith, is a disclosure made in terms of 
section 5 of the PDA, a disclosure to a legal 
adviser. (as discussed in paragraph 4.5.3 of 
Chapter 4) 
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Falling outside the PDA  x Section 31(4) of NEMA Disclosures regarding environmental risk made 
in terms of NEMA also need to be made in good 
faith. 
 X  Sections 203 and 204 of the CPA This relates to those circumstances in which a 
person has been complicit in criminal conduct. 
Should a person who may need to testify in 
respect of conduct in which he himself may have 
been complicit, he may be able to rely on the 
privilege against self-incrimination as provided 
for in terms of section 203 of the CPA, in that he 
may not be compelled to answer questions 
which may expose him to criminal charges. 
The provisions of section 204 go hand-in-hand 
with the provisions of section 203, and relate to 
the potential protection (indemnity from 
prosecution) that such accomplice may enjoy 
should he turn state witness. 
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Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal due to 
protected disclosure made 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA 
 
The reference to the 
‘employer’ in this regard, infers 
that it is applicable within the 
employment relationship; as 
such the narrower sense. 
X x Section 192 of the LRA 
 
 
 
This is not specifically provided for in the PDA. 
However, if the reprisal referred to is in relation 
to dismissal (as occupational detriment), the 
provisions of section 192 relating to the onus in 
respect of dismissal disputes comes into play, in 
respect of which the employee must prove the 
dismissal, and the employer must prove that the 
dismissal in question was fair (substantially and 
procedurally). 
   Tshishonga case 
Ramsammy case 
PDA 
The onus is on the whistle-blower to prove that 
he has made a disclosure that is protected. This 
would then as a matter of course require of him 
to prove: 
• that a disclosure was actually made as 
defined in terms of section 1 of the PDA, 
and as widened by the provisions of 
section 1(i)(a) and (b) of the Financial 
Services Law General Amendment Act 
45 of 2013; 
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• that the disclosure was made in 
accordance with the provisions of 
sections 5 – 9 of the PDA (in 
accordance with the correct or 
authorised procedure/channel); 
• that it was made in good faith; 
• that the employee reasonably believed 
that it was substantially true, and not for 
personal gain; 
• that there is a demonstrable nexus 
between the disclosure made and the 
alleged occupational detriment; and 
• if not made to the employer, that he had 
reason to believe that if the disclosure 
was made to the employer he will suffer 
an occupational detriment or that the 
same information was disclosed to the 
employer previously with no action 
taken in a reasonable period, or that it is 
exceptionally serious. 
 x  Section 159(6) of the CA Creates a rebuttable presumption in that it is 
presumed that the threat or conduct described in 
section 159(5) of the CA has occurred, as a 
result of a potential or actual disclosure that a 
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person is entitled to make or has made. 
 
The presumption can be rebutted if the person 
who engaged in the conduct or threat can show 
satisfactory evidence in support of another 
reason for engaging in the conduct or the 
making of the threat. 
Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA X x  There are sporadic independent studies, but not 
at regular intervals.  
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA     
In respect of the PDA  x  There is no evidence in this regard, even 
bearing in mind the guideline published by the 
Minister of Labour in 2011. 
Falling outside the PDA X  Section 159(7) of the CA This section places a duty on companies, 
including state owned companies to directly or 
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indirectly establish and maintain a system by 
which to receive disclosures confidentially and to 
act on them, and further, to routinely publicise 
the availability of that system, to all those who 
may make a disclosure and provided for in terms 
of section 159 (5) of the CA. 
 TABLE 2: EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
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8.3 Conclusion 
An overview of the PDA reveals the following basic structure:  
• Section 1: the definitions; 
• Section 2: the objects and the applications of the PDA; 
• Section 3: an employee making a protected disclosure may not be subjected 
to occupational detriment; 
• Section 4: the remedies availed; 
• Sections 5 – 8: to whom protected disclosures may be made; 
• Section 9: the general protected disclosure; 
• Section 10: the regulations that should and or may be made in respect of 
making a protected disclosure; 
• Section 11: the short-title of the PDA and its commencement. 
It is clear from the above table utilised for measurement, that the protection and 
remedies offered to the whistle-blower within an employment relationship, as 
defined, are comprehensive, however, when looking at the remedies actually 
provided by the PDA as contained in section 4 thereof one notes the following:  
• remedies in respect of dismissal and occupational detriment are (already) to 
be found in the LRA1; however in this regard it does provide that an employee 
may not be subjected to occupational detriment for having made or intending 
to make a protected disclosure; and 
• the actual catch-all is the provision providing that a whistle-blower may 
approach any court with jurisdiction2 and ‘pursue any other process allowed or 
prescribed by law’3; and 
• the whistle-blower must if reasonably possible and practicable be transferred, 
with the terms and conditions of such transfer, not taking place without his 
written consent, not being less favourable than those applicable immediately 
before his transfer.4 
                                                          
1  Section 4(2) of the PDA. 
2  Section 4(1)(a) of the PDA. 
3  Section 4(1)(b) of the PDA. 
4  Section 4(3) and (4) of the PDA. 
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Looking critically at the provisions of the PDA (being the main legislation protecting 
whistle-blowers in South Africa) in respect of the remedies offered it seems as 
though it makes the practice of subjecting a whistle-blower to occupational detriment 
addressable in terms of already existing rights and remedies available to employees. 
Further to this it provides for the transfer of a whistle-blower, as above-mentioned. 
The catch-all provided in section 4(1)(b) merely serves to provide remedies available 
to any person within South Africa, with the added burden of the whistle-blower 
having to ensure, assert and prove within such other process that he is in fact a 
whistle-blower and has made a protected disclosure in good faith. 
In light of this it is argued that the remedies availed to a whistle-blower in terms of 
the PDA are too general in nature to ascribe any praise for the PDA. It seems rather 
disappointingly, to be mainly concerned with setting the tests against which whistle-
blowers are to be measured, hoops they have to jump through, before they are 
afforded protection potentially already available to anyone in South Africa, excluding 
the provision in respect of potential transfer. Interestingly, within this context, the 
preamble of the PDA does not recognise that whistle-blowers need to be protected 
by availing appropriate and effective protection and or remedies apart from stating 
that every employer is responsible for taking all necessary steps in order to ensure 
that employees are not subjected to occupational detriment by way of reprisal. 
No accordant responsibility is assigned within the provisions of the PDA. 
It is argued that the PDA fails in actually meeting the objectives set in section 1(a) 
and (b). In fact, it would seem, especially taking into account the technicalities that 
the courts have attempted resolving, and that whistle-blowers have faced in their 
legal battles, that the PDA in its generality in respect of remedies, and the 
responsibilities placed on the shoulders of the whistle-blower in respect thereof, has 
unfairly tipped the bulk of the onus on the whistle-blower. The only provision in this 
respect placing any kind of requirement on the employer within this context is that no 
employer may subject a whistle-blower employee to occupational detriment5, which 
onus of proof too lies on the whistle-blower employee. No consequences are 
provided for in respect of an employer who does subject a whistle-blower employee 
to occupational detriment in contravention of the PDA. It would seem that the playing 
                                                          
5  Section 3 of the PDA. 
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field in in no manner equal, with the scale being tipped against the whistle-blower 
employee. 
 
242 
 
CHAPTER 9: THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN NEW ZEALAND 
9.1 Introduction 
The main legislation governing the protection of a whistle-blower in New Zealand is 
the Protected Disclosures Act 7 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘PDA NZ’), 
assented to on 3 April 2000, and which came into force on 1 January 2001, with the 
act being administered by the State Services Commission. Various amendments 
were effected during 2012. According to the New Zealand government, the purpose 
of the PDA NZ is as follows to promote the public interest by facilitating both 
disclosures and the investigation of serious wrongdoing in or by an organisation, and 
by ensuring protection for the disclosing employee.1  
The office of the Ombudsman has published a guide in respect of the PDA NZ, 
entitled ‘Making a protected disclosure – “blowing the whistle”’.2 
9.2 The role of the Ombudsman 
The role of the Ombudsman in respect of whistle-blowing is as including the provision 
of information and guidance lent to people who want or who have made a protected 
disclosure, as well as being one of the listed authorities to whom a disclosure may be 
made.3 
Section 6B of the PDA NZ elaborates on the role to be fulfilled by the Ombudsman, 
by providing that:  
• The Ombudsman may provide both information and guidance to employees, 
thus including former employees, pertaining to any matter regarding the PDA 
NZ, either in response to a request made to the Ombudsman, or at the 
Ombudsman’s discretion. 
• Should an employee notify the Ombudsman’s Offices orally or in writing that 
he has made a disclosure, or is considering making a disclosure as provided 
                                                          
1  State Service Commission http://www.ssc.govt.nz/node/8521 (Date of use: 23 March 2014). 
2  Office of the Ombudsman 
 http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/system/paperclip/document_files/document_files/441/ori
ginal/making_a_protected_disclosure_blowing_the_whistle_pdf?1349214579 (Date of use: 23 
March 2014).  
3  Anonymous http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz/what-we-do/protecting-your-rights/protected-
disclosures-whistle-blowing (Date of use: 10 April 2014). 
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for in terms of the PDA NZ, the Ombudsman shall provide both information 
and guidance to that employee in respect of the following considerations: 
• the kinds of disclosures that are protected under this Act; 
• the manner in which, and the person to whom, information may be 
disclosed under this Act; 
• the broad role of each authority referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (x) 
of the definition of appropriate authority in section 3(1); 
• the protections and remedies available under this Act and the 
Human Rights Act 1993 if the disclosure of information in 
accordance with this Act leads to victimisation of the person making 
the disclosure; 
• how particular information disclosed to an appropriate authority may 
be referred to another appropriate authority under this Act. 
Section 6C of the PDA NZ also provides that the Ombudsman for the purposes of the 
Act may request the following information from an organisation:  
• information concerning whether the organisation has established and 
published internal procedures for receiving and dealing with information 
about serious wrongdoing; and 
• a copy of those procedures; and 
• information about how those procedures operate. 
However, these powers are relatively limited as an organisation is not required to 
comply with such a request made by the Ombudsman, unless it is a public sector 
organisation.4 
Section 11 of the PDA NZ specifically provides for public sector organisations to 
establish internal procedures in respect of whistle-blowers, providing that each such 
public sector organisation must have in operation internal procedures, appropriate to 
that organisation, for the receiving and dealing with information pertaining to serious 
wrongdoing in or by that organisation, and requires that the said internal procedures 
must comply with the principles of natural justice. In addition thereto the internal 
procedures must identify the persons within the organisation to whom disclosures 
                                                          
4  Section 6C(2) of the PDA NZ. 
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may be made, and include reference to the effect of the provisions of sections 8 to 
10.Information in respect of the information so required, including adequate 
information of how to use the internal procedures must be published widely within the 
organisation, and republished at regular intervals.5 
9.2.1 Functions and the powers of the Ombudsman in respect of whistle-
blowing 
Section 13 of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975 6  sets out the functions of the 
Ombudsman; section 13(3) clearly confers the power of investigation in respect of 
whistle-blowing, providing that an Ombudsman make any investigation, whether as a 
result of a complaint or by own decision, and in respect of an investigation resulting 
from a complaint it may also investigate any decision, recommendation, act or 
omission related thereto. 
Section 22 of the same Act provides detailed procedures to be followed after an 
investigation has been completed, especially in cases in which the act or omission 
that was the subject of the investigation appears to have been contrary to the law, 
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, improperly discriminatory or wrong and the like. In 
matters in which the Ombudsman opines that the matter should be referred to the 
appropriate authorities for further consideration, 7  that an omission should be 
rectified,8 a decision should be cancelled or varied,9 that a practice or a law should 
be altered,10 that reasons should be given for a decision,11 or that any other step 
should be taken,12 the Ombudsman is obliged to report his opinion and the reasons 
therefore to the appropriate organisation or department. In doing so the Ombudsman 
may also make such recommendations as he thinks fit.13 Further to this, in such a 
case, may request the relevant organisation or department to notify him within a 
                                                          
5  Section 11(3) of the PDA NZ. 
6  Parliamentary Counsel Office “Ombudsman Act 1975” New Zealand Legislation 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1975/0009/latest/DLM430984.html?search=qs_act%40
bill%40regulation%40deemedreg_inspector-
general+intelligence+and+security+act+1996_resel_25_h&p=1&sr=1 (Date of use: 10 April 
2014) 
7  Section 22(3)(a) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
8  Section 22(3)(b) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
9  Section 22(3)(c) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
10  Section 22(3)(d) and (e) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
11  Section 22(3)(f) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
12  Section 22(3)(g) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
13  Section 22(3) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
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specified time of the steps it proposes to take to give effect to any recommendations 
so made. 
Should no action be taken, which to the Ombudsman seems adequate and 
appropriate, within a reasonable time, the Ombudsman in his discretion may send a 
copy of the report and the relevant recommendations to the Prime Minister, and may 
thereafter send a copy of the report to the House of Representatives.14 However, it is 
clear that before such drastic measures are taken, the relevant department or 
organisation must be afforded an opportunity to comment on the findings and the 
recommendations contained in the report. This requirement is bolstered by the 
provisions of section 22(7) which provide that the Ombudsman shall not make any 
comment that is adverse to a person in such report, unless the relevant person has 
been afforded an opportunity to be heard. 
Section 24 of the Act requires the Ombudsman to inform a complainant in a matter of 
the outcomes of the investigation launched. Section 25 creates a powerful basis in 
respect of the Ombudsmen and their functions, by providing that no proceedings of 
an Ombudsman shall be held as being ‘bad’ just as a result of the form thereof. 
Further to this, except on grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, no proceedings or decision 
of an Ombudsman can be challenged, reviewed, quashed or called into question by a 
court.  
The provisions of section 25 are further underpinned by the provisions of section 26 
of the Act, which provides the Ombudsmen with privilege, in that no civil or criminal 
proceedings shall lie against an Ombudsman or against any person holding office or 
appointed under the Chief Ombudsman in respect of anything he has done, reported 
on or said in the course of the exercise or intended exercise of his functions, unless it 
is shown that he acted in bad faith.15 Neither shall an Ombudsman or any person 
holding office or appointed under the Chief Ombudsman be called to give evidence in 
any court, or in any proceedings of a legal or judicial nature, in respect of a matter 
that came to his knowledge during the exercise of his functions.16 Anything said, any 
information supplied and any document, paper or thing produced by any person 
                                                          
14  Section 22(4) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
15  Section 26(1)(a) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
16  Section 26(1)(b) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
246 
 
during the course of an investigation or inquiry by or during proceedings before an 
Ombudsman in terms of the PDA NZ is also privileged.17 
In conducting investigations falling within its jurisdiction, the Ombudsman has been 
afforded the power of entry to premises in terms of the provisions of section 27. In 
this regard the Ombudsman is authorised to enter any premises at any time, 
occupied by a department or organisation named or specified in Schedule 1, and 
inspect the premises, and subject to the provisions of sections 19 and 20 to carry out 
inspections on such premises that falls within its jurisdiction.18 
Schedule 1 specifies the following various organisations and departments. 
This provision is however, slightly tempered by the provisions of section 27(2), which 
provides that before entering such premises the Ombudsman shall notify the relevant 
chief executive of the organisation or department. The reading of the said provision 
makes it clear that all that is required is notification, as opposed to permission. 
Further to this, section 27(3) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975 provides that the 
Attorney-General may from time to time exclude this power of entry as provided for in 
respect of any specified or class of premises, if he is satisfied that this power may 
prejudice the security, defence or the international relations of New Zealand. 
Section 19 relates to evidence, subject to the provisions of section 20. 19  The 
Ombudsman is empowered to require any person who in his opinion is able to give 
                                                          
17  Section 26(3) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
18  Section 27(1) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
19  20 Disclosure of certain matters not to be required 
 (1)  Where the Attorney-General certifies that the giving of any information or the 
answering of any question or the production of any document or paper or thing— 
  (a)  might prejudice the security, defence, or international relations of New 
Zealand (including New Zealand's relations with the government of any other 
country or with any international organisation), or the investigation or 
detection of offences; or 
  (b)  might involve the disclosure of the deliberations of Cabinet; or 
  (c)  might involve the disclosure of proceedings of Cabinet, or of any committee 
of Cabinet, relating to matters of a secret or confidential nature, and would be 
injurious to the public interest—  
   (1)  an Ombudsman shall not require the information or answer to be given or, 
as the case may be, the document or paper or thing to be produced. 
   (2)  Subject to the provisions of subsection (1), the rule of law which authorises 
or requires the withholding of any document or paper, or the refusal to 
answer any question, on the ground that the disclosure of the document or 
paper or the answering of the question would be injurious to the public 
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any information relating to a matter that is being investigated by the Ombudsman, to 
furnish information, documents or things, which are in the possession or under the 
control of such person.20 In this respect, the Ombudsman has the power to summon 
before him, and examine on oath any person who is an officer, member or employee 
of a department or organisation named or specified in Schedule 121, a complainant22 
or any other person who in the Ombudsman’s opinion is able to provide information 
required, with the prior approval of the Attorney-General23. As the examination of 
such person is performed on oath, it is deemed to constitute a judicial proceeding, 
and if such person perjures himself, he may be prosecuted in this regard.24 
In gathering the required evidence, even employees bound by an oath of secrecy are 
required to render the required information to the Ombudsman, even if such 
compliance would otherwise be in breach of the obligation of secrecy or non-
disclosure, and will not be regarded as a breach of such obligation of secrecy or non-
disclosure.25 No person who has complied with such requirement relating to evidence 
by the Ombudsman will be liable to prosecution by reason thereof.26 
In terms of section 15 of the PDA NZ the Ombudsman may elect to refer a complaint 
to another appropriate authority, a Minister of the Crown or elect to investigate the 
allegations itself. So too the Ombudsman is authorised to take over investigations or 
to investigate in conjunction with a public sector organisation in certain 
circumstances,27 or review and guide investigations by public organisations.28 
9.3 The Protected Disclosures Act 7 of 2000 
9.3.1 The Purpose of the PDA NZ 
The purpose of the PDA NZ is set out in section 5 thereof is to promote the public 
interest by facilitating both the disclosure and investigation regarding matters of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interest shall not apply in respect of any investigation by or proceedings 
before an Ombudsman. 
20  Section 19(1) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
21  Section 19(2)(a) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
22  Section 19(2)(b) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
23  Section 19(2)(c) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
24  Section 19(2) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
25  Section 19(3) and (4) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
26  Section 19(7) of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975. 
27  Section 15A of the PDA NZ. 
28  Section 15B of the PDA NZ. 
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serious wrongdoing by or in an organisation, and protecting employees who make 
disclosures regarding serious wrongdoing in accordance with the provisions of the 
PDA NZ.  
In terms of the purpose of the PDA NZ, it would seem that its provisions are also 
applicable in respect of the employment relationship. However, the definition of an 
employee makes it clear that the provisions go beyond the employment relationship 
as included in the definition of an employee is a former employee. 
9.3.2 Who qualifies as an “employee”? 
It is noted that the PDA NZ does not define who the employer29 would be within the 
context of whistle-blowing; however, section 3 thereof defines an employee as 
including:  
• former employees; 
• a homeworker as defined in section 5 of the Employment Relations Act, 2000; 
• a seconded person; 
• a person engaged or contracted under a service contract to perform work for 
the organisation; 
• person concerned in the management of the organisation, including a member 
of the board or governing board of the organisation; 
• a member of the Armed Forces in the New Zealand Defence Force; 
• a volunteer in the organisation. 
Section 5 of the Employment Relations Act 24 of 200030 (hereinafter referred to as 
“ERA”), defines a homeworker as including a person who:  
• is engaged, employed or contracted by another person to perform work for 
that person in a dwellinghouse, excluding work on that house or its fixtures, 
fittings or furniture; and 
                                                          
29  Section 5 of the ERA defines an employer as: a person employing any employee or employees; 
and includes a person engaging or employing a homeworker. 
30  Parliamentary Counsel Office  “New Zealand Legislation” 
 http://www.llegislation.govt.nz/act/public/2000/0024/latest/DLM58317.html (Date of use: 23 
March 2014). 
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• is in substance so employed or engaged, even in circumstances in which the 
contract between them is that of a vendor and a purchaser. 
In respect of the definition of an employee, the use of the word ‘organisation’ is 
apparent. An organisation is defined in section 3 of the PDA NZ as including a body 
of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, and whether it falls within the 
public or private sphere, and includes a body of persons existing of one employer 
and one or more employees. 
A public sector organisation is defined in terms of section 3 of the PDA NZ as 
including:  
• an organisation which has been named in Schedule 1 of the Ombudsmen Act, 
1975; 
• an organisation which has been named in Schedule 1 of the Official 
Information Act, 1982; 
• a local authority or public body which has been named in Schedule 1 of the 
Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act, 1987; 
• the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives; 
• Parliamentary Service; 
• An intelligence and security agency; and 
• A council-controlled organisation, falling within the provisions of section 6 of 
the Local Government Act, 2002. 
 
9.3.2.1 The protection of employees within the international relations and 
intelligence services  
The PDA NZ specifically provides for the protection of employees falling within the 
sensitive employment areas such as international relations and the intelligence 
services, in sections 12 - 14. Section 12 provides for special rules, in that the 
internal procedures of intelligence and security agencies must:  
• Provide that the people to whom a disclosure may be made must be persons 
holding the appropriate security clearance and be authorised to have access 
to the relevant information; 
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• Specify that the only appropriate authority to whom such information may be 
disclosed is the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
• Invite an employee who is considering disclosing, or who has so disclosed 
information under the PDA NZ, to seek information and guidance from the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, as opposed to the 
Ombudsman; and 
• Specify that no disclosure may be made to the Ombudsman or a Minister of 
the Crown, other than the Minister responsible for the relevant intelligence and 
security agency or the Prime Minister. 
Employees falling within the intelligence and security agencies are bound by the 
following special rules in respect of making a disclosure that is to be a protected 
disclosure:  
• The disclosure is to be made to an identified person within the area of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and 
• Should they wish to make a disclosure, or are considering making a disclosure 
and need guidance in the making thereof, they are required to engage the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Services as opposed to the 
Ombudsman. 
Section 3 of the PDA NZ states that an intelligence and security agency has the 
meaning given to it in terms of section 2(1) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security Act 1996,31 and which section provides that an intelligence and security 
agency means the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the Government 
Communications Security Bureau and any other agency which has been declared to 
be a security and intelligence agency for the purposes of the PDA NZ.  
Section 13 of the PDA NZ relates to information within the international relations 
sphere, providing that the internal procedures of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of 
Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force must, in so far as they relate to the 
                                                          
31  Parliamentary Counsel Office. 
 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0047/latest/DLM392290.html (Date of use: 10 
April 2014). 
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disclosure of information pertaining to the international relations of the Government of 
New Zealand, or intelligence and security matters must:  
• Provide for specific persons to whom such disclosures may be made. These 
identified individuals must hold appropriate security clearance, and be 
authorised to have access to the information in question; and 
• Specifically state that the only appropriate authority to which information may 
be disclosed is the Ombudsman; and 
• Invite an employee who is considering making a disclosure or who has made 
such a disclosure to enlist the assistance or guidance of the Ombudsman; and 
• State that no disclosure may be made to a Minister of the Crown, other than in 
the case of a disclosure relating to international relations to either the Prime 
Minister or the Minister responsible for foreign affairs and trade, or in the case 
of a disclosure which relates to intelligence or security matters, to either the 
Prime Minister or the Minister responsible for an intelligence or security 
agency. 
Section 14 provides that neither the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 
nor an Ombudsman may disclose information disclosed in accordance with the 
provisions of sections 12 or 13, except as provided for in terms of the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996 or the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975; an 
example of this to be found in section 21 of the Ombudsman Act 9 of 1975.   
9.3.3 Protection afforded reaches wider that the primary whistle-blower 
The protection afforded by sections 17 to 1932 apply with all necessary modifications 
to a person who volunteers supporting information, as though the volunteered 
supporting information were a protected disclosure.33 Such a volunteer could thus be 
seen as a secondary or co-whistle-blower. Such a person is described in the Act as 
being a person who volunteers supporting information, with that person:  
                                                          
32  See paragraph 9.2.6 below. 
33  Section 19A(1) of the PDA NZ. 
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• Providing information in support of a protected disclosure made by another 
person (the primary whistle-blower) to either the primary whistle-blower or to 
the person investigating the disclosure made;34 and 
• Is also an employee in the organisation in respect of which the protected 
disclosure was made;35 and 
• Whose intention is to provide the supporting information in order for the 
serious wrongdoing to be investigated.36 
A secondary whistle-blower will not qualify for the protection afforded in accordance 
with the provisions of sections 17 to 19 if he only provides the supporting information 
after being required to do so or after being approached by the investigator in the 
matter.37 
9.3.4 What qualifies as a protected disclosure? 
Disclosures made, which qualify as a protected disclosure, are defined in terms of 
section 6 of the PDA NZ, and which provides that an employee of an organisation 
may disclose information in accordance with this Act if:  
• the information pertains to serious wrongdoing in or by that organisation; and 
• the concerned employee believes on reasonable grounds that the information 
is true or likely to be true; and 
• the employee wishes to disclose the information in order for the allegations to 
be investigated; and 
• the employee wants the disclosure to be protected. 
It would seem that within the provisions of section 6, the intention and motivation of 
the would be whistle-blower enjoys the focus, as he or she needs to believe that the 
information about the alleged serious wrongdoing based on reasonable grounds is 
true or likely true, and that he or she wishes to disclose the information in order for 
the allegation to be investigated, with the disclosure being a protected disclosure. 
Any disclosure made in this way is said to be a protected disclosure.38 Exclusions of 
                                                          
34  Section 19A(2)(a) of the PDA NZ. 
35  Section 19A(2)(b) of the PDA NZ. 
36  Section 19A(2)(c) of the PDA NZ. 
37  Section 19A(3) of the PDA NZ. 
38  Section 6(2) of the PDA NZ. 
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which note must be taken is the fact that false allegations39 and the disclosure of 
information subject to legal professional privilege 40  do not enjoy protection as 
protected disclosures in terms of the provisions of the PDA NZ. 
What constitutes serious wrongdoing is defined in section 3 as including:  
• the unlawful, corrupt or irregular use of either the funds or resources of an 
organisation in the public sphere; 
• an act or omission or type of conduct which entails a serious risk to the public 
health and safety, or the environment; 
• an act or omission or type of conduct which entails a serious risk to the 
maintenance of law; 
• an act or omission or type of conduct which amounts to an offence, an act or 
omission or type of conduct perpetrated by a public official and which amounts 
to oppressive, improperly discriminatory, grossly negligent or gross 
mismanagement. 
The section makes it clear that the above-mentioned will constitutes such serious 
wrongdoing, whether or not it took place before or after the commencement of the 
PDA NZ. 
Section 6(3) deals with information so disclosed by an employee, who is mistaken in 
his belief in respect of the serious wrongdoing, and provides that in circumstances in 
which an employee discloses information about conduct which amounts to serious 
wrongdoing in or by the relevant organisation, on reasonable grounds, but it later 
transpires that the employee was erroneous in his belief, the information so disclosed 
is still to be treated as complying with the provisions of subsection (1)(a) for the 
purposes of protection of the PDA NZ, and by section 66(1)(a) of the Human Rights 
Act, 1993. 
It seems that the mistaken belief will still demonstrably need to be based on a 
reasonable belief. No protection is offered in respect of disclosures made mistakenly 
that are not based on reasonable belief that was made in bad faith or maliciously. 
                                                          
39  Section 20 of the PDA NZ. 
40  Section 22 of the PDA NZ. 
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This position is underpinned by the provisions of section 66(2) of the Human Rights 
Act 199341 (hereinafter referred to as the “HRA”). 
Section 66(1)(a) of the Act, deals with victimisation, and provides that it is unlawful for 
any person to treat another less favourably on the grounds that that person, a relative 
or associate of that person: 
• intends to make a protected disclosure; or 
• has made a protected disclosure or has encouraged another to make a 
protected disclosure; or 
• has given information or evidence in respect of the investigation of a 
protected disclosure made; or 
• has refused to act in a manner that contravenes the PDA NZ; or 
• has otherwise done anything whether under or by reference to the PDA NZ. 
In terms of section 6(4) of the PDA NZ, the provisions of section 6 are subject to that 
of section 6A,42 relating to technical failure to comply with the PDA NZ, and which 
provides that the disclosure of information is not prevented from being a protected 
disclosure as provided for in the PDA NZ just because of: 
• A technical failure to comply with the provisions of sections 7 to 10, if the 
employee has materially complied with the provisions of section 6; or 
• The employee’s failure to expressly refer to the name of the PDA NZ when 
making the disclosure. 
In other words, a whistle-blower’s disclosure will not be defeated and be left 
unprotected due to:  
• the fact that the employee simply did not mention that he is making the 
relevant disclosure in terms of the PDA NZ; or 
• because of non-compliance with the provisions of sections 7 to 10 of the PDA 
NZ, in other words for example:  
 
                                                          
41  Parliamentary Counsel Office “Human Rights Act 1993” New Zealand Legislation 
 http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act.public/1993/0082/latest/DLM304212.html (Date of use: 10 
April 2014).  
42  Which section was inserted into the Act on 6 May 2009. 
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a. failure to disclose the information in accordance with the internal 
procedures established and published by the employer for the making of a 
protected disclosure;43 
b. failing to make the disclosure to the head of the organisation in respect of 
the circumstances set out in section 8 of the PDA NZ; 
c. failing to make the disclosure to an appropriate authority in respect of the 
circumstances set out in section 9 of the PDA NZ; 
d. failing to make the disclosure to a Minister of the Crown or the 
Ombudsman in the circumstances set out in the provisions of section 10 of 
the PDA NZ. 
The technical failure referred to in section 6A relates to the provisions of sections 7 to 
10 of the PDA NZ. 
• Section 7 deals with disclosures to be made in accordance with internal 
procedures; 
• Section 8 deals with disclosures that may be made to the head of an 
organisation in certain circumstances; 
• Section 9 deals with disclosures that may be made to an appropriate authority 
in certain circumstances; and  
• Section 10 deals with disclosures that may be made to a Minister of the Crown 
or the Ombudsman in certain circumstances. 
All the above-mentioned sections are subject to the provisions of sections 12 to 14, 
and very clearly indicate the desired hierarchy in respect of making a disclosure. 
Section 7 provides that an employee must disclose information in the manner 
provided for by the internal procedures that have been established and published in 
the relevant organisation for receiving and dealing with information about alleged 
serious wrongdoing. Section 7 is subject to the provisions of sections 12 to 14.  
Section 8 provides that a disclosure may be made to the head or deputy head of the 
organisation in circumstances in which: 
                                                          
43  Section 7 of the PDA NZ. 
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• There are no established and published procedures for receiving and dealing 
with information about serious wrongdoing; 
• The employee making the disclosure believes on reasonable grounds that the 
person to whom the serious wrongdoing is to be reported is or may be 
involved in the alleged serious wrongdoing; or 
• The employee making the disclosure on reasonable grounds believes that the 
person to whom the wrongdoing should be reported in accordance with the 
relevant internal procedures is related to or associated with the person who is 
believed to be involved in the serious wrongdoing, and as such is not the 
appropriate person to who the disclosure should be made. 
Section 8 too, is subject to the provisions of sections 12 to 14.  
 In accordance with the provisions of section 9 a disclosure may be made to an 
appropriate authority in circumstances in which the employee making the disclosure 
on reasonable grounds believes that: 
• the head of the organisation in question is or may be involved in the alleged 
serious misconduct disclosed; 
• immediate reference to an appropriate authority is justified as a result of the 
urgency of the matter, or other exceptional circumstances that justify this; or 
• there has been no action or recommended action in respect of the matter to 
which the disclosure relates within 20 working days after the date on which 
the disclosure was made. 
 This section too is subject to the provisions of sections 12 to 14.  
Section 10 provides that a disclosure of information may be made to a Minister of the 
Crown or an Ombudsman in circumstances in which: 
• substantially the same disclosure has already been made in accordance with 
the provisions of sections 7, 8 or 9, and the employee believes on reasonable 
grounds that the person or appropriate authority in question, and to whom the 
disclosure was made: 
o has decided not to investigate the matter; or 
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o has decided to investigate the matter, but within a reasonable time 
progress with the investigation has not been made; or 
o has investigated the matter, but has not recommended any action or 
taken any action in respect of the matter; and 
• continues to believe on reasonable grounds, that the information disclosed is 
true or likely to be true. 
A disclosure under the provisions of section 10 may only be made to an Ombudsman 
if: 
• The disclosure is in respect of a public sector organisation, and it has not 
already been made to an Ombudsman in accordance with the provisions of 
section 9; or 
• The disclosure is not in respect of a public sector organisation, and the 
disclosure is made with the objective of allowing the Ombudsman to act in 
accordance with the provisions of section 15 or 16. 
This section too is subject to the provisions of sections 12 to 14. 
9.3.4.1 Making the disclosure to an appropriate authority 
As may have been noted from the above, disclosures may as defined above, be 
made to an appropriate authority. What would constitute an appropriate authority has 
been defined in section 3(1)(a) – (d) of the PDA NZ, however, it is argued that this 
does not constitute a numerous clausus, as it specifically states that the definition 
does not intend limiting the meaning of the term of an appropriate authority. The 
definition given caters for both the public and private sectors, and includes:  
• the Commissioner of Police; 
• the Controller and Auditor-General; 
• the Director of the Serious Fraud Office; 
• the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
• the Ombudsman; 
• the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment; 
• the Independent Police Conduct Authority; 
• the Solicitor General; 
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• the State Services Commissioner; 
• the Health and Disability Commissioner; 
• the Head of every public sector organisation; 
• certain private sector bodies; 
For mere convenience sake, the roles of the appropriate authorities referred to in this 
section, will be briefly considered; however, the Ombudsman is excluded due to 
previous elaboration. The Commissioner of Police has reference to the head of the 
New Zealand Police, and described as the chief executive of the Police, appointed by 
the Governor General and accountable to the Minister of Police for the administration 
of the police services, whilst independently performing the mandate.44 
The role of the Controller and Auditor-General is defined as being an office of 
Parliament, being described as independent in fulfilling the relevant mandate.45 
The role of the Serious Fraud Office as a specialised government department 
includes the investigation of serious instances of fraud. 46 
The responsibilities of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (hereinafter 
referred to as the “NZSIS”), and related to the reference to the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security, and includes inter alia gathering and evaluating intelligence 
related to matters of security, advising the government in relation to security 
matters.47 
The functions and the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment includes in the main functions provided for in terms of the provisions of 
the Environment Act, 1986.48 
                                                          
44  Anonymous http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/structure/commissioners-executive-
commanders (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
45  The Role of Controller and Auditor-General, http://www.oag.govt.nz/about-us/cag-role   (Date of 
use: 24 May 2014). 
46   Serious Fraud Office: Our Role and Purpose, https://www.sfo.govt.nz/about (Date of use: 24 
May 2014). 
47   Responsibilities: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-
us/our-purpose/ (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
48  Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment: Functions and Powers, 
http://www.pce.parliament.nz/about-us/functions-and-powers/ (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
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The role of the Independent Police Conduct Authority (hereinafter referred to as 
“IPCA”) is defined as being an independent body established by Parliament, with the 
central function of keeping watch over the Police.49 
The information pertaining to the Solicitor-General is to be found on the official 
webpage of the Crown Law Office, explaining their role which includes in the main 
the administration of law.50 
The role of the State Services Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “SCC”), 
includes the employment of public servants, protecting the public service from 
political interference, and ensuring the political neutrality of the public service.51 
The role of the Health and Disability Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as the 
“HDC”), and relating to the Health and Disability Commissioner, includes ensuring 
that the rights of consumers are upheld, and that any complaints regarding the health 
and disability services are dealt with fairly and efficiently. 52 
Section 16 of the PDA NZ provides for the circumstances in which an appropriate 
authority may refer a disclosure from the one to the other. Circumstances in which an 
appropriate authority to whom a protected disclosure has been made believes, after 
having consulted with another appropriate authority, that the other appropriate 
authority would more conveniently and suitably investigate the matter, may so refer 
the information to the other appropriate authority.53 Such other appropriate authority 
is required to promptly inform the whistle-blower that the matter has so been 
referred 54 . When such a protected disclosure is referred from one appropriate 
authority to another, the protected disclosure does not lose its status as a protected 
                                                          
49  Independent Police Conduct Authority: About us, 
http://www.ipca.govt.nz/Site/about/default.aspx (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
50   Crown Law Office: About us, http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/pagepub/docs/about/officers.asp 
(Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
51   State Services Commission: The Role of the SCC, http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sscer (Date of use: 
24 May 2014). 
52  Health and Disability Commission: The Commissioner, http://www.hdc.org.nz/about-us/the-
commissioner (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
53  Section 16(1) of the PDA NZ. 
54  Section 16(2) of the PDA NZ. 
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disclosure as a result of the referral55 and further to this there is nothing that prevents 
a protected disclosure from being so transferred more than once.56 
9.3.5 The protection offered by the PDA NZ 
Sections 17 to 19 offer protection to both the primary and secondary whistle-blowers 
in respect of three categories, namely, personal grievances, immunity from criminal 
and civil proceedings and confidentiality. Within this context reference will be made to 
‘the authority’. This has reference to the Employment Relations Authority established 
by section 156 of the ERA, and with the powers of the authority being provided for in 
terms of section 157 of the ERA. The authority is an investigative body, responsible 
for the resolution of employment relationship problems, by establishing the facts and 
making determinations in accordance with the substantial merits of the case, and 
without regard to technicalities.57 In fulfilling its role, the authority must comply with 
the principles of natural justice,58 aim to promote good faith behaviour, 59 support 
successful employment relationships60 and generally further the objectives of the 
ERA.61 The authority must also act as it thinks fit, and in good conscience, and may 
not do anything that is inconsistent with the ERA, any regulations made under ERA 
or the employment agreement.62 
It would seem that the authority is comparable with South Africa’s CCMA. 
Section 186 of the ERA provides for the establishment of the Employment Court.63 
The jurisdiction of the Employment Court is provided for in terms of section 187 of the 
ERA, which provides that the court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine  
  
                                                          
55  Section 16(3) of the PDA NZ. 
56  Section 16(4) of the PDA NZ. 
57  Section 157(1) of the ERA. 
58  Section 157(2)(a) of the ERA. 
59  Section 157(2)(b) of the ERA. 
60  Section 157(2)(c) of the ERA. 
61  Section 157(2)(d) of the ERA. 
62  Section 157(3) of the ERA. 
63  Section 186 Employment Court 
 (1)  This section establishes a court of record, called the Employment Court, which, in 
addition to the jurisdiction and powers specially conferred on it by this Act or any other 
Act, has all the powers inherent in a court of record. 
 (2)  The court established by subsection (1) is declared to be the same court as the 
Employment Court established by section 103 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
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inter alia elections under section 17964, whether heard under ERA or another Act 
which confers the necessary jurisdiction; any actions instituted for the recovery of 
penalties under the provisions of ERA; matters which has been referred to it by the 
Authority in terms of the provisions of section 17765 and the like. 
It is opined that the Employment Court is similar to the South African LC. 
9.3.5.1 Personal grievance 
Section 17(1) of the PDA NZ provides that where an employee makes a protected 
disclosure as provided for in the PDA NZ, and who claims to have suffered retaliatory 
action from his or her employer or former employer. Should that retaliatory action in 
question consist of or include dismissal then that employee may have a personal 
grievance as provided for in section 103 (1) (a) of the Employment Relations Act 
2000.66 Alternatively, should the retaliatory action in question consist of action other 
than dismissal, or such other action in addition to dismissal, then that employee may 
have a personal grievance as provided for in section 103 (1) (b) of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000.67 In terms of the provisions of section 17(2) of the PDA NZ, 
section 17(1) only applies to employees within the meaning of the ERA. 
Section 6 of the ERA defines an employee and includes inter alia the following:  
• A person of any age who has been employed to perform work for hire in terms 
of a contract of service; 
• A homeworker; 
• Excluding a volunteer, persons engaged in film production work (actor, stunt 
performer, extra, singer, dancer, entertainer and the like). Note that the 
exclusion does not apply to such persons involved in film production work if 
                                                          
64  Section 179 Challenges to determinations of Authority 
 (1)  A party to a matter before the Authority who is dissatisfied with the determination of the 
Authority or any part of that determination may elect to have the matter heard by the 
court. 
65  Section 177 Referral of question of law 
 (1)  The Authority may, where a question of law arises during an investigation,— 
(a)  refer that question of law to the court for its opinion; and 
(b)  delay the investigation until it receives the court's opinion on that question. 
66  Section 17(1)(a) of the PDA NZ. 
67  Section 17(1)(b) of the PDA NZ. 
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such person is a party to a contract of employment which states that he is an 
employee. 
A court may also upon application declare a person as being an employee, subject to 
the provisions of section 6 (6). 
9.3.5.1a A personal grievance in terms of section 103(1)(a) of the ERA 
In respect of section 17(1)(a) of the PDA NZ should the retaliation against a whistle-
blower (primary or secondary) include dismissal, he has because of the unjustifiable 
dismissal a potential claim in terms of section 103(1) of ERA, and Part 9 of the ERA 
is applicable.  
Part 9 of the ERA is entitled ‘Personal grievances, disputes, and enforcement’, with 
the objective of this part of the ERA being provided in terms of the provisions of 
section 101, and which is aimed at resolving employment relationship in an 
alternative dispute resolution fashion.  
9.3.5.1a (i) The test of justification 
In determining a personal grievance, in this case dismissal suffered by the whistle-
blower, ERA prescribes a test of justification, which is said to be an objective test.68 
The test to be utilised is to measure the employer’s conduct lies in determining 
whether, taking cognisance of all the circumstances, at the time of the dismissal, 
what a fair and reasonable employer would have done.69 In applying this test, the 
authority or court involved must consider the following factors:70  
 
• whether, having regard to the resources available to the employer, the 
employer sufficiently investigated the allegations against the employee 
before dismissing or taking action against the employee; and  
• whether the employer raised the concerns that the employer had with the 
employee before dismissing or taking action against the employee; and 
                                                          
68  Section 103A(1) of the ERA. 
69  Section 103A(2) of the ERA. 
70  Section 103A(3) of the ERA. 
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• whether the employer gave the employee a reasonable opportunity to 
respond to the employer's concerns before dismissing or taking action 
against the employee; and 
• whether the employer genuinely considered the employee's explanation (if 
any) in relation to the allegations against the employee before dismissing or 
taking action against the employee. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the authority or court may take into 
consideration any other factor that it may think appropriate.71 ERA also provides that 
the authority or court involved must not hold a dismissal unjustifiable just because of 
defects in the process that was followed by the employer, if the defects were minor 
and did not result in the employee being treated unfairly.72  
9.3.5.1a (ii) Raising a personal grievance the only way 
In terms of the provisions of section 113 of the ERA, an employee who has been 
dismissed, and who wishes to challenge the dismissal or any aspect of the dismissal 
for any reason, in any court, that challenge may only be brought in the authority 
under Part 9 as a personal grievance.73 This in no manner prevents an action under 
Part 9 brought in order for the employee in question to recover wages pertaining to a 
period of notice or an alleged period of notice,74 wages or other money relating to the 
employment prior to the dismissal of the employee,75 or other money payable on 
dismissal.76 
9.3.5.1a (iii) How a personal grievance is to be raised 
Section 114 of the ERA provides for the manner in which a personal grievance is to 
be raised by a whistle-blower dismissed. Such a grievance is to be raised with the 
employer within 90 days, which period starts running on the date on which the 
dismissal occurred or alternatively on the date the dismissal came to the dismissed 
whistle-blower’s notice, whichever date is the later, unless the employer in question 
                                                          
71  Section 103A(4) of the ERA. 
72  Section 103A(5) of the ERA. 
73  Section 113(1) of the ERA. 
74  Section 113(2)(a) of the ERA. 
75  Section 113(2)(b) of the ERA. 
76  Section 113(2)(c) of the ERA. 
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consents to the personal grievance being raised after the expiry of such period.77 
Should the employer refuse to consent to the personal grievance being raised after 
the expiry of the aforesaid experience, the employee may apply to the authority for 
leave to do so.78 When such an application is launched the authority is required to 
give the employer a chance to be heard, and may so grant leave to the employee, 
subject to such conditions as it may think fit, if the authority is satisfied that:  
• the delay in this regard was caused by exceptional circumstances, which may 
include one or more of the circumstances provided for in terms of section 
115;79 or 
• considers it just to grant the application.80 
For the purposes of section 114(4)(a), the circumstances provided for in section 115, 
include circumstances in which the employee:  
• has been affected or traumatised in such a manner by the matter that he was 
unable to properly consider raising a grievance within the prescribed time 
period;81 or 
• made reasonable arrangements to have the grievance raised on his behalf by 
another, and that other person failed to do so within the prescribed period;82 or 
• the employment agreement applicable to that employee did not contain an 
explanation of the procedure to be followed in the resolution of employment 
relationship challenges as required by section 5483 or section 6584;85 or 
• in circumstances in which the employer failed to provide reasons for the 
dismissal in question, and as obliged in terms of section 120(1)86.87 
                                                          
77  Section 114(1) of the ERA. 
78  Section 114(3) of the ERA. 
79  Section 114(4)(a) of the ERA. 
80  Section 114(4)(b) of the ERA. 
81  Section 115(a) of the ERA. 
82  Section 115(b) of the ERA. 
83  Section 54 relates to the form and contents required in respect of a collective agreement. 
84  Section 65 relates to the terms and conditions of employment that are required in 
circumstances in which no collective agreement applies. 
85  Section 115(c) of the ERA.    
86  Section 120 - Statement of reasons for dismissal 
 (1) Where an employee is dismissed, that employee may, within 60 days after the dismissal 
or within 60 days after the employee has become aware of the dismissal, whichever is the 
later, request the employer to provide a statement in writing of the reasons for the 
dismissal. 
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Where the authority grants the leave sought by the employee, it must direct that the 
employer and the employee use mediation in order to attempt to resolve the 
grievance between them.88 No personal grievance may be commenced with where 
the cause of action in respect of the relevant grievance, is older than three years.89 A 
grievance is held to have been raised as soon as the employee dismissed has made, 
or takes reasonable steps to make either the employer or a representative of the 
employer aware that he (the employee) alleges such a personal grievance that he 
wishes the employer to attend to.90 The employee who has so been dismissed may 
within 60 days of his dismissal or within a 60 day period in which the dismissal comes 
to his knowledge (whichever is the later) request the employer to provide him with a 
written statement in which the employer sets out the reasons for his dismissal.91 The 
employer is obliged to provide such statement within 14 days after the date on which 
it was received.92 Any statement that is made and any information provided in the 
course of raising a personal grievance or attempting to resolve such a personal 
grievance is absolutely privileged.93  
9.3.5.1a (iv) Remedies availed in respect of personal grievances 
The remedies that are potentially afforded to a dismissed whistle-blower are provided 
for in section 123 of the ERA, of which any one or more may be awarded, and which 
include the following:  
• The reinstatement of the dismissed employee in either his previous position or 
his placement in another position which is no less advantageous that that he 
was in when he was dismissed;94 
It is noted in this regard that reinstatement will be awarded in circumstances in 
which it reasonable and practicable to do so.95 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 (2)  Every employer to whom a request is made under subsection (1) must, within 14 days 
after the day on which the request is received, provide the statement to the person who 
made the request. 
87  Section 115(d) of the ERA. 
88  Section 114(5) of the ERA. 
89  Section 114(6) of the ERA. 
90  Section 114(2) of the ERA. 
91  Section 120(1) of the ERA. 
92  Section 120(2) of the ERA. 
93  Section 121 of the ERA. 
94  Section 123(1)(a) of the ERA. 
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Further to this, where the authority of the court provides the remedy of 
reinstatement to the dismissed whistle-blower, he must so be reinstated 
immediately or on such date that is specified by the authority or the court, and 
such reinstatement will be of full force and effect, regardless of any challenge 
or appeal in this regard, and such reinstatement will remain in full force 
pending the outcome of such proceedings, unless otherwise ordered.96 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 127 of the ERA, the authority may, on the 
application of the dismissed employee, make an order for the interim 
reinstatement of the employee, pending the hearing of the personal 
grievance.97 
The authority may at any time vary or rescind such an order made in respect 
of interim reinstatement. 98  So too a court may grant an interim injunction 
reinstating the employee so dismissed, whilst dealing with the proceedings 
pertaining to the personal grievance in question.99 
 
• The reimbursement of an amount equal to the whole or part of any wages or 
other money lost by the employee as a result of the personal grievance (in 
other words as a result of his dismissal);100 
 
Section 128 of the ERA provides specifically for such reimbursement of the 
dismissed whistle-blower as follows:  
This section applies where the Authority or the court determines, in 
respect of any employee,— 
• that the employee has a personal grievance; and 
• that the employee has lost remuneration as a result of the personal 
grievance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
95  Section 125(2) of the ERA. 
96  Section 126 of the ERA. 
97  Section 127(1) of the ERA. 
98  Section 127(6) of the ERA. 
99  Section 127(7) of the ERA. 
100  Section 123(1)(b) of the ERA. 
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If this section applies then, subject to subsection (3) and section 124, the Authority 
must, whether or not it provides for any of the other remedies provided for in section 
123, order the employer to pay to the employee the lesser of a sum equal to that lost 
remuneration or to 3 months' ordinary time remuneration. 
Despite subsection (2), the Authority may, in its discretion, order an employer to pay 
to an employee by way of compensation for remuneration lost by that employee as a 
result of the personal grievance, a sum greater than that to which an order under that 
subsection may relate. 
Section 130 of the ERA provides for matters relating to wages and the records, 
section 131which provides for arrears in respect of wages, and section 132 which 
provides for the consequences for an employer’s failure to keep or produce records 
in respect of wages and time records. 
 
• Payment of compensation to the employee101, including compensation for: 
(i) humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the 
employee;102 and 
(ii) loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which 
the employee might reasonably have been expected to 
obtain if the personal grievance had not arisen.103 
 
The ERA in respect of the payment of this compensation provides that the employer 
may be ordered to pay the amount off in instalments, but only if the employer’s 
financial circumstances require this.104  
 
• Should the authority or court presiding over the matter find that any workplace 
conduct or practices are a significant factor in respect of the personal 
grievance, it may make recommendations to the employer in this regard, and 
that the employer should take to avoid such personal grievances arising again 
in future.105 
                                                          
101  Section 123(1)(c) of the ERA. 
102  Section 123(1)(c)(i) of the ERA. 
103  Section 123(1)(c)(ii) of the ERA. 
104  Section 123(2) of the ERA. 
105  Section 123(1)(c) of the ERA. 
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• Should the authority or court also find that the employee who has raised the 
personal grievance was sexually or racially harassed in his employment with 
the relevant employer, it will also make recommendations to the employer: 
 
(i) concerning the action the employer should take in respect of the person 
who made the request or was guilty of the harassing behaviour, which 
action may include the transfer of that person, the taking of disciplinary 
action against that person, or the taking of rehabilitative action in 
respect of that person;106 
(ii)  about any other action that it is necessary for the employer to take to 
prevent further harassment of the employee concerned or any other 
employee.107 
 
In determining the relief that may be accorded to a whistle-blower who has been 
dismissed as a result of his protected disclosure made, the authority or the court will 
take the whistle-blower’s behaviour into account. In this determination the authority or 
court presiding over the matter will:  
• Consider the extent to which the actions of the whistle-blower contributed 
towards the situation that gave rise to the dismissal;108 as well as 
• Whether the actions in question require a reduction of the remedies that would 
otherwise have been accorded.109 
9.3.5.1b  Personal grievance in respect of section 103(1)(b) of the ERA  
Section 17(1)(b) of the PDA NZ provides that where an employee makes a protected 
disclosure as provided for in the PDA NZ, and who claims to have suffered retaliatory 
action from either his employer or former employer, then that employee if that 
retaliatory action consists of action other than dismissal or includes an action in 
addition to dismissal, may have a personal grievance, for the purposes of paragraph 
(b) of section 103(1) of the ERA, because of a claim described in that paragraph, and 
Part 9 of that Act applies accordingly. 
                                                          
106  Section 123(1)(d)(i) of the ERA. 
107  Section 123(1)(d)(ii) of the ERA. 
108  Section 124(a) of the ERA. 
109  Section 124(b) of the ERA. 
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Section 103(1) (b) of the ERA provides that for the purposes of ERA a personal 
grievance includes any grievance that an employee may have against the employer 
or previous employer as a result of a claim that the employee’s employment or one or 
more of the conditions of the employee’s employment is, are or was affected as a 
result of unjustifiable action taken by the employer, to the employee’s detriment. 
Thus the whistle-blower, besides being dismissed as a result of having made the 
protected disclosure is also protected against all disadvantages in respect of his 
employment caused by some unjustifiable action perpetrated by the employer. What 
would constitute such unjustifiable action would be determined in exactly the same 
manner as that discussed under paragraph 9.5.6.1a (i) supra, and as provided for in 
terms of section 103A of the ERA. The personal grievance is to be raised in the same 
manner as discussed under paragraph 9.2.6.1a (iii) supra, and as provided for in 
terms of sections 114 and 115 of the ERA. In attempting to resolve or address the 
personal grievance within this context, any statement made or information given in 
this context too, are absolutely privileged.110 The technicalities that may come into 
play in alleging that the employee has been subjected to a manner of unjustifiable 
disadvantage with reference to his employment are dealt with within the provisions of 
section 122 of the ERA which provides that nothing in Part 9 of the ERA or in any 
employment agreement prevents a finding that a personal grievance is of a kind 
other than the kind alleged.  
The remedies availed to the employee who has lodged the personal grievance within 
this context are the same as those discussed under paragraph 9.2.6.1a (iv) supra, 
excluding reinstatement in circumstances in which he has not been dismissed. 
9.3.5.2 Immunity from civil and criminal proceedings 
Section 18 of the PDA NZ provides for immunity of a primary and a secondary 
whistle-blower from civil and criminal proceedings, as well as disciplinary 
proceedings by reason of having made the protected disclosure or having referred 
the relevant information to the appropriate authority. This immunity applies to the 
whistle-blower despite any prohibition of or restriction on the disclosure of information 
under any legislation, contract, oath or practice. 
                                                          
110  Section 121 of the ERA. 
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9.3.5.3 Confidentiality 
Section 19 of the PDA NZ provides for the protection of the identity of the whistle-
blower in defined circumstances. The person to whom the protected disclosure is 
made or to whom the protected disclosure is referred is enjoined to use his ‘best 
endeavours’ in dealing with the matter, not to disclose any information that might 
identify the whistle-blower, unless:  
• The whistle-blower consents in writing to the disclosure of the information that 
may identify him;111 or 
• The person who has knowledge of the whistle-blower’s identity or information 
that could lead to his identification reasonably believes that the identifying 
information is essential: 
o In respect of the effective investigation of the allegations which 
constitute the protected disclosure;112 or 
o Regarding the prevention of serious risk to public health or safety, or 
the environment;113 or 
o In respect of the principles of natural justice.114 
Further to this, a request which is made using the Official Information Act 1982 or the 
Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987115, may be refused on 
the basis of being contrary to the provisions of the PDA NZ, if it might identify the 
relevant whistle-blower, unless such request is made by a constable who is 
investigating an offence.116 The Official Information Act 1982’s purpose is stated as 
being as including the following:117  
• To progressively increase the availability of information to the people of New 
Zealand, in order to: 
o Enable more effective participation in the making and administration of 
laws and policies; 
                                                          
111  Section 19(1)(a) of the PDA NZ. 
112  Section 19(1)(a)(i) of the PDA NZ. 
113  Section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the PDA NZ. 
114  Section 19(1)(a)(iii) of the PDA NZ. 
115  Parliamentray Counsel Office “Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 174 of 
1987” http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/0174/latest/DLM122242.html (Date of use: 
12 April 2014) 
116  Section 19(2) of the PDA NZ. 
117  Section 4 of the Official Information Act 1982. 
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o Promote accountability of the Ministers of the Crown and officials; 
• To provide proper access to official information by a person, in respect of such 
information that relates to that person; 
• To protect official information in a manner that is consistent with public interest 
and the preservation of privacy. 
The Official Information Act 1982 is based on the principle of availability. The 
question of whether official information is to be made available will be determined in 
accordance with the objectives of the Act, and the principle that information shall be 
made available unless there is a good reason for withholding the information 
requested. 118  Section 6 provides for conclusive reasons for withholding official 
information, in respect of the principle of availability. Two such conclusive reasons 
are that if the making available of the requested information would be likely to 
prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, 
detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial,119 or endanger the safety of any 
person.120 
Section 9 provides for ‘other’ reasons for withholding official information, when 
considered on the basis on the principle of availability as expressed in terms of 
section 5 of the Act. Section 9 provides that in circumstances in which this section 
applies, good reason for the withholding of official information exists, for the purpose 
of the provisions of section 5, unless, considering the circumstances of a particular 
case it is so that the withholding of the information is outweighed by other 
considerations which makes it advantageous in the public interest, to make that 
information available.121 
Section 9(2)(ba) is especially noteworthy within the context of protected disclosures, 
as its provisions will be applicable (withholding the information requested), in 
circumstances in which it is necessary to protect information that is subject to 
confidentiality or in circumstances in which a person has or could be forced to 
provide in terms of the provisions of any legislation, and in circumstances in which 
                                                          
118  Section 5 of the Official Information Act 1982. 
119  Section 6(c) of the Official Information Act 1982. 
120  Section 6(d) of the Official Information Act 1982. 
121  Section 9(1) of the Official Information Act 1982. 
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the availing of the information would be likely to prejudice the supply of similar 
information or information from the same source or the public interest. 
In respect of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, the 
purpose thereof is reflected by the provisions of section 4, which provides that the 
main objectives of the Act are to:  
• Provide for the availability of official information held by a local authority, to the 
public, and to promote the open and public transaction of business at 
meetings of the local authorities;122 
• Provide proper access to each person, regarding official information relating to 
that person;123 and 
• To protect official information to the extent that it is consistent with public 
interest and the preservation of personal privacy.124 
The Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 is based on the 
principle of availability. The question of whether official information is to be made 
available will be determined in accordance with the objectives of the Act, and the 
principle that information shall be made available unless there is a good reason for 
withholding the information requested. 125  Conclusive reasons for withholding 
information requested, in accordance with the principle of availability are stated as 
being the circumstances in which the making available of the relevant information 
would be likely to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including for example the 
prevention, investigation, detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial, 126 or 
endanger the safety of any person.127 
Section 26 further deals with reasons for the refusal of personal information, and 
more specifically section 26(1)(c) provides that the disclosure of information or of 
information identifying the person the supplied the information would breach an 
express or implied promise which was made to the person who supplied the 
                                                          
122  Section 4(a) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
123  Section 4(b) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
124  Section 4(c) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
125  Section 5 of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
126  Section 6(a) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
127  Section 6(b) of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
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information and which was to the effect that the information or the identity of the 
person would be held in confidence. 
The Ombudsman may provide both information and guidance to organisations and 
employees regarding the circumstances in which whistle-blowers may anonymously 
make the relevant protected disclosure.128 The Ombudsman may also provide both 
advice and assistance to organisations and other person regarding the obligation to 
protect the identity of the whistle-blower, as provided for in terms of section 19(1) of 
the PDA NZ. 
9.4 Conclusion 
The main piece of legislation aimed at the protection of whistle-blowers in New 
Zealand is the PDA NZ, supplemented as has been deemed necessary by way of 
reference by other legislation in respect of definitions, restrictions, and functions., 
such as for example the ERA and HRA. 
The purpose of the PDA NZ is two-fold, namely to facilitate the disclosure and 
investigation of matters of serious wrongdoing by organisations, and the protection of 
whistle-blowers within this context. A significant role in the protection of whistle-
blowers has been allocated to the Ombudsman, which has been vested with the 
necessary privilege, in respect of inter alia oversight regarding the establishment and 
implementation of the necessary procedures within the private and public 
organisation sphere, powers of investigation (either at own volition or as a result of a 
complaint made), and the referral to an alternative appropriate authority such as the 
SFO, SCC, NZSIS, and the HDC. 
The list of individuals to whom the protection in terms of the PDA NZ is extended is 
not limited only to an employee, but also includes former employees, homeworkers, 
seconded employees, contract employees, management employees, members of the 
defence force and armed forces, and volunteer workers, in the employment of public 
and private organisations with one or more employees. Further to this, specific 
protection is provided for employees falling within sensitive employment areas such 
as international relations and the intelligence services. The protection offered also 
                                                          
128  Section 19(3)(a) of the PDA NZ. 
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expands further, in terms of the provisions of sections 17 to 19 of the PDA NZ, to a 
person who volunteers supporting information. In this respect it is specifically noted 
that reference is not made to an employee or a former employee, but a person. The 
protection offered is specifically held not to be defeated as a result of a whistle-
blower not meeting technical requirements pertaining to the procedures to be 
followed, provided for in the PDA NZ (sections 7 – 10). 
The protection offered to whistle-blowers in terms of the provisions of sections 17 to 
19 of the PDA NZ, can be categorised into three main categories, namely personal 
grievances, immunity from criminal and civil proceedings, and confidentiality. 
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CHAPTER 10: THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN NEW ZEALAND’S POSITION 
MEASURED 
10.1 Introduction 
As indicated the main piece of legislation aimed at the protection of whistle-blowers in 
New Zealand is the PDA NZ, supplemented as has been deemed necessary by way 
of reference by other legislation in respect of definitions, restrictions, and functions., 
such as for example the ERA and HRA. The purpose of the PDA NZ is two-fold, 
namely to facilitate the disclosure and investigation of matters of serious wrongdoing 
by organisations, and the protection of whistle-blowers within this context. 
Liyanarachchi and Newdick1 submit sentiments in respect of the importance and the 
recognition of the importance of whistle-blowers and protecting whistle-blowers in 
New Zealand especially in light of the assertion that silence is not in the public 
interest. 2  
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants has stated that in the main the 
importance of the whistle-blower may also be attributed to their inter alia:  
• Their intimate knowledge and understanding of the relevant organisation’s 
processes and activities; 
• Serious wrongdoing impacts significantly on employee welfare, providing the 
employees with a powerful incentive to blow the whistle; and 
• That whistle-blowers may act as a deterrent to potential wrongdoers. 3 
A 2012 survey regarding the attitudes held towards whistle-blowers was reported on 
by Rob Stock. The findings of the survey included that New Zealand’s whistle-blower 
protection  is far from clear to the population and not well-known with approximately 8 
in 10 people being unaware of the protection afforded to whistle-blowers and the 
                                                          
1  Liyanarachchi and Newdick 2009 Journal of Business Ethics  
http://ecampus.nmit.ac.nz/moodle/file.php/4599/Whistleblowing/Liyanarachchi_Newdick_-
The_Impact_of_Moral_Reasoning_and_Retaliation_on_Whistle-
Blowing_New_Zealand_Evidence_2009.pdf (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
2   King A “Hansard and Journals New Zealand Parliament” 2007 
 http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/9/7/c/48HansD_20071018_00000926-
Protected-Disclosures-Amendment-Bill-First.htm.  (Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
3  Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ presently NZICA): 2003, Improving 
Corporate Reporting: A Shared Responsibility, Report for the Minister of Commerce (ICANZ, 
Wellington, New Zealand). 
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circumstances in which such protection would be afforded. Further to this it was 
found that it was unknown that the Office of the Ombudsman is able to take 
anonymous complaints disclosed.4  
As such it would seem that there is nothing extraordinarily different in respect of the 
rationale behind the protection of whistle-blowers in New Zealand, or even the 
sentiments regarding whistle-blowing and whistle-blowers. 
10.2 The whistle-blower in New Zealand’s position measured 
Under this heading, the relevant provisions of the PDA NZ, and other related 
legislation will be analysed and measured in accordance with the table set out in 
Chapter 1 hereof.  
                                                          
4     Stock 2012, http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/7965398/NZs-attitudes-to-whistleblowers 
(Date of use: 24 May 2014). 
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Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful acts 
including serious human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x  Section 6 of the PDA NZ, supplemented by the 
definition of “serious wrongdoing” in section 3 of the 
PDA NZ 
 
 
 
It is noted that human rights violations, life 
and liberty are not specifically listed within 
the text of section 6; however, it is opined 
that the definition as per section 3 could 
potentially cover all the categories within 
this measurement point. 
 
It is noted that section 6 makes it clear that 
it relates only to employees. 
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x  Definition of an “organisation” in section 3 of the 
PDA NZ makes it clear that whistle-blowers in both 
the public – and private sectors are afforded the 
relevant protection availed. 
The definition of an “employee” within section 3 of 
the PDA NZ.   
 
The definition of “public sector organisation” within 
section 3 of the PDA NZ. 
 
 
 
 
This definition includes members of the 
armed forces. 
 
This definition includes both the intelligence 
and security agency. 
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Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory 
New Zealand 
Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Employment laws x  Section 17 of the PDA NZ This relates to dismissal in retaliation for 
blowing the whistle, retaliatory action other 
than dismissal or in addition to dismissal. In 
these circumstances the whistle-blowers is 
enjoined to bring a personal grievance as 
provided for in terms of section 113 of the 
ERA. 
It is to be noted that section 17 only applies 
to employees within the meaning of the 
ERA, and as set out under paragraph 
9.2.6.1 in Chapter 9. 
Criminal law x  Section 18 of the PDA NZ 
 
 
Section 66(1)(a) of the HRA 
This section gives the whistle-blower 
immunity in respect of criminal proceedings. 
 
This section makes it unlawful for any 
person to treat or threaten to treat a whistle-
blower less favourably as a result of blowing 
or intending to blow the whistle. 
Civil law x  Section 18 of the PDA NZ This section gives the whistle-blower 
immunity in respect of civil proceedings. 
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Media law  x There is no evidence in this regard  
Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
 x There is no evidence in this regard  
Interim interdicts x  Section 127(7) of the ERA The Employment Court may grant an 
interim injunction reinstating the whistle-
blower dismissed, whilst dealing with the 
proceedings pertaining to the personal 
grievance. 
Final interdicts  x There is no evidence in this regard  
Compensation for pain and 
suffering 
x  Section 123(1)(c)(i) of the ERA 
 
 
 
 
Section 123(1)(c)(ii) of the ERA 
The Employment Court may also order 
compensation to the whistle-blower, 
including compensation for humiliation, loss 
of dignity and injury to feelings. 
 
The ERA goes further by providing for 
compensation in respect of loss of any 
benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind 
which the employee might reasonably have 
been expected to obtain if the personal 
grievance had not arisen. 
Loss of earnings x  Section 128 of the ERA In terms of this section the Employment 
Court may, when the relevant employee has 
lost remuneration as a result of the personal 
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grievance (whistle-blowing within this 
context) lost remuneration order the 
employer to pay such remuneration, or even 
a sum greater than that lost. 
Loss of status1 x  Section 123 of ERA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 127 of the ERA 
A dismissed whistle-blower may be 
reinstated by the Employment Court either 
in his previous position or placement in 
another position which is no less 
advantageous than that from which he was 
dismissed, but only where reasonable or 
practicable to do so. 
 
The Employment Court may on application 
of the dismissed whistle-blower make an 
order for the interim reinstatement of him or 
her, pending the hearing of the personal 
grievance. Such order may be varied or 
rescinded. 
Mediation x  Section 114(5) of the ERA 
 
 
 
Where the Employment Court grants leave 
in respect of a personal grievance, it must 
direct that the employer and the employee 
use mediation in order to attempt to resolve 
                                                          
1  In this respect, status is interpreted as meaning status as an employee. 
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Sections 114(2) and (6) of the ERA are also relevant 
in this respect. 
the grievance between them. 
Legal costs  x There is no evidence in this regard  
Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this regard  
Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this regard Although there is no independent oversight 
body established in this regard, the pivotal 
role played by the Ombudsman in theory, as 
described in Chapter 9 hereof. 
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this regard  
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x  Section 19 of the PDA NZ Subject to certain exceptions, such as 19 
(2) of the PDA NZ, coupled with the relevant 
provisions of the Official Information Act 
1982, and the Local Government Official 
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Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
See paragraph 9.2.6.4 of Chapter 9. 
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x x2 Section 6(3) of the PDA NZ 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 22 of the PDA NZ 
In terms of this section, even a whistle-
blower who blows the whistle in good faith 
on reasonable grounds, but who thereafter 
finds that his reasonable belief was 
mistaken, is still protected. 
 
Within this context note must be taken of 
the provisions of section 22 of the PDA NZ, 
which provides that nothing in the PDA NZ 
authorises a person to disclose information 
protected by legal professional privilege, 
and that the disclosure of such information 
is not a protected disclosure in terms of the 
provisions of the PDA NZ. 
Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x  Section 66(1)(a) of the HRA In terms of this section it is unlawful for any 
person to treat or threaten to treat any 
                                                          
2  The ‘no’ portion of this answer refers to the ‘no person’ reference therein. It is noted that the protection is only afforded in this respect of employees. 
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person less favourably as a result of 
blowing the whistle or intending to blow the 
whistle. 
Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this regard The relief availed is in respect of the 
employment relationship and as provided by 
the Employment Court by way of a personal 
grievance. 
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that the 
allegations were unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand x  Section 6(3) of the PDA NZ In terms of this section, even a whistle-
blower who blows the whistle in good faith 
on reasonable grounds, but who thereafter 
finds that his reasonable belief was 
mistaken, is still protected. 
Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this regard In respect of the Ombudsman it is noted 
that in section 22 (4) of the Ombudsman Act 
9 of 1975, the Ombudsman has been 
vested with a discretion. Should no action 
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be taken, which to the Ombudsman seems 
adequate and appropriate within a 
reasonable time, the Ombudsman may 
send a copy of its report and the relevant 
recommendations to the Prime Minister, and 
thereafter to the House of Representatives.  
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x Section 6(3) of the PDA NZ 
 
 
Section 66(2) of the HRA 
 
 
Section 20 of the PDA NZ 
Disclosures made in bad faith are not 
protected. 
 
This position is underpinned by this 
provision. 
 
In terms of this section, the protection 
conferred by the PDA NZ and section 
66(1)(a) of the HRA do not apply in 
circumstances where the whistle-blower 
knowingly makes false allegations or 
otherwise acts in bad faith. 
Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal due to 
protected disclosure made 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
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New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this respect.  
Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this respect.  
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
New Zealand  x There is no evidence in this respect.  
             TABLE 3: EVALUATION OF NEW ZEALAND
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10.3 Conclusion 
As with the PDA, the full extent of the definitions and provisions of the PDA NZ do 
not vest only within the pages of its text, but overlap with other legislation such as 
the ERA, the HRA, and the like.  
However, what is clear is the fact that the main focus of the legislation is on the 
employment relationship, the employee as the whistle-blower and compensation and 
relief in respect of the employment relationship.   
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CHAPTER 11: THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN AUSTRALIA 
11.1 Introduction 
Brown has asserted that whistle-blowing is of vital importance to ensuring in ensuring 
integrity and accountability in the public sector, which, according to him will not 
realise unless there is a sound legislative structure in place facilitating and protecting 
such public interest disclosures. Brown further refers to the many pieces of whistle-
blowing legislation in Australia, with strengths in some that other jurisdictions should 
pay careful attention to, and weaknesses in all the Australian whistle-blowing 
legislation that need to be addressed, perhaps by way of common answers.1  
The position of the Australian whistle-blower would be dependent on where, 
geographically speaking, he would find himself, when blowing the whistle, with, as 
pointed out by Brown various remedies and principles applicable. The following 
whistle-blower legislation is currently available in Australia: 
Description Territory 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 South Australia 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 Queensland 
Protected Disclosures Act 1994 New South Wales 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 Commonwealth 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 20122 Australian Capital Territory 
Protected Disclosure Act 20123 Victoria 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2002 Tasmania 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 Western Australia 
                                                          
1  Brown http://www.griffith.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0015/151314/full-paper.pdf (Date of use: 
26 May 2014). 
2  Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 repealed. 
3  Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 repealed. 
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Public Interest Disclosure Act 2008 Northern Australia 
TABLE 4: AUSTRALIAN WHISTLE-BLOWER LEGISLATION 
Due to the magnitude of the available legislation, it was decided to focus on only the 
Protected Disclosure Act 85 of 2012, version 2, incorporating amendments as at 11 
February 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “PDA A”). 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 2012 (Victoria) commenced on 10 February 2013, 
replacing the Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Victoria), significantly broadening 
the scope and processes previously provided for. 
Orifici and Webster welcomed the new PDA A, as part of the integrity reforms in 
Victoria 4 , which reforms included the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as “IBAC”), which was declared as the head of 
the new integrity regime, incorporating the Victorian Inspectorate (VI), which 
oversees IBAC and the Ombudsman, the IBAC Committee, which is responsible for 
monitoring IBAC’s activities and examines IBAC’s reports, and the Accountability 
and Oversight Parliamentary Committee, which has oversight of the Freedom of 
Information Commissioner and the Victorian Ombudsman. 
The making of a protected disclosure in terms of the PDA A is very structured, and 
can be said to fall into three distinct stages, namely the making of the disclosure, the 
assessment and determination of the disclosure, and the investigation of the 
allegations relating to a protected disclosure. It is clear from the text of the PDA A 
that only a limited number of bodies are permitted to receive disclosures made in 
terms of the Act, and in turn these public bodies in assessing to ascertain whether a 
disclosure is a protected disclosure, they are not required to reach a conclusion on 
this point. They are required to notify the IBAC if they are of opinion that a disclosure 
may be a protected disclosure. It is in fact the IBAC’s role to determine whether a 
disclosure made is a protected disclosure.  
Hereafter should such a determination have been made, IBAC can investigate the 
protected disclosure complaint should it relate to serious corrupt conduct, or it may 
                                                          
4  Orifici and Webster T A new whistle at work,  
http://www.liv.asn.au/Mobile/Home/Law-Institute-
Journal/Article?NodeID=509756&NodeParentID=509746 (Date of use: 27 May 2014). 
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be referred to the Chief Police Commissioner, the Victoria Inspectorate or the 
Ombudsman for investigation of the allegations. 
Part 6 of the PDA A provides remedies and protective measures for whistle-blowers 
against whom retaliatory action is, has or may be taken, which is detrimental in 
nature. 
11.2 The purpose of the PDA A 
The purpose of the PDA A is espoused in section 1 thereof as:  
• Encouraging and facilitating disclosures of improper conduct by public officer, 
public bodies and other persons; 
• Encouraging and facilitating disclosures of detrimental action which has been 
taken in reprisal for a person having made a disclosure in terms of the PDA A; 
and 
• Providing protection for persons who make the disclosures 5  as well as 
persons who may suffer detrimental action in reprisal for such disclosures; 
and 
• Providing for the confidentiality of both the content of the disclosure and the 
identity of the person who has made the disclosure. 
11.3 The information that may be disclosed in accordance with the PDA A 
Division 1, sections 9 to 11 of the PDA A provide for the types of information that 
may be disclosed, in order to qualify as a protected disclosure. The conduct forming 
the subject of the disclosure may have taken place before the commencement of the 
PDA A6, but may not relate to the conduct or actions of any of the following:  
• A Public Interest Monitor;7 
According to section 3 of the PDA A, the meaning of a Public Interest Monitor, is 
the same as that accorded to it in terms of section 4 of the Public Interest Monitor 
Act 2011.8 In terms of the provisions of section 4 the Public Interest Monitor 
                                                          
5  Section 1(b)(i) of the PDA A. 
6  Section 9(2) of the PDA A. 
7  Section 9(3)(a) of the PDA A. 
8  According to section 1 of the Public Interest Monitoring Act of 2011, the main purposes of this 
Act are: (a) to establish the offices of Principal Public Interest Monitor and Deputy Public 
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includes the Principal Public Interest Monitor or a Deputy Public Interest Monitor 
and the Office of the Special Investigations Monitor.9 
•  The Special Investigations Monitor;10 
• The Victorian Inspectorate;11 
In terms of section 3 of the PDA A, the Victorian Inspectorate has the same meaning 
as that accorded it in terms of section 3(1) of the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011.  
At this point it is deemed necessary to elaborate on the interconnectedness between 
the Victorian Inspectorate and other agencies which also play a role within the 
context of the PDA A, such as the Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption 
Commission, the Public Interest Monitor and the like, as they are all role players 
within the context of the Victorian integrity system. A useful starting point in this 
respect is section 11 of the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 (hereinafter referred to 
as the “VIA”). 
The Victorian Inspectorate has, inter alia, the following functions:  
• Monitor the compliance of the Independent Broad-based Anti-
corruption Commission (hereinafter referred to as “IBAC”)12 and IBAC 
personnel;13 
• Oversee the performance of the IBAC’s functions under the PDA A;14 
• Receive complaints in accordance with the VIA about the conduct of 
IBAC and IBAC personnel;15 
• Investigate and evaluate the conduct of IBAC and IBAC personnel in 
the preform or purported performance of their functions and their 
duties;16 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Interest Monitors; and (b) to confer functions on those Public Interest Monitors under this Act 
and under: (i)  the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 ; and  (ii) the Surveillance 
Devices Act 1999 ; and (iii) the Telecommunications (Interception) (State Provisions) Act 
1988; and  (iv) the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 .  
9  According to section 3 of the PDA A, the Special Investigations Monitor has the same meaning 
as that appointed under section 5 of the Major Crime (Special Investigations Monitor) Act 2004 
10  Section 9(3)(c) of the PDA A. 
11  Section 9(3)(d) of the PDA A. 
12  As established in terms of section 12 of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption 
Commission Act of 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “IBAC Act”). 
13  Section 11(2)(a) of the VIA. 
14  Section 11(2)(b) of the VIA. 
15  Section 11(2)(d) of the VIA. 
291 
 
• Monitor the interaction between IBAC and other integrity bodies, in 
order to ensure compliance with the relevant laws;17 
• Compliance, audit and reporting function in respect of the performance 
of the Public Interest Monitor;18 
• Monitor the exercise of coercive powers by Victorian Auditor General 
Office (hereinafter referred to as “VARGO”) Officers 19  as well as 
specified compliance20 in respect of the Audit Act 1994; 
• Receive complaints in respect of VARGO officers’ conduct21, and to 
investigate and assess such reported conduct;22 and 
• In respect of Ombudsman Officers, it has the following functions –  
o To monitor the exercise of coercive powers by Ombudsman 
officers, as well as compliance with the procedural fairness 
requirements in the performance of their duties and functions23 
including the conduct of enquiries, investigations and the like; 
• The Victorian Inspectorate must inspect the relevant records of the 
Public Interest Monitor once annually.24 
 
• A Victorian Inspectorate Officer;25  
• A court.26 
Excluding the above-mentioned, a natural person may disclose information that 
shows or tends to show that:  
• A person, public officer or a public body has engaged, is engaging or intends 
to engage in improper conduct;27 or that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16  Section 11(2)(e) of the VIA. 
17  Section 11(2)(f) of the VIA. 
18  Section 11(2)(g) and (h) of the VIA. 
19  Section 11(3)(a)(i) of the VIA. 
20  Section 11(3)(a)(ii) of the VIA. 
21  Section 11(3)(b) of the VIA. 
22  Section 11(3)(c) of the VIA. 
23  Section 11(4)(a)(i) and (ii) of the VIA. 
24  Section 13(2) of the VIA. 
25  Section 9(3)(e) of the PDA A. 
26  Section 9(3)(f) of the PDA A. 
27  Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the PDA A. 
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• A public officer or a public body has taken, is taking or intends to take 
detrimental action against a person that is in contravention of section 45 of the 
PDA A;28 
11.3.1  Improper conduct defined 
The meaning of ‘improper conduct’ is defined in terms of the provisions of section 4 
of the PDA A, and for the purposes of the Act includes corrupt conduct;29 
In terms of the provisions of section 3 of the PDA A, corrupt conduct bears the same 
meaning as it does in terms of section 4 of the IBAC Act, and which provides that 
corrupt conduct includes conduct by:  
o Any person which negatively affects the honest performance of the 
functions held by a public officer or public body; 
o A public officer or public body which involves the dishonest 
performance of his, her or its public functions; 
o A public officer or public body which involves knowingly and recklessly 
breaching public trust; 
o A public officer or public body and which involves the misuse of 
information or material obtained in the course of his, her or its public 
functions, and which would, if proved, beyond a reasonable doubt 
constitute an offence. 
Such corrupt conduct would include conduct for the purposes of the Act even if it 
occurred outside Victoria and Australia. 
However, conduct which is specifically excluded from the provisions of the PDA A, in 
terms of the provisions of section 4 (3) is the conduct of any person that may be 
considered by the Court of Disputed Returns in relation to a petition under Part 8 of 
the Electoral Act 2002. 
11.3.2  Detrimental action defined 
Detrimental action is defined by section 3 of the PDA A and includes action which 
causes injury, loss, damage, intimidation, harassment, discrimination, disadvantage 
                                                          
28  Section 9(1)(a)(ii) of the PDA A. 
29  Section 4(1)(a) of the PDA A. 
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in respect of employment, career, profession, trade or business, and would include 
the taking of disciplinary action. 
 
11.3.3 Identification of the alleged perpetrator 
In terms of the provisions of section 10 of the PDA A, a disclosure may be made, 
even in circumstances in which the whistle-blower cannot identify the person or the 
body to whom the disclosure relates; in other words, if the alleged wrongdoer is 
unknown to the whistle-blower. 
11.3.4  Disclosures under other Acts 
In terms of the provisions of section 11 of the PDA A, a disclosure or a notification 
made in terms of other legislation, may still be a disclosure made in terms of the 
provisions of the PDA A. 
11.4 To whom and how the disclosure is to be made 
In terms of the provisions of Division 2 of the PDA A, it is specified how and to whom 
disclosures must be made. 
A disclosure must be made in accordance with prescribed procedure30, and despite 
any provision contrary to that of the PDA A, with the exclusion of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, a disclosure may be made orally, in 
writing and anonymously.31 Disclosures, within the prescribed circumstances may be 
made to IBAC32 or the Victorian Inspectorate33, the Ombudsman34, a member of 
police personnel other than the Chief Commissioner of the Police or IBAC35 where it 
concerns a member of the police, and disclosures relating to a member of Parliament 
or Ministers of the Crown are to be made to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly 
or IBAC, depending on the standing of the Minister in question.36 
 
                                                          
30  Section 12(1) of the PDA A. 
31  Section 12(2) of the PDA A. 
32  Section 14 of the PDA A. 
33  Section 15 of the PDA A. 
34  Section 16 of the PDA A. 
35  Section 18 of the PDA A. 
36  Section 19 of the PDA A. 
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11.5 Disclosures to which the protected disclosures scheme does not apply 
Division 3 of the PDA A provides for disclosures to which the protected disclosure 
scheme does not apply. A disclosure made will not be a protected disclosure if at the 
time that it is made, the person making the disclosure expressly states in writing that 
the disclosure so made is not a disclosure made for the purposes of the PDA A.37 
Further to this, a disclosure that has been made by an officer or employee of an 
investigative entity, made in the performance of his functions or duties under the 
legislation in terms of which the investigative entity is authorised to investigate 
protected disclosures, will not amount to a protected disclosure, unless:  
• at the time at which the said disclosure is made, the person making the 
disclosure expressly states in writing that he is making the disclosure for the 
purposes of the PDA A;38 and 
• the disclosure so made is otherwise made in accordance with the provisions of 
Division 2 of the PDA A.39 
 
11.6 Notification of and the assessment of disclosures 
The PDA A requires that in set circumstances, for example the IBAC and the 
Victorian Inspectorate has to be notified that a disclosure has been made, and in 
respect of which it is then required to assess the disclosure so made and make a 
determination as to whether it indeed qualifies as a protected disclosure or not. A 
note has been incorporated into the Act, under section 26 which states that the 
protection afforded in terms of Part 6 of the PDA A applies to a protected disclosure 
whether or not the IBAC has determined that the disclosure is a protected disclosure. 
The same note has been incorporated under section 31, and in respect of the 
Victorian Inspectorate. 
Should the IBAC determine that a disclosure that has been made is a protected 
disclosure, it is required to deal with the disclosure in accordance with the IBAC Act40 
                                                          
37  Section 20(1) of the PDA A. 
38  Section 20(2)(a) of the PDA A. 
39  Section 20(2)(b) of the PDA A. 
40  Section 32 of the PDA A. 
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and if the Victorian Inspectorate makes such a determination, it is required to deal 
with the disclosure in accordance with the VIA41 
11.7 Related disclosures made 
If the person who made the protected disclosure complaint which was made to an 
investigating entity, makes a related disclosure, it is taken to be part of the (initial) 
protected disclosure complaint42, and is required to be investigated as such.43 If 
another person, in other words someone other than the initial whistle-blower makes a 
related disclosure to an investigating entity, the investigating entity is required to 
notify the related disclosure to the IBAC for assessment, and only if the investigating 
entity considers that the related disclosure is in fact a protected disclosure.44 
11.8 Protection of the person making the protected disclosure 
The protection of the whistle-blower is dealt with under Part 6 of the PDA A. Part 6 is 
said to apply to a protected disclosure made from the time that the disclosure has 
been made, whether or not the entity to whom the disclosure has been made notifies 
the IBAC and whether or not the IBAC or the Victorian Inspectorate has determined 
that the disclosure is indeed a protected disclosure complaint.45 For the purposes of 
Part 6, any further information provided which is related to a protected disclosure 
made previously, is to be treated as if it were a protected disclosure.46 This applies to 
the information disclosed, whether it is disclosed either orally or in writing to the entity 
to which the protected disclosure was made, the IBAC, the Victorian Inspectorate or 
an investigating entity that is investigating the protected disclosure made.47 
11.8.1 Immunity from liability 
The person who makes the protected disclosure is not subject to any civil or criminal 
liability, or any liability arising by way of an administrative process, including 
disciplinary action, for having made the protected disclosure.48 However, a person 
                                                          
41  Section 33 of the PDA A. 
42  Section 35(a) of the PDA A. 
43  Section 35(c) of the PDA A. 
44  Section 36 of the PDA A. 
45  Section 38(1) of the PDA A. 
46  Section 38(2) of the PDA A. 
47  Section 38(3) of the PDA A. 
48  Section 39(1) of the PDA A. 
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making a disclosure will not enjoy the afore-mentioned immunity if the person who in 
making the disclosure contravenes section 72(1) or (2) in relation to the information 
disclosed.49  
Section 72 refers to the fact that it is an offence to make a false disclosure or to 
provide false further information. Should a person provide false or misleading 
information, in a material particular, intending that the information so provided be 
acted on as a protected disclosure, 120 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment, or 
both, may be imposed. 50  If a person provides further information relating to a 
protected disclosure made by him or her, knowing that further information to be false 
or misleading in a material particular provided, 120 penalty units or 12 months 
imprisonment, or both, may be imposed.51  
 
However, confidentiality provisions do not apply within this context. 
11.8.2 Confidentiality provisions do not apply 
Without limiting the provisions of section 39 as afore-mentioned, a person who 
makes a protected disclosure:  
• does not by doing so commit an offence under section 95 of the Constitution 
Act 1975 or a provision of any other Act which imposes a duty to maintain 
confidentiality with respect to a matter or any other restriction pertaining to the 
disclosure of confidential information;52 or 
• breach an obligation pertaining to an oath, a rule of law, practice or under an 
agreement which requires that person to maintain confidentiality or which 
otherwise restricts the disclosure of information in respect of the relevant 
matter.53 
 
However, once again, the afore-mentioned protection afforded does not apply in 
circumstances in which the person discloses false information or further information, 
and thereby contravenes section 72(1) and (2) of the PDA A. 
                                                          
49  Section 39(2) of the PDA A. 
50  Section 72(1) of the PDA A. 
51  Section 72(2) of the PDA A. 
52  Section 40(1)(a) of the PDA A. 
53  Section 40(1)(b) of the PDA A. 
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Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1975 (as referred to above) provides that a person 
employed, temporarily or permanently in any position in the service of the State of 
Victoria will not:  
o Comment publicly on the administration of any department in the State 
of Victoria; 
o Use any information accessed as a result of his employment or 
association with the public service, except in the performance of his 
official duties; 
o Use or attempt to use, whether directly or indirectly, any influence 
relating to his salary or position of him or anyone else in the public 
service. 
The provisions of section 95 apply to every person employed in the public service, 
notwithstanding the fact that that person may not be subjected to the Public 
Administration Act 2004 or the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 or the 
Transport (Compliance and Miscellaneous) Act 1983 or the Transport Integration Act 
2010 or the Police Regulation Act 1958. However, the provisions do not apply to 
officers in the service of Parliament. 
11.8.3 Protection from defamation action 
Should a person who has made a protected disclosure be summoned regarding a 
case of defamation, in respect of the information which forms part of the protected 
disclosure, there is a defence of absolute privilege in respect of having made a 
protected disclosure which has been created.54 
The afore-mentioned protection afforded does not apply in circumstances in which 
the person discloses false information or further information, and thereby 
contravenes section 72(1) and (2) of the PDA A.55 
11.8.4 Liability for own conduct 
It is important that a potential whistle-blower within this context take note of the fact 
that despite anything to the contrary under Part 6 of the PDA A, the person’s liability 
                                                          
54  Section 41(1) of the PDA A. 
55  Section 41(2) of the PDA A. 
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for his own conduct is not affected by the person’s disclosure of that conduct under 
the PDA A.56 
11.8.5 Detrimental action taken in reprisal for a protected disclosure 
It will be deemed that a person takes detrimental action against another in reprisal for 
a protected disclosure, in the following circumstances:  
• where the person takes or threatens to take detrimental action against the 
other because of, or in the belief that the other person or anyone else –  
o has made or intends to make the disclosure in question;57 or 
o has cooperated or intends to cooperate with any investigation 
pertaining to the disclosure.58 
• For any of the above-mentioned reasons, the person incites or allows 
someone else to take or threaten to take detrimental action against the 
person.59 
The person does not take detrimental action against another in reprisal for a 
protected disclosure, if in so making the disclosure the person has contravened 
section 72(1) or (2) of the PDA.60 A person, who takes detrimental action against 
another person, does not take detrimental action in respect of a protected disclosure, 
as referred to above 61 if there is a substantial reason for the person taking the 
relevant action, excluding for the purposes of section 45 of the PDA A.62 
Section 45 of the PDA relates to protection from reprisal, and provides that a person 
is not permitted to take detrimental action against another person in reprisal for a 
protected disclosure which has been made. The penalty for doing so is 240 penalty 
units or 2 years imprisonment or both.63  
 
                                                          
56  Section 42 of the PDA A. 
57  Section 43(1)(a)(i) of the PDA A. 
58  Section 43(1)(a)(ii) of the PDA A. 
59  Section 43(1)(b) of the PDA A. 
60  Section 43(2) of the PDA A. 
61  In respect of the provisions of section 43(1)(a) of the PDA A. 
62  Section 43(3) of the PDA A. 
63  Section 45(1) of the PDA A. 
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11.8.6 Management action is not prevented 
The protection afforded to the whistle-blower under Part 6 of the PDA A, is said not to 
be intended to prevent a manager from taking management action in relation to an 
employee who has made a protected disclosure.64 As such, a manager may take 
management action that qualifies as detrimental action in relation to an employee 
who has made a protected disclosure but, only if the fact that the person has so 
made a protected disclosure is not a substantial reason for the manager taking the 
relevant action.65 
11.8.7 Protection from reprisal 
A person is not permitted to take any detrimental action against a person in reprisal 
for having made a protected disclosure; the penalty for such action is 240 penalty 
units or 2 years imprisonment or both.66 If a person is convicted or found guilty of an 
offence in respect of section 45, and as afore-mentioned, the court may in addition to 
the imposition of the prescribed penalty order that within a specified time, the 
offender pay to the person against whom the detrimental action in question was 
taken, damages that the court considers appropriate, in order to compensate the 
person for any injury, loss or damage which has been suffered.67 In this regard, and 
without limiting the court’s discretion when making an order in respect of 
compensation for injury, loss or damage68, the court may also take into account any 
remedy that has already been granted under section 47 (damages) or section 49 
(injunction or order), in relation to the same conduct.69 
If the employer of a person or someone within the course of employment or while 
acting as an agent for the employer is convicted or found guilty of contravening 
section 45, in relation to detrimental action taken against the employee, the court 
may in addition to imposing the penalty provided for under section 45, and in addition 
                                                          
64  Section 44(1) of the PDA A. 
65  Section 44(2) of the PDA A. 
66  Section 45(1) of the PDA A. 
67  Section 46(1) of the PDA A. 
68  As provided for in terms of section 46(1) of the PDA A. 
69  Section 46(3) of the PDA A. 
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to any damages ordered in terms of section 46(1), also order that the employer 
reinstate or re-employ the person in his former position or a similar position.70 
11.8.8 An order for damages or reinstatement 
A person, who takes detrimental action against another, in reprisal for a protected 
disclosure, is liable in damages for any injury, loss or damage to the other person 
and such damages may be recovered in proceedings as for a tort in any court of 
competent jurisdiction.71 The term ‘tort’ is foreign to South African law, and is defined 
as a civil infraction in respect of which an innocent party may claim damages. 
A tort is an old French word meaning a wrong. Australian law is derived from 
English common law and knowledge of English history is essential for an 
understanding of this subject.  
There is today a distinction between a tort and a crime. A tort is where an 
individual suffers a wrong or injury (such as personal injuries from an accident) 
the courts may assist that person – the plaintiff - to obtain redress or 
compensation. A crime is a wrong committed against the community (robbery or 
murder) and the courts will determine a proper punishment for that the guilty 
person – that is the criminal law. Criminal law is public law, tort law is private 
law. 
A person who has by negligence caused harm to another person has committed 
a tort. The injured party (the plaintiff) may sue for compensation or damages. A 
person who commits murder is prosecuted by the community and is punished 
for that crime.72 
 
A tort is comparable to action in South African civil proceedings, in respect of a civil 
wrong alleged in accordance with our substantive law provisions, and as opposed to 
a crime. Any remedy that may be granted by a court in respect of a tort, including 
exemplary damages may be granted by a court in proceedings brought under section 
47 of the PDA A. 73  Exemplary damages referred to above, are comparative in 
respect of punitive damages in South African law, and is defined as follows:  
exemplary damages n. often called punitive damages, these are damages 
requested and/or awarded in a lawsuit when the defendant's wilful [sic] acts 
were malicious, violent, oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, or grossly reckless.74 
 
The right of a complainant to bring proceedings for damages in no manner affects 
any right or remedy available to the complainant, arising from detrimental action.75 
                                                          
70  Section 46(2) of the PDA A. 
71  Sections 47(1) and (2) of the PDA A. 
72  Anonymous, Law Vision Pty Ltd, The law of torts, 2008 
  http://www.lawvision.com.au/uploads/PDFs/Tort%20Law%20.pdf (Date of use: 27 May 2014). 
73  Section 47(3) of the PDA A. 
74  Anonymous, The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Exemplary Damages, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/exemplary+damages (Date of use: 27 May 2014). 
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11.8.9 Vicarious liability of public bodies 
Section 48 of the PDA A provides for remedies in respect of the vicarious liability of 
public bodies, and as such, it is first necessary to determine what qualifies as a 
public body. Section 6 of the PDA A defines a public body as a public body within the 
ambit of section 6 of the Independent Broadbased Anti-corruption Commission Act 
2011, the IBAC or any other body or entity prescribed for the purpose of section 6. 
In terms of the provisions of section 6 of the IBAC Act, and as referred to in section 6 
of the PDA A, a public body includes a public sector body falling within the ambit of 
the provisions of section 4(1) of the Public Administration Act 2004, a body 
established by or under an Act for a public purpose, including a university so 
established, the Electoral Boundaries Commission established in terms of the 
Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 1982, a Council, a body performing a public 
function on behalf of the State, and any other body prescribed for the purposes of the 
definition provided in section 6. 
Should a person in the course of his employment with, or whilst acting as an agent of 
a public body take detrimental action against another person in reprisal for a 
protected disclosure in contravention of the provisions of the PDA A:  
• The public body, employee or agent are held to be jointly and severally civilly 
liable for the detrimental action so taken;76 and 
• Further to this, proceedings in respect of damages for reprisal, as provided for 
in terms of section 47 may be taken against both or either.77 
A defence is provided to such a public body, if proceedings under section 47 in 
respect of damages for reprisal is undertaken against it, in that if it is able to prove on 
a balance of probabilities that it took reasonable precautions to prevent the employee 
or agent, from taking such detrimental action.78 In this respect, Orifici and Webster79 
opine that in a proceeding brought against a public body, it is a defence if the public 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
75  Section 47(4) of the PDA A. 
76  Section 48(1)(a) of the PDA A. 
77  Section 48(1)(b) of the PDA A. 
78  Section 48(2) of the PDA A. 
79  Orifici and Webster "A new whistle at work" Law Institute Journal 87 (11) 2013 Victoria, 
Australia  
 http://www.liv.asn.au/Mobile/Home/Law-Institute-Journal/Article?NodeID=509756&NodeParent 
ID=509746 (Date of use: 27 May 2014)  
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body is able to prove on a balance of probabilities, that it took reasonable 
precautions with a view to preventing an employee or agent for taking detrimental 
action against another, by way of reprisal, for a protected disclosure made. 
Orifici and Webster note that what constitutes reasonable precautions is not defined, 
but would in the ordinary course include the implementation and communication of 
policies, regular and formal training of employees and agents, and the monitoring of 
compliance with the relevant policies.  
11.8.10 Injunction or order 
Section 49 of the PDA A provides for injunctions and orders. An injunction is defined 
by Stewart80 as orders made by the courts, restraining or requiring performance of a 
specific act, in order to give effect to the applicant’s legal rights, and typically either 
restrain or require certain action or conduct; described as either prohibitive or 
mandatory injunctions.    
It is also defined as a court order in terms of which a person is prohibited from or 
mandated to perform a specific act.81 
It therefore seems to be comparable with the interdict in South African law. 
If upon an application for an order or an injunction82 the Supreme Court is satisfied 
that a person has taken or intends to take detrimental action against another in 
reprisal for a protected disclosure made, the court may order the person who took the 
detrimental action to remedy that action, or grant an injunction in any terms that the 
court considers appropriate.83 
 
 
                                                          
80  Stewart C, Injunctions, 
 http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CFIQFjAF&url=
http%3A%2F%2Fsydney.edu.au%2Flec%2Fsubjects%2Fequity%2FSummer%25202011-
12%2FInjunctiions.pptx&ei=nnSEU9_bJuaV7Aap6IGwBQ&usg=AFQjCNFT4sBV6fhxVxhg6_s
WFakTbRiB1w&sig2=7oe4LSK458UOKEqYgxcCkg&bvm=bv.67720277,d.ZGU (Date of use: 
27 May 2014). 
81  Anonymous, The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Injunction, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/injunction (Date of use: 27 May 2014). 
82  As provided for in terms of section 50 of the PDA A. 
83  Section 49(1) of the PDA A. 
303 
 
11.8.11  The transfer of an employee 
An employee of a public service body or a public entity who has made a protected 
disclosure, and who on reasonable grounds believes that detrimental action will be 
taken, is being taken or has been taken against him in contravention of the provisions 
of section 45, may request a transfer in accordance with the provisions of section 51 
of the PDA A.84 Should such an employee request such a transfer, a public service 
body Head may transfer such employee to duties within another public service body, 
public entity or a different area of the same public service body on such terms and 
conditions of employment that considered overall, are not less favourable.85  
An employee may only so be transferred:  
• if the employee requests or consents to the transfer;86 and 
• the public service body or entity Head has reasonable grounds to suspect that 
detrimental action will be, is being or has been taken against the relevant 
employee in contravention of section 45 of the PDA A;87 and 
• the public service body or entity Head considers that the transfer of the 
relevant employee will avoid, reduce or eliminate the risk of detrimental action 
being taken against the relevant employee;88 and 
• the public service body or entity Head to which the proposed transfer is to be 
made consent thereto.89 
 
11.9 Confidentiality of disclosures 
11.9.1 The disclosure of the content of an assessable disclosure 
Part 7 of the PDA A provides for the confidentially in respect of protected disclosures 
made. In terms of its provisions, the content of an assessable disclosure may not be 
disclosed.90 An assessable disclosure is defined in section 3 of the PDA A.91 The 
                                                          
84  Section 51(1) of the PDA A. 
85  Section 51(2). 
86  Section 51(4)(a) of the PDA A. 
87  Section 51(4)(b) of the PDA A. 
88  Section 51(4)(c) of the PDA A. 
89  Section 51(4)(d) of the PDA A. 
90  Section 52(1) of the PDA A. 
91  Section 3 of the PDA A: assessable disclosure means— 
a) a disclosure that, under section 21(2), must be notified to the IBAC; or 
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penalty in respect of disclosing the content of an assessable disclosure in the case of 
a natural person is 120 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment or both92 and 600 
penalty units in the case of a body corporate.93 
11.9.2 The identity of the person making the assessable disclosure 
Neither a person nor a body is permitted to disclose information that is likely to lead 
to the identification of the person who has made an assessable disclosure, in other 
words the whistle-blower. 
The penalty for doing so in the case of a natural person is 120 penalty units94 or 12 
months imprisonment or both and 600 penalty units in the case of a body 
corporate.95  
Exceptions in this respect are provided for in section 53(2) of the PDA A. Section 54 
provides for further circumstances in which the information may be disclosed. 
11.9.3 Circumstances in which information may be disclosed 
In circumstances provided for in terms of section 54(2) of the PDA A, a person or 
body may disclose the content or information pertaining to the content of an 
assessable disclosure, or information likely to lead to the identification of the person 
who made the said assessable disclosure.96 Such disclosure may be made in the 
following circumstances:  
• where it is necessary for the purpose of the exercise of functions under the 
PDA A;97 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
b) a disclosure that, under section 21(3), may be notified to the IBAC; or 
c) a disclosure that, under section 36(2), must be notified to the IBAC; or 
d) a disclosure made in accordance with Division 2 of Part 2 directly to the IBAC; or 
e) a disclosure made in accordance with Division 2 of Part 2 to the Victorian Inspectorate 
under section 17; or 
f) a police complaint disclosure that, under section 22, must be notified to the IBAC; or 
g) a police complaint disclosure made directly to the IBAC; 
92  Section 52(2) of the PDA A. 
93  Section 52(2) of the PDA A. 
94  Penalty units are the manner in which the amount payable in respect of a fine is calculated, and 
is set and determined in accordance with the provisions of the Monetary Units Act 2004 
(Victoria). 
95  Section 53(1) of the PDA A. 
96  Section 5 (1) of the PDA A. 
97  Section 54(2)(a) of the PDA A. 
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• by an investigating entity or an officer of the investigating entity, where it is 
necessary for the exercising of its functions in terms of the provisions of the 
IBAC Act, the VIA, the Ombudsman Act 1973 or Part IVB of the Police 
Regulation Act 1958;98 
• for the purpose of proceeding in respect of an offence against a relevant Act99 
or section 19 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958100, arising 
from an investigation by the Ombudsman;101 
• for the purpose of a disciplinary process or action that has been instituted in 
respect of conduct that could constitute  an offence against the relevant Act or 
section 19 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958, arising from 
an investigation by the Ombudsman;102 
• for the purposes of obtaining legal advice or representation in relation to a 
witness summons, a confidentiality notice, a notice cancelling a confidentiality 
notice or an order extending a confidentiality notice or in relation to the 
person’s rights, liabilities, obligations and privileges under the relevant Act103 
and by an Australian legal practitioner and an interpreter that may in this 
regard be involved104 
 
 
 
                                                          
98  Section 54(2)(b) of the PDA A. 
99  Within this context, section 54(3) defines a relevant Act as follows –  
a) this Act; or 
b) the Independent Broad-based Anticorruption Commission Act 2011; or 
c) the Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011; or 
d) the Ombudsman Act 1973; or 
e) Part IVB of the Police Regulation Act 1958; 
100  19 Penalty for non-attendance, refusing to give evidence etc. 
 Every person who— 
(a)  being served as aforesaid with a summons to attend the commission fails without 
reasonable excuse to attend or to produce any documents in his custody possession or 
control which he is required by the summons to produce; or 
(b)  happening to be present before the commission and being required so to do refuses to 
be sworn or without lawful excuse refuses or fails to answer any question touching the 
subject-matter of inquiry or to produce any document— shall be guilty of an offence 
against this Act and liable to be dealt with in accordance with section 20 
101  Section 54(2)(c) of the PDA A. 
102  Section 54(2)(d) of the PDA A. 
103  Section 54(2)(e) of the PDA A. 
104  Section 54(2)(f) and (g) of the PDA A. 
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11.9.4 The disclosure of advice 
Beside the confidentiality provisions as discussed above, the PDA A also protects 
certain advice given in respect of protected disclosures, and as provided for in 
section 74 thereof. In terms of the provisions of section 74: 
• A person who is advised by an entity under section 24(2), 105  25(2) 106  or 
37(1)107 that a disclosure or related disclosure made by the relevant person to 
the entity has been notified to the IBAC for the purposes of assessment, may 
not disclose this, except in circumstances provided for in terms of section 
74(5) of the PDA A. 
o Contravention of this section carries a penalty of 60 penalty units or 6 
months imprisonment or both.108 
• A person who has been advised by the IBAC or the Victorian Inspectorate 
under section 28(1) that a disclosure made by the person has been 
determined to be a protected disclosure complaint, may not disclose this, 
except in circumstances provided for in terms of section 74(5) of the PDA A. 
o Contravention of this section carries a penalty of 60 penalty units or 6 
months imprisonment or both.109 
• A person who receives information as referred to above in respect of 
notification or determination, may not disclose this, except in circumstances 
provided for in terms of section 74(5) of the PDA A. 
o Contravention of this section carries a penalty of 60 penalty units or 6 
months imprisonment or both.110 
                                                          
105  This section applies if a disclosure is made to an entity other than a Presiding Officer. More 
specifically, section 24(2) provides that – If the entity notifies the disclosure to the IBAC under 
section 21(2) or 22(2), the entity must advise the person who made the disclosure that the 
disclosure has been notified to the IBAC for assessment under this Act. 
106  This section applies in circumstances in which a disclosure is made to a Presiding Officer. More 
specifically section 25(2) provides that – If the Presiding Officer notifies the disclosure to the 
IBAC under section 21(3), the Presiding Officer may advise the person who made the 
disclosure that the disclosure has been notified to the IBAC for assessment under this Act. 
107  Section 37(1) pertains to related disclosures notified to the IBAC, and more specifically 
provides – If a related disclosure is notified to the IBAC by an investigating entity under section 
36 (2), the investigating entity must advise the person who made the related disclosure that the 
related disclosure has been notified to the IBAC for assessment under this Act. 
 Section 36(2) provides that despite the provisions of section 21, the investigating entity must 
notify the related disclosure to the IBAC for assessment under Part 3, if, and only if, the 
investigating entity considers that the related disclosure is a protected disclosure. 
108  Section 74(1) of the PDA A. 
109  Section 74(2) of the PDA A. 
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• Another person who receives such information in respect of notification and 
determination may not disclose this, except in circumstances provided for in 
terms of section 74(5) of the PDA A. 
o Contravention of this section carries a penalty of 60 penalty units or 6 
months imprisonment or both.111 
 
Section 74(5) specifies the circumstances in which such information may be imparted 
as being the following:  
• Disclosure, where it is necessary for the purpose of obtaining any relevant 
information, a document or a thing to comply with a witness summons112, a 
confidentiality notice113, a notice cancelling a confidentiality notice or an order 
extending a confidentiality notice or in order to comply with section 74(5) of the 
PDA A,114 including circumstances in which the person involved –  
o Does not have sufficient knowledge of the English language to 
understand the nature of a witness summons, a confidentiality notice, a 
notice cancelling a confidentiality notice or an order extending a 
confidentiality notice. Here it extends to the interpreter used.115 
o If the person is under 18 years of age, it extends to his parent, guardian 
or independent person;116 
o If the person is illiterate or has a mental, physical or other type of 
impairment which prevents him from understanding the nature of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
110  Section 74(3) of the PDA A. 
111  Section 74(4) of the PDA A. 
112  A witness summons is defined in terms of section 74(6) as follows –  
     witness summons means— 
(a) a witness summons issued by the IBAC under section 82F(1) of the Independent 
Broad-based Anticorruption Commission Act 2011; or 
(b) a witness summons issued by the Victorian Inspectorate under section 33E(1) of the 
Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011; or 
(c) a witness summons issued by the Ombudsman under section 17 of the Evidence  
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958. 
113  A confidentiality notice is defined in terms of section 74(6) as follows –  
 confidentiality notice means— 
(a)  a confidentiality notice issued by the IBAC under section 33C(1) of the Independent 
Broad-based Anticorruption Commission Act 2011; or 
(b)  a confidentiality notice issued by the Victorian Inspectorate under section 28E(1) of the 
Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011; or 
(c)  a confidentiality notice issued by the Ombudsman under section 26C(1) of the 
Ombudsman Act 1973; 
114  Section 74(5)(a) of the PDA A. 
115  Section 74(5)(a)(i) of the PDA A. 
116  Section 74(5)(a)(ii) of the PDA A. 
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witness summons, a confidentiality notice, a notice cancelling a 
confidentiality notice or an order extending a confidentiality notice. Here 
it extends to the independent person who assists;117 
 
An exception in this regard also applies to circumstances of disclosure for the 
purposes of obtaining legal advice or representation in relation to:  
• a witness summons, a confidentiality notice, a notice cancelling a 
confidentiality notice or an order extending a confidentiality notice or 
compliance with section 74(5) of the PDA;118 
• the person’s liabilities, privileges and obligations within the context of the PDA 
A.119 
Further exceptions in this regard relate to the following: 
• disclosure by an Australian legal practitioner who receives a disclosure in 
circumstances as described above, and provided for in terms of section 
74(5)(b) of the PDA A, for the purposes of complying with a legal duty of 
disclosure or a professional obligation which arises as a result of his 
professional relationship with his client;120 
• disclosure for the purpose of making a complaint to the IBAC 121  or the 
Victorian Inspectorate122; 
• disclosure for the purposes of complying with a witness summons served on 
the person by either IBAC or the Victorian Inspectorate;123 
• disclosure of information that has already been published in a report by IBAC 
or has otherwise been made public;124 
• disclosure to a person’s spouse or domestic partner;125 
• disclosure to a person’s employer, manager or both the employer and 
manager;126 
                                                          
117  Section 74(5)(a)(iii) of the PDA A. 
118  Section 74(5)(b)(i) of the PDA A. 
119  Section 74(5)(b)(ii) of the PDA A. 
120  Section 74(5)(c) of the PDA A. 
121  Section 74(5)(d)(i) of the PDA A. 
122  Section 74(5)(d)(ii) of the PDA A. 
123  Section 74(5)(e) of the PDA A. 
124  Section 74(5)(f) of the PDA A. 
125  Section 74(5)(g) of the PDA A. 
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• disclosure that is otherwise authorised or required to be made by or under a 
relevant Act or the PDA A.127 
11.10 Guidelines, procedures and education in respect of the PDA A 
Part 9 of the PDA A provides for guidelines, procedures and education in respect of 
its content, providing inter alia that: 
• the IBAC is responsible for issuing guidelines consistent with the PDA A and 
related regulations in respect of the facilitation of the making of disclosures to 
entities, the handling of disclosures and related notifications and for the 
protection of persons from detrimental action in contravention of section 45 of 
the PDA A;128 
• the IBAC is responsible for issuing guidelines consistent with the PDA A and 
related regulations in respect of the management of the welfare of any person 
who has made a protected disclosure, and any person affected by a protected 
disclosure whether as a witness or the person who is the subject of the 
investigation;129 
In doing so the IBAC must ensure that its guidelines are readily available to the 
public, and relevant entities and their members, officers and employees, and each 
member of the police.130 Section 60 of the PDA A provides for structured review of 
the procedures to be developed, by IBAC. So too, with reference to the procedures 
developed in terms of section 58 of the PDA A, IBAC is empowered to make 
recommendations as it deems fit, and should the IBAC deem that insufficient steps 
have been taken by the entity is this respect, may after considering any comments in 
this regard by the entity, send a copy of the recommendations so made to the 
relevant Minister.131,132 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
126  Section 74(5)(h) of the PDA A. 
127  Section 74(5)(i) of the PDA A. 
128  Section 57(1) of the PDA A. 
129  Section 57(2) of the PDA A. 
130  Section 57(3) of the PDA A. 
131  In this regard section 61(3) defines relevant Minister as follows –  
a) in relation to a public body—the Minister responsible for that public body; 
b) in relation to a public officer—the Minister responsible for that public officer. 
132  Section 62(1) and (2) of the PDA A. 
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11.11 Reports in respect of the PDA A 
Part 10 of the PDA A requires that information relating to the obligations, functions 
and the like provided for by the PDA A be addressed in the annual reports of the 
IBAC,133 the Victorian Inspectorate,134 other investigating entities135 and bodies that 
are not investigating bodies.136 
11.12  Conclusion 
The PDA A is comprehensive,137 with references to other pieces of legislation, and 
bearing in mind that many concepts used therein are left undefined, including such 
as for example ‘employee’, being one of the most basic concepts herein. However, 
at the same time, the comprehensive nature thereof, it is argued, certainly does not 
lend itself to being user-friendly, combined with the highly technical nature of the 
provisions and the concepts. It is hoped that the prescribed guidelines envisioned 
will go a far way in addressing these potential difficulties. 
At its core the PDA A envisions a basic three phase process in respect of the making 
of a protected disclosure, namely, the receipt of the disclosure, the assessment 
thereof in order to determine whether the disclosure is in fact a protected disclosure, 
and the investigation of the allegations contained in the protected disclosure. 
The PDA A underpins the seriousness with which it views acts of retaliation 
undertaken against a whistle-blower, on account of having blown the whistle, 
affording varied methods of protection in this respect, including for example immunity 
from liability in respect of civil, criminal and disciplinary action, confidentiality in 
respect of the information contained in the disclosure and the name of the whistle-
blower, protection from defamation action, damages, reinstatement and the like. 
 
                                                          
133  Section 67(1) of the PDA A. 
134  Section 68 of the PDA A. 
135  Section 69 of the PDA A. 
136  Section 70 of the PDA A. 
137  Also bearing in mind that the text thereof comprises 189 pages. 
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CHAPTER 12: THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN AUSTRALIA – 
VICTORIA, MEASURED 
12.1 Introduction 
Within the context of this study, due to the proliferation of the whistle-blower 
legislation in Australia, it was chosen to include and analyse only the PDA A, 
applicable in Victoria, Australia, incorporating amendments as at 11 February 2013, 
and which repealed the Whistleblower Protection Act 2001 in its entirety.  
The PDA A is comprehensive, interrelated with many other pieces of legislation, and 
at its core it envisions a basic three phase process in respect of the making of a 
protected disclosure, namely, the receipt of the disclosure, the assessment thereof in 
order to determine whether the disclosure is in fact a protected disclosure, and the 
investigation of the allegations contained in the protected disclosure. 
As mentioned, the PDA A underpins the seriousness with which it views acts of 
retaliation undertaken against a whistle-blower, on account of having blown the 
whistle, affording varied methods of protection in this respect, including for example 
immunity from liability in respect of civil, criminal and disciplinary action, 
confidentiality in respect of the information contained in the disclosure and the name 
of the whistle-blower, protection from defamation action, damages, reinstatement 
and the like. 
The PDA A’s implementation and regulation is in the main overseen by the IBAC, 
more specifically in respect of the public sector. IBAC within this context is described 
as having the primary purpose of strengthening the integrity of the Victorian public 
sector, and in so-doing strengthening the community’s trust in public sector 
accountability. So too IBAC is the first anti-corruption body in Victoria responsible for 
identifying and preventing serious corruption across the public sector, including 
Parliament and the judiciary.1 
 
                                                          
1  Anonymous http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/ (Date of use: 27 May 2014). 
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IBAC also plays an important role in respect of the education of the public sector as 
a whole as well as the community concerning the detrimental effect of corruption and 
how it can be prevented. 
12.2 The whistle-blower in Victoria, Australia’s position measured 
Under this heading, the relevant provisions of the PDA A, and other related 
legislation will be analysed and measured in accordance with the table set out in 
Chapter 1 hereof. 
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Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful acts 
including serious human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia  x ‘natural person’ 
Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
Section 3 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PDA A provides that a natural person 
may disclose information that shows or 
tends to show that a person, a public officer 
or a public body has, is or will engage in 
improper conduct or that a public officer or 
a public body has, is or will take 
detrimental action against a person that is in 
contravention of section 45 of the PDA A. 
 
The concept of improper conduct is defined 
in terms of section 4 of the PDA, and relates 
to corruption. 
 
The concept of detrimental action is defined 
in terms of section 3 of the PDA A, and 
includes –  
a) Action causing injury, loss or damage; 
b) Intimidation or harassment; 
c) Discrimination, disadvantage or 
adverse treatment in relation to a 
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Section 72 of the PDA A 
person’s employment, career, 
profession, trade or business, 
including the taking of disciplinary 
action. 
 
It is clear that the focus of the PDA A is the 
eradication of corruption, and does not 
include irregularities not falling within the 
definition of corruption, in other words within 
the ‘normal’ employment relationship. 
 
It is not required that the disclosure made 
needs to be made in good faith; however, 
supplying false information or false further 
information is an offence. 
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x x ‘natural person’ 
Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the PDA A 
 
The PDA A provides that a natural person 
may disclose information that shows or 
tends to show that a person, a public officer 
or a public body has, is or will engage in 
improper conduct or that a public officer or 
a public body has, is or will take 
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detrimental action against a person that is in 
contravention of section 45 of the PDA A. 
 
However, it is to be noted that whilst it does 
indeed goes wider than just public and 
private sector employees, indeed including 
any natural person, it must be borne in mind 
that it relates to corruption and related 
activities in this respect, and as provided for 
in terms of sections 3 and 4 of the PDA A. 
 
The special – and armed forces are neither 
specifically included nor excluded, and as 
such from this it may be inferred that they 
are included unless specifically excluded. 
 
However, having said this, it must be borne 
in mind that information disclosed may not 
relate to  the actions or conduct of the 
Public Interest Monitor 1 , the office of the 
Special Investigations Monitor2, the Special 
                                                          
1  Section 9(3)(a) of the PDA A. 
2  Section 9(3)(b) of the PDA A. 
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Investigations Monitor 3  and the Victorian 
Inspectorate 4 , the Victorian Inspectorate 
Office5 and the courts6. 
No clarification is given in respect of the text 
of the PDA A how disclosures in this respect 
may be made. 
Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory 
Victoria, Australia 
Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the protected disclosures are only applicable within the realm of corruption and related activities as 
defined in terms of ‘improper conduct’.7 
Employment laws x  Section 39(1) of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject to the provisions of section 72 of the PDA A 
 
The person who makes the protected 
disclosure is not subject to any liability 
arising by way of an administrative process, 
including disciplinary action, for having 
made such a disclosure. 
 
It is an offence to make a false disclosure or 
to provide false further information, and the 
                                                          
3  Section 9(3)(c) of the PDA A. 
4  Section 9(3)(d) of the PDA A. 
5  Section 9(3)(e) of the PDA A. 
6  Section 9(3)(f) of the PDA A. 
7  Section 4 of the PDA A. 
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Section 45 and 46 of the PDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 51 of the PDA A 
immunity is thereby lost. 
 
If a person, included if the employer of a 
person or someone in the course of 
employment or while acting as an agent for 
the employer is convicted of an offence in 
respect of section 45 8 , the court may in 
addition to the imposition of the prescribed 
penalty order and in addition to any 
damages ordered in terms of section 46(1), 
also order that the employer reinstate or re-
employ the person in his former position or 
a similar position.9 
 
A whistle-blower employee may in certain 
circumstances, as provided for in terms of 
section 51, be transferred. 
Criminal law x  Section 39(1) of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
The person who makes the protected 
disclosure is not subject to any criminal 
liability for having made such a disclosure. 
 
                                                          
8  In terms of section 45, a person may not take any detrimental action against a person in reprisal for having made a protected disclosure; doing so is a 
criminal offence which carries a penalty of 240 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment or both. 
9  Section 46(2) of the PDA A. 
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Subject to section 72 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
Section 45 of the PDA A 
It is an offence to make a false disclosure or 
to provide false further information, and the 
immunity is thereby lost. 
 
In terms of section 45, a person may not 
take any detrimental action against a person 
in reprisal for having made a protected 
disclosure; doing so is a criminal offence 
which carries a penalty of 240 penalty units 
or 2 years imprisonment or both. However, 
there are also civil law remedies attached 
hereto as discussed below. 
Civil law x  Section 39(1) of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject to section 72 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 41 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
The person who makes the protected 
disclosure is not subject to any civil liability 
for having made such a disclosure. 
 
It is an offence to make a false disclosure or 
to provide false further information, and the 
immunity is thereby lost. 
 
Having made a protected disclosure, should 
the person be summoned to defend a case 
of defamation, in respect of information 
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Subject to section 72 of the PDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 45  and 46 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
which forms part of the protected disclosure, 
there is a defence of absolute privilege in 
this respect as a result of having made the 
protected disclosure. 
 
Section 41(2) specifically provides that as it 
is an offence to make a false disclosure or 
to provide false further information, such 
privilege will thereby be lost. 
 
If a person is convicted of an offence in 
respect of section 45 10, the court may in 
addition to the imposition of the prescribed 
penalty order that within a specified time, 
the offender pay to the person against 
whom the detrimental action was taken, 
damages that the court considers 
appropriate, in order to compensate the 
person for injury, loss or damage.11 
 
So too, a person who takes detrimental 
                                                          
10  In terms of section 45, a person may not take any detrimental action against a person in reprisal for having made a protected disclosure; doing so is a 
criminal offence which carries a penalty of 240 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment or both. 
11  Section 46(1) of the PDA A. 
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Section 47 of the PDA A action against another, in reprisal for a 
protected disclosure, is liable in damages 
for any injury, loss or damage to the other 
person, and such damages may be 
recovered in proceedings as for a tort in any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
Media law x  No evidence in this respect  
Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
x  Sections 3 and 4 of the PDA A The provisions of the entire PDA A are 
focussed on anti-corruption efforts in 
strengthening the integrity system. 
Interim interdicts x  Section 49 Provides for injunctions and orders. 
If upon an application for an order or an 
injunction the Supreme Court is satisfied 
that a person has taken or intends to take 
detrimental action against another in 
reprisal for a protected disclosure made, the 
court may order the person who took the 
detrimental action, to remedy that action, or 
grant an injunction in any terms that the 
court considers appropriate. 
Final interdicts   See above under interim interdicts  
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Compensation for pain and 
suffering 
x  Section 45 and 46 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 47 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 48 of the PDA A 
If a person is convicted of an offence in 
respect of section 45 12, the court may in 
addition to the imposition of the prescribed 
penalty order that within a specified time, 
the offender pay to the person against 
whom the detrimental action was taken, 
damages that the court considers 
appropriate, in order to compensate the 
person for injury, loss or damage.13 
 
So too, a person who takes detrimental 
action against another, in reprisal for a 
protected disclosure, is liable in damages 
for any injury, loss or damage to the other 
person, and such damages may be 
recovered in proceedings as for a tort in any 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
Section 48 provides for vicarious liability of 
public bodies, and in respect of detrimental 
action taken against a person in reprisal for 
                                                          
12  In terms of section 45, a person may not take any detrimental action against a person in reprisal for having made a protected disclosure; doing so is a 
criminal offence which carries a penalty of 240 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment or both. 
13  Section 46(1) of the PDA A. 
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a protected disclosure made. 
In terms of section 48 the public body, 
employee or agent are held to be severally 
civilly liable for the detrimental action so 
taken. 
Loss of earnings x  As above, in terms of damages  
Loss of status x  As above, in terms of damages  
Mediation  x No evidence in this respect  
Legal costs  x No evidence in this respect  
Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Section 48 of the PDA The vicarious liability provisions are 
appreciated as an appropriate incentive in 
respect of putting appropriate whistle-blower 
measures in place; especially when seen in 
light of the defence that may be raised by 
such public body if appropriate measures 
have been put in place and as provided for 
by section 48(3). 
Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  PDA A The main body to whom all disclosures 
made need to be sent for determination as a 
323 
 
protected disclosure is the IBAC. 
All disclosures in respect of the IBAC are 
sent for determination to the Victorian 
Inspectorate. 
 
As such there is a double layer of 
independent bodies, including a watchdog 
for the watchdog. 
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Part 3 of the PDA A: Notification and assessment of 
disclosures 
 
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Part 7, section 53 of the PDA A provides for 
confidentiality subject to the exceptions in section 54 
Neither a person nor a body may disclose 
information that is likely to lead to the 
identification of the whistle-blower. 
The penalty for doing so in the case of a 
natural person is 120 penalty units or 12 
months imprisonment or both and 600 
penalty units in the case of a body 
corporate. 
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
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Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia  x The mechanisms are more complex in this regard, 
as there are independent bodies to which the 
disclosures are to be made; the system is not 
centred in the usual manner.  
Good faith is also not a requirement; honesty is. 
However, anyone [any natural person] who 
makes a protected disclosure complaint in 
accordance with the prescribed procedures, 
honestly, including a person who provides 
relevant information to such disclosure is 
protected from retaliation in the form of 
detrimental action. 
Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference14 with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Section 45 of the PDA A It is an offence to take detrimental action 
against a whistle-blower for having made a 
protected disclosure, carrying a penalty of 
240 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment 
or both. 
Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Part 6 The protection is not limited to the 
employment relationship, and protected 
disclosures may be made by any natural 
person. 
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that the 
                                                          
14  In this respect interference will be viewed in the context of reprisal being taken against the whistle-blower for having made a protected disclosure. 
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allegations were unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  IBAC and Victorian Inspectorate See chapter 11 
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Section 72 of the PDA A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 72 provides that a person who 
knowingly provides false or misleading 
information in terms of the PDA A in respect 
of a material particular, with the intention 
that the information be acted on as a 
protected disclosure, is guilty of an offence 
which carries the following penalty: 
120 penalty units or 12 months 
imprisonment or both.15 
 
So too a person who provides further 
information, relating to a protected 
disclosure made, knowing it to be false or 
misleading in a material particular is guilty of 
                                                          
15  Section 72(1) of the PDA A. 
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Section 73 of the PDA A 
an offence, and which offence carries the 
same penalty as aforementioned.16 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 73 a 
person who claims that a matter is the 
subject of a protected disclosure knowing 
that claim to be false, is guilty of an offence, 
and which offence carries the same penalty 
as aforementioned.17 
 
So too, a person will be guilty of an offence 
if he claims that a matter is the subject of a 
disclosure that the IBAC or the Victorian 
Inspectorate has determined to be a 
protected disclosure complaint, knowing the 
claim to be false. This offence too carries 
the same penalty as aforementioned.18 
Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal due to 
protected disclosure made 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia  x No evidence in this respect  
                                                          
16  Section 72(2) of the PDA A. 
17  Section 73(1) of the PDA A. 
18  Section 73(2) of the PDA A. 
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Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Part 10 of the PDA A Part 10 of the PDA requires that information 
relating to the obligations, functions and the 
like provided for by the PDA A be 
addressed in the annual reports of the 
IBAC19, the Victorian Inspectorate20, other 
investigating entities21 and bodies that are 
not investigating bodies22. 
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Victoria, Australia x  Part 9 of the PDA A Division 1 of Part 9 deals with guidelines 
and procedures. 
The IBAC must issue guidelines consistent 
with the PDA A, and any regulations made 
in respect of the PDA A for procedures, in 
order to –  
a) Facilitate the making of disclosures;23 
b) Provide for the handling of those 
                                                          
19  Section 67(1) of the PDA A. 
20  Section 68 of the PDA A. 
21  Section 69 of the PDA A. 
22  Section 70 of the PDA A. 
23  Section 57(1)(a) of the PDA A. 
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disclosures, and where appropriate, 
the notification of those disclosures 
to IBAC as provided for by sections 
21(2) and 36(2);24 
c)   Facilitate the protection of persons 
from detrimental action in 
contravention of section 45.25 
The IBAC is also required to issue 
guidelines in respect of the management of 
the welfare of –  
a) Any person who has made a 
protected disclosure;26 and 
b) Any person affected by a protected 
disclosure, whether as a witness in 
the investigation of the disclosure or 
as a person who the protected 
disclosure has been made about.27 
 
The IBAC has to ensure that such 
guidelines are readily available to the public, 
                                                          
24  Section 57(1)(b) of the PDA A. 
25  Section 57(1)(c) of the PDA A. 
26  Section 57(2)(a) of the PDA A. 
27  Section 57(2)(b) of the PDA A. 
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each entity that is required to establish 
procedures in terms of section 58, each 
member, officer or employee of such an 
entity and each member of police 
personnel.28 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 58 of 
the PDA an entity that may receive a 
disclosure must establish procedures that 
facilitate the making of disclosures, as well 
as the handling of disclosures. 
 
In terms of the provisions of section 60 of 
the PDA A, the IBAC is permitted to give 
advice to the public sector regarding any 
matter which has been included in a 
guideline issued by IBAC under Part 9. 
TABLE 5: EVALUATION OF AUSTRALIA: VICTORIA
                                                          
28  Section 57(3)(a)-(d) of the PDA A. 
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12.3 Conclusion 
The PDA A is relatively technical, with many cross-references to additional 
legislation, although the protection offered in terms of the provisions of Part 6 thereof 
is largely dependent only upon the text of the PDA A, and the simplest part of the 
text. 
The PDA A does not provide protection in respect of ‘normal’ irregularities within the 
employment relationship, and in respect of which retaliation is undertaken against 
the whistle-blower for having blown the whistle. 
Its main focus is the strengthening of the system of integrity of the public sector, and 
specifically within the sphere of corruption and the related activities. 
The remedies availed to the whistle-blowers within this context are wide and 
appropriate, simultaneously ensuring a structured approach, facilitation, education, 
awareness and the measurement of related impact. 
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CHAPTER13: THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
13.1 Introduction 
Evans opines that for some, blowing the whistle is simply an act of disagreement or 
dissent, however, it is emphasised that it is consequential to distinguish whistle-
blowing from other broad negatives, such as complaining, litigating or arguing. 
Rather it is a specific form of dissent, with its own particular characteristic, stemming 
from the practice of the English policemen who blow a whistle when observing a 
crime, thereby also alerting the general public to the wrongdoing.1  
The main piece of legislation that regulates whistle-blowing in the United Kingdom is 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “PIDA”), and which 
has been inserted after part IV of the Employment Rights Act 1996.2 
Lewis and Uys state that the expanding interest in whistle-blowing in the UK before 
PIDA came into operation can be explained by way of reference to various factors 
including inter alia financial scandals, health and safety disasters and the work done 
by the Committee on Standards in Public Life.3 
13.2 The purpose of the PIDA 
The purpose of PIDA is captured in the preamble of the PIDA as being to protect 
people who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest, in order to 
allow for such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation, and for related 
purposes. 
13.3 What comprises a protected disclosure? 
In terms of the provisions of section 43A, a protected disclosure is a qualifying 
disclosure4, which is made by a worker as provided for in terms of section 43C-H. 
                                                          
1  Evans 2008 Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science Research 267-279. 
2  An Act to consolidate enactments relating to employment rights. 
3  Lewis and Uys  2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 76-92. 
4  As defined in section 43B of the PIDA. 
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A qualifying disclosure means the disclosure of information, which in the reasonable 
belief of the worker making the disclosure tends to show one or more of the following 
has taken place, will take place or is taking place:  
• A criminal offence;5 
• That a person is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is 
subject;6 
• That a miscarriage of justice has occurred;7 
• That the health, safety of an individual is endangered;8 
• That the environment is damaged;9 
• That there is information tending to show any matter falling within any of the 
afore-mentioned is deliberately being concealed.10 
 
Sections 43B(1)(a) to (e) of the PIDA are verbatim identical to the provisions of the 
definition of a ‘disclosure’ ((a) – (e)) as defined in section 1 of the PDA.11 
The term “relevant failure” in relation to a qualifying disclosure applies to the 
circumstances12 as set out above.13 
For the purposes of making a qualifying disclosure as set out above, it is immaterial 
whether the relevant failure took place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and 
whether the applicable law is that of the United Kingdom or another country.14 
However, the disclosure of information does not amount to a protected disclosure if 
the person making the disclosure commits an offence by doing so15, such as for 
                                                          
5  Section 43B(1)(a) of the PIDA. 
6  Section 43B(1)(b) of the PIDA. 
7  Section 43B(1)(c) of the PIDA. 
8  Section 43B(1)(d) of the PIDA. 
9  Section 43B(1)(e) of the PIDA. 
10  Section 43B(1)(f) of the PIDA. 
11  The only difference is the PDA’s reference to unfair discrimination referred to in paragraph (f), 
and a slight difference in wording between section 43B(1)(f) of the PIDA and paragraph (g) of 
the definition of a disclosure in section 1 of the PDA. 
12  Sections 43B(1)(a) – (f) of the PIDA. 
13  Section 43B(5) of the PIDA. 
14  The same provision in the South African context is made in the definition of ‘impropriety’ in 
section 1 of the PDA. 
15  Section 43B(3) of the PIDA. 
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example, if the person has taken an oath of secrecy within the work environment, 
and contravenes the oath of secrecy.16 
The disclosure of information to which legal professional privilege attaches is not a 
qualifying disclosure if it is made by a person to whom the information had been 
disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice.17 
A qualifying disclosure that is made in accordance with the provisions of section 
43C, qualifies as such a qualifying disclosure if the worker:  
• Makes the disclosure in good faith; 
• To his employer; or 
• In circumstances in which the employee believes reasonably that the relevant 
failure relates either solely or mainly to –  
o a person other than his employer; or 
o to any issue or matter for which a person other than his employer bears 
a legal burden to that other person. 
 
Thus a qualifying disclosure entails going wider than just making a disclosure in 
respect of the employee’s direct employer, and in respect of just the employment 
relationship. Should an employer have a procedure in place which authorises its 
employees making a qualified disclosure to someone other than the employer, in 
other words making the qualified disclosure externally, and the worker makes such 
qualified disclosure in accordance with such authorised procedure, it is treated as a 
qualifying disclosure.18 
In respect of employment in terms of which in terms of the worker’s employment he 
ordinarily works outside Great Britain, Part IVA (protected disclosures) and section 
47B do not apply to such an employment relationship.19 
                                                          
16  This provision of the PIDA is in essence the same as that reflected in the definition of a 
‘protected disclosure’ in section 1 of the PDA, paragraph (e)(i) thereof. 
17  Section 43B(4) of the PIDA.  
 It is noted that this provision is in essence the same as that provided as being excluded from 
qualifying as a protected disclosure in terms of the definition of a protected disclosure in section 
1 paragraph (e)(ii). 
18  Section 43C(2) of the PIDA. It is noted that the provisions of this section are in essence similar 
to that of the provisions of section 6(2) of the PDA. 
19  Provision 12 of the PIDA. 
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13.3.1 Defining the worker and the employer 
Section 43K defines the concepts of ‘worker’ and ‘employer’ for the purposes of the 
PIDA. The definition of who would qualify as a worker for the purposes of PIDA is 
extended when compared to the definition assigned to the concept of a ‘worker’ in 
terms of section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 199620, and includes a person 
who is not a worker as defined in terms of section 230(3), but who:  
• works or has worked for a person after being introduced or supplied to such 
person by a third person and in circumstances in which the work he did wasn’t 
determined by him, but by the person for whom he did or does the work or the 
third person. In respect of this situation the employer would be the person who 
substantially determines or determined the terms on which the employee was 
engaged. 
• either contracts or contracted with a person in respect of the other person’s 
business for the performance of work in a place not under the control of that 
business’s management; 
• who works or worked by providing general medical, general dental, general 
ophthalmic or pharmaceutical services in terms of arrangements made by the 
Health Authority21 or by a Health Board.22 In respect of these employees, the 
employer would be the relevant Health Authority or Board referred to. 
• who either is or was provided with work after a training course or training 
programme or together with training for employment, or both, otherwise than 
being under a contract of employment and otherwise than by an educational 
establishment regarding a course run by that establishment. Within this 
context the employer would be the person providing the work experience or 
                                                          
20   In this Act “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”)means an 
individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked 
under)  
(a)  a contract of employment, or 
(b)  any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in 
writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or 
services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that 
of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the 
individual; and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly. 
21  Under section 29, 35, 38 or 41 of the National Health Service Act 1977. 
22  Under section 19, 25, 26 or 27 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978. 
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training. An educational establishment is defined as including a university, 
college or other educational establishment.23 
 
In terms of section 230(3) a worker includes24 a person who has entered into or who 
works under, or worked under a contract of employment or any other contract in 
whichever form, in terms of which that person undertook to do or perform work or 
services personally for another party to the contract, and whose status is not that of 
a client or a customer. 
13.4 To whom a qualifying disclosure may be made 
Sections 43C – F specifies to whom qualifying disclosures may be made, and which 
includes a disclosure to an employer or other responsible person25, disclosure to a 
legal adviser26, disclosure to a Minister of the Crown27, disclosure to a prescribed 
person28 and other disclosures29. 
13.4.1 Disclosure to the employer or to another responsible person 
This has been dealt with under paragraph 13.3 above, and will not be repeated here. 
13.4.2 Disclosure made to a legal adviser 
A disclosure will be protected as a qualifying disclosure where it is made in the 
course of obtaining legal advice.30 In this regard it is noted that the disclosure made 
need not be made bona fide as is required in respect of the other relevant 
provisions.31 
13.4.3 Disclosure made to a Minister of the Crown 
A disclosure will qualify as a qualifying disclosure where the worker’s employer is an 
individual who has been appointed under any enactment by a Minister of the Crown 
                                                          
23  Section 43K(3) of the PIDA. 
24  Excluding the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”. 
25  Section 43C of the PIDA. 
26  Section 43D of the PIDA. 
27  Section 43E of the PIDA. 
28  Section 43F of the PIDA. 
29  Section 43G of the PIDA. 
30  Section 43D of the PIDA. 
31  It is noted that the provisions of section 43D are similar in essence to that of section 5 of the 
PDA. So too, in respect of PIDA a disclosure made to a legal adviser need not be made in good 
faith. 
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or a body whose members are appointed under any enactment by a Minister of the 
Crown, and the disclosure is made in good faith to a Minister of the Crown.32 
13.4.4 Disclosure made to a prescribed person 
A worker making a disclosure will make a qualifying disclosure if the worker makes 
the disclosure in good faith, to a person who has been prescribed by an order made 
by the Secretary of State for the purposes of section 43F, and the person making the 
disclosure reasonably believes that the failure in question falls within the ambit of 
matters prescribed33 and that the allegations are substantially true. 
13.4.5 Disclosures made in other cases 
In this regard a qualifying disclosure will be made in accordance with the 
requirements of section 43G if:  
• The worker makes the disclosure bona fide;34 
• Reasonably believes that the information he is disclosing, and related 
allegations are substantially true;35 
• He does not make the disclosure for purposes of personal gain;36 
In determining whether a disclosure was made for personal gain, no regard 
shall be had to any reward which is payable by or any enactment.37 
• Any of the provisions of section 43G (2) are met;38 and 
The conditions referred to in this respect are as follows: 
• At the time that the disclosure is made, the worker reasonably believes 
that his employer will subject him to detriment if he makes a disclosure 
to his employer or to a prescribed person in terms of section 43F;39 
                                                          
32  Section 43E of the PIDA. 
33  Section 43F(1)(b)(i) of the PIDA. 
34  Section 43G(1)(a) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(1) of the PDA. 
35  Section 43G(1)(b) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(1)(a) of the PDA. 
36  Section 43G(1)(c) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(1)(b) of the PDA. 
37  Section 43L(2) of the PIDA. 
38  Section 43G(1)(d) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(1)(b)(i) of the 
PDA. 
39  Section 43G(2)(a) of the PIDA.  
337 
 
• Where no person has been prescribed in terms of section 43F, with 
reference to the relevant failure, the worker reasonably believes that it 
is likely that the evidence pertaining to the relevant failure will be 
destroyed or concealed if he makes the disclosure to his employer;40 
• The worker has already made a disclosure of substantially the same 
information to the employer or prescribed person.41 
• In all the circumstances of the case in question it is reasonable for him to 
make the disclosure.42 
In order to decide whether in the circumstances of the case it was reasonable 
for the worker to make the disclosure, the following factors are to be 
considered in terms of section 43G(3):   
• The identity of the person to whom the disclosure was made;43 
• The seriousness of the relevant failure;44 
• Whether the relevant failure so disclosed is continuing or likely to continue;45 
• Whether by making the disclosure, it is made in breach of a duty of 
confidentiality which is owed by the employer to another person;46 
• Where the worker has already made a disclosure of substantially the same 
information to the employer or prescribed person, whether any action was 
taken in this respect, or whether one could reasonably have expected action 
to have been taken;47 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(2)(a) of the PDA, 
with the main difference being that the PIDA refers to detriment and the PDA refers to 
occupational detriment. 
40  Section 43G(2)(b) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of 9(2)(b) of the PDA. 
41  Section 43G(2)(c) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(2)(c) of the PDA, 
with the difference that the PIDA does not provide that no action was taken within a reasonable 
time after the disclosure was made, as the PDA provides. 
42  Section 43G(1)(e) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(1)(b)(ii) of the 
PDA. 
43  Section 43G(3)(a) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(a) of the PDA. 
44  Section 43G(3)(b) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(b) of the PDA. 
45  Section 43G(3)(c) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(c) of the PDA. 
46  Section 43G(3)(d) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(d) of the PDA. 
47  Section 43G(3)(e) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(e) of the PDA. 
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• Where the worker has already made a disclosure of substantially the same 
information to the employer, whether in making the disclosure to the 
employer, the worker complied with any procedure authorised was used by 
the worker.48 
For the purposes of section 43G (‘disclosure in other cases’) a subsequent 
disclosure made may be regarded as being a disclosure of substantially the same 
information as that disclosed in a previous disclosure to his employer or a prescribed 
person, even in circumstances in which the subsequent disclosure extends to 
information about action taken or not taken by any person in consequence of the 
previous disclosure.49 
13.4.6 Disclosure of an exceptionally serious nature 
What would qualify as a disclosure of an exceptionally serious nature is not defined, 
and as such it is assumed that this qualification will be left open to the evaluation and 
decision on a case by case basis. A qualifying disclosure will be made in accordance 
with section 43H (of an exceptionally serious nature) if:  
• The worker makes the disclosure bona fide; 
• Reasonably believes that the information disclosed and the related allegations 
are substantially true; 
• The disclosure hasn’t been made for personal gain; 
In determining whether a disclosure was made for personal gain, no regard 
shall be had to any reward which is payable by or any enactment. 
• The relevant failure is of an exceptionally serious nature; and 
• In all the circumstances of the case it was reasonable for the disclosure to be 
made; 
In determining in respect of this consideration whether it was reasonable 
regard shall be had in particular to the person to whom the disclosure has 
been made. 
 
                                                          
48  Section 43G(3)(f) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 9(3)(f) of the PDA. 
49  Section 43G(4) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence exactly the same as the provisions of section 9(4) of the 
PDA. 
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Although importance is obviously assigned to whom the disclosure in this context is 
made, no guidance is given in respect of who the disclosure is to be made. 
13.4.7 The position in respect of contractual duties of confidentiality 
Section 43J provides that any provision in an agreement entered into between a 
worker and the employer is void in so far as it attempts to preclude the worker from 
making a protected disclosure.50 
13.5 Remedies provided by the PIDA 
In terms of the provisions of the PIDA a worker has the right not to be subjected to 
any detriment by an act or deliberate omission, by the employer, and which is 
imposed as a result of having made a protected disclosure.51 
13.5.1 Presentation of a complaint to an employment tribunal and related 
remedies and positions 
A worker who is so subjected to detriment in contravention of section 47B (as afore-
mentioned), may present a complaint to an employment tribunal, that he has been 
subjected to such detriment.52 If such a complaint is to be made and thereafter 
considered by the employment tribunal, it must be presented before the end of the 
period of three (3) months, which calculation begins with the date of the act or failure 
(omission) to which the complaint in question relates, or where there has been a 
series of acts or failures, from the date of the last of them.53 However, the tribunal 
may hear such complaint outside the time limits set out above, if the tribunal 
considers such further period to be reasonable; where it is satisfied that it was not 
reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of the three 
month period.54 Where such a tribunal finds that such relevant complaint55 is well-
founded the tribunal has to make a declaration to that effect, and may thereafter 
                                                          
50  It is noted that this section is in essence similar to the provisions of section 2(3) of the PDA. 
51  Section 47B(1) of the PIDA.  
 This section of the PIDA is in essence the same as the provisions of section 3 of the PDA. 
52  Section 49(1A) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
53  Section 48(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
54  Section 48(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
55  As provided for in terms of section 49 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
340 
 
make an award for compensation, which is to be paid by the employer to the 
complainant in respect of the act or ommission to which the complaint relates.56 
In respect of such an award of compensation, subject to sections 49(5A) and (6) of 
the Employment Rights Act 1996, the amount of the compensation awarded shall be 
such as the tribunal considering the matter deems to be both just and equitable in 
the circumstances, taking into account the infringment to which the complaint relates 
and any loss that is attributable to the relevant act or omission.57 The loss referred 
to, in determining the compensation to be awarded, shall be taken to include the 
following considerations:  
• Any expense that has been reasonably incurred by the complainant as a 
consequence of the act or omission in question;58 and 
• The loss of any benefit which he may reasonably be expected to have had if 
it were not for the act or omission in question having been perpetrated.59 
 
Further to this, in ascertaining the loss suffered by the complainant in question, the 
tribunal shall apply the same rule concerning the duty that a person has to mitigate 
his loss as applies to damages recoverable under the common law of England, 
Wales or Scotland, as the case may be.60 Should the tribunal make a finding that the 
act or the omission to which the complaint relates was in any manner caused or 
contributed to by the complainant’s actions, the amount of compensation shall be 
reduced proportionally, as may be considered to be just and equitable in the given 
circumstances.61 Where a complaint is made by a worker subjected to detriment, 
and the detriment to which the worker has been subjected to is the termination of his 
contract and the contract is not a contract of employment, any compensation 
awarded by the tribunal may not exceed the compensation that would be payable 
under Chapter II of Part X if the worker had been an employee and had been 
dismissed for the reason specified in section 103A.62 
                                                          
56  Section 49(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
57  Section 49(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
58  Section 49(3)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
59  Section 49(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
60  Section 49(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
61  Section 49(5) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
62  Section 49(6)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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13.5.2 Unfair dismissal 
Provision 5 of the PIDA provides for the insertion of section 103A into the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, pertaining to protected disclosures and providing that 
an employee who has been dismissed shall be regarded as having been unfairly 
dismissed for the purposes of the relevant part of the Employment Rights Act 1996, if 
the reason, or more than one reason or the principal reason for the said dismissal is 
that the employee had made a protected disclosure.63 
13.5.3 Redundancy 
In terms of provision 6 of the PIDA, section (6A) has been inserted under section 105 
(6) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, pertaining to protected disclosures and 
providing that if the reason, or one or more of the reasons or the principal reason for 
which an employee has been selected for redundancy was that the employee had 
made a protected disclosure, such dismissal may be regarded as an unfair 
dismissal. 
13.6  Unfair dismissal in terms of Employment Rights Act 1996 and as a 
remedy 
13.6.1 A general introduction to unfair dismissals in terms of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 
Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 holds the relevant provisions in respect of 
unfair dismissals.64 In terms of section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, an 
employee has the right not to be dismissed unfairly by his employer. It is noted that 
in terms of the provisions of section 110(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, in 
circumstances in which a dismissal procedures agreement is in force, the provisions 
of section 94 do not apply. 
Within this context an employee is dismissed by his employer if:  
                                                          
63  This provision is comparable to the provisions of section 4(2)(a) of the PDA. 
64  It would seem that the manner in which remedies regarding protected disclosures are 
approached in respect of unfair dismissals is comparable to the manner in which it is dealt with 
in terms of the PDA. 
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• The contract in terms of which he is employed is terminated by the employer, 
with or without notice being given;65 
• If the employee is employed under a limited-term contract, and the contract 
terminates as a result of the limiting event, and without being renewed under 
the same contract;66 
• The employee terminates the contract in respect of which he is employed, 
with or without giving notice, in circumstances in which he is so entitled to 
terminate without giving notice as a result of the employer’s conduct;67 
 
Further to this, an employee shall be considered to have been dismissed by his 
employer for the purposes of Part X relating to unfair dismissals, where: 
 
• The employer gives the employee notice of the termination of his contract;68 
and 
• When such notice is given, it is at an earlier date than the date on which the 
employer’s notice is due to expire;69 and the reason for the dismissal is ‘to be 
taken to be the reason for which the employer’s notice is given’.70 
Section 98 of the Employment Relations Act 1996 relates to the fairness of the 
dismissal in question, and providing that in determining for the purposes of Part X 
whether or not a dismissal was fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show that:  
• The reason, or if more than one reason, the principal reason for the 
dismissal;71 and 
o That it is a reason provided for in section 98(2) 72  or some other 
substantial reason justifying the dismissal of an employee holding the 
position that the dismissed employee had held.73 A reason falls within 
the ambit of section 98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 if:  
                                                          
65  Section 95(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
66  Section 95(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
67  Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
68  Section 95(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
69  Section 95(2)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
70  Section 95(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
71  Section 98(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
72  Dealt with below. 
73  Section 98(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.  
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o It relates to the capability or the qualifications of the employee, and for 
the work being performed by the employee, and for which the 
employee had been employed to do;74 
o It relates to the retirement of the employee;75 
o That the employee was redundant;76 or 
o That the employee could not continue to work in the position in 
question without contravention, on the part of the employee or the 
employer, of a duty or a restriction imposed under an act;77 
 
In a case78 where the employer has succeeded in fulfilling the onus it has in terms of 
section 98 (1), the determination of the question as to whether the dismissal of the 
employee was fair or unfair, whilst having regard to the reasons shown by the 
employer will depend on whether in the given circumstances the employer acted 
reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the 
employee79 and this shall be determined in accordance with the substantial merits of 
the matter80 (own emphasis). 
Section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless that employee has 
been continuously employed for a period of less than one year, 81 however, this 
exclusion of the right in respect of the right not to be unfairly dismissed is not 
applicable to whistle-blowers.82 
                                                          
74  Section 98(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. In terms of the provisions of section 98(3) 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996, in subsection in subsection (2)(a)— 
(a)  “capability”, in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference to 
skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality, and 
(b)  “qualifications”, in relation to an employee, means any degree, diploma or other 
academic, technical or professional qualification relevant to the position which he held. 
75  Section 98(2)(ba) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
76  Section 98(2)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
77  Section 98(2)(d) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
78  Other than a case provided for in terms of section 98(3A) which relates to retirement, and which 
provides as follows: 
 Section 98(3A) In any case where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1) 
by showing that the reason (or the principal reason) for the dismissal is retirement of the 
employee, the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair shall be determined in 
accordance with section 98ZG 
79  Section 98(4)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
80  Section 98(4)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
81  Section 108(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
82  Section 108(3)(ff) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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More specifically, Chapter II of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides the 
remedies for unfair dismissals. 
13.6.2 Remedies for unfair dismissal 
The first remedy provided for is that a complaint may be presented to an 
employment tribunal against the employer by an employee alleging unfair 
dismissal.83 Such a complaint has to be presented to an employment tribunal before 
the end of a period of three (3) months, which is to be calculated from the effective 
date of the termination or within such further period as an employment tribunal 
considers reasonable, and in circumstances in which it is satisfied that it was not 
reasonably practicable for the relevant employee to have presented the complaint 
within the three month period.84 
13.6.2.1 Orders and compensation 
Should an employment tribunal find that a complaint lodged in terms of the 
provisions of section 111 is well-founded the tribunal shall explain to the complainant 
what kinds of orders may be made85 and ask him whether he wishes the tribunal to 
make such an order. 86  Should the complainant express that he so wishes the 
tribunal may make such an order in respect of section 113.87 
The orders that may be made by the tribunal in terms of section 113 are:  
• An order for reinstatement of the employee in accordance with section 114.88  
An order for reinstatement is described as an order that the employer shall 
treat the complainant in all respects as if he had not been dismissed at all,89 
and on making such an order there are a number of related matters that the 
employment tribunal is required to specify, including : 
• any amount payable by the employer in respect of any benefit 
which the complainant might reasonably be expected to have had 
                                                          
83  Section 111(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
84  Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
85  In terms of the provisions of section 113 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
86  Section 112(1) and (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
87  Section 112(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
88  Section 113(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
89  Section 114(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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but for the dismissal (including arrears of pay) for the period 
between the date of termination of employment and the date of 
reinstatement,90 
• any rights and privileges (including seniority and pension rights) 
which must be restored to the employee, and 
• the date by which the order must be complied with.91 
Further to this, if the complainant would have benefitted from any improvement in the 
terms and conditions of his employment if it had not been for his unfair dismissal, the 
order for reinstatement will require the employee to be treated as benefitting from 
such improvement which would otherwise have been implemented or which would 
have accrued.92 The employee can alternatively request an order for re-engagement 
in accordance with the provisions of section 115,93 which order is an order on such 
terms as the tribunal may decide.94 In making such an order for re-engagement the 
tribunal is required to determine the terms on which the re-engagement is to take 
place, including the identity of the employer 95, the nature of the employment96, 
remuneration97, any amount that may be payable by the employer98, any rights and 
privileges which must be restored to the employee99 and the date by which the order 
must be complied with.100 In making a decision in respect of the discretion that an 
                                                          
90  Section 114(4) provides as follows: 
 (4) In calculating for the purposes of subsection (2)(a) any amount payable by the employer, 
the tribunal shall take into account, so as to reduce the employer’s liability, any sums received 
by the complainant in respect of the period between the date of termination of employment and 
the date of reinstatement by way of— (a)wages in lieu of notice or ex gratia payments paid by 
the employer, or (b)remuneration paid in respect of employment with another employer, and 
such other benefits as the tribunal thinks appropriate in the circumstances.  
91  Section 114(2)(a) to (c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
92  Section 114(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
93  Section 113(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
94  Section 115(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
95  Section 115(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
96  Section 115(2)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
97  Section 115(2)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
 Section 115(3) provides as follows in respect of the calculation of an amount to be paid: 
 Section 115(3) In calculating for the purposes of subsection (2)(d) any amount payable by the 
employer, the tribunal shall take into account, so as to reduce the employer’s liability, any sums 
received by the complainant in respect of the period between the date of termination of 
employment and the date of re-engagement by way of— 
(a)  wages in lieu of notice or ex gratia payments paid by the employer, or 
(b) remuneration paid in respect of employment with another employer, and such other 
benefits as the tribunal thinks appropriate in the circumstances. 
98  Section 115(2)(d) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
99  Section 115(2)(e) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
100  Section 115(2)(f) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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employment tribunal has under section 113 as to an order for reinstatement or re-
engagement, the employment tribunal is required to first consider reinstatement, and 
in considering it shall take into account whether the complainant wants to be 
reinstated101, whether such an order is practicable for the employer102 and where the 
complainant to some extent contributed to or caused the dismissal, whether it would 
be just to order such reinstatement.103 Should the tribunal decide not to make an 
order for reinstatement, it will consider whether to make an order for re-engagement, 
and if so, on what terms the re-engagement should take place,104 taking into account 
any wishes in this regard expressed by the complainant105, whether it is practicable 
for the employer106 and whether such order would be just where the complainant 
caused or contributed to the dismissal.107  
In terms of sections 116(4) and (5):108  
• excluding cases in which the tribunal considers contributory fault under the 
provisions of subsection (3)(c) it will if it orders re-engagement, do so on such 
terms that are as favourable as an order for reinstatement of the person, 
where reasonably practicable; 
• in circumstances in which the employer has hired a permanent replacement in 
the position of the employee dismissed, the tribunal will not consider for the 
purpose of the provisions of subsections (1)(b) or 3 (c) whether it is 
practicably possible for the employer to comply with an order reinstating or re-
engaging the dismissed employee. 
                                                          
101  Section 116(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
102  Section 116(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
103  Section 116(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
104  Section 116(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
105  Section 116(3)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
106  Section 116(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
107  Section 116(3)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
108  In terms of section 116(6): 
 Subsection (5) does not apply where the employer shows— 
(a)  that it was not practicable for him to arrange for the dismissed employee’s work to be 
done without engaging a permanent replacement, or 
(b)  that— 
 (i)  he engaged the replacement after the lapse of a reasonable period, without having 
heard from the dismissed employee that he wished to be reinstated or re-engaged, 
and 
 (ii)  when the employer engaged the replacement it was no longer reasonable for him 
to arrange for the dismissed employee’s work to be done except by a permanent 
replacement. 
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Alternatively in circumstances in which an order is not made under section 113, the 
tribunal shall make an award for compensation for unfair dismissal, which award will 
be calculated in accordance with section118, to be paid by the employer to the 
employee. 109  Section 118 provides for compensation, and in terms of which, in 
circumstances in which an employment tribunal makes an award for compensation 
for an unfair dismissal under section 112(4)110 or section 117(3)(a)111 the award may 
consist of the following: a basic award;112 and a compensatory award.113 
 
Section 117 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, provides for the enforcement of an 
order and compensation. 
 
13.6.2.2 The provision of interim relief pending the determination of a complaint 
If an employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal alleges in the 
complaint that he has been unfairly dismissed as a result of having made a protected 
disclosure the employee may apply to the tribunal for interim relief.114 However, it is 
specified that such tribunal will not entertain such an application for such interim 
relief unless it is submitted to the tribunal before the end of a period of seven (7) 
days immediately following the effective date of the termination of the 
employment.115  
Section 129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for the procedures for such 
application, whilst section 131 provides for an application for the variation and 
revocation of an order made in terms of section 129, which application may be made 
at any time. 
                                                          
109  Section 112(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
110  Section 112(4) If no order is made under section 113, the tribunal shall make an award of 
compensation for unfair dismissal (calculated in accordance with sections 118 to be paid by the 
employer to the employee. 
111  Section 117(3)(a) : Subject to subsections (1) and (2), if an order under section 113 is made but 
the complainant is not reinstated or re-engaged in accordance with the order, the tribunal shall 
make — (a) an award of compensation for unfair dismissal (calculated in accordance with 
sections 118 to 126) 
112  Section 118(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and calculated in accordance with 
sections 119 to 122 and 126 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
113  Section 118(1)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and calculated in accordance with 
sections 123, 124,124A and 126 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
114  Section 128(1)(a)(i) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
115  Section 128(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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Section 132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for the consequences of 
failure to comply with an order made under sections 129(5) or (7) for the 
reinstatement or re-engagement of the relevant employee. 
The employment tribunal is required to determine the application for such interim 
relief as soon as is practicable after having received the application for interim 
relief.116  
13.7 The PIDA and the PDA 
The commonalities in respect of the main body of the PIDA and the PDA is 
unmistakable, and has been referred to in the footnotes above, however, it is 
deemed to be of such import as to be highlighted in terms of the content of this 
paragraph as follows:  
                                                          
116  Section 128(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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# Description PDA Provision Similar PIDA provision 
1 Description of a disclosure Section 1, definition of ‘disclosure’ 
paragraphs (a) to (e) 
Section 43B(1)(a) to (e) 
2 Description of a disclosure Section 1, definition of ‘disclosure’ 
paragraph (g)  
Section 43B(1)(f)  
3 Description of a protected disclosure Section 1, definition of ‘protected 
disclosure’ paragraphs (e) (i) and (ii) 
Sections 43B(3) and (4) 
4 Provisions in contracts or agreements attempting to exclude the 
measures protecting whistle-blowers 
Section 2(3) Section 43J 
5 Employees making a protected disclosure not to be subjected to 
occupational detriment 
Section 3 Section 47B(1) 
6 Remedies availed in terms of labour law in respect of dismissals 
deemed unfair or alleged to be unfair 
(In respect of approach adopted) 
Section 4(2) The insertion of section 103A into the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, in 
terms of provision 5 of the PIDA, and 
the consequent application of Part X 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
7 Protected disclosure to a legal adviser Section 5 Section 43D 
8 Protected disclosure to an employer Section 6(2) Section 43C(2) 
9 Protected disclosure to a member of Cabinet or Executive 
Council (SA) and a Minister of the Crown (UK) 
Section 7 Section 43E 
10 Protected disclosure to certain persons or bodies identified Section 8 Section 43F 
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11 General protected disclosure Section 9(1) Section 43G(1)(a) 
  Section 9(1)(a) Section 43G(1)(b) 
  Section 9(1)(b) Section 43G(1)(c) 
  Section 9(1)(b)(i) Section 43G(1)(d) 
  Section 9(1)(b)(ii) Section 43G(1)(e) 
  Section 9(2)(a) Section 43G(2)(a) 
  Section 9(2)(b) Section 43G(2)(b) 
  Section 9(2)(c) Section 43G(2)(c) 
  Section 9(2)(d) Section 43H1 
  Section 9(3) Section 43G(3) 
  Section 9(3)(a) Section 43G(3)(a) 
  Section 9(3)(b) Section 43G(3)(b) 
  Section 9(3)(c) Section 43G(3)(c) 
  Section 9(3)(d) Section 43G(3)(d) 
  Section 9(3)(e) Section 43G(3)(e) 
  Section 9(3)(f) Section 43G(3)(f) 
  Section 9(4) Section 43G(4) 
                                                                                            TABLE 6: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PIDA AND THE PDA    
                                                          
1  To a lesser extent. 
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13.8 Conclusion 
In respect of the protection of whistle-blowers, there are many similarities between 
the PIDA and the PDA. 
In the main the PIDA requires a qualifying (protected) disclosure to be made in good 
faith, except when it is made to a legal advisor, to an employer, or in circumstances 
in which the whistle-blowing employee reasonably believes that the relevant failure 
relates to a person other than his employer or to an issue or a matter for which a 
person other than his employer bears the legal burden, to such other person. In this 
respect it would thus seem that the whistle may be blown on matters falling outside 
the scope of the employment relationship. However, it would seem that no protection 
or remedies are availed to such a whistle-blower either in terms of the PIDA or the 
Employment Relations Act 1996, which leaves such whistle-blower potentially 
vulnerable. 
It would seem that the approach in respect of the blowing of the whistle within the 
employment relationship, the provisions are aimed at internal reporting first, with 
external reporting being allowed where the employer has put authorised procedures 
in place in terms of which such disclosure may be made externally. Under defined 
circumstances such disclosures may be made to other parties such as another 
responsible person, a Minister of the Crown, and prescribed person and the like. In 
circumstances in which a worker is subjected to detriment in contravention of section 
47B; in other words for having made a qualifying disclosure the worker is entitled to 
present a complaint to an employment tribunal. Where an employment tribunal finds 
that such complaint is well-founded it makes a declaration to that effect and may 
make an award for compensation. Should an employee be dismissed unfairly for 
having made such qualifying disclosure, Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
is activated. The onus is then on the employer to show that the employee was not 
dismissed for an unfair reason as alleged.  
Chapter II of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for the remedies in respect 
of an unfair dismissal including orders for reinstatement, re-engagement, 
compensation and interim relief, similar to that of the PDA. 
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CHAPTER 14: THE POSITION OF THE WHISTLE-BLOWER IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, MEASURED 
14.1 Introduction 
Lewis and Uys 1 explain that there are various factors which contributed to the 
increased interest in whistle-blowing in the UK, prior to the enactment of PIDA, 
including by way of example a number of financial scandals and health and safety 
related disasters, the work done on the topic by the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life and the like. 
In the previous chapter it was concluded that in the main the PIDA requires a 
qualifying (protected) disclosure to be made in good faith, except when it is made to 
a legal advisor, to an employer, or in circumstances in which the whistle-blowing 
employee reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates to a person other than 
his employer or to an issue or a matter for which a person other than his employer 
bears the legal burden, to such other person. In this respect it would thus seem that 
the whistle may be blown on matters falling outside the scope of the employment 
relationship. However, it would seem that no protection or remedies are availed to 
such a whistle-blower either in terms of the PIDA or the Employment Relations Act 
1996, which leaves such whistle-blower potentially vulnerable. 
It seems that the approach in respect of the blowing of the whistle within the 
employment relationship, the provisions are aimed at internal reporting first, with 
external reporting being allowed where the employer has put authorised procedures 
in terms of which such disclosure may be made externally. Under defined 
circumstances such disclosures may be made to other parties such as another 
responsible person, a Minister of the Crown, and prescribed person and the like. In 
circumstances in which a worker is subjected to detriment in contravention of section 
47B, in other words for having made a qualifying disclosure the worker is entitled to 
present a complaint to an employment tribunal. 
Where an employment tribunal finds that such complaint is well-founded it makes a 
declaration to that effect and may make an award for compensation. Should an 
employee be dismissed unfairly for having made such qualifying disclosure, Part X of 
                                                          
1  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 77. 
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the Employment Rights Act 1996 is activated. The onus is then on the employer to 
show that the employee was not dismissed for an unfair reason as alleged.  
Chapter II of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for the remedies in respect 
of an unfair dismissal including orders for reinstatement, re-engagement, 
compensation and interim relief. 
14.2 The whistle-blower in the United Kingdom’s position measured 
The impact of the PIDA is commented on by Lewis 2 in which, in the main, the 
following points serve to be highlighted:  
• In Miklaszewicz v. Stolt Ltd [2002] IRLR 344 it was held that in its application 
of the remedies offered by the PIDA, it was immaterial as to whether the 
disclosure had been made before or after the PIDA had come into effect;3 
• In Parkins v. Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109 it was underpinned that in 
circumstances in which there was a failure to comply with a legal obligation 
contained in the worker’s own contract of employment, disclosure in this 
regard could still amount to a qualifying disclosure;4 
• In Darnton v. University of Surrey [2003] IRLR 333 the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal had held that in deciding whether the relevant worker had held a 
reasonable belief as required by PIDA, determining the factual accuracy of the 
allegations contained in the disclosure would be important and with the 
reasonable belief being based on how the worker understood the facts to be;5 
• In Kraus v. Penna plc [2004] IRLR 260 the Employment Appeal Tribunal had 
found that a whistle-blowing worker would not be afforded protection in terms 
of the PIDA in circumstances in which the employer was not under a legal 
obligation, even if the worker believed the employer had been under the legal 
obligation alleged. In this respect however the Appeal Court held that the 
Kraus case had been wrongly decided;6 
• In Street v. Derbyshire Unemployed Workers Centre [2004] IRLR 687 the 
Court of Appeal decided that in deciding such matters the employment 
                                                          
2  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 77.  
3  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 80. 
4  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81. 
5  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81. 
6  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81. 
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tribunals should determine the predominant or dominant reason for the 
disclosure having been made. In this matter the complainant’s disclosure had 
not been protected as it was found that the dominant reason for her having 
made it was personal antagonism in respect of her manager.7 
• Similarly in Lucas v. Chichester Diocesan Housing Association Ltd (EAT 
0713/04) the Employment Appeal Tribunal recommended that in such cases 
in which a personal motive or agenda was alleged to play a role on the part of 
the complainant, this was to be alleged by the employer and put to the 
complainant;8 
Lewis makes pivotal points in respect of the motives with which the whistle is blown,9 
stating that there are principled objections to looking at an employee’s motive within 
the context of whistle-blowing. These objections include the consideration that such 
a view may deter important disclosures from being made and that in circumstances 
in which the whistle-blower reasonably believes the truth of the information, the 
motive behind the disclosure is irrelevant. 
As set out within the content of Chapter 1, it now becomes necessary to measure the 
PIDA in accordance with the points of measurement provided for in this respect. 
 
                                                          
7  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81. 
8  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81. 
9  Lewis and Uys 2007 Managerial Law (49)(3) 81-82. 
355 
 
Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful acts 
including serious human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK x  Section 43C-G of the PIDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sections  43B(1), (3) and (4) of the PIDA 
 
 
Section 43H 
Good faith is required in respect of all 
disclosures made as provided for within the 
text of PIDA, excluding the disclosures 
made to a legal adviser, and a reasonable 
belief in respect of the information being 
disclosed is also required. 
The types of conduct relates to those as 
provided for in section 43B(1) of the PIDA, 
taking into account the provisions of 
sections 43B(3) and (4). 
Also relevant in this respect is section 43H, 
relating to disclosures relating to 
exceptionally serious failures. 
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK x x Section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
and as widened by the provisions of section 43K of 
the PIDA 
It is argued that in terms of the definitions 
supplied both public and private sector 
employees could potentially enjoy the 
protection availed. 
However, no special mention is made of the 
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armed forces and special force members. 
Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory 
UK 
Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Employment laws x  Section 47B (1) of the PIDA 
Section 49(1A) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 48(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 48(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 49 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 105(6A) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 110(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 95(1) and (2) of the Employment Rights Act 
1996 
Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 112 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 113 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 114 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 115 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 116 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 118 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section Sections 119 to 122 and 126 of the 
The protection availed to the whistle-blower 
within the context of the PIDA is specifically 
aimed at the potential consequences within 
the employment relationship. 
 
However, as pointed out under paragraph 
13.8 of Chapter 13, there is a concern in 
respect of the provisions of sections 43C(1) 
(b)(i) and (ii) of the PIDA, in respect of 
which a disclosure may be made if the 
whistle-blowing employee reasonably 
believes that the relevant failure relates to a 
person other than his employer. It is wholly 
unclear what relevant protection is availed 
to such employee, as it would seem that the 
detriment may then in all likely hood fall 
outside the scope of the employment 
relationship. 
No remedy in the PIDA provides for such a 
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Employment Rights Act 1996 
Sections 128 and 129 of the Employment Rights Act 
1996 
Section 132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
circumstance. 
Criminal law  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Civil law  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Media law  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
 x There is no evidence in this respect  
Interim interdicts  x There is no evidence in this respect However, having said this, it is noted that 
the provisions of section 128 of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 does  provide 
for the employment tribunal to whom a 
complaint has been submitted, does have 
the power to providing for interim relief for 
the whistle-blower. 
Final interdicts  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Compensation for pain and 
suffering 
 x There is no evidence in this respect  
Loss of earnings x  Sections 49(5A) and 6 of the Employment Rights Act 
1996 
Section 49(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Section 49(3) (a) and (b) of the Employment Rights 
An award of compensation 
 
 
Any reasonable expense incurred by the 
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Act 1996 
Sections 49 (4), (5) and (6) (a) of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996 
 
 
 
complainant as a consequence of the act or 
omission in question, and the loss of any 
benefit which the complainant may 
reasonably be expected to have had if it 
were not for the act or the omission in 
question having been perpetrated. 
Loss of status x  Section 114 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 Reinstatement of the whistle-blower 
Mediation x x Section 115 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 The reason for the partial yes in this respect 
is that mediation is not specifically referred 
to in the text of the PIDA, however, in terms 
of the remedies availed an employment 
tribunal may in defined circumstances order 
re-engagement between the complainant 
and the employer, which could conceivably 
include a level of mediation. 
Legal costs x  Section 49(3)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 Any reasonable expense incurred by the 
complainant as a consequence of the act or 
omission in question – this could 
conceivably cover the reasonable legal 
costs of the whistle-blower.  
Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
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Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK x x Section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
as widened by section 43K of the PIDA 
Sections under measurable 3 above 
The reason for the partial yes answer in this 
respect is as follows –  
• It does not avail protection to 
‘anyone’, but only to workers as 
defined in terms of the PIDA and the 
Employment Rights Act 1996; and 
• It only avails work-related retaliation 
as set out in Chapter 13 hereof. 
Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
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Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that the 
allegations were unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal due to 
protected disclosure made 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK x x Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 The reason for the partial answer in this 
respect is that the burden of proof which is 
placed on the relevant employer relates only 
to dismissal and not any other acts of 
reprisal. 
In fact the PIDA only provides remedies for 
unfair dismissal. 
The section relates to the fairness of the 
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dismissal in question, and in respect of 
which a burden of proof is placed on the 
employer. 
Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
UK  x There is no evidence in this respect  
         TABLE 7: EVALUATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
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14.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of the main whistle-blower legislation in the UK, the PIDA, is captured 
in the Act’s preamble as being to protect people who make certain disclosures of 
information in the public interest, in order to allow for such individuals to bring action 
in respect of victimisation, and related purposes. This stated purpose seems to 
reflect a much wider scope as that which is available in terms of the relevant 
provisions of the related legislation, namely the PIDA and the Employment Rights 
Act 1996. However, this widened scope is also the reason for one of the main 
concerns relating to the text of the PIDA, and more specifically in relation to the 
persons who in making a disclosure qualify for the available remedies which are 
strictly limited to remedies within the employment context. 
The provisions of section 43C (1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the PIDA, provide that in 
circumstances in which the employee believes reasonably that the relevant failure 
that he would want to blow the whistle on relates solely or mainly to a person other 
than his employer or to an issue for which a person other than his employer bears a 
legal burden, he is required to make the disclosure to such other person. And yet, all 
the remedies availed to the whistle-blower in terms of both the PIDA and the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, relate to employment related matters. It seems that 
such employee would be availed no protection in any manner, leaving him 
vulnerable. 
The parties to whom a worker 1 may blow the whistle in good faith, and in the 
circumstances defined, include:  
• The employer;2 
• Someone other than the employer (as discussed in the paragraph above);3 
• To a legal advisor;4 
• To a Minister of the Crown;5 
• To a prescribed person;6 and 
                                                          
1  As defined in terms of section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and section 43K of 
the PIDA. 
2  Section 43C(1)(a) of the PIDA. 
3  Section 43C(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the PIDA. 
4  Section 43D of the PIDA. 
5  Section 43E of the PIDA. 
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• Other cases.7 
A worker in the UK has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by an act or a 
deliberate omission, by the employer, and which is done as a result of him having 
made a protected disclosure. What would amount to detriment is not in any manner 
defined within the text of the PIDA. It is noted though that in respect of whatever 
detriment may be complained of, the employee may receive an award for 
compensation.8 
The protection in terms of the provisions of the PIDA, and as supplemented by the 
provisions of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and in respect of the undefined 
‘detriment’, is aimed at the protection of workers as defined by section 230 (3) of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, and as widened in scope by the provisions of section 
43K of the PIDA, including aspects such as:  
• Submitting the relevant complaint to an employment tribunal, which 
employment tribunal may make an award for compensation, which is to be 
paid by the employer to the relevant complainant.9 In determining such 
award reasonable expenses and the loss of any benefit is taken into 
account.10 
In this respect an award may consist of a basic award and a 
compensatory award.11 
• An order for re-engagement;12 
• An order for reinstatement;13 
• Interim relief;14 
The PIDA, within the context of the Employment Rights Act 1996 does not expressly 
provide for relief in respect of the following:  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  Section 43F of the PIDA. 
7  Section 43G of the PIDA. 
8  The award for compensation as provided for in terms of section 49 (1) of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996. 
9  Section 49(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
10  Section 49(3)(a) and (b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
11  Section 118(1)(a) and (b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
12  Section 114 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
13  Section 115 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
14  Section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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• Criminal law; 
• Civil law; 
• Media law; 
• Interim or final interdicts; and 
• Compensation for pain and suffering; 
So too, the PIDA does not make any provision in respect of the following:  
• Specific anti-corruption measures; 
• Appropriate incentives offered to both the public-and private sector to put 
appropriate whistle-blower measures in place within their sphere of 
responsibility; 
• There is no independent oversight body that has been established to 
oversee and facilitate matters relating to whistle-blowing in terms of PIDA; 
• There are no measures to ensure that disclosures made within the context 
of qualifying (protected) disclosures are timeously and properly 
investigated; 
• There are no measures to ensure that in appropriate circumstances the 
identity of a whistle-blower is protected; 
• There is no prohibition of interference with a whistle-blower; 
• There are no provisions protecting external (non-worker) whistle-blowers 
in appropriate circumstances; 
• There are no provisions indicating that whistle-blowers acting in good faith 
will be protected, even in circumstances in which it later turns out that the 
allegations made by the whistle-blower were unfounded; 
• There are no provisions providing for appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms in respect of the investigation of whistle-blowers’ allegations 
made; 
• There are no provisions protecting a party (within this context 
predominantly the employer) against whom accusations are made in bad 
faith; 
• There are no provisions ensuring that the impact and implementation of 
the measures of PIDA are measured at regular intervals; and 
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• There are no provisions in PIDA in respect of which the acceptance, 
participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness in respect of whistle-
blowing. 
Finally, the emphasis on the good faith in which a disclosure must be made in order 
to be a qualifying disclosure is questionable, as it is unclear for the pivotal role this 
plays within the greater scheme of whistle-blowing. Certainly the emphasis should 
rather be placed on whether or not there is truth in the allegations made first and 
foremost. The good faith element should arguably only become relevant in 
circumstances in which it turns out that the allegations made were totally unfounded, 
and vexatious and malicious only in nature. If for example party A has committed an 
offence, and party B blows the whistle on Party A’s offence committed, certainly the 
main consideration and focus should be the illegal conduct by Party A. The motive 
behind the whistle-blowing, good or bad, vexatious or malicious, one way or another 
cannot change Party A’s illegal conduct to legal conduct. This aspect will be dealt 
with further in the next chapter. Suffice it to say though that there are many 
perceived weaknesses within the PIDA, which leaves the potential whistle-blower 
vulnerable, and which should be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 15: A CONCLUSION ON THE DETERMINED POSITION OF THE 
WHISTLE-BLOWER IN SOUTH AFRICA 
15.1 Introduction 
The study at hand’s main purpose is to determine whether the protection provided to 
the whistle-blower who blows the whistle under the protection of the relevant South 
African legislation, namely the PDA, enjoys appropriate protection, as availed in 
terms of the PDA’s provisions. 
In order to make the above-mentioned determination, it was stated15 that it needed 
to be established:  
• Who the persons are that qualify for protection in terms of the relevant 
legislation; 
• Under what circumstances protection in terms of the relevant legislation is and 
is not availed to the whistle-blower; 
• Whether the South African legislation meets the objectives in terms of the 
legislation itself; 
• How the protection availed in the PDA measures up to that availed to whistle-
blowers in the selected countries; and 
• In the circumstance that the protection availed in terms of the PDA measures 
up negatively in terms of the comparison to that availed to the whistle-blowers 
in the selected countries, to determine how the legislation should be amended 
to strengthen the position of the whistle-blower in SA. 
In attempting to determine what such appropriate protection would be, attention has 
been devoted to 16 determined measurables as described and determined in 
Chapter 1 of the study. The measurables are as follows:  
Measurable 1 Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against 
various types of unlawful acts including serious human rights violation, life, 
liberty and health  
Measurable 2 Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and 
special forces 
Measurable 3 Provides for various legal issues including –  
                                                          
15   Par 1.3, Chapter 1 hereof. 
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• Employment laws 
• Criminal law 
• Civil law 
• Media law 
• Specific anti-corruption measures 
• Interim interdicts 
• Final interdicts 
• Compensation for pain and suffering 
• Loss of earnings 
• Loss of status 
• Mediation 
• Legal costs 
Measurable 4 Appropriate incentives are offered to private and public sectors to put 
appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Measurable 5 An independent oversight body has been established 
Measurable 6 Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Measurable 7 Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Measurable 8 Ensuring the protection of anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower 
procedures in good faith from retaliation 
Measurable 9 Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle- blower  
Measurable 10 In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Measurable 11 Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected 
even if it turns out later that the allegations were unfounded 
Measurable 12 Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Measurable 13 Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Measurable 14 Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged 
action/omission wasn’t in reprisal due to a protected disclosure made 
Measurable 15 The impact and implementation of the legislation should be measured at 
regular intervals 
Measurable 16 Facilitation by the law of the acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and 
public awareness of whistle-blowing 
TABLE 8: THE MEASURABLES 
In determining the position of the whistle-blower in South Africa16, a comparison is to 
be made in respect of the position of the whistle-blower in Australia 17 , New 
Zealand18 and the United Kingdom19. 
                                                          
16   Especially Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
17   Chapters 11 and 12. 
18   Chapters 9 and 10. 
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15.2 The bigger framework of whistle-blower protection in South Africa 
The bigger framework in respect of whistle-blowing in South Africa was considered 
before the provisions of the PDA were considered, and which may be depicted as 
follows:  
NON-LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCES LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCES 
The Code of Conduct for Public Servants PDA 
Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements Practical guidelines for employees in terms of 
section 10(4)(a) of the PDA 
Anti-Corruption Framework Public Service Act 103 of 1994 
United Nations Convention against Corruption Defence Act 42 of 2000 
African Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption 
South African Police Act 68 of 1995 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 
SADC Protocol against Corruption Western Cape Public Protector Act 6 of 1994 
 Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Activities Act 12 of 2000 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
 Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 
 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
TABLE 9: Bigger framework in respect of whistle-blowing in SA 
However, there are admitted challenges in respect of this framework as discussed, 
both legislative and non-legislative in respect of the whistle-blower, especially in 
respect of duties of disclosures placed on persons in circumstances in which 
concurrent protection is not afforded to the discloser (whistle-blower). In this respect, 
it is argued more specifically that the Practical Guidelines for employees in terms of 
section 10(4)(a) of the PDA, needs to be reviewed and reconsidered as a matter of 
urgency to ensure that the challenges pointed out in Chapter 5 of this study are 
resolved. After having considered the bigger framework as set out above, the 
position of the whistle-blower in South Africa within the context of the PDA was 
considered and measured in Chapter 8 hereof. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19   Chapters 13 and 14. 
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15.3 A re-evaluation of South Africa, strictly within the context of the PDA 
It was noted under paragraph 8.1 of Chapter 8 of the study that the measurement of 
the position of the whistle-blower in South Africa could not take place within the 
context of the PDA only, considering all the additional legislative influences in place 
already. However, in order to fairly measure the position of the whistle-blower in 
South Africa’s position in comparison with the other elected legislation the 
measurement has to be reconsidered and measured strictly in accordance with the 
provisions of the PDA only. 
Such re-evaluation reveals the following:  
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Measurable 1: Definition of a protected disclosure includes all bona fide disclosures against various types of unlawful acts including serious 
human rights violations, life, liberty and health. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA x x Section 1 of the PDA1  
Measurable 2: Covers public and private sector whistle-blowers, including armed forces and special forces. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
SA x x Section 2 (1) (a) of the PDA2   
Measurable 3: Provides for various legal issues as set out below: 
Country/ Territory 
SA 
Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
Employment laws x  PDA and LRA  
Criminal law x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Civil law x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Media law x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Specific anti-corruption 
measures 
 x There is no evidence in this respect in the text of the PDA  
Interim interdicts x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Final interdicts x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Compensation for pain and 
suffering 
x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Loss of earnings x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Loss of status x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Mediation x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
                                                          
1   As discussed in Chapter 8. 
2   As discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Legal costs x  As discussed in Chapter 8 Part of the ‘catch-all’ section 4(1)(a) of the PDA 
Measurable 4: Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 5: Independent oversight body 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 6: Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 7: Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 8: Protect anyone who makes use of internal whistle-blower procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
Only employees, and then within defined 
circumstances 
Measurable 9: Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
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Measurable 10: In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 11: Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are protected even if it turns out later that the allegations were 
unfounded. 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 12: Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 13: Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 14: Burden of proof should rest with the employer to prove that the alleged action/ omission wasn’t in reprisal due to protected 
disclosure made 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
 x  Section 4(2) of the PDA, read together with section 192 of 
the LRA 
See this portion in Chapter 8 
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Measurable 15: The impact and implementation of the legislation measured at regular intervals 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
Measurable 16: Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
Country/ Territory Yes No Evidence Comment/Other 
  x There is no evidence in this respect within the text of the 
PDA 
 
TABLE 10: Evaluation of SA within the context of the PDA
374 
 
15.4 An overview of the measurements allocated  
Having placed the South African position squarely within the context of the PDA, it is 
necessary to compare the positions of the selected countries in an overview format, 
in order to more meaningfully gage the South African position.*1 
 COUNTRY 
 
MEASURABLE 
South Africa New Zealand Australia United Kingdom 
PDA PDA NZ PDA A2 PIDA 
Measurable 1 Partial Yes No Partial 
Measurable 2 Partial Yes Partial Partial 
Measurable 3     
Employment laws Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Criminal law Yes Yes Yes No 
Civil law Yes Yes Yes No 
Media law Yes No Yes No 
Specific anti-
corruption measures 
No No Yes No 
Interim interdicts Yes Yes Yes No 
Final interdicts Yes No Yes No 
Compensation for 
pain and suffering 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Loss of earnings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loss of status Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mediation Yes Yes No  No 
Legal costs Yes No No Yes 
Measurable 4 No No Yes No 
Measurable 5 No No Yes No 
Measurable 6 No No Yes No 
Measurable 7 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 8 No Partial No Partial 
Measurable 9 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 10 No No Yes No 
Measurable 11 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 12 No No Yes No 
Measurable 13 No No Yes No 
Measurable 14 Yes No No Partial 
Measurable 15 No No Yes No 
Measurable 16 No No Yes No 
TABLE 11: OVERVIEW OF MEASUREMENTS ALLOCATED 
 
                                                          
1   * In this respect an answer of partial denotes a yes with a qualification. 
2   Victoria. 
375 
 
Reinterpreted in respect of the number of answers per category (yes, no and partial), the 
overview looks as follows:  
COUNTRY South Africa New Zealand Australia United Kingdom 
YES 12 13 21 4 
NO 13 13 5 19 
PARTIAL 2 1 1 4 
TABLE 12: TOTALS IRO THE OVERVIEW 
Graphically depicted the content of Table 12 reveals the positions as being as follows: 
 
GRAPH 1: REINTERPRETATION OF THE OVERALL VIEW 
It seems clear that the PIDA (UK) meets the least amount of the measurements set, 
with the PDA A (Australia, Victoria) meeting the most of the measurements; the PDA 
NZ is equally balanced in meeting and not meeting the measurements and the PDA 
meeting less of the measurements than not, but still meeting more than the PIDA.3 
The PDA ranks third out of the four when measured in this manner.  
                                                          
3  In this regard it needs to be noted that had it not been for the catch-all provision contained in 
section 4(1)(b) of the PDA, the PDA would have ranked last. 
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Ironically it seems therefore, with reference to the outcomes in respect of the 16 
measurables that the country not to be followed is the UK (PIDA) upon which the 
PDA has been modelled, with the Victorian legislation being the furthest ahead in 
respect of measuring up to the measurables set. 
There are a few comments to be made in respect of the two of the measurables that 
have attracted a ‘no’ in the PDA A (Victoria, Australia). In this regard it has to be 
borne in mind that:  
• Measurable 1 – a protected disclosure does not need to be made in good 
faith, but with honesty. It is argued that this in in fact a positive aspect, that the 
PDA should aspire to, and as will be dealt with in the concluding remarks 
further, in this Chapter. Further the PDA is focussed solely on combatting 
corruption, although the measurements still remain relevant in toto within the 
context of this study. 
• Measurable 8 – also relates to the fact that a protected disclosure does not 
need to be made in good faith, but with honesty. 
Having established that the PDA ranks second last of the four countries compared, it 
is important to define in what respects the PDA is not meeting the measurements 
set. 
15.5 In what respects the PDA does not measure up 
It is not only important to understand how the PDA measures up to the selected 
countries’ selected legislation, but also to understand more fully in what respects the 
PDA does measure up positively with reference to the set measurements. 
The PDA fails to meet the set measurements in the following respects:  
Measurable # Description 
Measurable 3 Specific anti-corruption measures 
Measurable 4 Appropriate incentives offered to private and public sectors to put 
appropriate whistle-blower measures in place 
Measurable 5 Independent oversight body 
Measurable 6 Ensuring that disclosures are timeously and properly investigated 
Measurable 7 Ensuring that the identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
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Measurable 8 Protecting anyone who makes use of internal  whistle-blower 
procedures in good faith from any retaliation 
Measurable 9 Prohibition of interference with a disclosure by a whistle-blower 
Measurable 10 In relevant circumstances, external whistle-blowers are protected 
Measurable 11 Whistle-blowers acting in good faith when blowing the whistle are 
protected even if it turns out later that the allegations were unfounded 
Measurable 12 Enforcement mechanism to investigate the whistle-blower’s allegations 
Measurable 13 Appropriate protection provided for accusations made in bad faith 
Measurable 15 The impact and the implementation of the legislation measured at 
regular intervals 
Measurable 16 Facilitation by the law of acceptance, participation in whistle-blowing 
and public awareness of whistle-blowing 
TABLE 13: MEASUREMENTS THE PDA FAILS TO MEET 
Having said this, there is a further consideration that begs attention in this respect 
and in regard to the provisions of the PDA, which is the provision of section 4(1)(b) 
thereof, the so-called ‘catch-all’. 
Section 4(1)(b) of the PDA provides that any employee that has been subjected, is 
subject to or may be subjected to an occupational detriment in breach of section 34 
may pursue any other process allowed or prescribed in any law. 
It has to be admitted that this really is a ‘catch-all’ in every sense of the word, and it 
does not really add anything new, in other words something that is not already 
available in law, with the proviso that in order to attain the protection herein mention, 
the whistle-blower will first have to establish that he has made a protected disclosure 
correctly. It should however be pointed out that this provision alone is responsible for 
the attainment of a positive answer in respect of ten (10) of the sub-measurements 
of measureable 3.  But which legislation meets the requirements that the PDA does 
not?  
Relooking Table 11 provides the relevant answer:  
  
                                                          
4  Which provides that no employee may be subjected to any occupational detriment by his or her 
employer on account or partly on account of having made a protected disclosure. 
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 COUNTRY 
 
MEASURABLE 
South Africa New Zealand Australia United Kingdom 
PDA PDA NZ PDA A5 PIDA 
Specific anti-
corruption measures 
No No Yes No 
Measurable 4 No No Yes No 
Measurable 5 No No Yes No 
Measurable 6 No No Yes No 
Measurable 7 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 8 No Partial No Partial 
Measurable 9 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 10 No No Yes No 
Measurable 11 No Yes Yes No 
Measurable 12 No No Yes No 
Measurable 13 No No Yes No 
Measurable 15 No No Yes No 
Measurable 16 No No Yes No 
TABLE 14: RELOOKING TABLE 11 
It is telling to take note of the fact that the PDA fails in respect of the same 
measurables as the PIDA, which is to be expected in light of the fact that the PDA 
has obviously been modelled on the PIDA.6 
Once again PDA A ranks number one in meeting the most of these requirements 
hands down. 
15.6 What the PDA actually provides to the whistle-blower in respect of 
remedies 
In determining what the content of the PDA actually provides to the whistle-blower in 
respect of remedies, it is deemed helpful to look at the actual construction of the 
PDA in identifying the said remedies, which may be done as follows:  
Section of the PDA Heading Content 
Section 1 Definitions Disclosure 
Employee 
Employer 
Impropriety 
                                                          
5  Victoria. 
6  As pointed out in paragraph 13.7 in Chapter 13, Table 5: Similarities between the PIDA and the 
PDA. 
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Minister 
Occupational detriment 
Organ of state 
Prescribed 
Protected disclosure 
This Act 
Section 2 Objects and application of the Act  As the heading indicates 
Section 3 Employee making protected disclosure 
not to be subjected to occupational 
detriment 
As the heading indicates 
Section 4 Remedies 4 basic remedies 
Section 5 -9 To whom disclosures may be made As the heading indicates 
Section 5 Protected disclosure to legal adviser As the heading indicates 
Section 6 Protected disclosure to employer As the heading indicates 
Section 7 Protected disclosure to member of 
Cabinet or Executive Council 
As the heading indicates 
Section 8 Protected disclosure to certain persons 
or bodies 
As the heading indicates 
Section 9 General protected disclosures  As the heading indicates 
Section 10 Regulations Regulations to be promulgated 
Section 11 Short title and commencement As the heading indicates 
TABLE 15: CONSTRUCTION OF THE PDA 
Almost 50% of the PDA is devoted solely to identifying to whom a protected 
disclosure may be made and how, with only one section providing 4 basic remedies 
to the whistle-blower. 
It is clear from the above table utilised for measurement, that the protection and 
remedies offered to the whistle-blower within an employment relationship, as 
defined, are comprehensive, however, when looking at the remedies actually 
provided by the PDA as contained in section 4 thereof one notes the following:  
• remedies in respect of dismissal and occupational detriment are (already) to 
be found in the LRA7; however in this regard it does provide that an employee 
may not be subjected to occupational detriment for having made or intending 
to make a protected disclosure; and 
                                                          
7  Section 4(2) of the PDA. 
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• the actual catch-all is the provision providing that a whistle-blower may 
approach any court with jurisdiction8 and ‘pursue any other process allowed or 
prescribed by law’9; and 
• the whistle-blower must if reasonably possible and practicable be transferred, 
with the terms and conditions of such transfer, not taking place without his 
written consent, not being less favourable than those applicable immediately 
before his transfer.10 
Looking critically at the provisions of the PDA (being the main legislation protecting 
whistle-blowers in South Africa) in respect of the remedies offered it seems as 
though it makes the practice of subjecting a whistle-blower to occupational detriment 
addressable in terms of already existing rights and remedies available to employees. 
Further to this it provides for the transfer of a whistle-blower, as above-mentioned. 
The catch-all provided in section 4(1)(b) merely serves to provide remedies available 
to any person within South Africa, with the added burden of the whistle-blower 
having to ensure, assert and prove within such other process that he is in fact a 
whistle-blower and has made a protected disclosure in good faith. In light of this it is 
argued that the remedies availed to a whistle-blower in terms of the PDA is too 
general in nature to ascribe any praise for the PDA. It seems rather disappointingly, 
to be mainly concerned with setting the tests against which whistle-blowers are to be 
measured, hoops they have to jump through, before they are afforded protection 
potentially already available to anyone in South Africa, excluding the provision in 
respect of potential transfer. 
Interestingly, within this context, the preamble of the PDA does not recognise that 
whistle-blowers need to be protected by availing appropriate and effective protection 
and or remedies apart from stating that every employer bears a responsibility to take 
all the necessary steps in ensuring that employees who wish to make a disclosure 
are protected from any reprisals as a result of having made such a disclosure. 
No accordant responsibility is assigned within the provisions of the PDA. 
                                                          
8  Section 4(1)(a) of the PDA. 
9  Section 4(1)(b) of the PDA. 
10  Section 4(3) and (4) of the PDA. 
381 
 
It is argued that the PDA fails in actually meeting the objectives set in section 1(a) 
and (b). In fact, it would seem, especially taking into account the technicalities that 
the courts have attempted resolving, and that whistle-blowers have faced in their 
legal battles, that the PDA in its generality in respect of remedies, and the 
responsibilities placed on the shoulders of the whistle-blower in respect thereof, has 
unfairly tipped the bulk of the onus on the whistle-blower. The only provision in this 
respect placing any kind of requirement on the employer within this context is that no 
employer may subject a whistle-blower employee to occupational detriment11, which 
onus of proof too lies on the whistle-blower employee. No punitive consequences are 
directly provided for in respect of an employer who does subject a whistle-blower 
employee to occupational detriment in contravention of the PDA; this statement 
excludes the remedies that may be implemented against the employer by the 
employee. It seems that the playing field in no manner equal, with the scale being 
tipped against the whistle-blower employee. 
15.7 Conclusion and recommendations in respect of the suggested way 
forward 
Effective and appropriate protection afforded to a whistle-blower makes blowing the 
whistle a great deal more enticing when the relevant remedies are embodied in 
legislation. 
Within the South African context it is averred that whistle-blowers and whistle-
blowing are a necessary check and balance, ensuring accountability, a core value of 
democracy, within our democratic society; and further that in terms of section 
16(1)(b) of the Constitution that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, 
which includes the freedom to receive or impart information or ideas. The PDA is 
envisaged as being the main legislation in respect of the protection of whistle-
blowers blowing the whistle in South Africa, and although many authors have 
commented on perceived shortcomings within the text of the PDA, since its 
commencement on the 16 February 2001, thirteen years ago, inexplicably not one 
amendment had been made to the PDA. 
                                                          
11  Section 3 of the PDA. 
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During June 2004, the South African Law Reform Commission published Discussion 
Paper 107, Project 123, in respect of Protected Disclosures; the project entailed a 
comparative study. The discussion paper highlighted the urgent need for the revision 
of the PDA, both with reference to the scope of the PDA, and the remedies availed to 
the whistle-blower. In the ten (10) years since, the recommendations were ignored 
flatly. The only movement at all has been seen in the last thirteen (13) years has 
been the issuing of the Practical Guidelines for Employees in terms of section 
10(4)(a) of the PDA, and as discussed under paragraph 5.2 of Chapter 5. The 
additional challenges enlivened herewith need to be addressed as a matter of 
urgency. 
The total apathy in this respect is inexplicable. 
However, the fact of the matter is that the PDA needs to be revisited and addressed, 
and more specifically, it is recommended that the following aspects thereof needs to 
be addressed:  
1. The fragmented provisions in various pieces of legislation regarding whistle-
blowing and whistle-blowers, as evidenced in Table 2 12  should be 
consolidated under the ‘umbrella’ of the PDA. 
2. Either the preamble needs to be aligned to the actual provisions of the PDA, 
or the PDA needs to be aligned to the actual content of the preamble. Either 
way, in light of the current preamble, amendments incorporating –  
 
a. Appropriate incentives offered both to the public and private sectors for 
putting appropriate whistle-blowing mechanisms in place (measurable 
4); and 
b. The facilitation by the PDA of the acceptance, participation and public 
awareness of whistle-blowing (measurable 16); 
c. The impact and implementation of the legislation should be measured 
in a compulsory fashion, at regular intervals (measurable 15). In this 
manner a proverbial finger can be kept on the pulse of whistle-blowing 
and best-practice identified, studied and implemented at a wider level 
of application. 
                                                          
12   Chapter 8. 
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d. In order to oversee the above-mentioned and related functions, an 
independent oversight body should be established. In this manner too, 
further fragmentation could be curbed, encouraging standardisation 
and resultant certainty. 
 
The requirements in respect of measurables 6 and 12 could be 
incorporated into the powers and functions of such an independent 
oversight body, separately or a division between the independent 
oversight bodies and organisations (public and private). 
 
3. Section 1 of the PDA should include a definition of a ‘contract of employment’ 
in order to ensure the inclusion of so-called vulnerable workers; 
4. Independent contractors, vendors and suppliers should be brought into the 
scope of protection if optimal effect is to be attained. Here too, reconsideration 
of what is considered to be potentially pivotal exclusions is recommended.13 A 
portion of the PDA should be revised to include the protection of third parties 
to the employment relationship, standing outside the scope of the employment 
relationship as the Companies Act has done. This will not necessarily lead to 
a duplication of that provided for in terms of the Companies Act, as there are 
many other entities within which independent contractor, vendors and 
suppliers operate. The relationships between the entities, and an employee of 
either who blows the whistle on the actions or omissions of the non-employer 
party may be ‘sacrificed’ in any event to ensure that the relations between the 
parties continues undisturbed. 
5. The definition in section 1 of the PDA is not wide enough to include the 
protection of disclosures relating to ethical and policy matters14; this should be 
reconsidered, especially in light of the importance of policy provisions and 
impact at both a macro and micro level; 
6. In terms of the definition of a ‘protected disclosure’, a disclosure made in 
respect of which the employee concerned commits an offence by making the 
disclosure, 15  will not be a protected disclosure 16 . This would mostly be 
                                                          
13   With reference to inter alia paragraph 4.5.2 of Chapter 4. 
14   With reference to the discussion under paragraph 4.5.2.1 of Chapter 4. 
15   Protected disclosure – section 1(e)(i) of the PDA. 
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applicable in circumstances in which employees work with classified 
information in accordance with the Minimum Information Security Standards, 
and or where the employee has had to sign what amounts to an oath of 
secrecy. It is understood that such information is necessarily of such a 
sensitive nature that it needs to be protected, however, it is not understood 
why an alternative process has not been included for such employees, and in 
terms of which they would not be committing an offence if the prescribed 
process is followed, with the main aim of someone of appropriate clearance 
being the reporting channel and the integrity of the information remaining 
intact. 
 
Blanket exclusion seems to belittle the importance of whistle-blowing, and 
potentially excludes crucial information being imparted in a controlled manner 
without further ado; this may not be justifiable. 
An example of the manner in which this can be viably incorporated is to be 
found within the text of the PDA A. 
 
7. The requirement of good faith is to be found in every instance in the PDA with 
the exclusion of a disclosure being made to a legal adviser.17 The concept of 
good faith has not been defined within the text of the PDA, and establishing 
whether or not a whistle-blower has or has not complied with the requirement 
of good faith has had our courts grappling in order to define viable tests in this 
regard. 18  The actual reasoning behind the inclusion of good faith is not 
understood. Bearing in mind the aims of the PDA, as reflected in the preamble 
thereof, it is clear that the main aim of the PDA is to ensure ‘the disclosure of 
information by employees relating to criminal and other irregular conduct in 
the workplace in a responsible manner …and protection against any reprisals 
as a result of such disclosures’ and ‘promote the eradication of criminal and 
other irregular conduct…’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16  With reference to the discussion under paragraph 4.5.2.2 of Chapter 4 
17  Sections 5 to 9 of the PDA. 
18  See Chapter 7. 
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The criminal and irregular conduct relates to the conduct of a person other 
than the whistle-blower. So too, the conduct which is in essence the retaliation 
against the whistle-blower for having blown the whistle (in the form of 
occupational detriment) relates to conduct by a person other than the whistle-
blower. In light of this consideration what should be abundantly clear is the 
fact that such criminal or irregular conduct will remain criminal or irregular 
conduct no matter what the intention of the whistle-blower is. Even if the 
disclosure is made in bad faith, the criminal or irregular conduct still remains 
what it is. The question that begs answering is why the attitude of a whistle-
blower is of such import as to deprive him fully from the protection of the PDA. 
 
The whistle-blower’s intention should be totally irrelevant as long as he 
discloses the information honestly. In light of this the PDA should be amended 
to require honesty, not good faith. This amendment would not dislodge the 
requirement pertaining to reasonable belief in respect of the definition of a 
disclosure; in fact it would underpin it logically. In fact, such an amendment 
would tie in with a latter recommendation that where a whistle-blower, acting 
honestly blows the whistle should enjoy the protection offered in respect of the 
PDA, even if it later turns out that his allegations were unfounded. The reason 
for this is that the requirement of honesty would then be utilised to determine 
such protection in the stead of good faith alone, as good faith would 
necessarily be a factor to be considered in respect of the honesty of the 
disclosure. The meaning of ‘honesty’ within the context of the PDA should be 
defined within the content of section 1 thereof to minimise uncertainty as far 
as possible.  
8. In accordance with measurable 3, specific anti-corruption measures should be 
incorporated into the text of the PDA; here valuable cues can be taken from 
the PDA A, especially in light of the fact that its focus is specifically anti-
corruption; 
9. In accordance with measurable 12 the provision of an enforcement 
mechanism relating to the investigation of whistle-blower allegations should 
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be incorporated within the text of the PDA.19 Once again, the provisions of the 
PDA A in this respect could prove valuable. 
10. In accordance with measurable 6 a provision to ensure the timeous and 
proper disclosure of whistle-blower allegations should be incorporated within 
the text of the PDA.20 Once again, the provisions of the PDA A in this respect 
could prove valuable. 
11. A remedy ensuring the prohibition of any interference with a disclosure by a 
whistle-blower, coupled with appropriate penalties, in accordance with 
measurable 9 should be incorporated within the text of the PDA. 
12. Although accepted that in the main, the PDA is aimed at the protection of an 
employee whistle-blower within the context of employment, bearing in mind 
the definition of corruption, in relevant circumstances external whistle-blowers 
should also be afforded protection within the provisions of the PDA and in 
accordance with measurable 10. 
13. In accordance with measurable 11 (but slightly adjusted), the remedies of the 
PDA should be extended to appropriately and effectively protecting whistle-
blowers who honestly and on reasonable belief make disclosures, even if it 
later turns out that the allegations were unfounded. Once again, the 
provisions of the PDA A in this respect could prove valuable. 
14. Based on the case law explored in Chapter 7, it is suggested that a provision 
should be included in the PDA in accordance with which disclosures are 
protected in the event that they lack merely in respect of technicalities. Once 
again, the provisions of the PDA A in this respect could prove valuable. 
15. Penalties should be introduced for parties who cause occupational and other 
forms of detriment to the whistle-blower as a result of the whistle-blower 
having made a protected disclosure.  
16. So too, penalties should be introduced in respect of employees who further 
personal agendas by malicious and dishonest allegations under the guise of 
disclosures, seeking protection for bad behaviour. 
 
                                                          
19   Note the suggestions in this regard made under point 2 above. 
20   Note the suggestions in this regard made under point 2 above. 
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Introducing the above 16 suggested recommendations would most certainly align the 
PDA with as close to best practice as could be, and would in all probability revive the 
hopes and engagement of the whistle-blower in South Africa. So too it would build on 
the political will expressed and the multifarious foundation already laid for whistle 
blowing in South Africa.  
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ANNEXURE A 
 CHECKLIST 
No.: Consideration: 
 Action or application proceedings to be instituted? 
1 Does the court have jurisdiction? 
a The court only has jurisdiction to determine the underlying dispute once the 
conciliation process has run its course. 
b Interim interdict: 
However, in respect of those matters in terms of which an interim interdict 
or interdict is sought, the court clearly has the power to order that the 
status quo be preserved or restored, pending the determination of the main 
dispute. 
At common law a court’s jurisdiction to entertain an application for an 
interim interdict depends on whether it has jurisdiction to preserve or 
restore the status quo, as opposed to the jurisdiction to decide the main 
dispute. 
A court will only intervene in respect of disciplinary proceedings in 
exceptional circumstances 
c In an urgent application, has a case for urgency been made out? 
2 Disclosure must be made by an employee (either to an employer or an 
external party as provided for by the PDA) 
3 A disclosure must be made 
4 When determining whether the disclosure made is indeed a protected 
disclosure: 
a Determining whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure is a 4 
stage process: 
1. Analysis of the information to determine whether there was a 
disclosure; 
2. If yes, is it a protected disclosure? 
3. Was the employee subjected to occupational detriment? 
4. What remedy should be awarded? 
b The applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proving that his disclosure is 
protected 
 
Having said this, sight must not be lost of the provisions of section 192 of 
the LRA which deals with the onus in dismissal disputes. 
Section 192 (1): in any proceedings concerning any dismissal, the 
employee must establish the existence of the dismissal. 
Section 192 (2): if the existence of the dismissal has been established (by 
the employee), the employer must prove that the dismissal is fair. 
 
c The information: 
i Has reason to believe the information shows or tends to show the range of 
conduct that forms the basis of the definition of a disclosure. 
ii It has been argued that ‘disclosure’ should be interpreted to mean conduct 
synonymous with whistle-blowing and excludes normal duty reports. 
Counsel in Ramsammy matter referred to the Tshishonga matter: 
Information includes, but is not limited to, facts… 
Information would include such inferences and opinion based on the facts 
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that show that a suspicion is reasonable and sufficient to warrant an 
investigation.  
iii Disclosure means the act or action of making known 
iv The seriousness of the alleged impropriety must be considered 
v ‘Smelling a rat’ is not information 
vi The standard of the quality that the information must meet is no higher than 
requiring the ‘impropriety’ to be likely 
d ‘Reason to believe’ in respect of the information: 
i The court must be satisfied that there are facts upon which the reason to 
believe could be based. 
ii Whether the employee had a reason to believe the information is both a 
subjective and objective test: 
Subjective in the sense that the employee (making the disclosure) believes 
it. 
Objective in the sense that the subjective belief has to be based on reason 
(belief has to be reasonable) 
The reasonableness of the employee’s belief is directly related to his bona 
fides (good faith). 
For example: if the primary or exclusive purpose of reporting is to 
embarrass or harass the employer, the reasonableness of the employee’s 
belief is questionable. 
iii The PDA does not require the employee to prove the truth of the 
information, only the reasonable belief. 
iv Reason to believe cannot be equated with personal knowledge. 
Hearsay, depending on its reliability could influence the reasonableness of 
the belief. 
5 The channel used:21 
a Where required, the disclosure must be made to the employer 
b If there is a prescribed or authorised procedure in accordance with which 
the disclosure must be made, there must be substantial compliance 
therewith 
c If there is no prescribed or authorised procedure, the disclosure must be 
made to the employer 
d If the procedure authorises the employee to make the disclosure to an 
external party the employer is deemed to have made the disclosure 
e PDA encourages a culture in terms of which internal remedies and 
procedures are resorted to and exhausted before a disclosure is made 
public 
f Engaging with and cooperating with the employee before going to an 
external party, is directly linked to good faith and the reasonableness of the 
belief involved 
g Four recognised factors to be considered in respect of making the 
                                                          
21  It needs to be noted that in respect of the channel utilised in making the disclosure, employees 
potentially have an exception in this regard, and in accordance with the provisions of section 
31(4) and (6) of the NEMA. It is argued that this section is applicable to employees, as it refers 
to ‘any person’ and dismissal and discipline.  
Section 31 (6) of the NEMA provides that section 31(4) is applicable, whether or not the 
whistle-blower has exhausted any other applicable external or internal procedure to report or 
otherwise remedy the matter, relating to environmental risk. This proposition has as yet to be 
tested in our courts. 
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disclosure public: 
 
1. The concern was raised internally or with a prescribed regulator, but 
was not properly addressed; 
2. The concern was not raised internally or with a prescribed regulator 
because the whistle-blower reasonably believed that he would be 
victimised; 
3. The concern was not raised internally because the whistle-blower 
reasonably believed a cover-up was likely and there was no 
prescribed regulator; 
4. The concern was exceptionally serious. 
6 Good faith: 
a Disclosure must be made in good faith – the PDA seeks to balance the 
employee’s rights to free speech, on a principled basis, with the interests of 
the employer. 
b An employee who deliberately sets out to embarrass or harass the 
employer will not satisfy the requirement of good faith. 
c May not be made for personal gain 
d Good faith requires: 
i The core meaning of good faith is honesty  
 
By setting good faith as a specific requirement in the PDA, the legislature 
must have intended something more than reasonable belief and the 
absence of personal gain. 
 
Good faith is a finding of fact. 
The requirement of good faith invokes a proportionality test to establish the 
dominant motive.  
ii Proof of the validity of the concerns or suspicions 
iii Conjecture, rumour and a subjective opinion or accusation do not qualify 
iv Malcontents and employees who slander the employer without foundation 
or who disagree with the way in which the organisation is managed do not 
enjoy whistle-blower protection. 
7 A demonstrable nexus: 
a There must be a nexus between the disclosure made and the occupational 
detriment alleged 
b The nexus must be demonstrable 
In this regard it needs to be noted that the Commissioner in H & M Ltd 
added to this, in that it stated that it wasn’t deemed necessary that the 
detriment be directly linked to the disclosure in the sense that an employee 
would be entitled to a remedy if and only if the detriment threatened or 
applied by the employer is so threatened or applied expressly for the 
making of a disclosure, as this would permit unscrupulous employers to 
create pretexts upon which to effect occupational detriments and 
undermine the purpose of the PDA. 
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ACRONYMS DESCRIPTION 
 
ABET Adult Basic Education and Training 
ACF Anti-Corruption Framework 
ACFE Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
ACT Australian Capital Territory 
ACTT Anti-Corruption Task Team 
ACWG Anti-Corruption Working Group 
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
AUC on PCC African union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption 
 
BCEA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
 
CA Companies Act 71 of 2008 
CCMA Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
CDC Coega Development Corporation 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CID Crime Intelligence Division 
COO Chief Operations Officer 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CPA Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
CV Curriculum Vitae 
CWU Communication Worker's Union 
 
DA 1957 Defence Act 44 of 1957 
DA 2002 Defence Act 42 of 2002 
DCS Department of Correctional Services 
DOH Department of Health 
DPCI Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation 
DPSA Department of Public Service and Administration 
Dr Doctor 
 
ERA Employment Relations Act 24 of 2000 (New Zealand) 
EXCO Executive Committee 
 
FIC Financial Intelligence Centre 
FICA Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
 
HDC Health and Disability Commission 
HPCSA Health Professions Council of South Africa 
HRA Human Rights Act 82 of 1993 (New Zealand) 
 
IBAC Independent Broadbased Anti-Corruption Commission 
IBAC Act Independent Broadbased Anti-Corruption Commission 2011 
ICAC Independent Commission against Corruption 
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IMATU Independent Municipal and Allied Workers’ Union 
IPCA Independent Police Conduct Authority 
 
JCPS Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster 
LAC Labour Appeal Court 
LC Labour Court 
LRA Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Ltd Limited 
 
MACC Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity 
MEC Member of Executive Council 
Mr. Mister 
Ms. Miss 
MNE Meyersdal Nature Estate 
MTN Mobile Technology Network 
 
NACH National Anti-Corruption Hotline 
NDP National Development Plan – 2030 
NEMA National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
NNA Nozuko Nxusani  Attorneys 
NZSIS New Zealand Security Intelligence Services 
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHSA Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
OWAP Office of Witness Protection 
 
PACOFS Performing Arts Centre of the Orange Free State 
PAIA Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
PIDA Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
PDA Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
PDA A Protected Disclosures Act 85 of 2012 (Australia) 
PDA NZ Protected Disclosures Act 7 of 2000 (New Zealand) 
PFMA Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
PRECCA Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004 
PSA Public Service Act 103 of 1994 
PSC Public Service Commission 
PSC Power System Control 
 
QAD Quality Assurance Department 
 
R Rand 
RAG Retail Apparel Group 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
 
SA South Africa 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SALRC South African Law Reform Commission 
SAMWU South African Municipal Workers' Union 
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SANDF South African National Defence Force 
SAPS South African Police Service 
SAPS Act South African Police Act 68 of 1995 
SARS South African Revenue Service 
SC Senior Council 
SC Act Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
SEO Strategic Executive Officer  
SITA State Information Technology Unit 
SSC State Services Commission 
 
TAACT Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 
UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
UNISA University of South Africa 
USC United States Congress 
 
v Versus 
VARGO Victorian Auditor General Office 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VIA Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011 
W & R SETA Wholesale & Retail Sector Education and Training Authority 
WA Western Australia 
WCPPA Western Cape Public Protector Act 6 of 1994 
WPA Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998 
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